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ABSTRACT 
 
 
FORMATIONS OF DIASPORA NATIONALISM: 
 THE CASE OF CIRCASSIANS IN TURKEY 
Doğan, Setenay Nil 
PhD, Political Science 
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Meltem Müftüler-Baç  
Spring 2009, x + 360 pages 
 
 
 This dissertation aims to understand the multiple and yet interrelated formations of 
diaspora nationalism through the case study of an under-researched ethnic group in Turkey, 
Circassians.  Based on semi-structured interviews with Circassian intellectuals and activists 
in Ankara and Istanbul, it aims to explore the dynamics and structures of Circassian 
diaspora nationalism in Turkey.  To explore the formations of Circassian diaspora 
nationalism, there are four interrelated axes upon which this dissertation is based.  Each of 
these axes is significant in the formation and as the formations of Circassian diaspora 
nationalism in Turkey.  The first axis of this dissertation takes diaspora nationalism as a 
historical phenomenon with its ebbs and flows as the second axis regards the relationships 
of the diaspora with the host community, host state and the hegemonic nationalism of the 
host community.  The third axis that this dissertation studies considers homeland as a 
dynamic construction, and the fourth axis concerns the gendered dimensions of diaspora in 
general and diaspora nationalism in particular.  Through the exploration of these axes, this 
dissertation studies Circassian diaspora nationalism as a heuristic device through which 
diasporas, nationalism and ethnicity in a globalized world in general and Turkish politics in 
particular can be explored.   
 
Keywords: diaspora nationalism, Circassians, diaspora, nationalism, gender 
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ÖZET 
 
 
DĐASPORA MĐLLĐYETÇĐLĐĞĐNĐN FORMASYONLARI: 
 TÜRKĐYE’DEKĐ ÇERKESLER ÖRNEĞĐ 
Doğan, Setenay Nil 
Doktor, Siyaset Bilimi 
Danışman: Prof. Dr. Meltem Müftüler-Baç 
Bahar 2009, x + 360 sayfa 
 
 Bu tez, diaspora milliyetçiliğinin farklı fakat birbiriyle oldukça yakından ilintili 
formasyonlarını, üzerinde bugüne kadar çok az sayıda çalışma yapılmış olan Türkiye’deki 
Çerkesler örneğiyle anlamayı amaçlamaktadır.  Çalışma, Türkiye’deki Çerkes diaspora 
milliyetçiliğinin yapısını ve dinamiklerini, Ankara ve Đstanbul’da Çerkes entellektüelleri ve 
aktivistleri ile gerçekleştirilen yarı-yapılandırılmış mülakatlar ile incelemeyi 
hedeflemektedir.  Çerkes diaspora milliyetçiliğinin formasyonları, çalışmaya temel teşkil 
eden ve birbiriyle ilintili dört boyuttan incelenmiştir.  Anılan dört boyutun her biri Çerkes 
diaspora milliyetçiliğinin oluşum süreçlerinde yapı taşları olarak önemli bir role sahiptir.  
Boyutlardan ilki, diaspora milliyetçiliğini tarihi bir olgu olarak değerlendirmektedir. Đkinci 
boyut ise ilk boyutla da ilintili olarak, diasporanın ev sahibi konumundaki toplum, devlet ve 
ev sahibi ülkedeki hakim milliyetçilikle ilişkilerini ele alır.  Çalışmanın temel aldığı üçüncü 
boyutta ise anavatan kavramı dinamik bir kurgu olarak çalışılırken, dördüncü boyut 
kapsamında, diaspora ve diaspora milliyetçiliğinin toplumsal cinsiyete dair boyutları 
tartışılmaktadır.  Tüm bu boyutları göz önünde bulunduran çalışmamız Çerkes diaspora 
milliyetçiliğini, küreselleşen dünyada ve Türk siyasetinde diaspora, etnisite ve milliyetçilik 
kavramlarının incelenebileceği bir gözlem alanı olarak ele almaktadır.  
 
Anahtar kelimeler: diaspora milliyetçiliği, Çerkesler, diaspora, milliyetçilik, toplumsal 
cinsiyet
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1.The Aims of the Study and the Research Questions 
 
 
 
 Diaspora, which is a relatively old term used to refer to the histories of some 
particular communities, has acquired increasing scholarly attention since the 1990s.  It has 
become a tool for social science to investigate the hybrid, transnational and global sites of 
identities and politics which challenge the national order of things, the naturalized and 
normalized understanding of the world of nations as a discrete partitioning of territory.1  
The concept of diaspora, rather than referring to particular experiences of some particular 
communities, has now become crucial for social science to rethink the concepts of ethnicity 
and nationalism in the context of shifting borders and processes of globalization.2   
 Focusing on a diasporic context, this dissertation aims to rethink nationalism and 
ethnicity as it employs the notion of diaspora as a choice which may serve to deconstruct 
hegemonic nationalism despite its ambivalence and fragmentation.  However, regarding 
diaspora as a challenge posed vis-à-vis the nation-state is not sufficient to understand 
                                                  
1
 L. Malkki, “National Geographic: The Rooting of Peoples and the Territorialization of National Identity 
among Scholars and Refugees,” in Culture, Power, Place: Explorations in Critical Anthropology, eds. A. 
Gupta and J. Ferguson, (Duke University Press, 2001), 52-74, 55. 
 
2
 S. Shami, “Circassian Encounters: The Self as Other and the Production of the Homeland in the North 
Caucasus,” Development and Change 29(1998): 617- 646. 
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diaspora politics and diasporic condition.  Diasporas' relationships with the nation-states are 
much more complicated; diasporas both challenge and corroborate nation-states’ authority3 
and national order within which nation-states are located.  As diasporas have proved to be 
effective political groups in the 1990s as far as conflicts, wars and politics are concerned; 
diasporic communities are mostly bound by their own nationalisms.  Diaspora nationalism 
or long distance nationalism which is identified as “a very distinctive, very conspicuous, 
important sub-species of nationalism”4 is being regarded as “an increasingly more likely 
and more important form of ethno-nationalist expansion and an even more potent 
phenomenon in international politics” as a result of the increasing global interdependence 
of the world.5  Such a form of nationalism is shaped not only by challenging the nation-
state but also by a more subtle web of relations with the host community, homeland and 
other nationalisms, especially the hegemonic nationalism in the host society.  These 
interconnections of diaspora nationalism are significant to understand not only the terms of 
survival, resistance and regeneration for diasporas but also nationalism in its 
simultaneously global and local, deterritorialized forms.   
 This dissertation argues that diasporas as global actors are formed through the 
interplay between various factors: external factors such as the relationships with the 
historical homeland, host communities, host states, other groups and international 
organizations; and internal dynamics formed through class and gender.  It aims to 
understand these multiple and yet interrelated formations of diaspora nationalism through 
the case study of an under-researched ethnic group in Turkey, Circassians.  The ultimate 
aim is to understand the dynamics and structures of Circassian diaspora nationalism in 
Turkey through the exploration of several factors which, this dissertation claims, are 
significant for and as the formations of Circassian diaspora nationalism.   
 Similar to Hall’s and Gieben’s use of the notion of ‘formations’ in their explorations 
of modernity, 6  I employ the notion of ‘formations’ in two meanings.   ‘Formations’ refers 
                                                  
3
 B. Axel, “Context of Diaspora,” Cultural Anthropology 19(1)(2004): 26-60, 54. 
 
4
 E. Gellner, Nations and Nationalism  (NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), 101. 
 
5
 Z. Skrbis, Long-distance Nationalism: Diasporas, Homelands and Identities (Brookfield, VT: Ashgate Pub., 
1999), xiii.   
 
6
 S. Hall and B. Gieben, Formations of Modernity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992).   
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to both political, social, economic and cultural processes as the motors of the formation 
processes; and articulation of these processes into multiple domains such as the polity, the 
economy, the social structure and the cultural sphere.  Thus, the concept of ‘formations’ 
used in the title of this dissertation aims to explore both the activities of emergence and 
their outcomes: both process and structure.7   
 Hence, this dissertation aims to explore formations of Circassian diaspora 
nationalism to situate diaspora as an actor in world politics, politics of the homeland, 
politics of the host community; to locate diaspora in a more complicated web of 
relationships, bargains and strategies; and to situate it in the debates on gender, ethnicity, 
nationalism and globalization.  Moving away from the idea of ‘victim diaspora’, Circassian 
diaspora nationalism in Turkey is regarded as actors who participate in several networks of 
relationships with the homeland, host community, and international community.8  
However, the ultimate aim is not to have a monograph on Circassian diaspora and diaspora 
nationalists in Turkey but to locate diasporic communities and diaspora politics in a matrix 
of interrelated formations.   
 The basic research questions of this dissertation are the following:  How are 
diaspora nationalisms formed?  Through which processes is it formed and what are its 
configurations?  To answer these basic research questions, there are four interrelated axes 
upon which this dissertation is based.  Each of these axes that is considered significant in 
the formation and as the formations of Circassian diaspora nationalism in Turkey will be 
explored in a chapter of this dissertation.   
 The first axis is diaspora nationalism as a historical phenomenon with the constant 
construction of a vision of politics, identity and claims.  The basic questions that this 
chapter deals are the multiple forms of Circassian diaspora nationalism in Turkey; how 
Circassians in Turkey regard Turkish nationalism; and how Circassian diaspora activists 
regard nationalism in general.  How do they maneuver vis-à-vis Turkish nationalism as the 
activists of a diasporic community?   
                                                                                                                                                        
 
7
 S. Hall and B. Gieben, Formations of Modernity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), 7.   
 
8
 S. J. Tambiah, “Transnational Movements, Diaspora and Multiple Identities,” Daedalus: Journal of Arts and 
Sciences 129 (1)(2000): 163- 194. 
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 The second axis concerns the relationships of diaspora with the host community, 
host state and the dominant nationalism of the host community.  What are the relations 
between diaspora and host community?  How are the relations of diasporic nationalism 
with hegemonic nationalism which is Turkish nationalism?  Is it based on direct and total 
opposition or is it based on strategic and contextual bargains, flirts and cooperation?   
 The third axis pertains to the homeland and it takes “homeland” not as an objective 
historical fact but as a dynamic construction that attains meaning not only through the 
political developments but also through memories, discourses and narratives of individuals 
on “home” and “homeland.”  The questions that the research asks on this axis are the 
meanings attached to the notion of the homeland by Circassian diaspora in Turkey; and 
diaspora activists’ relationships with the homeland and their transformation in the post-
Soviet order. 
 The fourth axis regards the gendered dimensions of diaspora in general and diaspora 
nationalism in particular.  It aims to ask and explore the following questions in terms of 
Circassians in Turkey: What are the gendered images and symbols of Circassians?  What 
do these images imply for Circassian diasporic identity and Circassian diaspora activists? 
What do they imply for other discourses such as Turkish nationalism and Orientalism?  
What are the relationships of diaspora nationalism with gender?  What does it mean to be a 
Circassian woman?  Are there any duties, responsibilities, and expectations from the 
women of Circassian diaspora in Turkey?  What does this imply for Circassian diaspora 
nationalism and its relationships with homeland and host community?   
 Through these four axes, this dissertation is an attempt to explore the configurations 
and genesis of Circassian diaspora nationalism; and to situate it in an array of contemporary 
debates on the processes of globalization, post-Soviet order, and the rise of identity politics. 
 Thus, this study is not a monograph on Circassian diaspora activists in Turkey per 
se but it studies Circassian diaspora nationalism as a heuristic device through which 
nationalist politics, ethnicity and national order of things in a globalized world in general 
and Turkish politics in particular can be understood.  Taking diaspora as the crossroads 
where nationalism, ethnicity and globalization meet and cross each other, this dissertation 
is an attempt to better understand these crossroads.   
 
5 
  
 
     
1.2. Research Design 
 
   
 
 Formations of diaspora nationalism can be understood not only through a discursive 
analysis of the relevant documents but also through exploring diasporic subjectivities in 
terms of  experiences, life histories, conflicts, and discontents.   
 To study diaspora nationalism, this dissertation is based on semi-structured 
interviews with Circassian intellectuals and activists.  28 semi-structured in-depth 
interviews were conducted with two groups of Circassians in Turkey which are not 
mutually exclusive; activists and intellectuals.9  All interviewees are Circassian activists 
who have been associated with and worked in Caucasian Associations, and intellectuals 
who, apart from their professional occupations, write books, articles, news, poems etc. and 
publish or translate books and pieces on Circassians.  This dissertation will not be able to 
associate their personal works on Circassians with their interviews but the interviewees of 
this dissertation are not only lawyers, business men/women, or teachers but those people in 
such occupations who voluntarily study Circassian culture, history, literature, and who 
voluntarily work in the Circassian organizations in Turkey.  They are the intellectuals and 
activists of the Circassian community in Turkey.  
 6 of the interviewees were female, and 22 interviewees were male.  A focus on 
women in the in-depth interviews might have enabled us to hear the voices of women 
calling themselves Circassian nationalists who are invisible in the magazines, internet 
based discussion groups and Caucasian Associations.   In the magazines published by 
Circassians in Turkey, most authors are male; and discussion e-mail groups which have 
been new channels of communication for the Circassians in Turkey since mid 1990s often 
prove to be masculine sites.  Furthermore, Caucasian Associations are masculine sites of 
politics.  A study that focuses on particularly women would have helped us to hear the 
voices of women in the diaspora.  Yet, hearing the voice of women in the Circassian 
                                                  
9
 For the interviewees, see Appendix I.   
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diaspora is beyond the scopes of this research; and this dissertation on diaspora nationalism 
works within these limitations of Circassian diaspora in Turkey.  Hence, the imbalance 
between the number of the male and female interviewees is a reflection of the Circassian 
organizations in Turkey.   
 All of these interviewees were selected from the decision-making groups (from 
associations, foundations, platforms and youth committees) in Ankara and Istanbul.  The 
two cities are selected because for the Circassians in Turkey, diaspora nationalism has been 
basically an urban phenomenon.  Migrations to urban areas throughout the 1960s and 1970s 
in Turkey prepared the ground for its emergence in cities such as Ankara and Istanbul 
where Circassian Associations were established and became active.  These two cities 
became the places where diaspora nationalism of Circassians in Turkey emerged.   
 In terms of the selection of the interviewees for this research, the basic concern has 
been to include Circassians activists and intellectuals from different groups and 
organizations.  As no diasporic group is a monolythical block, Circassians also display a 
huge amount of heterogeneity in terms of ideology, attitudes towards homeland and 
diaspora politics.  In one of the interviews, when I demanded help in terms of my list, one 
of my interviewees, looking at my list of interviewees, warned me that I had a very difficult 
task at hand because “each of those people is a republic in themselves.”  Yet, capturing that 
heterogeneity in terms of groups, organizations, perspectives and political affiliations was 
among the aims of this research.  To ensure the inclusion of diasporic heterogeneity in the 
research, I preferred to share the list of future interviewees with all of the interviewees after 
the interview; and I asked them for further advice.  Hence, the list and the choices of the 
interviewees were a result of a series of collective thinking between the researcher and the 
researched.  My interviewees not only came up with additional names for me to interview 
but they also sometimes helped me in terms of contacting the next interviewees.   
 The interviews focused on how women and men calling themselves Circassian 
defined their identity, masculinity, femininity; how they constructed and experienced 
diasporic condition and Circassian identity in Turkey; how they defined their relationships 
with the state apparatus, homeland and current debates in Turkey. The  interviews were 
done between February 2007 and June 2008.  The number of interviews conducted for this 
research was determined by the “theoretical saturation” which refers to the phase in 
7 
  
interview research within which the new interviews are more likely to confirm earlier 
insights.10 10 of the interviews were conducted in Ankara and 18 were conducted in 
Istanbul.  The places where interviews took place were offices, cafes, restaurants, 
Circassian organizations and homes of the interviewees.    
 Before and during the interviews, confidentiality and anonymity was assured and 
this dissertation maintains these ethical rules.  Before the interviews, the interviewees were 
informed about the purpose of the interview and the possible range of future uses to which 
it might be put.  They were informed that their identities would be kept anonymous and that 
I had a responsibility to ensure that their physical, social and psychological well being was 
not adversely affected by the research.11  Except one case who did not want any recording; 
in each of the interviews, an audio device was used with the permission of the interviewee; 
and with the premise that there could be off-the-record answers based on the request of the 
interviewees and they could stop the interview at any time.  In order to maintain 
confidentiality and anonymity, within the text, quotations from the interviews are 
introduced with a pseudo-name.  Furthermore, some personal information which may be 
crucial to better understand the quotations from the interviews is not discussed in some 
cases since the group of Circassian activists and intellectuals in Turkey is a relatively small 
group composed of members who are well-known by the community and those groups and 
people interested.   
 In terms of age, the interviewees’ ages ranged between 34 and 88.  In terms of 
ethnic composition, the respondents were Kabardian, Abkhaz, Abzakh, Beslenei, Ubykh, 
Chechen, Shapsug and Chemguy.  In terms the place of birth, they were born in Đstanbul, 
Kayseri, Düzce, Adapazarı, Eskişehir, Çanakkale, Bilecik, Samsun, Bilecik, Maraş, Sivas, 
Ankara, Amasya, Antalya, and Adana.  6 of the interviews were born in cities as the rest 
were born in the villages of these cities.   
 The interviews lasted between 70 minutes and 330 minutes.  The total amount of 
time spent during interviewing is approximately 80 hours which were transcribed as 750 
                                                  
10
 K. Gerson and R. Horowitz, “Observation and Interviewing: Options and Choices in Qualitative Research,” 
in Qualitative Research in Action, ed. T. May (London: Sage, 2002), 199-224, 211.   
 
11
 J. C. Richardson and B. S. Godfrey, “Towards Ethical Practice in the Use of Archived Transcripted 
Interviews,” International Journal of Social Research Methodology 6(4): 2003, 347-355, 348. 
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pages in addition to field notes taken right after the interviews.  Transcriptions were 
completed by me in almost 6 months.   As all the interviews were conducted in Turkish, the 
transcribed texts of the interviews were also in Turkish.  The quotations used in this 
dissertation are translated into English by me.  In cases where I felt that the translation was 
missing and lacking in terms of meaning, I put the original Turkish phrase into brackets in 
italics.  I also tried to be careful about silences or reactions such as smiles, laughters and 
variations in intonation.   
 This study considers interview “as a site of knowledge construction, and the 
interviewee and interviewer as co-participants in the process.”12   Hence, rather than 
informants or respondents, the interviewees of this research are regarded as co-producers of 
knowledge.  Furthermore, the interview responses are treated in this dissertation not as 
giving direct access to ‘experience’  but as actively constructed ‘narratives’ involving 
activities which themselves demand analysis,13 the ultimate of which is verstehen in the 
Weberian sense.   
 
 
 
1.3. Methodological Caveats 
 
 
 
 Like most social science research, the research undertaken has some limitations.  
First limitation concerns the activists interviewed.  In terms of the interviewees, males 
overweigh the females while older people overweigh the younger ones.  The distorted 
distribution of the interviewees in terms of age and sex is a result of the characteristics of 
Circassian organizations in Turkey: they are dominated by elders and men.  Hence, this 
research is bound with these limitations of the phenomenon which is being studied.  A 
further research may decompose and demystify these so-called traditional and 
                                                  
12
 J. Mason, “Qualitative Interviewing: Asking, Listening and Interpreting,” in Qualitative Research in 
Action, ed. T. May (London: Sage, 2002), 225-241, 227. 
 
13
 D. Silverman, Doing Qualitative Research: A Practical Handbook (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage 
Publications, 2000), 36.   
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organizational hierarchies through focusing extensively on women and young people but 
this is beyond the scope of this dissertation.   
 Secondly, ethnic groups, just like any other communities are not homogeneous 
entities.  Within them, multiple groups with different or differently ranked priorities, 
interests and discourses coexist.  Not all people who identify themselves as Circassians in 
Turkey choose to be members of Caucasian Associations or consider themselves as 
Circassian activists.  The identifications, relations and discourses of Circassians in Turkey 
are much more varied and complex than those of the Circassian activists.  A study that aims 
to include all these groups requires a more extensive research that should be conducted in 
multiple cities among multiple status groups with the use of multiple research techniques.  
Hence, rather than being a study on Circassian diaspora in Turkey, this dissertation is the 
study of Circassian diaspora nationalism in Turkey which is embraced by a group of people 
prioritizing their Circassian origins.  As such, it tells a lot about Circassians in Turkey but it 
is not a complete analysis of it.  Circassian nationalists are, by no means, the sole 
representer of the Circassians in Turkey but their claims to represent the community and 
the recognition of this claim by the Turkish state, historical homeland and other institutions 
make them crucial.   
 Thirdly, diaspora nationalists, by no means, form a homogeneous entity; within the 
diasporic community there are multiple nationalist groups that are differentiated along 
ideological, regional and ethnic/tribal lines.  The term 'diaspora nationalists' denotes 
multiple groups with different priorities and ideological positions. Yet these groups share 
some minimal consensuses on identity, history, culture; and they are able to assume a 
homogeneous voice and act as an entity at some particular historical moments.  Diaspora 
nationalism of Circassians in Turkey should be read within such a chaotic, and yet, orderly 
context.   
 Fourthly, as I will discuss in Chapter 3, “Diaspora Nationalism,” most of the 
Circassian activists and intellectuals interviewed for this research do not call themselves 
‘Circassian nationalists.’  Their definition of nationalism is different than the demands of 
cultural rights, group rights, protection and development of ethnic identity; a reference to a 
sacred historical homeland etc.  Therefore calling them diaspora nationalists was my 
decision as the researcher.  In several instances within which I asked them about diaspora 
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nationalism, they did not like and accept the identification since diaspora nationalism, as a 
term, sounded quite similar to Turkish nationalism or Russian nationalism which they 
encountered each day.  Rather than a limitation, this imposition of the researcher in terms 
of identification should be stated as a caveat of this dissertation.   
 
 
 
1.4. Significance of the Study 
 
 
 
 This dissertation aims to contribute to literatures on diaspora, nationalism, gender, 
and ethnicity and nationalism in Turkey on several grounds.    
 Firstly, it contributes to the literature on diaspora.  Since the 1990s, as diaspora 
politics has proved to be effective in many parts of the world, diaspora studies have 
increased.  Ironically, the notion of diaspora becomes more blurred in such a context.  I 
argue that rather than identifying diasporic experience and identity with some particular 
communities, literature and theoretical debates on diaspora should be supported by multiple 
case studies that explore the fields of meanings, experiences and practices pertaining to the 
diasporic communities.   This dissertation aims to provide a case study of an under-
researched diaspora.  Proliferation and amplification of the case studies of diasporas will 
further our understanding of diasporic experience, condition and strategies in particular, 
and the theories of diaspora in general. 
 Furthermore, most of the diaspora studies explain their focus on diaspora in terms 
of the tensions between the nation-states and the diaspora communities.  Yet diasporas are 
living communities and political groups.  From such a perspective, diasporas should be 
analyzed not just as a particular kind of politics that locates itself vis-à-vis the nation-states 
but also as political bodies that are formed through the interplays of several discourses, 
such as nationalism, gender, citizenship and militarism.  Hence, understanding and 
exploring the particular discourses and strategies that make such a politics possible and 
‘meaningful’ is crucial.  Exploring the ways in which diaspora communities enhance 
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nationalisms is one of the ways to understand diasporas and their politics.  Such an 
approach contributes to diaspora theory by transforming diaspora from a “vis-à-vis the 
nation state” position to the crossroads where multiple discourses on gender, nationalism, 
ethnicity and globalization form the diasporic sites. 
 Secondly, this dissertation is a contribution to the theoretical literature on 
nationalism.  Most studies on nationalism start with the fact that not all nations or 
nationalisms have nation-states.  Yet such an acknowledgment remains as a caveat in the 
theories of nationalism.  What these theories focus is nationalism with nation-states, hence 
‘successful’ nationalist projects that invent, imagine, and create the nation.  This 
dissertation contributes to our understanding of nationalisms without nation-states by 
exploring the question of how the nation is imagined in the absence of a nation-state but in 
the presence of a claimed and imagined homeland and multiple attachments.   
 Thirdly, this dissertation is a contribution to gender studies.  A closer look at 
women’s studies in Turkey reveals that they have evolved throughout time; they have 
studied women through a Kemalist ideological framework, through sociological village 
studies, through modernization theories and finally, through feminist frameworks that have 
been dominant after the 1980s.14  In the 1990s, women's studies in Turkey have re-read 
nationalism, Kemalism and modernism from a gender perspective.  They have questioned 
the Kemalist project of modernity and nation-building as a profoundly gendered project 
that has created a new form of patriarchy.  Such a perspective and analysis have proved to 
be crucial for social science to question and de-sanctify Kemalist, modernist nationalism 
and its myths on woman’s rights, emancipation of women and Westernization.  Yet, to the 
extent that women's studies focus solely on Kemalist nationalism as the constructor, 
liberator, emancipator or the oppressor, they run the risk of ignoring and overlooking other 
nationalisms in Turkey that simultaneously construct masculinities and femininities.  
Hence, “feminist scholarship has created its own margins and silences reflecting the 
exclusionary cultural politics in Turkey throughout Republican history”.15  Ironically 
desanctification of Kemalist nationalism as ‘the nationalism’ has created its own 
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 Y. Arat, “Women Studies in Turkey,” New Perspectives on Turkey 9 (1993): 119-135. 
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 A. Altınay, The Myth of the Military-Nation: Militarism, Gender, and Education in Turkey (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 57. 
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sanctification and recreated the silences and voids that are at the heart of the Turkish 
official historiography which these studies aim to deconstruct and challenge.16 
 This dissertation claims that Kemalist nationalism is the hegemonic nationalism in 
Turkey but not ‘the nationalism’ in terms of permeating into, constructing, engendering and 
constraining the gendered sphere of the social meanings and practices.  'Other' nationalisms 
that coexist with, that are related to but different from Turkish nationalism also construct 
the discourses and experiences of masculinity and femininity in Turkey.  Such a 
perspective does not only deconstruct and re-read the ‘other’ nationalisms from gender 
lenses but it will also give gender studies in Turkey “a more complicated historical 
diversity than is permitted by the opposition male/female, a diversity that is also differently 
expressed for different purposes in different contexts.”17  This dissertation aims to 
contribute to the discovery of multiple masculinities and femininities that are essential 
subtexts of multiple nationalisms which are unequal players of the same social and political 
geography.   
 Finally, this dissertation which studies Circassian nationalism in Turkey is a 
contribution to the literature on ethnicity and nationalism in Turkey.  Circassian community 
in Turkey is an under-researched ethnic group.  Within the academic studies on ethnic 
groups in Turkey Circassians are either unmentioned or added into the research as footnotes 
or parentheses.  Studies and debates on ethnicity in Turkey are dominated by a focus on 
“the Kurdish question”18 and studies on minority groups focus on Jewish, Greek and 
Armenian groups.19   
 This study argues that a better understanding of ethnicity and nationalism in Turkey 
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 Ibid. 
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 J. Scott quoted in J. Squires, Gender in Political Theory (Malden, Mass: Polity Press, 2000), 130. 
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 See for instance, M. Yeğen, Devlet Söyleminde Kürt Sorunu (Đstanbul: Đletişim Yayınları, 1999); W. 
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should include analyses of the other ethnic groups whose histories and experiences are 
shaped not only by explicit oppression, assimilation or conflict but by a more subtle set of 
relationships, tensions and flirts with official historiography and Turkish nationalism.  A 
deconstructionist approach towards ‘the nationalism’ requires not prioritizing and reifying 
one ethnic group among many others as ‘the most oppressed’ but exploring the various 
spaces in which meanings and practices of ethnicity, identity and citizenship are created 
and recreated.  These meanings and practices that pertain to ethnicity and citizenship should 
be read not only through the notions of assimilation, oppression, conflict or ethnic 'problem' 
but also within their own complexity, with the recognition of the multiplicity of actors that 
shape and are shaped by the terrains of nationalism, ethnicity and citizenship.   
 Hence, a study on Circassians in Turkey will not only contribute to our 
understanding of the multiple sites of ethnicity in Turkey but also allow us to explore 
nationalisms of the 'others' who locate themselves vis-à-vis and through Turkish 
nationalism.  This study aims to analyze Circassian nationalists as actors who interact with 
and articulate multiple discourses on nation, nationalism, diaspora and Turkish nationalism.   
 Bringing Circassian nationalism into dialogue with official historiography and the 
recent literature on Turkish and Kurdish nationalisms will enrich our understanding of 
ethnicity and nationalism in Turkey.  Shedding light on the spaces within which multiple 
ethnic identities and nationalisms in Turkey are played out will contextualize Turkish 
official historiography as a political discourse that creates ethnic hegemony through 
legitimizing a particular historical approach.  In addition, an analysis of Circassian diaspora 
nationalism in Turkey will contribute to our understanding of how ethnic groups in Turkey 
locate themselves vis-à-vis and through Turkish nationalism and historiography.  Such an 
approach that underlines the multiplicity of ethnic groups and identities that are formed in 
close relationship with Turkish nationalist historiography can bring nationalist 
historiography and Turkish nationalism into its full dimensions.   
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1.5. Organization of the Study 
 
 
 
 The following chapter, “Studying Circassians in Turkey” aims to discuss first, my 
experience as a researcher with Circassian origins during the fieldwork conducted for this 
study and second, a brief history of the Circassians in general and in Turkey in particular.   
 Chapter 3, “Diaspora Nationalism” aims to explore the theoretical debates on 
diaspora and diaspora nationalism, their changing meanings and roles in world politics 
since the 1990s.  After discussing how the notion of diaspora is employed in this study, the 
chapter briefly explains why Circassians in Turkey are regarded in this study as a diaspora, 
rather than an ethnic group or a minority group.   The next part aims to map diaspora 
nationalism: it argues that Circassian diaspora nationalism in Turkey has four interrelated 
forms since the nineteenth century.  After analyzing the discourses of diaspora nationalists 
on hegemonic nationalism, Turkish nationalism; the final part of the chapter discusses how 
diaspora nationalists situate themselves and maneuver within/through/vis-à-vis nationalism 
in general and Turkish nationalism in particular.   
 The next chapter, “Host Community and Host State” explores diasporic relations 
with the host on two interrelated and yet, separate levels: community and state.  To unfold 
these relations, this chapter first locates Circassians within Turkish nationalism.  This 
dissertation takes Circassian diaspora nationalism not as a phenomenon that takes place in 
isolation but through profound and continuous interactions with Turkish nationalism.  
Literature on Circassians lacks how Turkish nationalism deals with Circassians, how 
Circassians are located by the hegemonic nationalist discourse in Turkey.  However, 
understanding Circassian community in Turkey requires an analysis of the discursive 
constructions of Circassians in Turkish nationalist discourse.  To explore how Circassians 
are located, identified and categorized in Turkish national discourse, this part of the chapter 
analyzes the nationalist texts that may be considered the constitutive elements of Turkish 
nationalism such as the texts produced by Ziya Gökalp, Yusuf Akçura, Ahmet Ağaoğlu, 
Mustafa Kemal, Recep Peker, Afet-Đnan, etc.; the political party programs and the nation-
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state policies to the extent that they pertain to Circassians in Turkey.   
 The next part of the chapter explores how Circassian identity is being defined and 
experienced in Turkey through the narratives of Circassian diaspora nationalists.   To better 
understand these narratives, the Circassians’ perceptions on how they are received and 
perceived by ‘the Others’ are examined.  Finally, relationships with the Turkish state are 
explored.  In this exploration, the narratives of Circassian activists on MĐT (National 
Intelligence Organization) and education in Turkey are interrogated to better understand the 
complex nature of the relationships between Circassian diaspora and Turkish state.   
 Chapter 5, “Diaspora in Transformation” aims to explore Circassian diaspora 
nationalism in line with the post-Soviet transformation, the processes of globalization, the 
rise of ethnic nationalisms and identity politics in the 1990s.  It analyzes the transformation 
of Circassian diaspora in the 1990s on three interrelated levels.  The first level concerns the 
homeland: after examining the relationships of the Circassian diaspora with the Caucasus 
and the meanings Circassian activists attached to the notion of homeland during the Soviet 
Era and Cold War, this chapter discusses the transformation of these relations into new and 
systematic encounters, and new problems of establishing new relations with the homeland.  
The second level of transformation concerns the relations with the host community: the 
transformation of Circassians’ relations with the Turkish state and how Circassians, as an 
ethnic group in Turkey situate themselves in terms of the current ethnic problems in 
Turkey, namely the Kurdish question and claims of Armenian genocide.  The third level 
aims to explore the transformations on the community level and understand how the 
Circassian community’s constructions of its past and future have been transformed.   
  Chapter 6, “Diaspora Nationalism and Gender” starts with the theoretical debates 
on nationalism, diaspora and gender to understand how a gendered reading of diasporas and 
their nationalisms may contribute to social science.  The next part explores the construct of 
Circassian Beauty as a gendered image and interrogates its implications as an Orientalist 
figure, as an historical and popular image in Turkey, and as an item on the agenda of 
Circassian diaspora nationalists.  The chapter then re-reads Circassian diaspora nationalism 
through gendered lenses.  As diaspora nationalisms are sustained by particular 
constructions of masculinity and femininity, the nationalist discourse in diasporic contexts 
links itself to the homeland and the host country through these gender constructions.  Re-
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reading diaspora from a gender perspective will shed light on the centrality of the 
reproduction of particular types of masculinities and femininities within diaspora 
nationalism which strategizes, bargains and narrates from “in-between.”  Finally, I will 
employ the notion of diasporic patriarchy in order to unfold the gender dimensions of the 
Circassian diasporic identity and diaspora nationalism in Turkey. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
STUDYING CIRCASSIANS IN TURKEY 
 
 This chapter aims to explore first, my experiences in the field in terms of studying 
Circassians which is my own community and second, history of Circassians in general and 
Circassians in Turkey in particular.  The first part of the chapter aims to explore my 
experience as an insider researcher since interviews on which this study is based took place 
within a series of negotiations between the researcher and the interviewees.  This part aims 
to understand what such a position meant for this research.  The second part aims to give a 
relatively brief history of Circassians which is to some extent narrated by the Circassian 
diaspora activists.  Hence, this chapter serves as an introduction to the research and the 
group, Circassians in Turkey which this dissertation studies.   
 
 
 
2.1. Studying My Own Community 
 
 
  
 Before the field, when I was writing the research project, I thought that a set of 
problems might result from my identity as a Circassian throughout the research.  Such an 
identity might have several effects: in terms of documents, it might ease the problems of 
accessibility and trust; in terms of interviews it might either establish bonds of trust 
between the interviewees and interviewer or result in resistance on the side of the 
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interviewees in terms of sharing some of their experiences, feelings or perspectives with 
someone from their own ethnic group –whom they are likely to know by kinship, kin 
surnames, networks etc.   
 In the literature, several accounts of social scientists -especially anthropologists- 
explore the implications of insider position for the research.1  For instance, Soraya Altorki 
who conducted fieldwork among members of her own status group in her own society in 
Jiddah, Saudi Arabia states that despite certain immediate advantages such as the intimate 
knowledge of the vernacular, the ability to quickly “set up shop” in the field, and 
familiarity with the people and environment; a number of problems also had to be 
confronted such as the requirement of abiding by the norms expected of her as a native; 
overcoming the reluctance of informants to provide her with direct answers to her questions 
concerning religious practices and intra-family conflicts; and resocializing herself into her 
own culture.2  For Stephenson and Greer, while familiarity with the culture under study 
may be a bonus, prior knowledge of the people studied provides no guaranteed advantage.3  
According to Ganguly, though the status as a daughter/son of the community might make it 
difficult for the researcher to negotiate questions of authority, such a position might also 
provide an exemption from the hostility and indifference that some researchers face in the 
field.4  Given these methodological debates and my expectations before the research, I will 
now share my experiences in the field.   
 First of all, the initial reactions to my research by the informants were always in the 
form of appreciation: they appreciated me for studying such a topic and a community 
“which needs to be studied carefully.”  I was celebrated as the researcher “who will now 
                                                  
1
 For further debates on the complexities of researcher’s identity and positioning as an insider, see for 
instance, L. Abu-Loghodi, “Writing against Culture,” in Recapturing Anthropology: Working in the Present, 
ed. R.G. Fox (Santa Fe: School of American University Press, 1991), 137-162; R. Rosaldo, Culture and 
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686.   
 
2
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and C. F. El-Solh (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press,1988), 49-68, 49.   
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Organization 40(2) (1981): 123-130, 129. 
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understand us” vis-à-vis other researchers whom they regarded as unable to understand 
Circassian culture, community and history.   
 During the initial contacts and the interviews, the people I interviewed regarded me 
as one of themselves.  Some of them had ties of kinship and friendship to my family while 
some of them knew my family name. “In a society where family is an all-important 
institution in structuring social relationships, it stands to reason that the people …wished to 
place me within the context of a family.”5  In my research, the relationships of my family 
established my entrée into the community while some people whom I interviewed also 
knew me or my name from the Circassian associations where I voluntarily worked in the 
youth committees some years ago.   
 Yet my position as an insider was not an absolute.  These positions of insider and 
outsider are fragile notions in terms of boundaries as “my participant-informants positioned 
me as insider and outsider, demonstrating how the rigidity of these boundaries can 
collapse.”6  Thus, the shifting positions of outsider and insider were prevalent in my 
research: while I was continuously celebrated as ‘one of us’ (with the phrases such as “you 
know it too,” “you know the community well” etc.), I was also sometimes transformed into 
the outsider position since I was an urban Circassian raised in the cities, not in the villages; 
since I did not know the Circassian language; since –based on those- there was a high 
possibility that I might not exactly know the traditions (xabze). 
 Despite my changing positions as an outsider and insider, I was most often regarded 
as “our researcher who will understand us better.”  Due to being considered “our researcher 
who will now understand the Circassian community in Turkey,” I was provided with every 
kind of material that, they thought, would interest me during and after the interviews: they 
shared their family trees, books, reports, photographs, magazines and contacts with me.  
Some informants shared their evenings after work and Saturday mornings with me so that 
we would work better.  Hence, they regarded my research very important and each of them 
stated this not only verbally but also through their actions, the gifts they gave me, the times 
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they spent with me etc.  Though most of them published several books, articles or stories 
on Circassians, they stated that it was “different that I wrote and studied Circassians.”  To 
that extent, I was considered different from them as a researcher “who knows how to do it 
scientifically” and also I was considered different from other researchers in terms of my 
insider position.   
 Lewis states that such an insider position is different from the outsider position as 
far as the relations between the community and the researcher are concerned:  
 
   “There is a growing fear that the information collected by an outsider, 
someone not constrained by group values and interests, will expose the group to 
outside manipulation and control…  The insider, on the other hand, is 
accountable; s/he must remain in the community and take responsibility for 
her/his actions.  Thus, s/he is forced through self-interest to exercise 
discretion.”7   
 
Hence, the researcher constitutes a threat of exposure and judgment for the communities.  
On such a threat, Altorki states that while the question of exposure to the public can be 
bridged by trust and confidence in the researcher, the threat of judgment is harder to 
overcome for the insider.8  In my case, age became a very critical variable that structured 
my relations in the field.  As a younger Circassian, I already was not considered in a 
position to judge them since Circassian culture, traditions and hence codes of behavior 
always prioritize the elders over the younger ones.   
 In terms of trust, as the insider I almost had full trust in the field.  However, the 
concept of trust is a relative concept and it needs to be clarified: what I experienced in the 
field was the trust of a Circassian to another Circassian.  They trusted me to the extent that 
they trusted any Circassian whom they knew or they did not know.  Thus, in some 
instances, issues of mistrust were a reflection of mistrust in the community itself and its 
members.  When I was demanding his consent to use a recorder, Gürtuğ, for instance, 
looked at my recorder and stated that “I, too, would use a voice-recorder like that if I were 
an agent.”  During the interview, while telling about his life history, he mentioned that 
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these information that he was telling already “existed in the files of those people who were 
after him” and I mentioned that I did not know and I did not have access to those kinds of 
things.  After some time, when asking questions about the state, I provoked Gürtuğ a little 
to further explore the origins of his thoughts on me, ‘the researcher’ whom he never met 
before: 
 
   “Setenay:  The state…  When we started the interview, you told that these  
  [information] existed in the files.   
Gürtuğ:  You will add these; then, it will get richer.  [Bunları da ilave  
  edersiniz, zenginleşir.] 
Setenay:  Will I?  …Will I just wander like that if I had such an   
  access? 
Gürtuğ:   I am joking.  Here there are so many people like that.  [Öyleleri  
  çok burada.] 
Setenay:  I do not have these [access to those].  I wish I had those so that I  
  would not wander around so much [for interviews]. 
Gürtuğ: No, we do not have anything secret.  [Yok, gizli bir şeyimiz  
  yoktur.]”9 
 
What Gürtuğ referred as “here” was the Circassian association in Ankara; and his 
expectations of me were reflections of his expectations from the Circassians.  What shaped 
his expectations from me whom he never met before was the myth of MĐT (National 
Intelligence Organization) which was prevalent in every interview in different forms and 
levels.  As the myth of MĐT will be further explored in Chapter 4, “Host Community and 
Host State”, the basic idea included in the myth is that any Circassian can be a member, 
collaborator, agent or something of MĐT or other mechanisms of surveillance.  Therefore, 
without knowing me in person, Gürtuğ started the interview with the possibility that I might 
be something else than a PhD student.  As a Circassian and as a researcher specialized in 
“Political Science,” my research was suspect.  The myth of MĐT was so dominant in the 
interviews that I sometimes caught myself thinking whether or not I interviewed any of 
these “collaborators.” 
 Another instance of suspicion took place in the interview with Nurhan. Nurhan was 
the only person who did not consent to the use of the voice recorder at all as some other 
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interviewees preferred to close the recorder while answering some questions.  While 
rejecting the use of the recorder which was among her personal rights as an interviewee, 
Nurhan stated that as a Circassian in Turkey she was terrified after the assassination of 
Hrant Dink.10  Interview with Nurhan took place in March 2007, two months after the 
assassination of Hrant Dink.  Then Nurhan stated that she could not purchase a subscription 
of the newspaper Agos11 since she was warned by her maid that there was the branch of an 
ultra nationalist political party nearby.  Interestingly, Nurhan, who was a retired person in 
her early 70s, was taking care of the sick people in her family for the last ten years and she 
had not been active in terms of participating into Circassian events, associations etc.  Yet, 
as one of the earliest interviews of my research and closest to the assassination of Hrant 
Dink, she believed that she had to be more cautious in terms of issues of ethnicity.  
Interview with Nurhan made me concerned about the future interviews since her fears and 
concerns that had been triggered after Hrant Dink’s assassination overcame her fifty years 
of friendship with many members of my family that goes beyond generations.  After such 
an experience of closure, I chose to give a break to the interviews.  I had my next interview 
two months later. 
 The problems of caution and suspect did not take place in other interviews in such 
explicit forms.  Yet I do not think that the examples of Nurhan and Gürtuğ were exceptions; 
these two examples were just the ones who were very concerned and restless.  During the 
other interviews, the fragile questions were answered in lower voices; for instance, the 
stories on MĐT were always told in these lower voices.  Furthermore, sometimes some parts 
of the life histories, some thoughts and concerns were told just after the interviews when 
we were chatting: such as the punishment of Meral for not singing the Turkish national 
anthem in the school ceremony; Nesibe’s concern about what her son who had a Circassian 
name and no Turkish name would do during the military service [“Ve ismi de X, üstelik 
başka, Türkçe ismi de yok, nasıl olacak bilmiyorum.”]; the debate of Yasemin with a film 
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producer working on a film on imperial harem, and her ideas that Ottoman palace 
mimicked Caucasian life styles and that Caucasian women in the Harem were stronger in 
personality and authority than they were being imagined.12 [“Yok öyle bir şey.  Oradaki 
kadınlar başat roldeydi.  Bir tanesi padişaha meydan okuyor.  Ben diyor sizden daha eski 
bir tarihe sahibim.”]   
 It is not a coincidence that these three examples of disclosure after the interviews 
come from female interviews.  Gender has been another significant variable in my research 
experience.  As a result of the traditional limitations of the Circassian culture and my 
gender as the interviewer, women were more comfortable during the interviews in terms of 
talking about the personal while men were more constrained.  Unlike male interviewees, 
they also asked me a lot of personal questions. 
 During most of the interviews, I was there not only as a researcher but also as a 
person whose life history and identity was part of the interview.  As such a position is valid 
for all researchers, I was always personally included in the accounts of the interviewees: 
“You bear the name, we have the theme of Seteney Guashe”; “In those days, you were not 
born yet”; “The Kabardian dialect you speak… has the voices of the forest…  You are not 
able to say it but they whistle”; “Especially in Uzunyayla where you, too, belong …maybe 
you heard about it, there were confrontations among your people [sizinkilerden] too.”  As 
some of these information were given by me, some were being known implicitly as part of 
the knowledge of the community.  Thus, I was always reminded that they knew me 
personally and my life history was embedded in their personal histories.  Furthermore, as 
acquaintances, my interviewees usually asked and told me about my relatives as well as 
their relationships with them.  Some older interviewees knew my family tree better than I 
had ever known.   
 Therefore I was received and treated as a “daughter” of the community.  Seteney 
Shami, in her study of her own community, Circassians in Jordan, explores her position as 
the “daughter:”  
 
   “In the Circassian research, I felt that all avenues were open to me.  Common 
ethnicity overrode class and gender differences.  Being the daughter and 
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granddaughter of people whom my informants knew or could remember, would 
immediately establish the atmosphere of trust which is essential for good 
rapport.  In addition, the fact of my being Circassian established in my 
informants’ eyes enough motivation on my part to be involved in such a 
research project.  While other anthropologists may often have to justify their 
interest, mine was automatically put down to “ethnic patriotism.”  This allowed 
me access to information, opinions, and emotions that I have no doubt would 
have been denied to a non-Circassian.  On the other hand, it also laid a heavy 
responsibility upon me.  To a community that was undergoing a great deal of 
change and anxiety about its ethnic identity, my research seemed to confirm its 
“specialness” and the reality of its cultural distinctiveness.  Often my 
informants would thank me for my efforts, irrespective of whether they 
expected to see any results from the fieldwork.”13 
  
 Another anthropologist, Gönül Ertem in her research on Circassians in Eskişehir 
highlights her position as a researcher from Ankara who is “not really Circassian and who 
just knows that she had a great-grandmother who was known to be Circassian:”14 “I ask my 
reader to travel through discourses, places, relations of authenticity, difference and change, 
as I did as a misafir kız among the Cherkess.  In the Misafir Kız role, I was at different 
moments taken into different groups as a guest-daughter, as an elder sister as well as being 
trusted as an independent ‘Cherkess’ women.”15   
 In terms of negotiations of positionality, my negotiations were similar to Seteney 
Shami’s experiences in the field.  In terms of the expectations from the daughter, my 
education did not provide any flexibility or autonomy.  Furthermore, through my position 
as the daughter, the power asymmetry between the researcher and the researched was 
continuously transcended.  Being the insider, I was supposed to know and fit into the 
cultural repertoire indispensible for membership in the community.  For instance, in the 
interview with Zekeriya, aged 88, the so-called hierarchy between the researcher and the 
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researched was toppled from the very beginning.  After I informed him about my 
affiliations, my research, the principles of anonymity etc. and took his permission to use a 
recorder, Zekeriya told me to sit down.  I sat down.  Meanwhile, he was wandering around 
to have some walking exercise.  Worried that such a distance would impede conversation 
and also the recording; and also restless to be sitting while an elder Circassian was standing 
up –which would be considered against ‘tradition’; I stood up and I told Zekeriya in a very 
low voice that “I wish you had sat, too.”  [“Siz de otursaydınız.”]  He asked me whether he 
would not sit down if I did not ask him.16  [“Sen söylemezsen ben oturmayacak mıyım?”]  
Calling me “donkey” without raising his voice, he pretended that he was angry and he 
slapped in my face very slowly, without hurting. I immediately apologized and sat.  As I 
was very ashamed at that moment, I later realized that that instance was the establishment 
of the power relationship between us.  Despite my tension during the interview as a result 
of this event, Zekeriya did not feel any tension or he did not imply anything about that 
moment: the relation was fixed and that symbolic act of fixing the hierarchy was bygone 
for him.  At that instance of our encounter, Zekeriya established that he was the thamade 
who had the ultimate say in all matters as I was the young Circassian.  He enjoyed 
reiterating the usual and ‘traditional’ scenario of Circassian social life: thamade who leads 
the young Circassian in a semi-harsh and semi-humorous manner and the young Circassian 
who just collapses out of shame.  Later on I realized that to the extent that the scenario was 
performed, Zekeriya was indeed disclosing his own identity and affirming the existence of 
the Circassian identity and community.   
 As I was expected to abide by the norms as the insider, I tried to be careful about 
these norms; I tried not to ask elders their state of their health directly; I tried not to sit 
cross-legged; I tried not to turn my back etc.  Yet I believe that abiding these roles as the 
insider consolidated the interviewees’ trust in me since during the interviews, they, 
frequently, and voluntarily transcended those cultural limitations and norms.  They, who 
were not supposed to use the names of their wives and children according to traditions and 
who would be careful about that in daily life, told me very personal details such as how 
they got married, how they got divorced, what they thought about their children’s future 
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marriages etc.  Hence, as the researcher who also knew how to abide by the rules of the 
community, I was let to go beyond the traditional boundaries.   
 My position as the daughter of the community also enabled them to ‘protect’ me 
through warnings.  Some of the interviewees had some warnings regarding my research.  
For instance, Nurhan, after she shared her concerns about the assassination of Hrant Dink, 
warned me about the risks involved in my research: “Are you doing that research on the 
future of Circassians, diaspora?  When your mother told me, I found it a little risky.  It is 
not risky for me of course, but it may be risky for you.”17   
 As the daughter, my experience in the field was similar to Schramm’s research 
experience in Ghana: “Yet in none of my interviews with a Pan-African-minded person was 
I allowed to take up the position of the sole investigator.  The dynamics of question-and-
answer were rather unpredictable and I myself was often therefore being turned into a 
subject of research.”18  As Schramm explains her experience as a stranger who was marked 
in very negative terms such as alien, intruder and enemy; she states that the continuous 
friction that she experienced in field forced her to acknowledge that she had a white subject 
position and that it was not a neutral one.19  Unlike Schramm, my position was an insider 
position and yet mine was not a neutral one, too.   
 During the interviews, I was turned into a subject of research on several grounds 
because for the interviewees I was more than a researcher.  Most often after the interviews 
and sometimes during the interviews, I was being tested by my interviewees who were 
checking whether or not I knew the meaning of my own name; whether and to what extent I 
could speak Circassian; and whether I knew xabze etc.   
 The younger male interviewees and female interviewees of all ages asked my future 
marriage plans as some of my questions regarded masculinity, femininity, marriage, and the 
gendered dimensions of Circassian diaspora in Turkey.  For instance, after one of the 
interviews, a female interviewee asked me about what I thought about marriage and then 
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advised me to marry a Circassian or at worst an American or Englishman since I, as a 
Circassian, “would not be able to make it otherwise.”  In another instance, again a female 
interviewee asked me about marriage.  When I told her that I did not exactly know about 
my future decisions, she said “Then you are saying you will marry whoever comes, aren’t 
you?” [Ha kim olsa evlenirim diyorsun, öyle mi?]   
 Yet these reactions were not tensions that were related to our interviews.  They were 
related to my position as the insider, as the daughter of the community.  On that level, I was 
more than a researcher; I was associated with the young Circassians and the present 
situation -or even the future- of the Circassian community in Turkey as Zekeriya concluded 
the interview on his larger perception of me and my research: 
 
   “[With those organizations] the culture persisted.  Without them …Circassian 
language would have been forgotten to a greater extent.  Just like Seteney who 
is 21 years old and does not know Circassian despite her interest, everybody 
would be Seteney.  [Herkes Seteneyleşirdi.]  Well, they would have forgotten 
Circassianhood, they would have had the idea that s/he was a Circassian and 
that Circassians had a culture.  Now Seteney is dealing with that.  If you go to 
the Uzunyayla association, you will learn a thousand words in two or three 
months.  There is also one in Bağlarbaşı [association].  Look for an opportunity 
to go to one of them.”20   
 
 As the insider position enriched my research, expectations from me were also high.  
As they shared their experiences with other researchers, I “would be different from those 
researchers who could not understand” the Circassians in Turkey and their culture.  For 
instance, Nezih wished that I would be a girl who would serve the Kabardian culture.   
 As some accounts in literature highlight that some considerations may inhibit a 
researcher working in his or her own society from the possibility of expressing opposite 
views;21 in my case, more than the question of potential and severe ostracism, what 
concerned me most during the interviews and writing the dissertation has been the 
confidentiality of data.  Several accounts state this as a common concern for indigenous 
researchers since it is known from experience what will happen to informants if such 
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information is traced back to them22 and researcher is concerned about the misuse of the 
published information by governments and power elites against the people studied.23  
Meanwhile, most of my informants seemed not to share my concerns: most of them insisted 
me to use their own names and stated that they had “nothing to hide.”  I think that apart 
from the cultural trait of courage that Circassians attributed to themselves, this may be due 
to the fact that they live with several myths of surveillance such as the myth of MĐT which 
will be explored in Chapter 4: hence their fears and concerns are normalized and 
demystified.  Also as the activists, their insistence that their names could be used implied 
that they ventured any kind of risks involved in their activism.  Furthermore, most of them 
were like Gürtuğ in their belief that there were “several files about them” so they thought 
there was nothing new to add to them.   
 In short, I argue that insider position, studying his/her own society had some 
advantages and disadvantages for the researcher.  In terms of disadvantages, first, the 
researcher may be drawn into too much details, community gossips, internal conflicts, very 
personal tensions etc.  Moreover, the over-narration of these tensions, debates etc. may be 
utilized by the interviewees as a means to overcome and ignore the more ‘risky’ questions.  
Secondly, the research experience is overtly more personal than an outsider researcher 
would have experienced.  Humiliation, shame, responsibility, concerns over the inability to 
meet the expectations and concerns about community’s responses may be among the 
experiences of the insider researcher in the field.  Thirdly, insider research means 
experiencing constant negotiations and constantly shifting positions.  As this happens also 
in the research of outsiders, the negotiations are quicker and sharper for the insider 
researcher who plays several roles at the same time so it is harder to negotiate the 
relationships in the field.   
 In terms of advantages, first, it is relatively easier to build trust as an insider.  
Secondly, once trust is built, unrestricted access to documents, materials and further help is 
possible.  Furthermore, acquainted with the culture, structure, debates and politics of the 
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group and given that these acquaintances are known by the interviewees, they share stories, 
ideas and details that they might not have shared with other researchers.  In my case, some 
life histories that were not told by the interviewees themselves were completed by the other 
interviewees who, in their very detailed discussions about the community and multiple 
groups in the community, were unaware that they were sharing what the others did not tell 
about themselves.  Hence, I was also informed about what the interviewees concealed 
during the interviews.  Though I did not add or use these details which they did not share 
with me in the interviews, the opportunity to think about their reasons of concealment 
enabled me to understand them much better.  Thirdly, I also argue that as an insider, the 
researcher who is expected to abide by the norms is able to grasp the norms and observe 
them in practice much better unless s/he normalizes these codes and norms.  Fourthly, I 
believe that an insider position may change interviewees’ interest in the research, 
researcher and the interview.  As the insider, I believe that I often heard the most interesting 
and less censured forms of stories, events and narratives since my interviewees believed 
that “I would understand them” much better than a non-Circassian researcher.    
 
 
 
2.2. Circassians 
 
 
 
 The Circassians referring themselves as Adyge are the indigenous people of the 
North-West Caucasus.24  Circassian community is composed of several tribes, clans, and 
each of these has different dialects, languages, folklore and traditions.  Yet, historically in 
Turkey and in the other host countries within which Circassians are settled, they are named 
as Circassians as a rubric. 
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 This study employs the name Circassian in a different sense which is larger from 
the former definition that focuses on the North-West Caucasus.  It uses “Circassian” as a 
historical category rather than the name of an ethnically homogenous group.  The term 
Circassian here includes Adyge (including the Kabardian, Shapsug, Hatukuey, Beslenei, 
Bzedoug, Abzakh and so on) and other tribes (Chechens, Abkhaz groups).  Though 
Chechens and Abkhaz are not considered to be Adyge, these groups are historically and 
spatially inseparable from the Adyges of the Circassian diaspora in Turkey.  Therefore, 
despite the debates on the term Circassian and variations with which the term is used in the 
Caucasus and other diasporic communities, this dissertation on Circassians in Turkey 
employs the term Circassian as a historical rubric for peoples originally from North 
Caucasia that have been settled in Turkey in the nineteenth century.25    
 Employing the term Circassian as a historical category of identification, this part 
aims to explore the history of Circassians in general and Circassians in Turkey in particular.  
In addition to exploring the literature on Circassians, this part also aims to explore history 
with the help of interviews that this study is based on.  Hence, literature review will be 
supported by explorations into how Circassian diaspora activists in Turkey narrate on 
particular historical transformations.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                  
 
25
 As there are some opinions that Circassian as a term is an ambiguous one; Adyge, Abkhaz or smaller 
identities such as Chechen should be the means of identification and organization; that Caucasus today 
embraces a different definition and use of the term Circassian; this study takes historical coexistence in social 
life and organizations as significant.  It is not meaningful to define Circassian solely as Adyge; since 19th 
century many groups coexisted with Adyge and used the label to define themselves.  Hence, within the scope 
of this study, it is not meaningful to define Circassian solely as Adyge and exclude other groups.  As 
contemporary debates among Circassians on the rise of different identities and organizations signify some 
change, whether or not such a political and social crystallization of other identities will have long term 
influences as far as Circassians in Turkey are concerned is yet to be seen.   
 
31 
  
 
2.2.1. Immigration 
 
 
 As the Caucasus had been the subject of one of the main clashes between the 
Ottoman State and Russia,26 the immigration which Circassian community in Turkey today 
calls “Great Exodus” took place after Crimean War (1853-1856) at the peak of Russian 
expansionist policy.  Though the flight from the Caucasus started in the 1820s on a small 
scale and gained speed in the early 1860s as some Circassians has fled “to escape the forced 
sedentarization and Christianization programs of the Russian state,”27 immigration reached 
its peak in the mid 1860s after Russia issued a decree commanding Circassians to abandon 
their homelands.  The final pacification of the Northern Caucasus and the first exodus came 
in 1864. 
 Though immigration had been unanticipated and troublesome in terms of extent, 
Ottoman government strategically encouraged and accepted the immigrants as new human 
capital to strengthen the presence of Muslims in the areas inhabited by Christians, to 
employ Circassians as a military force in the suppression of nationalist movements, to 
fortify the Ottoman army especially vis-à-vis the Russian Army, and to settle them as a 
buffer against the separatist powers in the country.28  Apart from the Ottoman government's 
strategic acceptance of the immigrants; religious propaganda, social structure of the 
Circassian society and personal networks with the Ottoman Empire had also been 
influential in starting the mass immigration to Ottoman lands.29 
 Pushed out by the Russian expansion into the Caucasus, and encouraged by the 
Ottoman Empire, large numbers of Circassians immigrated to Ottoman lands, into Anatolia, 
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Syrian Province and Balkans.30  Yet the immigration process was far from being 
unproblematic.31  The major ports of entry for the immigrants were Trabzon, Samsun, 
Istanbul and Varna, each of which suffered shortages of food, medical facilities and 
housing due to the massive influx of immigrants which in some instances, led to disruption 
of public order and economic activity.32  According to one account, this mass displacement 
led to the death of one third of the people who fled their native country which is estimated 
to be 1.2 million.33  Overwhelmed by the constant influx of immigrants, Ottoman state 
formed the Commission of General Administration of Immigrants (Đdare-i Umumiye-i 
Muhacirin Komisyonu) in 1860 to deal with the settlement of the immigrants and control 
the ports of entry. The Commission immediately started negotiations with the Russian 
government to spread the deportations over a long period of time, establish better 
quarantine stations at the ports of deportation and provide the immigrants with some basic 
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immediate needs before embarkation.34  As these appeals were ignored by the Russian 
government, little financial support came from Europe. 
 The initial settlements were unplanned; and up to 1863, most of the immigrants 
were settled in Anatolia.  When the number of immigrants swelled in 1863, the Ottoman 
policy of settlement shifted from one of expediency to planned settlements, and most of the 
Circassians were sent either to the areas where the Muslim population was in a minority 
such as Adrianople, Danube, or to the depopulated regions such as the vilayets of 
Diyarbakır, Aleppo.35  One of the basic disagreements between Ottoman and Russian 
governments concerned the places of settlement of Circassians, and Russia had been 
successful in preventing the settlement of Circassians and resettling the groups that were 
already settled in areas close to Russian borderlands.36  
 Eventually, after the flow of immigration began to ebb in the early 1870s, the 
Commission of General Administration of Immigrants was abolished and its duties were 
given to the Immigrants Administration (Muhacirun Đdaresi) which would be further 
supported by the Charity Organization (Đane Komisyonu) that  was established by the order 
of the Sultan who stated that the arriving immigrants were “destitute and in need of charity 
and mercy and had taken refuge here because of the enemy's aggression on their lands, it 
was essential for the entire population of Istanbul to fulfill their [Islamic] obligations of 
hospitality and protection as already evident in the willingness of everybody to aid the 
immigrants”.37  After 1887, the Ottoman government encouraged Muslim immigrants and 
revived the old High Immigration Commission (Muhacirin Komisyonu Alisi) which would 
be renamed as High Islamic Immigration Commission (Muhacirin-i Đslamiye Komisyon-u 
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Alisi) in 1897 functioning under the chairmanship of the Sultan and superseding the 
authority of all other existing bodies.38 
 As the number of immigrants from the Caucasus into Ottoman Empire range 
between 350,000 and 1 million in Russian sources, official documents of the Ottoman 
Empire indicate that up until June 1864, 595,000 Circassians had been settled in various 
parts of the empire.39  Yet, given the possibility that not all immigrants had been settled by 
the Commission, the number can be taken as a minimum.  Karpat states that between 1859 
and 1879, two million people, most of whom were Circassians had left Russia; only 1.5 
million had survived and settled in Ottoman Empire.40  Circassian accounts similarly range 
between 1 million and 1.5 million.41  Another account states that after the exodus only 20% 
of the North Caucasian population, “only a demographic 'toe-hold'”42 remained behind, 
with the exception of the Ubykhs43 who were all expelled.44 
 The relationships with the other groups of the empire after settlement were mostly 
characterized by religion: while most of the opposition came from non-Muslim groups such 
as the Christians in Syria who asked the Porte to stop sending immigrants and Greeks who 
were complaining about the raids of the Circassians to the Greek and Bulgarian villages in 
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Macedonia; the friction between local Muslims and the refugees was relatively minimal.45  
The religious-cultural factors which had precipitated their exodus from their homelands 
proved to be instrumental in facilitating their adjustment to the new socio-cultural 
environments of Syria, Anatolia etc.46 
 According to some accounts, Circassians did not consider their new situation as 
permanent but rather regarded it as “a step back for a leap forward” which aimed to get the 
support of strong states, especially Ottoman Empire; save the Caucasus from Russian 
conquest and form a massive return movement.47  Russian newspaper, Russkiy Đnvalid for 
instance claimed that 200,000 Circassians who settled in Ottoman lands had burned their 
houses in order to return their homeland.48  Yet the initial attempts to return proved 
unsuccessful; while the Russian government banned the return of the Circassian immigrants 
by denying Circassians under Ottoman rule -even short-term- visas after 1865, the Ottoman 
government approached the demands negatively.49  Within this context, Turco-Russian War 
of 1877-1878 was regarded as an opportunity by the Circassians to gain their independence 
through an alliance with the Ottoman Empire which intended to attack at Russia taking 
advantage of an uprising in the Caucasus and hence used Circassian voluntary armies that 
were formed out of the immigrants in Ottoman lands.  Yet Ottoman Empire lost the war; 
Abkhazians rebelled and the Second Exodus took place.50  Furthermore, the Turco-Russian 
War of 1878-78 forced large groups of Circassians to leave their homes in Serbia and 
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Bulgaria.51   Between the years 1881 and 1914, there was a further immigration of 
approximately 500,000 Circassians,52 while, in the wake of the Second World War, six 
hundred North Caucasians who had been accused of collaboration with the Germans settled 
in Turkey.53 
 One silent fault line among the Circassians in Turkey today is the question of 
whether Circassians were exiled or they migrated in a semi-voluntary manner. Though this 
fault line is not much voiced among Circassians; since the 1990s, the Caucasian (Kafkas) 
Associations and some Circassian nationalists have preferred the exile discourse, and called 
it the “Great Circassian Exile” (Büyük Çerkes Sürgünü) which has been symbolically 
commemorated every year, on May 21. During the last decade, statements on Circassian 
exile became public notices in some newspapers.  The idea of genocide is the less 
pronounced one among the claims of Circassian diaspora.54   
 As immigration is called as tragic by the Circassians, immigration in itself is 
remembered as an event about which their elders would not talk much:  
 
   “We used to know that we are a different nation since our childhood times.  
The tragedies that they used to mention in their chats were not told to the young 
people.  They never talked about the diseases and problems that they had during 
immigration.  But in some moments we used to hear by accident.  Well, they 
kept their silence; they did not transform that experience to their children.  They 
did that consciously so that the children would not be demoralized, 
depressed.”55 
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2.2.2. Circassians in the Ottoman Empire 
 
 
 Within the Ottoman Empire, Circassians became part of the political apparatus and 
elite since the era of Abdulhamit II (1876-1909): employed within armed forces and 
government, and settled in Armenian and Arab villages which worked for the suppression 
of these groups when necessary, Circassians' relationships with their homeland were also 
seen as a potential gateway for the propaganda of Panislamist thought in Russia.56  Yet 
Circassians are also claimed to have established various organizations such as Circassian 
Party which was against the reign of Abdulhamit II.57  One should also mention that in the 
same period which is considered to be the beginning of “golden years” for Circassians, the 
first attempt to write Circassian history by a group of Circassian historians led by Ahmet 
Mithat, one of the leading figures of Young Ottomans, was prevented by the Sultan.58  
Furthermore, the theater within which the theatrical play, Çerkes Özdenleri written by 
Ahmet Mithat was played was demolished with the order of Abdulhamit II.  Some accounts 
claim that the theater was demolished because of a journal sent to Abdulhamit II that the 
play was about the claims of Circassians for independence and freedom.59 
 As the Second Constitutional Period (1908) implied the formation of a public 
sphere in the Ottoman Empire in general, it led to the emergence of Circassian 
organizations and publications in particular.  Circassian Union and Mutual Aid Association 
(Çerkes Đttihat ve Teavün Cemiyeti), established in 1908 and closed in 1923 declared its 
aims as informing Circassians culturally, supporting trade among Circassians and providing 
the land to be harvested in addition to serving for the protection of the constitutional 
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regime.60  Though the association was sanctioned in accordance with the Law on 
Associations (1909) which prohibited the opening of political associations that were based 
on racial and national distinctions,61 it remained untouched until 1923.  In 1911, it 
published the first Circassian newspaper Ğuaze in Turkish and Adyge which was published 
weekly and composed of eight pages, and established the first Circassian school Özel 
Çerkes Örnek Okulu in Istanbul and then in other cities of Anatolia. Đzzet Aydemir informs 
us that the school was located in Beşiktaş, Akaretler.  According to his account, courses 
taught at the school were Language; Circassian History; Geography; Circassian Language 
and Literature; French; Art; Circassian Language, History and Geography; Music; 
Circassian Pronunciation; Turkish; Sewing, Gym; and Modern Dances.62  Regarding the 
educational activities of Circassian Union and Mutual Aid Association, one of my 
interviewees explains how he met the left-overs of the association in the 1960s: 
 
   “At the beginning of 1960s, we went to Düzce with a friend; we were going 
to stay there.  Since Düzce is closer to Istanbul, there were so many books, 
newspapers, magazines; still there are so many leftover sources there.  A 
woman told us that Ğuaze newspaper had been sent to their houses, she had 
read it, and there had been books sent.  She told us that they had read those 
books in the schools; they had had Circassian mathematic books in Düzce.  I 
just did not believe it, and I would not believe it if I had not seen a diploma in 
Circassian language.  Circassian Union and Mutual Aid Association supported 
normal schools in Circassian villages and it helped the opening of new ones.  
….multiple associations were established though they were small.  …..For sure, 
all of them became invisible.  I asked the woman whether or not they had some 
of the books.  My friend started to laugh, because that was his neighborhood.  
She said that they used to have them, we were talking in half Turkish and half 
Circassian, she was in her 60s, she said that there was none left.  I asked what 
had had happened to them.  She said that the books were in Circassian, a lot of 
people were executed in that region, and there were stocks of the books to be 
delivered to other locations.  I asked whether or not even one book was left.  
She told me that women tore all of them to pieces, she said “we, women, tore 
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them to pieces.  They were made of high quality paper, so it was hard to tear 
them.  Finally, we threw them into the oven in the garden.””63 
 
 Therefore Circassian Union and Mutual Aid Association today is remembered as a 
Circassian organization that was not only closed in 1923 but also whose leftovers were also 
destroyed sometimes voluntarily by the Circassians themselves after some political events 
during the transformation from the empire to the nation-state.  These schools and 
educational activities of Circassians in Ottoman Empire were going to be unprecedented in 
Turkey as far as Circassians in Turkey were concerned: there was going to be no publicly 
used Circassian school, textbook or course.   
 However, the importance of Circassian Union and Mutual Aid Association is going 
to be a theme among the Circassian diaspora activists with 1990s.  Interestingly, 
Circassians also meet the footprints of the association in Caucasia: “For instance, schools in 
Caucasia had been established by that organization.  When I went to the Caucasus I met 
elder people educated in those schools.  I met in one of the villages.  …..In that school 
Turkish was also taught, apart from that the books were published in Turkey.”64 
 As the teaching of Turkish in those schools is an indicator of how Circassian 
interests and Ottoman interests were embedded in those activities, the activists in the 
association were members of the Young Turk movement and the association had close 
relationships with The Committee of Union and Progress.65 
 After intense debates in Ğuaze, the association also published a Circassian alphabet 
in 1919.66  Though slavery was legally abolished, the committee also worked for the 
emancipation of Circassian slave girls during the last years of the empire.67   
 In 1910, another organization, an Abkhaz-Circassian committee called Immigrants 
Commission (Muhacir Komisyonu) was established.  The committee initially dealt with 
cultural activities such as forming alphabets, elementary books for reading and writing, and 
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exploring the areas of settlement of North Caucasian tribes in the lands of the empire etc. 
and then worked for The Committee of Union and Progress in the Caucasus.68 
 In 1914, another organization called North Caucasian Association (Şimali Kafkasya 
Cemiyet-i Siyasiyesi) was established and it particularly dealt with propagating Panturkism 
in the North Caucasus in harmony with the political interests of the Committee of the 
Union of Progress.69  The association in its program stated its aims as to defend and protect 
the rights of the groups of the North Caucasus, establish and strengthen national solidarity 
and cooperation among these aforementioned groups, develop the national character,  
spread and publicize sciences and applied sciences, encourage art and trade, protect the 
orphans and families in need of help, increase the national population by struggling with 
diseases, and protect the purity of the line (soy).70  Conversion of the national languages 
into writing, the establishment of national schools, establishment of branches in places 
where national elements exist were declared to be the instruments through which these aims 
would be fulfilled.71  The association also ordered its branches that  
 
   “Since the protection of the purity of the race and making the Circassian 
family life more comfortable is crucial, it will be provided that Circassian men 
are married to Circassian girls and the marriage of Circassian girls with 
elements that are not Caucasian and whose line is unknown, especially and 
solely, in the name of wealth will be prevented.”72 
 
 Related to Circassian Union and Mutual Aid Association (Çerkes Đttihat ve Teavün 
Cemiyeti) and Özel Çerkes Örnek Okulu, CircassianWomen's Mutual Aid Society (Çerkes 
Kadınları Teavün Cemiyeti) was established in 1918.73  Between the years 1920 and 1923, 
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the organization published the magazine Diyane74 which means “Our Mother” in 
Circassian.  In 1922-23, the society was involved in integrating the North Caucasians who 
took refuge mainly in Istanbul during the Russian Civil War.75 
 Throughout the period between the second half of the nineteenth century and 1920 
the relations between the Ottoman state and Circassians were harmonious.  Circassians 
were well accepted in state mechanisms such as palace, bureaucracy and military and the 
Ottoman state’s foreign policy that identified Czarist Russia as an expansionist force that 
was threatening the Ottoman lands was in harmony with Circassian interests in the 
Caucasus.  Based on these conditions, Circassians were welcomed by the Ottoman center 
and any activity on the side of Circassians toward Caucasia was supported by this alliance 
of Circassians with the Ottoman state mechanism and by their embeddedness in the center.  
As an instance of this alliance that not only worked for the future of the Ottoman lands but 
also toward the future of the Caucasus after the Bolshevik Revolution, one of the 
interviewees narrates on his encounter with a Circassian participant of a meeting organized 
as a result of this alliance:  
 
   “The more or less important people were gathered in North Caucasian 
Association.  ….I heard about that meeting from two people, but I did not see 
any documents.  ….But I coincidentally met someone in the 1960s, we were 
young, and I was writing something and he told me that they had done things 
like that but they had been unconscious.  He stated that there was an 
organization called North Caucasian Association, that he used to go there, the 
association was somewhere in Beyoglu, Bursa street.  …the man was not lying, 
he immediately told the date, it was just after the Mondros treaty.  He said the 
meeting had been organized by the initiative of Rauf Orbay and 108 people had 
participated.  ….that the participating people had been invited by name, that it 
had been something special.  ….That they talked what they were going to do 
given the Ottoman Empire’s political situation.  I asked him about the decision, 
he told that they decided to be loyal to the Ottoman state till its last moment, 
that they were guests here, that Ottoman state had done nothing harmful to 
them, that they were not like Albanians or Armenians.  He added that they 
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elected a committee of seven people to announce their decisions and take 
advice from the Sultan but he could only count to five names.”76 
 
 Hence, throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth century, with extensive 
participation into state mechanisms, the Circassian identity was embedded in Ottoman 
identity.  Similarly, most of the Circassian bureaucrats’ and soldiers’ autobiographies 
emphasize the embeddedness of these two identities.  From such a perspective, being a 
Circassian was harmonious with being a member of the Ottoman Empire.  Furthermore, 
being a Circassian nationalist was not in conflict with being a patrimonial of the Ottoman 
Empire.    
 However, the alliance and the harmony of Circassians with the political system was 
going to change in the 1920s with the transformation from the multinational, multiethnic 
and multireligous empire to nation-state.   
 
 
 
2.2.3. “Homeland” after the Bolshevik Revolution 
 
 
 Until 1917, migrant communities' relationships with the homeland had been quite 
stable.  The revolution in February 1917 seemed to have bestowed the opportunity of 
independence on the Circassians.  Initially named as Transitional Administration of Union 
of United People of the Caucasus Mountains, then as the Transitional Government, the 
representatives of the Northern Caucasus sent memorandums to the Ottoman Government 
and to other countries on May 11, 1918 and proclaimed the independence of the Republic 
of the Northern Caucasus.77  It should be mentioned that Circassian immigrants in the elite 
cadres of the Ottoman Empire played a crucial role in the formation and maintenance of the 
networks between newly-formed Republic and the Ottoman government.  The fact that the 
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Republic of the Northern Caucasus was diplomatically recognized only by the Ottoman 
Empire is no coincidence: Circassian immigrants worked for the recognition of the 
independence of the Republic by the Ottoman Empire and other countries.   
 Yet, despite extensive networks with the Ottoman Empire and Circassian 
immigrants,78 the Republic had collapsed vis-à-vis the Red Army in 1921 and members of 
the government fled to Turkey and Europe in order to represent the North Caucasus in Paris 
Peace Conference and organize the diaspora.   
 Due to the relatively friendly relations between Soviet and Turkish governments, 
immigrants of 1921 did not find the political freedom to organize in Turkey.  Yet 
Circassian nationalists in Europe organized as the Promete Club in Poland and Kafkas in 
Paris.  These two groups tried to announce their cause through their magazines.   One 
special target was Turkey which was inhabited by the largest migrant Circassian 
community.  However, due to Soviet disturbance, these magazines were banned in 
Turkey.79  While the center of the magazine of Kafkas group which works like a 
government in exile was carried to Berlin just before the Second World War, the Promete 
group dissolved with the invasion of Poland.80  Hence, Nazi Germany became the sole site 
of Circassian politics in exile.  Though German government initially banned all anti-Soviet 
activities in accordance with the Non-Agression Pact between Nazi Germany and Soviet 
Union after 1941, the Nazi government needed the help of the Circassian nationalists in 
Germany to win the support of local people in the Caucasus.81  In 1942, North Caucasian 
National Committee was established to motivate the Soviet captives of Circassian origin 
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against the Red Army and make propaganda to influence the North Caucasus.82  Since 
German army stayed for a short period of time in the Caucasus, the Committee proved to be 
inactive.  Yet, political activism in these war years resulted in wholesale deportations of 
Karachai and Balkars in 1943, and Chechnians and Ingush in 1944 under Stalin rule to 
Central Asia with the claim of cooperation with German armies.  As they were repatriated  
under Khrushchev in 1957, these events had proved to be the starting point of several 
conflicts and turmoil that would be left unresolved until the 1990s.83 
 The politics of the Circassian nationalists in exile after 1945 was shaped by the 
postwar arrangements and Cold War context.  As North Caucasian National Committee, 
which was reestablished after the war, dealt with the problems of Soviet soldiers of 
Circassian origin who were at the lands of the allied countries when the war was over; 
another group, Free Caucasus group which was composed of nationalists that were in favor 
of monarchy emerged.  In Wiesbaden conference in 1951 which had been convened with 
the support of America, as the Committee declared that they did not want to “change 
masters but to have independence,” Free Caucasus Group joined the conference as the 
representative of the North Caucasus and stated the importance of the collapse of the 
Bolshevik regime for the solution of nationalities problems and independence.84  Within the 
Cold War context, these groups gradually lost their importance.   
 Given the failure of the Circassian political cadres in Europe in terms of gaining 
support for independence, and given the exhaustion of the population in the homeland, the 
Adyge were not qualified as a “nation” and divided into different administrative republics 
and districts which were the Adyge, the Kabardin, and the Cherkess.85 
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2.2.4. Circassian Community outside Anatolia 
 
 
 The end of the First World War and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire implied the 
containment of Circassian immigrants in several newly-formed nation-states, Syria and 
Jordan with a few in Israel and Iraq, and only one village in Yugoslavia.   
 In Jordan, where there are approximately 60,000 Circassians, Circassians compose a 
middle class urban community with favorable representation in government, bureaucracy, 
parliament and the military.86  Jordan has long allowed Circassians their language rights.87   
 Though Circassian community in Syria which is today composed of 40,000 
Circassians had a primary school between the years 1928 and 1931 whose language of 
instruction was Adyge, the community had to cope with Arab nationalism, and it is claimed 
to be the largest current of the return movement that took place throughout the 1990s.88  
Given the Circassian history of having served first the Ottomans and then the French in 
what is now Syria, their position is considered to be extremely insecure since they are seen 
as non-Arabs whose tendencies are inimical to those of the Arabs.89 
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 The community in Israel which is composed of two villages and 3,000 people 
enjoys cultural privileges such as schools which use Adyge language as the language of 
instruction.  Historically Circassians served Israel as an elite border guard.90   
 The number in Iraq is altogether unknown, though surely small.  Yet the recent 
political change in Iraq seemingly work as an opportunity for Circassians in Iraq to interact 
with other Circassian diaspora communities.91 
 In addition to the diaspora communities formed in the nineteenth century, secondary 
immigrations to Germany, Holland and the United States throughout the twentieth century 
led to the formation of small Circassian communities in Europe and America.  These 
communities have their associations and especially the associations in Europe are closely 
linked to the Circassian associations in Turkey.  One of the accounts claims that about 
10,000 Circassians are living in the State of New Jersey, U.S.A.92  After the initiation of 
Glasnost and Perestroika in Soviet Union, the Circassian societies in America had proved 
to be one of the first Circassian communities that had begun campaigns to promote trade, 
educational and economic assistance to the homeland.93  The Netherlands Circassian 
Culture Association (Tjerkessen Kultuur Vereniging Nederland), established in 1979 in 
Almelo/The Netherlands states that today there are 1,000 Circassians in Netherlands, 
15,000 in Germany and 150 in Denmark.94 
 The histories, political participation strategies, rights, and discourses of Circassian 
diasporic communities have been to a large extent influenced by the politics and policies of 
the host community. 
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2.3.5. From the Empire to the Nation-State: Circassians in Republican Turkey 
 
 
 As the largest wave of immigration was to Anatolia, Circassian community in 
Turkey today is considered the largest Circassian community when compared to Syria, 
Jordan and Palestine/Israel and other diaspora communities formed through secondary 
immigrations to Germany, Holland and the United States.95  One account claims that “the 
final destination of about 90 percent of the total Circassian immigrants was today's 
territorial Turkey.”96 
 However, the end of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of the Republic of 
Turkey implied not only the formation of new diasporic communities tied to newly formed 
nation-states but also the very end of the fellowship that Circassian Turkish relations are 
based on.   
 For the Circassians in Turkey, Turkish War of Independence and the Çerkes Ethem 
affair constitute the turning points which have been constantly referred in both Turkish and 
Circassian accounts of Republican history.  Within the Turkish War of Independence, two 
Circassian groups were visible: those who were for the Independence and who later became 
leading figures in the establishment of the Republic of Turkey; such as Ali Fuat Cebesoy, 
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Rauf Orbay, Yusuf Đzzet Paşa, Bekir Sami etc.; and those, with their loyalty to the 
Caliphate and Sultan, who are against the government in Ankara such as Anzavur97 who 
was interestingly crushed by another Circassian, Çerkes Ethem.  A third exceptional group 
Şark-ı Karip Çerkesleri Temin-i Hukuk Cemiyeti, established in Izmir in 1921 and 
composed of 22 members from Marmara region (Adapazari, Hendek, Düzce, Kandıra and 
Karasu, Yalova ve Karamursel, Bilecik, Eskişehir, Geyve, Bursa, Biga, Gönen, Erdek, 
Bandırma, Balıkesir, Manisa, Aydın and Kütahya) stated that the final source of 
annihilation for the Circassians had been the forced Turkification policies of the Committee 
of Union and Progress; that Circassians had been forced to fight first in the World War I 
and then in the War of Independence; and that they were at the time being forced to  
support “the throne of Mustafa Kemal.”98  The association then declared its loyalty to the 
Greek forces. 
 Though Çerkes Ethem affair -that is the elimination of independent guerrilla forces 
in favor of a regular army-99 is seemingly unrelated to ethnic and national causes as far as 
Circassians in Turkey are concerned,100 its results had been destructive for the Circassian 
groups in Turkey.101   
 As early as 1923, all Circassian organizations were closed by the Turkish 
government.  Shortly thereafter the building and library of the Circassian Union and Mutual 
Aid Association (Çerkes Đttihat ve Teavün Cemiyeti) were lost in a fire.102  Furthermore, the 
residents of 14 Circassian villages, approximately 10,000 people in Western Anatolia 
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(Manyas and Gönen) were deported to the country's eastern provinces though they were 
allowed to return subsequently.103  Circassians had been implicitly and explicitly 
considered the relatives of Çerkes Ethem for a long time.  Association of the name 
Circassian with “traitor” has led Circassians in some regions to hide their Circassian origins 
as much as possible.  The ones whose Circassian origins were known had sometimes been 
called “grandsons / granddaughters of the traitor Ethem”.  Since the 1960s, Çerkes Ethem 
has not been called “the traitor” in the history books.  Yet the identification still persists.    
 After the announcement of the Law on the Maintenance of Order 1925, the newly-
formed state had proved to be suppressive as far as the press was concerned which implied 
that North Caucasians were silenced in terms of organizations and publishing.  In 1934, 
even the circulation of foreign emigrant populations, such as the Circassian magazines 
Promete and Kafkas produced in Europe and aimed at communicating with the Circassian 
diaspora in Turkey, was prohibited.104   
 Thus, Çerkes Ethem affair, still a taboo in Turkish history, had profoundly affected 
Circassian diaspora in Turkey.  What the affair of Ethem meant for Circassians is signified 
by a quotation from the interviews upon which this study is based: “Marmara region.  For 
instance, my uncle’s name was Ethem.  When he was born, because my grandmother 
named him as Ethem, all the villagers were offended and did not speak with my 
grandmother.” 
 However, it is not just Çerkes Ethem affair whose consequences were harmful as far 
as Circassians were concerned but there seems to be general “Circassian problem” as the 
title of Fetgerey’s letter to Grand National Assembly shows.  During the one party period, 
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between the 1920s and mid 1940s, Circassians lost all their social and political power as 
Circassians.  There was no mentioning of the Circassian in-between those years.  And the 
alliance between the state and the Circassians, Circassian soldiers, bureaucrats and 
intellectuals became invisible.  Hence, first generation of Circassian activism which started 
with the Second Constitutional Period became invisible with the dissolution of the Ottoman 
Empire.  Some Circassian activists today explain this loss and removal of Circassian 
intellectuals and elements from the public sphere through the removal of the Ottoman 
Empire and ‘anything Ottoman’ as “the other”: 
 
   “The other of the Turkish identity has never been the West.  ….The other has 
been constructed as the Ottoman, the ancient regime and till recent years this 
has continued.  ….Based on this, Circassians were associated with the Ottoman 
Empire: being a Circassian was inconvenient.  When someone told that, I 
thought a lot about that.  In Circassian families that have been urbanized and 
politicized in relatively early years, Circassian elements have vanished.  
Especially, they are from Republican People’s Party.  The person I met was 
from RPP for two generations; their father transformed nothing to his children, 
they only knew that they were somehow Circassian but nothing else.  One day 
his child asked him the reason of this behavior, and he said that being a 
Circassian meant being Ottoman.”105   
 
Another group explains this removal as assimilation of urban Circassians: 
 
   “Then they embraced a voluntary assimilatory process; they became silent.  
Though it was a significant group in terms of number, Circassian bourgeoisie, 
voluntarily got assimilated.  After the 1960s, as urbanization started, we, people 
from rural areas discovered the city; and after that, intense attempts on 
organizing started.  For instance, you can see that in any meeting of any 
association, the 99 percent of the activists over 30 years old are born in villages.  
It is impossible to find urban activists.  ….The negative side of the massive 
assimilation of our feudal and intellectual groups is that our cultural heritage 
was gone with them because they had it.  The good side is that the class 
hierarchy among those who remained has vanished.”106  
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Between the end of the War of Independence and the 1950s, no organization was 
established by Circassians in Turkey.  Yet, in the absence of the organizations and 
associationd, family houses and offices proved to be the places of gathering as one of my 
interviewees highlights: “When the organizations were non-existent, our house was the 
association and my father’s workplace was the association.”  With the establishment of the 
first Circassian associations, Friends Hand Mutual Aid Association (Dost Eli Yardımlaşma 
Derneği) with the collaboration of Azeri Turks in 1946, Caucasus Association (Kafkas 
Derneği) in Istanbul in 1952, and North Caucasus Cultural Association (Kuzey Kafkasya 
Kültür Derneği) in Ankara in 1964, Circassians started to establish urban and less active 
provincial associations.107  Regarding the first association, Dost Eli Yardımlaşma Derneği, 
Zekeriya states 
 
   “When I started the university in year 1946, establishing a Circassian 
association, using the title Circassian was a little bit inconvenient, because of 
some leftovers from Ethem.  This is why Dosteli was established.  In that 
association, the elders, young people of the time used to go, play accordion and 
have fun.  When Democrat Party won the national elections in 14 May 1950, 
the terms Circassian, Adyge, Kabardian and Caucasia had become easily 
pronounced words; in those years Caucasian Cultural Association was 
established.  And North Caucasian Cultural Association was established.”108   
 
Circassians in Turkey have used Caucasian Culture Associations (Kafkas Kültür 
Dernekleri)109 for interaction, socialization and cultural activities,110 magazines since 
decades and recently e-mail discussion groups for communication.  The finances and 
activities of these associations and foundations are subject to regular government review 
which is considered to be a standard procedure both by the activists working in associations 
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and state authorities.111  Until the 1960s, Circassian organizations and magazines were 
quite ephemeral and volatile; they appeared under the guise of North Caucasian “Turks”; 
and timidity and anti-communism gave the organizations and the publications their 
characteristics112 which were going to be criticized by the later activists as exemplified by 
an interviewee:  
 
   “The Circassians in big cities were people with status, they only thought 
about not being disturbed and living with each other in comfort.  It was the 
young people from the rural areas who started to think and analyze.  …For 
instance, in our youth, we used to keep those newspapers within which 
Circassians were mentioned once for days; if something was told about a 
Circassian, we used to talk about it for days.  We had no written document, we 
had no history, we had nothing except what was told.  ….I remember that when 
I got the book, “Caucasia in History”, the world was mine.  There were the 
balls, dances of Istanbul Caucasian Cultural Association.  When I saw any 
photograph or news from those activities on newspapers, we would be thrilled 
so that Circassians were alive, that they were able to tell that they were 
Circassians.  …….Within limits, the aim was to establish an association there 
with families who knew each other, watch their own dances, listen to accordion, 
but they had no thought about homeland.  They had no thought about the 
people.  …they were the founders, they had an aspiration; we cannot deny that.  
But there was not a firm thought. How can that be?  You will be open to people, 
you will go to base, you are living in the city but there are other people living in 
less developed areas, you will see their problems.  You will reach Circassian 
villages; you will help the student from Anatolia.  None of this existed, they 
were living in welfare.  They did not even use the bus; they had their balls in 
the most expensive places of Istanbul.”113 
 
Starting from the mid 1960s, the discourses of the diaspora changed.  The idea that 
Circassians were a Turkic tribe was rejected; the idea of return/repatriation, and the threats 
of assimilation and Turkification became dominant themes; slogans such as “our god is our 
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freedom, our temple is the homeland” and “to serve a foreigner and neglect one's own 
interest is an error” were increasingly used.114  As the politically turbulent decade of the 
1970s led to the emergence of two groups within the community: namely, the devrimci 
(revolutionaries) suggesting that Circassian rights could only be attained through a socialist 
revolution and the dönüşçü/göççü, (‘returnists’) who advocated a return to the homeland,115 
the military regime of 1980 closed all associations, closely scrutinized the ones 
representing non-Turkish cultural movements116 and confiscated the official documents of 
all Circassian associations.  One interviewee underlines his close experience of the coup 
d’état of 1980 in the associations: “September 12th knocked us down.  We were just 
scattered.  Of course I was arrested; I was the head of the association.  In the interrogation, 
it was as if the responsibility of all history of diaspora was attributed to me.  I was asked 
about the old, unliving Circassian people, what they did and what they did not do.”117 
 In the meantime, just like the period before 1946, alternative places functioned as 
associations for the Circassians in Turkey.  One interviewee, for instance, explores those 
days after the coup d’état of 1980: “There was a place, a hamburger place; that was the 
meeting point, everybody would go there.  Different locations like that became places to 
meet.  At houses we continued to see each other.  Also in universities there was a lot of 
movement.”118  
 Starting from the mid 1960s, universities became one of the places within which 
Circassian activists informally organized.  Universities were the places in which young 
Circassians were “discovered and tied to the associations.”  Hence, universities became a 
significant source of activists since the 1960s: “For instance somebody from Uzunyayla 
had been newly registered in the department of pharmacy.  Somebody would just go to the 
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department and write his name on the board.  The person would show up and we would just 
take him.” 
 By the year 1984, the associations were reopened.  Liberalization and the more 
liberal outlook of the Prime Minister Turgut Özal in terms of Kurdish cultural identity in 
Turkey contributed to the emergence of a political atmosphere within which associations 
representing non-Turkish communities and their activities can be renewed.119  This renewal 
was further supported by the Glasnost in the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War as 
far as Circassians in Turkey were concerned.   
 
 
 
2.3. Conclusion 
 
 
 
 In the first part of this chapter, I argue that my position and my negotiations in the 
field as the insider researcher were significant for this research.  Despite some 
complications in terms of negotiations during the interviews, such an insider position, I 
believe, created an additional space for this research and provided me with almost 
unlimited access, trust and details in the field. 
 The second part of the chapter examines the Circassian diaspora in Turkey in terms 
of historical turning points in Turkey, Russia and the Caucasus.  Given such a history 
intertwined with the histories of other nations and nation-states, Circassian diaspora is a 
historical entity which is formed in constant interaction with the politics and history of the 
host state and homeland.   
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CHAPTER 3 
 
DIASPORA NATIONALISM 
 
Concerning the Label Emigrant  
 
I always found the name false which they gave us: Emigrants. 
That means those who leave their country. But we 
Did not leave, of our own free will 
Choosing another land. Nor did we enter 
Into a land, to stay there, if possible for ever. 
Merely, we fled. We are driven out, banned. 
Not a home, but an exile, shall the land be that took us in. 
Restlessly we wait thus, as near as we can to the frontier 
Awaiting the day of return, every smallest alteration 
Observing beyond the boundary, zealously asking 
Every arrival, forgetting nothing and giving up nothing 
And also not forgiving anything which happened, forgiving nothing 
Ah, the silence of the Sound does not deceive us! We hear the shrieks 
From their camps even here. Yes, we ourselves 
Are almost like rumours of crimes, which escaped 
Over the frontier. Every one of us 
Who with torn shoes walks through the crowd 
Bears witness to the shame which now defiles our land. 
But none of us  
Will stay here. The final word 
Is yet unspoken.  
 
 
Bertolt Brecht1 
 
 
 The poem above by Bertolt Brecht has been one the most quoted poems throughout 
the recent years in the magazines and activities of the Circassian community in Turkey; and 
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 B. Brecht, “Concerning the Label Emigrant,” in Refugees: An Anthology of Poems and Songs, ed. B. 
Coleman. (Ottawa: self-published, 1988). 
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it highlights the diasporic condition which Circassian activists and associations associate 
themselves with. 
Though diasporas are heterogeneous and contested spaces, every diaspora 
constantly constructs a collective identity, a “common we.”2  Exploring the processes 
through which the collective “we”is constructed is crucial to understand how diasporic 
identities that are actually contested, complex and embedded in multiple narratives of 
struggle assume a singular, unified and homogeneous form within the nationalist frame.3   
Circassians in Turkey and other countries has remained under-researched compared 
to other diasporic communities such as Jewish, Armenian and Black diasporas.  What is 
even less studied is the analysis of Circassian diaspora as embracing diaspora nationalism.  
Studying diaspora nationalism implies that diasporic subjects, within the constantly 
changing limits set by the politics of homeland, host community and international relations 
are actors that are capable of negotiating, acting, reacting, resisting and narrating.   
This dissertation studies Circassians in Turkey as a diasporic community which is 
not a homogenous block but composed of multiple groups, organizations and cliques.  To 
map Circassian diaspora nationalism, these multiple groups should be explored in terms of 
their perspectives and relationships with nationalism.  Therefore, within all their 
heterogeneity, despite the lack of consensus even on the simplest debate i.e. such as the 
groups the word Circassian includes, there are some some common grounds through which 
Circassian activists deal with nationalism.   
With these aims, this chapter will first interrogate diaspora literature.  Then it will 
try to understand and map Circassian diaspora nationalism in Turkey; its historical forms, 
its relationships with the hegemonic nationalism and its manevuvers vis-à-vis Turkish 
nationalism in particular and nationalism in general.   
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3.1. Diaspora as / at the Crossroads4  
 
 
 
Throughout the 1990s, the debates on diaspora have peaked; technological, political 
and social changes (collapse of the Soviet Bloc, end of Cold War, communication 
technology etc.), the rise of the politics of identity, the claims to 'difference', a defense of 
multiculturalism and the questioning of the notions of national sovereignty and territoriality 
have all added new dimensions to the notion of diaspora.  Thus, since the 1990s, social 
science has been face to face with a much complicated and yet, vaguely defined notion of 
diaspora which is simultaneously intertwined with the notions of nationalism, ethnicity and 
globalization more than ever.  This dissertation claims that diaspora as a theoretical concept 
is the crossroads where ethnicity, nationalism and processes of globalization meet.   
The notion of diaspora is studied by various disciplines such as history, international 
relations, cultural studies, political science etc.  Yet the literature on diaspora is 
characterized by two complementary and two diverging approaches on the definition, 
characteristics and categorization of diasporas.   
First, there is a consensus in the literature with respect to the proliferation of the 
meanings of the diaspora vis-à-vis its original meaning.  In terms of the original meaning, 
the word “diaspora” is found in the Greek translation of the Bible, and it originates from the 
Greek verb speiro (to sow) and the preposition dia (over).5  Therefore the original meaning 
of the term, associated with the experiences of the Armenians, Jews and Greeks, is “to sow 
widely”.  Yet the notion of diaspora now has multiple meanings that may refer to 
immigrants, expatriates, refugees, guest workers, exile communities, overseas 
communities, and ethnic communities.6  Therefore, what had started as the particular 
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experiences of some specific communities now refers to a host of communities and groups 
that have very different histories and experiences.   
Second, there is consensus in the literature with respect to the relationships between 
diasporas and processes of globalization.  Diaspora literature underlines the changing 
meanings, relations and roles of diaspora as a result of the processes, technologies of 
globalization, and transnationalism that is associated with globalization.  On such a ground, 
globalization has enhanced the practical, economic and affective roles of diasporas, proving 
them to be particularly adaptive forms of social organization.   
Apart from the debates on the changing contexts of the diasporas, and their 
relationships with the processes of globalization where there is a consensus in the literature, 
there is also a debate on how to study diasporas: as a descriptive typological tool or as a 
social condition and process.7  
 The basic difference between two approaches concerns the definition of the notion 
of diaspora.  As a starting point, the simplest and most general definition of diaspora refers 
to the dispersal of a people from its original homeland.  Yet such a definition is criticized 
for being too broad to be useful.8  Studies of diaspora as a descriptive tool respond to the 
need for a more specific, yet a more applicable definition.  One such attempt to list the key 
characteristics of diasporas has come from Safran who defines diaspora as a community 
whose members, having been dispersed from an original “center” to two or more foreign 
regions, retain a collective memory, vision, myth about their original homeland including 
its location, history and achievements; the idea of return; continuous relationships with that 
homeland which define their ethnocommunal consciousness and solidarity; a belief that 
they are not fully accepted in their host societies and that all members of diaspora should be 
committed to the maintenance or restoration of the original homeland.9   
 Cohen further develops Safran’s list with additional emphasis on alternative routes 
to diaspora formation in search of work, trade or colonial ambitions; the development of a 
return movement that gains collective approbation; a strong ethnic group consciousness 
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sustained over a long time and based on a sense of distinctiveness, a common history and 
the belief in a common fate; a sense of empathy and solidarity with co-ethnic members in 
other countries of settlement; and the possibility of a distinctive creative life in host 
countries with a tolerance for pluralism.10  Based on the modes and reasons of exile or 
migration, he categorizes diasporas as victim/refugee, imperial/colonial, labor/service, 
trade/business/professional and cultural/hybrid/postmodern diasporas.11  However, 
including Jews and Palestinians, or Ancient Greeks and Russians within the same category, 
this account does not historicize the experiences and characteristics of various diaspora 
communities. 
 These ideal types of diasporas are criticized on several grounds.  First problem is 
that few communities ascribe to all of these characteristics.  Secondly, postulating the 
homeland as a diaspora's constitutive place of origin and naturalizing spaciality, these 
ideal-types are based on “dreams of boundedness and authenticity”.12  In the case of 
diaspora, 'homeland' connotes not a singular identity based on a single place but 
“dislocation, contradiction, unforeseen cultural possibilities, multiple geographies of 
identity exceeding the boundaries of nation-states.”13  Thirdly, in this checklist approach 
the concept of diaspora is regarded as rooted in the group itself; and hence, it reifies 
diasporic identity.  Yet identities are never fixed and simultaneous diasporic identities are 
possible even within a single diaspora.14  Therefore, rather than taking diaspora and 
diasporic identity for granted, the multidimensionality and heterogeneity through which 
these groups are formed, reformed and revived should be explored.  Fourth, but not the last 
criticism underscores that diasporas are neither given nor fixed: diasporic communities wax 
and wane depending on the changing possibilities (obstacles, openings, antagonisms and 
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connections) in their host countries, homelands and transnational arena.15  Cohen's and 
Safran's approach takes diaspora as an unproblematic entity whose formations have been 
based on either the exact moment of migration or the relationship with the homeland after 
that particular moment.  Thus, such an approach ignores the dynamic social and historical 
processes out of which these groups are created and constantly recreated. 
 These critiques lead us to the second approach that studies diaspora as a condition 
and as a process rather than as an ideal-typical community.  Starting with the criticisms of 
the descriptive accounts, post-modern accounts focus on diaspora as a condition, 
experience, process and consciousness: as a part of a new vocabulary that “registers the 
constitutive potency of space, spatiality, distance, travel and itinerancy in human sciences 
that had been premised upon time, temporality, fixity, rootedness and the sedentary.”16   
Here, diaspora is not a matter of categorization but a tool for the deconstruction of the 
categories themselves.   
From such a perspective, the notion of diaspora denotes a specific type of 
experience and thinking, that is 'diaspora consciousness'.  Diaspora consciousness is a 
characteristic of people living 'here' and 'there', a product of cultures and histories in 
collision and dialogue, and hence, distinct versions of modern and transnational 
experience.17  Furthermore, diaspora consciousness is considered to have the ability to 
question the configurations of power and the hegemony of the all-pervasive nation-state.18  
As “alternate public spheres” which enhance forms of solidarity and consciousness that 
maintain identifications outside the national time and space in order to live inside, with a 
difference,19 diasporas challenge the nation-states and their notions of sovereignty.   
 In the post-modern accounts, diaspora is not a stable entity or identity that refers to 
a particular moment of dispersal from a particular territory.  It denotes the processes of 
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unsettling, continuous dislocation and hybridization.  Diasporas refer to constantly shifting 
categories of identification that are “contested, complex and embedded in multiple 
narratives of struggle”.20  Rather than being organic and unproblematic entities, diaspora 
communities and their cultures are the instances and products of the processes of 
diasporization, transplantation and syncretization.21  In these accounts, diaspora challenges 
our notions of place, disrupts those normative spatial-temporal units of analysis like nation 
and culture, and denotes one type of displacement.22  
 Denoting displacement and deterritoralization, the notion of diaspora is considered 
beyond ethnicity and nationalism.  Such a perspective regards diaspora communities as the 
antithesis of the old understandings of ethnicity and nationalism.  The notion of diaspora no 
longer refers to those scattered tribes whose identity can only be secured in relation to some 
sacred homeland which is the old, the imperializing, the homogenizing form of “ethnicity” 
but it is defined by the recognition of a necessary heterogeneity and hybridity that refer to 
identities which are constantly producing and reproducing themselves anew through 
transformation and difference.23   
These post-modern accounts of diaspora claim that by challenging the conceptual 
limits imposed by national and ethnic/racial boundaries24 and delineating how the local and 
global have become intertwined in the processes of globalization,25 the notion of diaspora 
opens up new spaces and debates that enable us to understand the dynamics of transnational 
politics, cultural and economic processes that are shaped through the interplay of 
globalization, diversity and hybridization.   
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There are several interrelated critiques of the post-modernist approach. First, the 
automatic identification of the diasporic and the hybrid with a politically progressive and 
democratic agenda are criticized as a fetishization which ignores the importance of 
contemporary economic processes and various kinds of diasporic subject positions that 
have been used strategically for economic gain.26  Diasporas and their projects are not 
necessarily more democratic or egalitarian than the nation-states.  Furthermore, diasporas 
just like any other national or ethnic group enhance multiple hierarchies.  Diasporic identity 
is foremost a collective identity that provides us with scripts on the proper ways of having 
that particular collective identity, and hence, expectations to be met.27  Therefore the 
question here is whether the collective identity at hand is part of an emancipating project or 
whether it is another form of oppression or tyranny. 
Secondly, though deterritorialization takes place on a global scale, some lands are 
still considered sacred by the diasporas, and the claims to imagined or mythical homelands 
still persist among some communities.  ‘The call of the homeland' still continues to resonate 
as one of the most effective instruments of nationalists to mobilize their members.28  These 
attachments and claims to territories are the very part of the hybridity that the post-
modernist studies celebrate.   
Thirdly, the assumption that diaspora is beyond the notion of ethnicity is 
problematic.  Given that ethniés are defined by a common proper name, a myth of common 
ancestry, shared historical memories, a link with a homeland which may not be physically 
occupied but symbolically attached, and finally, a sense of solidarity on the part of at least 
some sections of the ethnié's population;29 the notions of ethnié and diaspora have so much 
in common.  The legitimation and strength of the diasporic groups may be gained through 
global connections and sought in global contexts, yet diasporas may be reconstituting new 
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and deterritorialized forms of ethnic and particularist ethnic absolutism.30  On such a 
ground, diaspora is not beyond ethnicity but “a particular type of ethnic category, one that 
exists across the boundaries of nation states rather than within them”.31  Hence, the 
practices and discourses that pertain to diaspora communities should also be read through 
the notion of ethnicity.  
 Fourthly, despite the consensus in the literature on the fact that globalization 
provides diasporas with new opportunities beyond the nation-state, there is no consensus 
on the characteristics of the diaspora communities that is supported by the processes and 
technologies of globalization.  Given that globalization refers to multiple processes which 
are complex, often resisted and unevenly developed over space and time;32 the 
relationships between these multiple processes and diaspora communities is multi-layered, 
complex and still open to debate.  The processes of globalization and diasporas that it 
supports do not necessarily transform into a democratic political sphere.  Global political 
sphere can as well be filled with nationalisms of various kinds.33  This dissertation argues 
that diaspora nationalism is one of those nationalisms that are channeled through the 
processes of globalization.   
Diasporas embrace a form of politics which is enmeshed in a nationalism that often 
has a life of its own, semi-independent from developments in the homeland, but frequently 
making reference to it.34  Diaspora nationalism is nationalism of ethnic groups living 
voluntarily or involuntarily in host communities, maintaining attitudes of loyalty and 
patriotism towards their home countries and sometimes organizing themselves to this 
effect.35  Through diaspora nationalism, a displaced community may keep the nationalist 
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agenda alive in isolation.36  The members of diasporic community may not politically 
orient themselves to the state in which they are located, but to the country of origin; and 
hence, employ long-distance nationalism37 that is based on a claim to membership in a 
political community that stretches beyond the territorial borders of a homeland.38  
However, such 'distance' is only a partial truth; and to understand the immediacy of this 
participation the implications of the modern information and communication revolutions 
should be considered.39  
Despite all hybrid identities and discourses within which it is located, diasporas 
enhance a kind of nationalism which is embedded in the reproduction and maintenance of 
multiple hierarchies.  It is ironic that diasporas, carriers of transnationalization may become 
the self-proclaimed guardians of rigorous nationalist and religious projects40 through their 
absolutist orientations to minorities and majorities both within the diaspora and in the so-
called homeland.41   
Yet, such a nationalism is a weapon of the relatively weak, and in order to 
understand diaspora nationalism, nationalist longing and nostalgic visions should be 
distinguished from actual processes of nation building that take place within and through 
nation-states.42  Hence, it would be a mistake to consider long-distance nationalism 
necessarily extremist.  However, as Anderson states, long-distance nationalism may be seen 
as a “probably menacing portent for the future” for three reasons: first, it is the product of 
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capitalism's remorseless and accelerating transformation of all human societies; second, it 
is based on a politics that is radically unaccountable; third, such politics, unlike those 
activists for global human rights or environmentalist causes, are neither intermittent nor 
serendipitous.43  This dissertation argues that analyses of the ways in which diasporas are 
imagined through nationalist frameworks is crucial for social science to understand the 
notion of diaspora and diaspora politics in particular and nationalism in general.   
Given such a theoretical framework, this study employs the notion of diaspora first, 
as a choice which is manifested as a voice at the political level and which even though 
ambivalent and fragmented may serve to deconstruct hegemonic nationalism.44  Secondly, 
diasporas are regarded as composed of multiple actors who participate in several networks 
of relationships with the homeland, host community, international community.45  Such an 
approach aims to move away from the idea of ‘victim diaspora’ and to locate diaspora in a 
more complicated web of relationships, bargains and strategies.  Thirdly, this study 
considers diaspora the crossroads where nationalism, ethnicity and globalization meet and 
cross each other.  From such a perspective, diaspora is a heuristic device through which the 
dynamic terrains of nationalism, ethnicity and globalization can be explored. 
 
 
 
3.2. Mapping Diaspora Nationalism of the Circassians in Turkey 
 
 
 
 This dissertation regards Circassians as a diaspora community.   Given that there are 
other ways to study Circassians that may lead this study to different theoretical orientations; 
this is a particular choice that should be explained.   
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 When the self-definition of the group is taken into account, it is seen that the 
Circassian community in Turkey has defined itself in various ways and used the terms 
immigrant, minority, diaspora and nation interchangeably and, most of the time, 
strategically.  While all of these identifications may be useful for social science to 
understand Circassians in Turkey; the existence of multiple, conflicting and strategically 
shaky grounds on which Circassians define themselves signals that Circassians in Turkey 
continuously define themselves through multiple solidarities, identities, narratives and 
relations.  Studying Circassians in Turkey as an ethnié, minority group or immigrants 
freezes such a diversity and reduces it to one dimension which is only one among many.  
Such a unidimensional approach ignores the web of relations between the homeland, the 
host country and the diasporic community; the continuous references of Circassians in 
Turkey to the homeland, to diaspora and to Circassians in other countries; and the return 
movement of the 1990s which cannot be regarded just as an instance of immigration or 
ethnicity but as a conscious move that Circassian community has claimed to be looking 
forward to since the nineteenth century.  Therefore the concepts of ethnié, immigrant 
community and minority will be useful to the extent that they are studied as parts of 
diasporic discourses which are embedded in politics of Turkey and homeland, international 
politics, and globalization. 
 Hence, in terms of highlighting and capturing the dynamism of the community, the 
notion of diaspora proves to be useful for the Circassians in Turkey.  Although there are 
significant differences between the definitions of diaspora,46 one can still track the common 
features among those definitions that most diaspora scholars seem to agree upon; and one 
can analyze Circassians in Turkey and in other countries through these features. 
 First, rather than a transfer from the homeland to a single destination, the term 
diaspora implies a scattering and the existence of the internal networks linking the various 
segments of a diaspora.47  Throughout the nineteenth century, Circassians had immigrated 
to Turkey, Syria, Jordan and Palestine/Israel.  Furthermore, there are Circassians and 
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Circassian Associations in Europe (Holland and Germany) and America.  Despite 
differences and historical variations in terms of the extent and scope of relationships among 
various diaspora communities and with the homeland, Circassian community in Turkey has 
always been linked to other diasporic communities and homeland.  Yet the ways Circassian 
diaspora in Turkey is linked to the homeland and other diaspora communities have changed 
and intensified after 1990.   
Secondly, the notion of diaspora refers to a relationship to an actual or imagined 
homeland and such a bond is the foundation from which diaspora identity may develop.48  
Circassian community in Turkey has always referred to a homeland that is considered 
sacred.  Even when discourse on homeland was not accompanied by narratives of exile 
before the 1990s, the Caucasus was regarded as the site where Circassians were once 
'rooted';49 and it was considered the land to be remembered by the Circassians in Turkey.  It 
was through the laments (ğıbzes) that they remembered the Caucasus; it was the Nart 
Sagas; it was the mountains of the Caucasus, Elbruz that they remembered; it was the 
memories on the places of birth, deportation and resettlement.  In the periods when 
diaspora nationalisms were on the rise, it was the poems, stories, articles published on 
magazines which were sometimes transformed into physical encounters and relations with 
other Circassians and the Caucasus.  Thus, this dissertation claims that, within the 
Circassian community in Turkey, there has always been a group that has embraced diaspora 
nationalism though the collapse of the Soviet Union proved to be a golden opportunity for 
the rise of diaspora nationalism.   
Moreover, one should also note the heterogeneity within this group of Circassian 
nationalists.  Circassian diaspora nationalism is not a homogenous block but it is composed 
of multiple lines of thought.  As far as Circassians are concerned, there are different forms 
of diaspora nationalism.  Rather than being solid political movements, these forms of 
diaspora nationalism are interrelated and to some extent opposed to each other; and each 
pertain to some Circassian groups and organizations.  These forms and groups are those 
                                                  
48Ibid. 
 
49
 For the naturalization of links between people and place through botanical metaphors see L. Malkki, 
“National Geographic: The Rooting of Peoples and the Territorialization of National Identity among Scholars 
and Refugees,” in Culture, Power, Place: Explorations in Critical Anthropology, eds. A. Gupta and J. 
Ferguson, (Duke University Press, 2001), 52-74. 
 
68 
  
who favour the creation of an independent and united Caucasia; who support ‘return’ and 
repatriation in the Caucasus as the only option of Circassian diaspora in Turkey; who 
regard a socialist revolution as the only way for Circassians; and finally, who regard 
Turkish nationalism and Turanist ideas as feasible for Circassians.  However, each line of 
thought is among the sources of Circassian diaspora nationalism; and taken together, all of 
them are the formations of diaspora nationalism despite their oppositions to each other.   
As these forms of diaspora nationalism sometimes pertain to historical epochs, the 
actual questions that are being debated pertain to the questions on the homeland, diaspora 
politics and Circassian identity.  Though post-Soviet conjuncture has altered some basic 
elements of these thoughts, these lines of thought still act as formations and discourses of 
diaspora nationalism through which diasporic groups debate on homeland, identity and 
politics.  Furthermore, these formations of diaspora nationalism are far from being 
homogenous within themselves: each embodies several different positions which may only 
be explored by a particular focus on particular groups which is beyond the scope of this 
study.  I will now explore four interrelated forms of Circassian diaspora nationalism in 
Turkey. 
 
 
 
3.2.1. “Independent and United Caucasia”  
 
 
As the slogan of “Independent and United Caucasia” can be thought as a general 
diasporic discourse, it is a shortcut for a diasporic line of thought as far as Circassians in 
Turkey are concerned.  Starting from the mid 1950s, Circassian nationalist groups had been 
organized in line with this thought.  The idea of “United Caucasia” and its vision of 
homeland was highy inspired by the people from Caucasia who came to Turkey during the 
Bolshevik Revolution and Second World War, and their understandings of Caucasia.  The 
basic historical reference is the Republic of the Northern Caucasus which was established 
in 1918 with the help of the Ottoman Empire and as a consequence of the political alliances 
that were based on vague Turanist aims.  As this line of thought is prone to be anti-
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Bolshevik in the Cold War Era, and, to some extent, anti-Russian in the post-Soviet 
context, it is discursively open to multiple alliances with the Turkish rightist groups such as 
Islamists and Turkish nationalists.  The basic vision towards the homeland is not returning 
to the homeland but rather changing its political conditions.  Thus, anti-Russianism, anti-
Bolshevism, anti-leftism and Islamism act as the basic principles of the thought of United 
Caucasia.   
In the post-Soviet order, given the multiple debates over the future of the Caucasus, 
the arguments of “Independent and United Caucasia” are still being voiced though one of 
the most crucial elements of the thought which is anti-communism is lost. Đzzet, aged 62, a 
former president of the Caucasus Federation underlines the criticism of the “United 
Caucasia” group vis-à-vis the Caucasus Federation in terms of their visions of and actions 
in the Caucasus:   
 
   “When we try to defend return, when we say that we are against Chechnian 
War and war [in general], that we have tolerance for the death of even one of 
our people, that we need to increase our people, they oppose us by reacting us 
for being the servants of Russia, allies of Russia and use slogans such as 
independent great free Caucasia from Black Sea to Caspian which will be 
sympathized by the young people.  Both independent and great united Caucasia.  
God makes those who do not want that blind.  I also want that but they have 
never told whether or not that is real or whether that is going to be real.”50 
 
 
 
3.2.2. Returnists (Dönüşçü / Göççü) 
 
 
The idea of return and repatriation among Circassians emerged in the mid 1960s; 
groups of young people –mostly university students who came from villages to urban 
centers of Turkey for education in the 1960s formed the base of the movement.  Even 
though Đzzet Aydemir, the president of Ankara Association and the publisher of Kafkasya 
magazine has often been referred as the first sparkle of the movement, it was especially 
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with the later magazines of Kamçı and Yamçı published in the 1970s that the movement 
relatively became –relatively- solid and public. 
It was in these years that the ideas of return, exile, assimilation and repatriation 
were first announced.  Furthermore, the Caucasus was explicitly imagined for the first time 
as a geography to be explored and visited.  Anti-assimilationism, return and the national 
right to self-determination were among the themes used by the returnists.   
On these years, Metin, aged 62 and one of the leading figures of the group explains 
the returnists and their thoughts:  
 
   “Then we analyzed that geography had a great effect.  And then we had so 
many question marks such as we were Circassians, we were not Turks, we had 
a homeland, then we had to do whatever we could to unite and meet at our 
homeland, was it possible, how was it possible, how did we come from there, 
why did we come; we started to explore these.  Finally, we decided that we 
could return to the Caucasus.  We could if we wanted to and we should want 
that.  If we explained that to our people, they would want it.  Because each 
society, each creation struggles for survival.  ….There might be obstacles, 
Russia, Soviet Union back then might not accept it; if it did not accept it, there 
were other things to be done, the support of United Nations and the world might 
be provided.  After all, there is the right of a people to live in their territory; this 
should be accepted, the right of the nations to determine their own destiny….  
We really received so many positive reactions from all over Turkey, and there 
were so many people who got furious at us and told that we would be a trouble 
for them.”51   
 
As the first –though vaguely- organized Circassian group in Turkey that used a 
nationalist language for national matters and explicitly talked about return and repatriation, 
the movement was inspired and triggered by the politics of the 1960s and 1970s, 
particularly ‘68 movement and the rise of Turkish nationalism; and the terminology was to 
some extent borrowed from the leftist movement in Turkey.  Hasan, aged 48 who was a 
university student in Ankara in those years explains the relationship of the returnists with 
the anti-communism of United Caucasia and the general attitudes of the groups in the 
associations and the leftists whose ideas would be voiced in the 1970s:   
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   “…and when you talked about Circassianhood, when you said the Caucasus 
etc., you were automatically regarded as a leftist.  In years ‘73 or ‘74, when 
someone in the association of Ankara communicated with his relatives in the 
Caucasus, there had been attempts to nullify his membership.  There was such 
an environment; I am telling this for you to see it.  There was an extreme anti-
communism.  [The claim of the anticommunists was that] The Circassians who 
remained [in the Caucasus] were the collaborators of Russians; there was no 
spoken language there, Circassian stuff [books, magazines etc.] were being sent 
here but these were all propaganda by the Russians to deceive the Circassians in 
Turkey.  For instance, Circassian broadcasts were being listened in Turkey and 
these were all showcases, Circassian was not being spoken, they were regarded 
as tricks and those who went to the Caucasus were totally seen as spies.  ….. 
After 1976, when the socialist movement in Turkey developed, a further 
affiliation took place but we, I mean the movement in the background, never 
used a totally socialist discourse.  Of course, we used international concepts 
such as assimilation, chauvinism, being anticapitalist and anti-imperialist etc.  
…It was more of an independent line.”52 
 
Borrowing terminology from the politics of the late 1960s and 70s, returnists emphasized 
assimilation in diaspora, and hence, the necessity of return as the only way to live as 
Circassians.  As there had always been some sort of contacts of the Circassians in Turkey 
with the Caucasus, the returnists were the first in the diaspora to find their “lost” relatives 
in the Caucasus, visit the Caucasus and contact with the organizations in the Caucasus.  
Furthermore, their actions were oriented to forming an explicitly political movement with a 
solid political program.   
 
 
 
3.2.3. Leftists 
 
 
In the 1970s, another group emerged among the Circassians in Turkey.  It was 
inspired by the socialist movements in Turkey and it was composed of several political 
fractions just like the socialist movement in Turkey.  Meral, aged 51, a leftist Circassian at 
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the time explains how she experienced two identities of being a leftist and Circassian in the 
1970s:  
 
   “Indeed it was a leftist group within which we entered with our Circassian 
friends.  They overlapped.  We had a young group in the association.  As that 
group was going to the cinema together, playing our dances, that group was 
organized by a movement that came from outside, let me put it that way.  One 
of the organizers was Circassian and we all joined the movement.  …we 
continued in the association; that is, we used to go out of the association and go 
to the meetings, protests; that group in the association did not break up.  …Our 
motivations were still about Circassians.  That is, if the revolution was made, 
all peoples would be equal, all of us would get equal rights, then on that basis 
we would have developed relations with the Caucasus.  …So again our leftism 
was not independent of Circassians, we were leftists since leftism would be 
good for Circassians, let me put it that way.  Its sincerity can also be debated, it 
seems.”53 
 
Thus, the basic argument of the Circassian leftists was that revolution would benefit 
Circassians in Turkey.  As for some groups the Bolshevism of Russia, and hence, the 
Caucasus was an inspiration, some leftists groups rejected Bolshevism.  The Circassian 
revolutionists in Turkey were a mirror of the general socialist movement in Turkey, yet 
they tried to conciliate two different political affiliations: ethnic activism and leftism that 
were conflictual -at least- in theory.   
Remembering the late 1970s, Nezih, who is originally a returnist himself despite his 
opposition to some of the returnist groups, explains his interaction with the young 
Circassian leftists of the time:   
 
   “The agenda was not return any more.  Our debate in Istanbul occurred 
because of the leftists.  …These kids were leftists but they were a group that 
read more, studied Circassianhood more, organized conferences.  They were 
constantly alert.  But according to them there was going to be a social 
revolution in Turkey and Circassians were going to get their rights.  They were 
going to get their identity, with that aim they were working as fractions.  But 
these children had Circassian identities.  …I told them “Friends, you have 15 
days, we are elected by the Circassians, this place is a Circassian association.  
Okey, I accept leftism, I also accept your fractionalism but we have a measure.  
Let us support the fraction that supports the Circassians most since we are 
elected by the Circassians.”  …For three nights we debated till morning.  They 
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used to read continuously, they read Stalin, they read Lenin, they read and read.  
…Then we met again, I said “here you are, which one of you now brings 
fractions?”  No one.  No word.  There is no mentioning of the Circassian.  It is 
all Kurds.  …There we had a decision on principles that we were Circassians 
and our fraction was Circassianhood, without that we could not operate.”54 
 
However, what terminated the existence of the leftist movement in the Circassian 
associations was not the lack of the notion of ethnicity other than Kurds in socialist 
movements in Turkey but rather the political developments in Turkey such as the coup 
d’éta of 1980 and later, the end of Cold War.   
Looking back from year 2008, the revolutionists of the time state that the political 
movements that they joined in those years were not in conflict with their ethnic identities 
and that they could easily exist as Circassians in those movements.  Nevertheless, some of 
the revolutionists of the time today have some self-reflections regarding their political 
activism.  Kenan, who, because of his political activism, spent some of his years hiding not 
to be arrested after the coup d’éta of 1980 states:  
 
   “But I should mention that there was a very different thing back then, there 
was an aim in Turkey, there was something to do, socialism was going to be 
achieved.  There was an ideal like that, when struggling for that why should I 
deal with the particularity of Circassians?  If I put that system into practice, I 
was already solving the problem.  Furthermore, it was not the problem of 
socialism, it was our problem.  ….A movement that aimed to save Turkey 
should know about all the details of Turkey, working groups should have been 
organized on that basis.  If I am a Circassian, my special interest should be 
Circassians and their particular problems.  A movement that should have been 
like that became something else later on.  …One of the defects of the socialist 
Circassians of the 1968-78 generation, apart from the inability to politicize the 
people in Turkey, was that we should have had that struggle particularly for 
Circassians, we did not struggle at all, all work was done for the people of 
Turkey.”55   
 
Such a self-reflection by the Circassian leftist activists is a result of the post-Soviet 
order and the dissolution of the Soviet Union since leftist activists of the Circassian 
community in Turkey vanished starting from the 1990s.   
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3.2.4. Turkish Nationalism 
 
 
As Turkish nationalism, in most of the instances, is thought as an opponent of other 
nationalisms in Turkey, this study argues that Turkish nationalism is one of the forms of 
Circassian diaspora nationalism.  The relationships between Turkish nationalism and 
Circassians in Turkey are more complex than total opposition.  For instance Gürsoy, aged 
47 and politically active in the Turkish nationalist groups in late 1970s explores the role of 
his ethnic identity in the political movement:  
 
  “Well, years 76, 78 were exactly a period when such a civil war took place, 
you had to locate yourself somewhere, and my place was indeed obvious.  
Well, who was the protector and enforcer of a political movement in this 
country?  Russia.  I had to be automatically located against that.  ….The Party 
did not discuss that [ethnic identity], it was secondary.  When there were issues 
about us, we were already a very enhanced identity.  That is, being Caucasian in 
origins was a source of pride in those organizations.”56 
 
As anti-Russian and anti-Soviet tendencies acted as the uniting factors between the 
Circassian and other minor identifications and Turkish nationalism throughout Cold War 
years, ‘being a nationalist in general’ also acts as a bridge.  Hicran, aged 43 narrates her 
observations on the relationship between members of ethnic communities and Turkish 
nationalism: “You always find them in a group of people from the Nationalist Action Party.  
There are people who think that being from the Nationalist Action Party, since it is 
nationalist, is like being an Abkhazian nationalist.”57   
Hence, despite the relationship between Turkish nationalism and Circassian activists 
have most often been far from being harmonious, there are some channels between the two.  
From such a perspective, Turkish nationalist movement not only acts as the significant 
other but also as one of the forms and sources of diaspora nationalism though it is the most 
subtle and conflictual one.   
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3.3. Discourses of Circassian Diaspora Nationalists on Turkish Nationalism  
 
 
  
As Turkish nationalism is not a timeless monolythical block but composed of 
several branches, in general it has a dual attitude towards Circassians in Turkey: as one 
discourse underlines the commonalities between Circassians and Turks and invents the 
notion of “Caucasian Turks” just like the notion of “Mountain Turks” which is used for 
Kurds, the other major nationalist discourse highlights Circassians as one of the many 
different ethnic groups that threats Turkish nation as “the enemies inside”.  Most of the 
Circassians interviewed for this study have highlighted the multiplicity of the discourses of 
Turkish nationalism on Circassians.  Hasan, for instance, highlights heterogeneity of 
Turkish nationalist discourses in terms of Circassians:  
 
“Then I had a lot of time, I read most of those Turkist magazines.  …In those 
magazines, it is apparently seen that Circassians are not Turkish; there are the 
enemies inside and outside; there is the idea that these are people who will 
always betray.  If we move from the most racist group… to the less racist 
group, there is a movement that defines Circassians as Caucasian Turks.  ...It is 
like: these [Circassians] are very heroic people, they struggled a lot with 
Russians, they are already Turks.  If we move further, there is a group that 
accepts that Circassians are not Turks but they should be Turkified.  …If we 
move further, there is a group that thinks that they can protect their cultural 
presence to some extent but this should happen under the Turkish identity, that 
there should be a higher identity and that should be Turkish identity.”58 
 
As the multiplicity of discourses of Turkish nationalism on Circassians is 
highlighted, conditions of inclusion in the nation are also among the themes of the members 
of diaspora.  From such a point of view, Turkish nationalism has never been the exact 
opposite of Circassian identity and activism but rather Turkish nationalism has its own 
conditions of inclusion for Circassians.  Hence, the acceptance of Circassians into Turkish 
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nationalist groups as exemplified by many members of diaspora is seen as conditional.   
Most of the Circassians during the interviews have narrated on the conditional nature of the 
relationship between Turkish nationalism and Circassians.  The first condition of inclusion 
is accepting Turkishness as Kaya, aged 49 explains: “Turkish nationalism considers us the 
enemy.  When we say we are Turks, there is no problem for them.  Till now, the concept of 
Caucasian Turk has been a dual hypocrisy.  But the moment we say we are not Turks we 
have a serious problem.”59 
 As announcencement of Circassian identity is problematic to the extent that it is 
defined as separate from Turkish identity, Mert further underlines that the relationship 
between Turkish nationalism and Circassians is a one-way relationship: 
 
   “Turkish nationalism regards Circassians as good on the basis that they do not 
declare their Circassian identity.   The moment they announce their Circassian 
identity, it just becomes opposed.  But still there are exceptions like my friends 
who are Turkish nationalists but who still appreciate me.  …Well, Circassians 
enhance Turkish nationalism but a Turk does not enhance Circassian 
nationalism.  …This is a significant point.  That should be understood.”60 
 
As there are many Circassians that join Turkish nationalist groups, their existence in these 
groups has a twofold effect.  First, the existence of Circassians in Turkish nationalist 
movement creates a bufferzone between Circassians and Turkish nationalists as Esat, aged 
37 explains the relationship between Circassians and Turkish nationalists:  
 
   “It seems that Turkish nationalism’s relationship [with Circassians] is not 
similar to quote en quote its relationship with Kurds that considers them lower.  
But I feel that there is a conceptualization that considers them [Circassians] an 
element of betrayal, an element that lives within itself but which is going to bite 
one day when the times are hard.  But I cannot know all the dimensions.  
Maybe this is not very visible because in rural areas there are unfortunately so 
many Abkhazians and Circassians in the Turkish nationalist movement.” 
 
Secondly, the existence of Circassians among nationalist groups is defined as conditional.  
Such an existence in those political parties and groups is based on defining Circassians as a 
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branch of Turks rather than a separate ethnic group.  Meral, for instance, narrates on one of 
her friends’ experience in Turkish nationalist groups:   
 
   “If you define yourself as Circassians who are a noble branch of the Turks as 
they try to deceive, then there is no problem.  For instance one of our friends, 
let’s not give his/her name, got involved with people from MHP [Nationalist 
Action Party] when s/he was in teacher’s school.  S/he had relationships wih 
them, s/he became one of them.  But meanwhile s/he was very proud of his 
Circassian identity, s/he always talked about it etc. and nobody was bothered 
about that.  Then s/he went to his/her village.  When s/he talked more about 
being a Circassian after return, they just pull him/her to a corner and told him 
“We know that you are a Circassian but do not tell that openly everywhere.”  
…Then s/he said “I am a Circassian, how can I not tell that?” and s/he 
questioned it.  ….Well it is not a problem when you put your identity as part of 
Turks.  But the moment you put it as Circassians, of course they are going to 
consider it an enemy.”   
 
As public announcements of Circassian identity are narrated as troublesome as far as 
Turkish nationalism is concerned, there are other conditions of inclusion and acceptance.  
Şener, one of the activists in Circassian associations further elaborates on these conditions 
and expectations of Turkish nationalism from Circassians:  
 
   “Turkish nationalism first of all regards Circassians as victims of Russia.  
That is the point that overlaps.  And it connects Circassians to the Turkish 
peoples in the Caucasus and Central Asia.  Turkish nationalism expects from 
Circassians to forget Caucasia because it is afraid that Caucasia may feed 
Circassian identity.  The support that it gives to Circassians is conditional; 
Circassians are supported to the extent that they forget Caucasia and become 
the enemies of Russians.  Turkish nationalists expect thankfulness from the 
Circassians, it expects that Circassians should be thankful to them by saying 
that “you embraced us, without you we would not exist”.  And it regards any 
demand in the name of Circassian identity as ingratitude.  ….this is based on 
four conditions: forgetting Caucasia, being thankful, hating Russians, 
demanding nothing.  When they do not fulfill these four conditions, Circassians 
become the Slavic germs in Russia in the eyes of the Turkish nationalist.  
Unfortunately the given support is conditional.”61   
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Hence, despite the existence of a group among the Turkish nationalist movement, 
the positions between friend and foe, support and opposition are easy to travel for 
Circassians in the discourse of Turkish nationalism.  In such instances of travel, Turkish 
nationalism regards Circassians as a potential threat which should be observed and kept 
under constant surveillance.  Some Circassian activists criticize Turkish nationalism on the 
basis that it is oppressive, assimilating and unrespectful to differences as Nezih, a 
Circassian lawyer narrates on Turkish nationalism and his encounters with some Turkish 
nationalist reactions as a Circassian: 
 
   “Former is refusal and latter is the assimilation policy.  Well, it says that 
Circassians are Turks, this is one approach.  Second, it does not accept anything 
Circassian, it rejects it.  This is the most usual form of assimilation that is used 
by the state mechanism.  It tells you that “Setenay, you are a Turk” but it knows 
that you are a Circassian, it knows, it knows that you are ethnically Circassian.  
But because naming you as Turks fits into its nationalism and thought, it calls 
you Circassian.  But when you want to do something, tell something as 
Circassians, it just says no, it rejects.  ….The notion of human rights in Turkish 
identity is self-centered human rights.  It is Turks-centered.  It is human rights 
that do not recognize any identity, any culture.  Now they come and tell us that 
“Can’t you be lawyers, doctors or members of the parliament?  What else do 
you want?”  Well, none of these is human rights.”62 
 
 However these encounters of Circassians with Turkish nationalist groups and 
reactions take place not only on the individual level but also on the organizational level.  
The choice of the date of the commemoration of May 21, the commemoration day of exile 
may be an instance of encountering Turkish nationalism without any intention of Circassian 
activists.  In the discourse of Turkish nationalism, the lines between friend and foe, us and 
them, loyal elements and traitors are easy to surpass for Circassians as Meral tells the 
unexpected consequences of a May 21st commemoration:  
 
   “For instance there is an event that I remember.  We arrange the 
commemoration of May 21 according to the weekend so that everybody can 
participate.  So one year we commemorate May 21 on May 19.  For instance, 
about that event there is a very long article of a retired soldier: why did they 
[Circassians] make it coincide with May 19?  There is an article that says that 
                                                  
62
 Nezih, interview by author, 17-18 August 2007, Đstanbul. 
 
79 
  
May 19 is the day for Youth and Sports, this [coincidence] had a special 
meaning and asks what Circassians were trying to say.  I read it and I cannot 
believe it.  That much of conspiracy theory is unbelievable.”63 
 
Similar to the example quoted above, most of the encounters of Circassians with 
Turkish nationalism are haphazard and random.  In these instances, Circassians are 
regarded as the “next ethnic group” that may tend to betray Turkish nation.  Here it should 
be emphasized that the explanations for these kinds of nationalist sensitivities are historical 
as the historical examples of the so-called traitors are commonly referred in these reactions.  
Thus, the reactions are far from being particular to Circassians but rather about the way 
Turkish nationalism thinks about the ethnic groups other than Turks: with suspicion, 
paranoia, the emphasis on the need for surveillance, and the possibility of being stabbed in 
the back again etc.   
Yet the relationship between Circassians and Turkish nationalism is not only based 
on rejection or the existence of mutual groups but also Turkish nationalism has a 
constitutive role as far as other nationalisms are concerned to the extent that it is “the other” 
of these nationalisms.  For instance, redefining and politicizing itself throughout the 1970s, 
Turkish nationalism inspired Circassian activisits of the same period.  Most people I 
interviewed have highlighted the significance of Turkish nationalism in their becoming 
“Circassian and gaining diasporic consciousness”:  
 
  “Okey, we were going to be idealist teachers, enlighten people etc. but what 
manipulated me most was that within that political context of 1970s people 
from the Nationalist Action Party had very harsh attitudes towards Circassians.  
They were so humiliating… “Either love or leave” had started even in those 
times.  To be frank, that disturbed us.  We needed to explore a new identity that 
we were unaware till that time.  I remember very well that they had a 
declaration; in that we were all traitors, dreadful calamities.  In those days, we 
did not even have our associations.  But as far as I am concerned what triggered 
Circassians’ consciousness was people from the Nationalist Action Party.  
…Then we were shocked.  After that shock we wondered whether that was us.  
Then I started studying our history, I started going to our associations.”64   
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As homeland dimension is crucial for diaspora which is beyond the scope of this 
chapter, encounters between hegemonic nationalism and diaspora shape the way diaspora 
narrates about itself, locates and transforms its identity.  Through state policies in 
education, armed service, justice etc. and a rising Turkish nationalism which is based on 
multiple and simultenous tides of assimilation and exclusion, Circassian diasporic identity 
is constantly constructed and positioned vis-a-vis/through Turkish nationalism. 
Relationships with the state institutions especially in terms of education, soldiering and 
security set the context which shapes diasporic experience and identity.   
Furthermore, comparisons with Turkish nationalism give Circassians an explanation 
for their failure: why Circassians have failed as a nation in terms of nation-state building.  
In these comparisons Turkish nationalism is the successful project as the Circassian case is 
the failure in an order within which nations and nation-states are the norm.  Hence, the 
relationship with Turkish nationalism is not just based on rejection or criticism but also 
acknowledgement of the successful implementation of the Turkish nationalist project:    
 
   “Turks are different from Circassians.  They are committed to land, that 
[commitment] starts with the soil and goes to the homeland.  This is reverse for 
Circassians.  They are not psychologically attached to land.  They tend to leave 
it easily.  …culturally they have not been able to reach to the concept of 
homeland.  …In Turkey, they have a full consensus in terms of homeland.  As 
far as I am concerned this is good.  …Circassians in Turkey are ideologically 
nothing.  When Turks are struggling, they have no debate on the homeland, 
there is no debate on that.”65  
 
For the Circassian activists in Turkey, Turkish nationalism and Turkish state formation 
process is “the paradigm”, “the model” and “the pattern” through which nationalism is 
learned, acknowledged, criticized or imitated.  Meanwhile, several Circassians in Turkey 
have been in very good terms with Turkish nationalism and state, and still retained their 
cultural identity as Circassians.   
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3.4.  Diasporic Maneuvers  
 
 
 
Circassians in Turkey not only produce discourses on Turkish nationalism but also 
relates to and acts on Turkish nationalism in several ways.  Through these discourses 
diaspora nationalism simultaneously rejects, imitates, flirts, cooperates and challenges 
hegemonic nationalism.  Hence, the relationship between diaspora nationalism and 
hegemonic nationalism is far from being an exact opposition but rather includes strategies 
and maneouvers that are open to rapid change and transformation.  From such a 
perspective, the ways Circassian nationalists define themselves, their identity, history and 
aims are not regardless of their relationship with other nationalisms but deeply embedded in 
them as manouverized acts to resist, cope and deal with the hegemonic nationalism.  This 
part of the chapter aims to explore the ways through which Circassian diaspora nationalists 
in Turkey cope with Turkish nationalism in particular and nationalism in general.   
 
 
 
3.4.1. Reclaiming the Public 
 
 
As Circassian nationalists over and over emphasize that they have no problems with 
the territorial indivisibility of the country, they demand, claim and indeed reclaim the 
public sphere.  The overemphasis on indivisibility is mostly due to their fears of 
“resembling to Kurdish nationalism.”  The claim and the demand to publicity, gaining and 
regaining the public is one of the recent areas of struggle for Circassian nationalists in 
Turkey.  As the significance of regaining the public is highlighted as a political project, 
reclaiming the public is also reclaiming the diasporic identity, past and memories.  For 
instance Nesibe, aged 58 who is among the professional workers of one of the Circassian 
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associations associates her first experience of hearing Circassian songs in public with her 
father’s experience:  
 
   “My father did not hear Circassian songs in public.  Of course he listened on 
radio and cassettes.  We used to listen Jordanian radio those days, on Saturday 
evening at four o’clock. … But apart from that he could not listen in public.  
When Doğan’s cassette [the first Circassian music artifact that has been 
produced for the national market] had been first on the market, I heard it on the 
street playing from a music store.  There was no such thing.  I felt…   I could 
not just stand there, I could not leave.  It is not proper to cry in the middle of the 
street.  It was just playing there as loud as it could be...  It was dreadfully 
beautiful.  He [my father] could not see these.  I feel sorry for that.”66 
 
The policies of the nation-state provide Circassians and other ethnic groups in Turkey a 
monolythical public sphere.  In such a context, the non-Turkic languages –for instance 
Adyghe language- becomes a private practice, a language that is spoken at home, between 
spouses, between grandson and grandparents etc.  Thus, one of the recent debates of the 
Circassians in Turkey considers how to exist in the public sphere; the recent celebrations, 
announcements and commemorations that are open to Turkish public originate from this 
idea.   
However to the extent that the attempt to reclaim the public is fulfilled, encounters 
with Turkish nationalism in particular and nationalism in general become unavaoidable: 
 
   “Our image in Turkey was like that, when you say Circassian, people would 
think about beauty, aesthetics, respect, love and culture.  But nowadays 
especially within the last 5 years, because of our people, people start to think 
that Circassians will be the next calamity after Kurds.  ..There are already so 
many racists in Turkey.  Kurdish and Turkish nationalisms are struggling with 
each other but even non-racist people are now regarding us in negative terms.  
This is very bad.  …How are we going to make it right?  …For instance, I am a 
graduate of a technical university, and I have an image there.  But recently due 
to those newly formed negative connotations, my friends are immediately 
blaming me with Circassian nationalism whenever I send a mail to our e-mail 
group.  There is a reaction that is being formed.  I have always been known as a 
Circassian in my class.  But I used to be known as a Circassian but a good 
guy…”67 
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Any participation, claim or demand that is voiced in Turkish public is received and 
reacted in nationalist terms.  As Meral highlights, any diasporic claim or demand by 
Circassians tend to be understood in nationalist terms, such as the indivisibility of the 
country: “We do not have any claim towards the indivisibility of the country.  All we think 
about is the Caucasus and having some cultural rights here.  That is, will Turkey be divided 
if I speak Circassian?  It is such an absurd thing.”68   
 Diaspora which is theoretically a global and transnational player that presumably 
creates a third space beyond national systems is unable to avoid or overcome nationalism in 
a context within which different nationalisms are struggling for public sphere.  The 
dilemma of diaspora activists is that they will either give up the claim to public sphere and 
enhance the usual silence of Circassians in Turkey that is referred in the interviews or they 
will be a part of the nationalist struggles and discourses in which, given their diasporic 
condition, they claim to have no place.  Moreover, since Turkish nationalism is constructed 
in the lines argued in Chapter 4, any recognition of diversities or any such demand is seen 
as a challenge as far as Turkish nationalism is concerned.   
 
 
 
3.4.2. Reversing the Official Historiography 
 
 
One of the instances that shape Circassian diasporic experience and identity in 
Turkey is related to official historiography which had associated the name Circassian with a 
so-called traitor figure of Turkish national history, Cerkes Ethem for decades.   
 Since the 1990s, Circassian researchers have tried to overcome that stigmatizing 
identification.  Although Circassians have joined other wars before and after the War of 
Independence, one of the contemporary research areas in Circassian diaspora in Turkey is 
the role of Circassians in the War of Independence which is historically considered to be 
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the constitutive war of the Turkish Republic.69  Similarly most of the Circassian people 
today refer to their “grandfathers who has shed blood for this country” to claim equal rights 
of citizenship vis-à-vis any possibility of ethnic discrimination.  The claims of participation 
into the Turkish War of Independence links diaspora nationalism to the Turkish Republic 
and Turkish official historiography.  Hence, the military experience that is shared with the 
people of Turkey, an exclusively masculine affair as far as Circassians in Turkey are 
concerned becomes the source of claims over equal citizenship and equality.  The links 
with the Republic of Turkey are discursively formed through shared experiences of 
militarism which are exclusively masculine.   
 These claims find their opposites in Turkish national historiography which is not 
only silent on the 'claimed' participation of Circassians into the War of Independence but 
also regards the Çerkes Ethem affair as a turning point in which the “traitors” are 
eliminated from the national cause.  As Circassians nationalists, since the 1990s, have 
challenged and reversed the national historiography by claims of participation into the War 
of Independence, they have also rejected the title “traitor” concerning Cerkes Ethem affair 
not as historically invalid but politically incorrect.  As an example, one reader letter in a 
newspaper in 1990 complains about and rejects such a use of the name Circassian:  
 
   “It has been stated that Çerkes Ethem is a traitor, that he escaped, that he 
stabbed the country in the back (“vatanı arkadan bıçakladı”)...  When they say 
as strong as a Turk (“Türk gibi kuvvetli”), they give Yaşar Doğu as an example.  
However, Yaşar Doğu is a Circassian.  So why is it Çerkes Ethem and not 
Çerkes Yaşar Doğu?  These are issues that make many people like me 
heartsick.”70  
 
 Claims of participation into the nation-building processes also allow Circassians to 
define themselves as the constitutive elements of the Turkish Republic and legitimize their 
diasporic claims.  For instance Taner, aged 52, a journalist narrates on this constitutive role 
while explaining his relationship with Turkey as a Circassian:   
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   “Are we the enemies of this country as Circassians?  We are not.  We live in 
this country, this country hosted us, these lands host us.  We love this country; 
we are the constitutive members of Turkish Republic.  So?  Are we betraying 
our country?  No, sorry but I am a Circassian.  Well, I would like to be born as 
a Turk but I am born as a Circassian, there is nothing I can do about it.  I really 
would [like to be born as a Turk]; then I would not think and get concerned 
about these.  Really I would not think, I would love to be born as a Turk and 
live without trouble.  I would not have additional concerns.”71 
 
Thus, through the discourse of the constitutive element, Circassians today challenge the 
official historiography of Turkish nationalism and claim multiple roles in Ottoman history 
and in the history of Turkish Republic.   
 
 
 
3.4.3. Myth of Circassian Nationalism: “We have been used.” 
 
 
As official Turkish historiography both names the traitors as Circassians and ignores 
the Circassian origins of the Republican heroic figures, Circassians further reverse that 
historiography by talking about the way “they have been used.”  Hence, another subtle 
struggle is for the victim position. 
 
   “But we were used.  Not because they loved us.  This is how states make 
policies.”72 
 
   “In this phase of adaptation our people had done several mistakes to survive.  
Their identities were distorted, their personalities had been distorted.  You can 
see in history that they sacrificed a lot but they were not paid back in return.  
They were flattered, they were used.  I consider the history of Circassians as the 
history of being used since mid 19th century.  That is, some people had 
constantly used us.”73 
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Such a newly emerging victim position is empowering as far as Circassians are 
concerned.  First, it explains the complaints of the activists on current situation i.e. 
assimilation, loss, disintegration of the Circassian diaspora in Turkey.  Secondly, the idea 
of “still being alive despite such political experiences” makes the activists proud.  Thirdly, 
the claim that Circassians served this country in several wars or political affairs with their 
lives, properties etc. implies that in Turkey they are not “guests” any more.  When asked 
about what they heard from their grandparents or grand relatives, most of my interviewees 
highlighted their silence and refusal to talk about migration, processes of remigration, 
relationships with the host community and their experiences in the particular instances of 
nation-building process such as “Citizen Speak Turkish” campaigns etc.  Circassian 
activists mostly explain this refusal and silence as a consequence of the “guest position”, as 
a fear of losing the only land they have and becoming the migrant, the refuge again.  Hence, 
the claim that Circassians are part of the Anatolian history, Turkish national history is 
indeed the attempt to overcome this “silence of the guest.”  From such a perspective, 
Turkish national history becomes not only a ground to be rejected or challenged but also 
participated by the Circassians in Turkey.  Thus, diaspora nationalism may strategically 
search for paths of inclusion not only in the history of the homeland but also in the history 
of host states. 
 
 
 
3.4.4. Claims of ‘Rootedness’ in Anatolia 
 
 
In addition to claims of participation into the wars of the Republic, Circassians also 
connect to Turkish history through their discourses on Anatolia.  As most of the Circassians 
that I interviewed narrated on their rootlessness, inbetweenness, inability to belong, 
diasporic loneliness etc., some Circassians narrated on their existence in Anatolia not in 
terms of diaspora or “guest” but rather as parts of Anatolia.  On such a level, the 
relationships of Circassians with the peoples of Anatolia are older than the Turkish nation-
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state.  Yasemin, aged 59, an independent researcher of Circassian history and language for 
instance defines herself not as diaspora but a more rooted group of Anatolia:  
 
   “We are not here today.  Even in years 1600s you say Circassian, Abkhazian, 
you say Abkhazian Ahmet Pasha etc.  They lived on these lands with their own 
identities.  These were the people who built the Circassian Mamluk state.  Well 
we…  To be frank, I do not consider myself diaspora.  We did not come here 
yesterday and I do not explain the relationships here only with reference to the 
immigration of 1864.”74   
 
These claimed connections with Anatolia and Turkish history also explains the fact that 
how, among the Circassians, there are significant groups that regard themselves as the 
constitutive elements in Turkey, in its history and state, rather than a separate diasporic 
community.   
 Okan, aged 64, an author and an artist reitarates the thesis that Hattis were 
Circassians and employs the claim to associate history of Circassians with Turkish official 
history.  In his narrative, criticism towards Turkish official history which he insuniates with 
his words about Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the leader cult of the official history is coupled 
with the attempt to associate Circassian history with the official history of the host nation.  
Therefore criticism is ironically intertwined with a discourse on commonality:   
 
  “I believe that Hattian language is Caucasoic, and I continue believing in that 
till the reverse is proved.  Well, they built two monuments in Central Asia 
which are called Orhun monuments.  One monument is Adyghe saga, they are 
Adyghe sagas, you know that Circassians call themselves not Circassian but 
Adyghe.  Then Turks and Circassians lived together in Central Asia in one 
epoch of history.  …But I also know that Mustafa Kemal desired Turks to be 
Hattians by origin, I am saying that he desired, I am saying this particularly.  
…But afterwards people stated a big similarity between Circassians and Turks.  
…The love for the horse, warriorship, warriorship is not a virtue but 
unfortunately they had to learn it well and they became good fighters to 
survive.”75 
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Hence, Circassian activists claim a historical role not only in Turkish historiography but 
also in Anatolia.  Both of these claims empower Circassian activists vis-à-vis Turkish 
nationalism which often regards Circassians as late immigrants or guests.   
 
 
 
3.4.5.  Military Nation 
 
 
Among the diasporic maneuvers of Circassian activists in Turkey, there is also the 
discourse of military nation which is quite similar to its Turkish version.  In most of the 
interviews, Circassian activists defined Circassian history with reference to wars.  
Circassian history just like Turkish official history is narrated as the history of wars and 
military losses. Furthermore, the wars that Circassian activists referred are quite the same 
wars that are the basic elements of official Turkish history such as the War of 
Independence, the War of Gallipoli and the operation in Cyprus.  Thus, diasporic history is 
constructed and remembered as a mirror of the history of the Turkish Republic and 
diaspora is defined as a military nation:  
 
   “We feel guilty for coming here.  We left.  We migrated.  We were exiled.  
We escaped.  We left.  And we feel the anxiety of that each moment.  We are 
afraid that somebody will say you took refuge here.  Yes, we took refuge, but 
we paid its price.  …No they did not embrace us.  …they accepted us because 
we were useful.  They needed soldiers.  They needed a soldier nation.  And 
these people had died there.  They died in exiles.  Out of diseases.  Because of 
the bad conditions of settlement.  In wars.”76 
 
   “What was the ideal?  To go back to the Caucasus, to return to homeland but 
meanwhile, defending the country which had been a second homeland to them, 
they had to keep their faces open, this was what their culture demanded.  This is 
why in Gallipoli…”77 
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   “My uncle was a person who got medals from Ataturk, the uncle of my 
mother was imprisoned and sent to Athens, his surname was put as patriot, just 
think about it.  That is, our people has always been sincere warriors in Turkey, 
we do not study that much.  …My uncle for instance used to make me read the 
poem of Yahya Kemal “We, the thousand men with horses were happy like 
children that day, we, the thousand men with horses defeated a huge army that 
day” million times.  Because they really had enormous struggles.  …I am 
saying that because in our house there was sympathy for both Turkish people 
and Caucasian people.”78 
 
Cezmi, aged 65, a retired state official quotes his and an older Circassian’s dialogue with 
one of the leading politicians of Turkey in an official ceremony.  He stresses and explains 
the participation of Circassians into the wars of Turkish Republic:   
 
   “He [the older Circassian state official] told him [the politician] that since we 
knew the pains of losing a homeland, we embraced Turkey which we called our 
second homeland.  When he told that we were the group that had the most 
martyrs in the War of Independence, I told that we also had martyrs in the 
peace operation of Cyprus, that I just went to the military branch in Pınarbaşı 
and when I was passing the stairs, there were 28 photographs of martyrs, 26 of 
them were Circassians and 2 were Avshars.”79   
 
  It is striking that Circassians are defined as “military nation” in Circassian 
narratives just like Turkish nationalism which employs the concept of military nation as a 
foundational myth, an essential discursive component.80  By way of employing/ borrowing 
the concept of military nation and constructing the diasporic history on wars, martyrs and 
“blood shed for the country”; Circassian nationalists not only appropriate and reiterate the 
Turkish nationalist discourse but also challenge it by underlining the multiethnic character 
of the establishment of the nation-state.  Therefore we can argue that there is a similarity 
between the construction of Turkish national identity and Circassian national identity in 
terms of the myth of military nation.  Turkish nationalism is not  
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3.4.6.  Claiming the National 
 
 
As the necessity of claiming the public is narrated by most of the Circassians that I 
interviewed, one of the themes that they highlight is the necessity to create a national 
discourse and employ the nationalist symbols and rituals.  From such a perspective diaspora 
is not the hybrid actor of a globalized world but rather defined in terms of its lack of 
national symbols and rituals.  In a world that is based on a national order, diaspora becomes 
the failure and the lack of the national.  Mert for instance narrates on such a lack of the 
national:  
 
   “Well, let me tell you a very simple thing.  Very very simple.  There are times 
that I get sad by the question of why the word Circassian is not written in our 
passports.  Or there are times when I got surprised when our people got medals 
when they competed under different flags.  It happened to me so many times.  
Well, now why does this guy, for instance a Chechen, an Ossetian who became 
a champion, participate not under his own flag but compete for the Russian 
flag?”81 
 
Hence, one of the basic themes of diaspora activists is to claim the national.  Mirroring the 
nation-states and nationalisms that they observe; flags, ceremonies, national anthems, 
national championships are crucial for them. For instance, recalling his activism at the end 
of the 1960s, Timuçin, aged 63, who was a returnist in the 1970s and still calls himself a 
returnist, narrates on the Circassian activists’ search for the national:  
 
   “We even tried to write a national anthem.  Our national anthem.  It was 
about return.  We even wrote it, to do that we had meetings for nights.  …[he] 
wrote the first verse, I wrote the second one, let me tell you in Khabartay 
language.  ……It means “Young people waiting for the homeland!  What are 
you waiting for?  The homeland is waiting for you.  What are you still doing?”.  
…[He] wrote this and I wrote the second.  ….[It means] “if you forget me, get 
ashamed.  I do not think the blood of your grandfathers will be rightful. [helal]  
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I am waiting for you by heart, when is your return?”  …There was a guy from 
Jordan who was playing accordion, maybe he made its music, he was working 
on that.  …We were going to keep it alive among ourselves.  We still read those 
when we get together.  It is a longing, it is a desire, we still read it among 
ourselves.” 
 
To the extent that national symbols and rituals are crucial for diaspora activists, they 
strategize inbetween the national borders to create and claim the national.  Cezmi, aged 65, 
tells about the trip of an amateur Circassian dance troup from Turkey to Jordan in 1970s: 
 
   “Jordanian national anthem….  Well I told them I did not come as a 
representative of the Republic of Turkey, they did a lot not to let us come here, 
I told them not to play it [the Turkish national anthem]. …All the saloon stood 
up.  The Jordanian national anthem was played and afterwards we were waiting 
for the Turkish national anthem.  Then the voice of microphone was just cut 
off.  We waited and waited; when it did not continue, the king just told us to sit 
down by his gestures and he looked at the [Turkish] ambassador.  …Everbody 
sat down.  Our night started with the chorus, there was Mecit in the chorus, he 
wore his Circassian clothes, and the chorus was standing there.  …the piano 
was there, Adghey national anthem started with it.  It could not be done if you 
were to arrange it.  There were girls from Syria who were students in a 
boarding school and who hired a bus to come there and watch the show.  And 
they particularly bought the tickets of the first row.  They were conscious girls.  
…When the curtain was opened and Mecit sat in front of the piano and started 
playing, the first row automatically stood up.  When they stood up, all the 
saloon stood up.  When they stood up, the king and the queen stood up.  The 
ambassadors stood up.  Well, in a place where Turkish national anthem was not 
played, they watched the Adighey national anthem standing.”82 
 
This instance narrated by Cezmi, followed by his joyful laughters and the story of his 
further –and mostly unpleasant- encounters with the Turkish ambassador after this event is 
an instance of the ways diaspora resists the national order and strategizes to claim the 
national.  In this particular narrative, it was the Circassians of Turkey, Jordan and Syria that 
challenged the diplomatic practices and claimed the national.  From such a perspective, the 
national anthem which did not pertain to any particular nation-state but rather to an 
autonomous district of the Soviet Union that was hard to reach and communicate for 
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diaspora communities was employed to symbolize the resistance of diaspora and its claim 
to being a nation.   
Recently younger diaspora activists rethink about these strategies to claim the 
national.  For instance, they dream of football tournaments as a means of reclaiming the 
national as Şener states: 
 
   “For instance, for the future I think about an Adyghe-Abkhaz world football 
tournament.  It is not my project; well, I am the father of the idea but this 
should be a project of World Circassian Union, it should be handled on that 
level.  And my dream is that each city in Turkey within which there is an 
association forms a team.  …The games are played, there are the champions of 
the groups.  …And then there are the champions of the countries.  …The games 
are played in Israel, America, Holland.  …It is not played in Caucasia.  Because 
it is the place that is going to save us.  We will play those football matches 
there.”83 
 
Therefore diaspora activists think about alternative ways to create a national space for 
themselves.  The very theme of creating/playing the national anthem turns into more subtle 
ways to create and claim the national such as global football tournaments that will glorify 
the homeland.  Having observed the relationship between football and nationalism in 
Turkey, football is seen as a mechanism for diaspora to connect to other diasporic 
communities and the homeland, and hence, to revive or construct the nation.   
 
 
3.4.7.  Dilemma of Diaspora Nationalism: “My Nationalism is not Like That!”  
 
 
 One of the basic problems about the fieldwork conducted for this dissertation 
concerned the reactions of Circassian activists vis-à-vis nationalism.  Most of the 
interviewees stated that they regarded themselves not as nationalists but as “patriots”, 
people who love their culture, or just people who would like their culture and identity to 
survive.  For the diaspora activists, these definitions were not parts of nationalism.  Thus, 
during the interviews, they rejected to call themselves as nationalist, some even discussed 
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the issue with me further: they simply did not like to be called nationalist.  Even the general 
title of my dissertation made them restless.  We talked about whether or not there has ever 
been Circassian diaspora nationalism in Turkey.  For some of them Circassians were not 
able to have a movement like that and they considered that a failure.  For some 
interviewees, Circassians and nationalism were two ideas that did not go together well.  
According to them, nationalism was something different, something evil, something 
assimilating and oppressive.  In that sense, Turkish nationalism was a typical nationalism.  
Given their rejections, calling them nationalist was part of my analysis which most of them 
did not agree.  Yet this disagreement in terms of terminology needs to be explored in terms 
of Turkish politics and the meanings of being a Circassian nationalist in Turkey as far as 
Circassians are concerned.  
Concerned about resembling to the other nationalisms in Turkey, i.e Kurdish and 
Turkish nationalisms; Circassian activists who call themselves nationalist and still feel 
restless about the term revise it with some reservations and they narrate on differance of 
diaspora nationalism from other nationalisms: 
 
   “What do we mean by nationalism?  I am not chauvenistic nationalist but I 
am a nationalist.  I want to protect and be conscious about my identity.  If that 
is fascist nationalism… I do not know.  I do not think so…. I am not that.  I do 
not want to kill anybody.  I am not saying that the ones who are not from us 
should not live.”84 
 
Aged 85, with close links to Turkish nationalism Zekeriya who is among the people that 
established the Circassian associations and whose narratives may be considered the official 
history of Circassians does not consider himself nationalist:  
 
   “No, I am not a Circassian nationalist.  I am not saying that people who are 
not Circassian are not worthy.  But,   coincidentally, Circassians are created as a 
very graceful, honest, ethical people.  We are coincidentally born as 
Circassians.  This is why I am thankful.  Just coincidentally.”85  
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   “I do not like nationalism.  But I struggle for Circassians’ rights which have 
been taken away just like other people and nations.  I have friends from each 
nationality.  I do not think I am superior to them.  …But I love being 
Circassian, I love it.  I love feeling like a Circassian.”86   
 
   “But my nationalism is not based on assimilation and destruction of other 
cultures.  It depends on coexistence.  …I try to struggle with people trying to 
assimilate me not by fighting but with dialogue and I want my culture to 
survive.”87 
 
 Vis-à-vis dominant nationalism, that is Turkish nationalism, Circassian activists in 
Turkey within all their nationalist demands and discourses reject “that sort” of assimilating 
nationalism.  They mostly consider their nationalism a non-nationalism, “a natural 
nationalism” or “humanistic nationalism” at best.  Faced with assimilating nationalisms, 
they regard nationalism as a totally pejorative ideology in which they, as the members of 
the diaspora, claim to have no place.   
What most hightlights the dilemma of Circassian nationalism is that: “Yes, we 
should somehow remove the veil, the impact of Turkish nationalism but when you do that 
with the same mechanisms that Turkish nationalism used in the formation process, 
tomorrow you will get stuck.”88 
Given the inability to be part of the national order of things in a nation-state which 
is based on a different dominant ethnic identity which is either assimilating or excluding, 
nationalism is an ideology that constantly slips from the hands of Circassian diaspora 
activists.  Yet, given the rise of Turkish and Kurdish nationalisms in Turkey since the last 
15 years, there is no ground in Turkish politics and society beyond nationalism for the 
Circassians to locate itself.  It is either Turkish nationalism or Kurdish nationalism:    
 
   “I am telling this as an example.  Human Rights Association organized a 
panel and we were four people who participated.  A Laz, …a Kurd, me, a 
Circassian and an Assuryian.  These were the presenters.  We started to talk.  
Then a friend stood up and told that he was in the board of the association.  He 
just started like “We, the Kurds” and went on like “we are the smartest, heroic 
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people”.  ….I told him that then I should be saying that Circassians were the 
best horse riders, the most heroic people etc.  …Where are we going to reach 
with the best ones?  …I told him that we could not have an evaluation like that.  
Then he apologized and told that this was not what he intended.  Indeed that 
was exactly what he meant.  Kurds, Turks and the others.  This is the point that 
they would like to bring us.  This cannot happen.  This can happen nowhere.”89   
 
There seems to be no ground for Circassians inbetween Turkish nationalism which 
denies the existence of non-Turkic ethnic groups or sees them as potential threats and 
Kurdish nationalism which has territorial claims over Turkey.  As nationalism seems to be 
the most powerful political discourse that gives a group its raison d’étre in the country that 
they have settled, Circassians as a diasporic group is neither in a position to embrace it nor 
able to employ a non-nationalist language to claim their identity and voice publicly.   
 
 
 
3.5. Conclusion 
 
 
 
To conclude, I argue that diaspora politics is based not only on resistance or 
oppression but also on an array of narratives and strategies of struggle.  Within all its 
nationalist demands and agenda, diasporic groups may reject nationalism not to fall into the 
trap of resembling the hegemonic nationalism that they are trying to decompose.  Still they 
may appreciate the dominant, hegemonic nationalism as a successful example that should 
be modelled.  The way diaspora struggles with hegemonic nationalism is shaped not only 
by resistance or rejection but also by flirts, cooperations and bargains.   
As instances and products of the processes of diasporization, transplantation and 
syncretization rather than organic and unproblematic entities, as Stuart Hall reminds, the 
way diasporas narrate and politicize their diasporic condition, demands, identity and history 
is as chaotic as it can be. Within and through all that diasporic chaos, diaspora strategizes, 
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narrates and reconstructs itself and approporiates multiple narratives of struggle.  Yet these 
struggles of existence pose a very basic dilemma for diaspora activists: how to voice 
nationalist demands without resembling the oppressing and assimilating other; how to 
struggle without being nationalist, how to resist nationalism while embracing it? Faced with 
these dilemmas, Circassian activists in Turkey is a showcase for the dilemma of diaspora 
nationalism in general: challenging and criticizing the national order of things that is the 
naturalized and normalized understanding of the world of nations as a discrete partitioning 
of territory90 on one level and reclaiming their diasporic and still national identity on the 
other.    
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CHAPTER 4 
 
HOST COMMUNITY AND HOST STATE 
 
 In 1918, at the end of World War I, an anonymous British consular report defined 
Circassians in Anatolia in the following way: 
 
   “Constantinople and the other towns have developed another class of 
Circassians.  Their loyalty and influence of lady relations [such as consorts or 
wives] in the Imperial Harem raised many of them to high places in the army 
and Palace.  Among the leading families of Constantinople and Cairo, a 
considerable number are, at any rate, by origin, Circassian.  In sentiment they 
are Turkish –often more Turkish than the average Turk- and they do not think 
of themselves as a separate people.” 1 
 
 88 years after this report which also defined Circassians as a group from whose less 
reputable classes many of the assassins, secret agents and other “fedais” 
[militiamen/paramilitaries] of Turkish politicians had been recruited,2 on June 10, 2006, a 
column titled “The Circassian Reality of Turkey” in a Turkish daily newspaper discussed 
the transformation of Circassian identity in Turkey and quoted one of the Circassian 
activists in Turkey.  The quotation stated:  
 
   “Circassian diaspora wants to return to the homeland.  Young generations are 
not able to speak our languages.  We want Circassian language schools for that 
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situation to change.  It is not enough to permit private language courses.  We 
would like to utilize positive discrimination because Circassians consider 
Turkey their homeland and they are among the founding elements of modern 
Turkey.”3    
 
 These two incidents are among the many instances of the ways Circassian diaspora 
in Turkey relates to the host community and host state.  Exploration of these relationships 
is significant to understand not only Circassian diaspora in particular and diasporic 
communities in general but also the ways Turkish state relates to ethnic groups in Turkey 
and vice versa.   
 However, as Circassians is a quite underresearched ethnic group in Turkey, studies 
with a focus on Circassian relationships with the Turkish state and peoples of Turkey are 
further limited in number.  Yet, there are some works that have some arguments on the 
nature and dynamics of this relationship.  Kemal Karpat, for instance, states that after the 
immigration of Circassians to the Ottoman lands, a dialectical and peaceful integration took 
place at the local level while at the upper level Circassian elites became identified with the 
state as part of the emerging modern-Turkish speaking Ottoman elite.4  Ayhan Kaya starts 
his analysis of the political participation strategies of the Circassian diaspora in Turkey by 
stating a common belief that Circassians are more privileged than other ethnic groups in 
Turkey.5  Tanıl Bora, however, states that Circassians were regarded as a group which had 
to be put under some degree of surveillance during the early Republican years.6  For Sevan 
Nişanyan, Circassians who were already in a process of losing their mother tongue even in 
the very early years of the Turkish Republic were one of the rare ethnic groups in Turkey 
who “changed their language” in line with state policies.7  Such a perspective considers 
Circassians an ethnic group that did not resist like Kurds in Turkey.  Similarly, Baskın Oran 
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defines Circassians as a group that is far from questioning the Turkish identity.  According 
to Oran, Circassians can be defined as a group that aims for the continuation of their 
cultural identity and prevention of dissolving in the larger society at best.  He claims that 
the fact that they are not autochthons but immigrants has prevented the formation of a full 
minority group consciousness among them and contributed to their integration and natural 
assimilation.8  Likewise, Kirişçi states that starting from the foundation of the Republic till 
today Circassians have been considered among the ethnic groups that would easily melt 
into a Turkish identity and be successfully assimilated.9  In a similar vein, Çelikpala defines 
Circassians as a group some portion of which lives in harmony with other groups in Turkey 
and therefore has changed their identities despite the transformation of Circassians from 
immigrants to diaspora that has been taking place since the 1990s.10  In most of these 
academic accounts most of which do not particularly focus on Circassians per se but rather 
give some arguments on Circassians, Circassians are regarded as an assimilated group in 
harmonious and privileged relationships with the Ottoman and Turkish state, respectively. 
 This chapter aims to examine the relationship of Circassians with the host 
community and host state.  Yet, to do that, this chapter aims to deconstruct the 
unidimensional approaches on Circassian relations with the host.  It argues that these 
relations of the diaspora with the host are complex and they are constantly shaped on 
interrelated but also different levels.  These different levels that this chapter explores is first 
Turkish nationalism as hegemonic nationalism that has multiple and dynamic discourses on 
Circassians.  The second part explores the community level: how Circassian diaspora 
nationalists define Circassian diaspora in Turkey and narrate their experiences as an ethnic 
group in Turkey; and how they regard their image and their relationships with the non-
Circassian people in Turkey.  The third part aims to analyze Circassian relationships with 
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the state apparatus which is claimed to be in close relationships with the Circassians since 
the Ottoman Empire. 
 
 
 
4.1. Circassians in Turkish Nationalist Discourse 
 
 
 
There is a tendency in the studies on Turkish nationalism to underline the centrality 
of Muslimhood for the definition of Turkishness.11  From such a perspective, as non-
Muslims are excluded as “the Others”, Muslim groups are regarded as part of the alliance 
and they are well accepted despite their non-Turkish origins.  It is stated that governments 
in Turkey defined the term “Turkish descent and culture” to include “not only Turkish 
speaking groups but also Albanians, Bosnians, Circassians, Pomaks and Tatars, particularly 
from the Balkans.”12  However, as the legal minorities are regarded as “marginalized, 
limited and citizens who are not “not considered from us” except some of the cases who 
were integrated with the state, party, and the capital,”13 the way non-Turkish Muslim 
groups are defined has been far from total inclusion.   
 This study argues that the inclusion of non-Turkish Muslims in the nation building 
project is highly conditional and ambiguous.  As an almost total rejection of non-Muslims 
can be observed, non-Turkish groups have not been exempt from the means of othering and 
exclusion but indeed very close to be called as “the Others”.  Indeed, what differentiates 
“the others” from “us” is not religion per se but rather loyalty attributed to the particular 
group:  Yeğen states that openness of the definition of Turkishness to Muslimhood was 
“mostly due to their actual or assumed loyalty to the Ottoman-Turkish state” as exemplified 
                                                  
11
 M. Yeğen, “Citizenship and Ethnicity in Turkey,” Middle Eastern Studies 40(6)(2004): 51-66, 58. 
 
12
 K. Kirişçi, “Disaggregating Turkish Citizenship and Immigration Practices,” Middle Eastern Studies 
36(3)(2000), 1-22, 7. 
 
13
 T. Parla and B. Oran quoted in R. Bali, Cumhuriyet Yıllarında Türkiye Yahudileri: Bir Türkleştirme 
Serüveni, 1923-1945 (Istanbul: Đletişim, 2005), 554.   
 
101 
  
by the doubts of Turkish officials as to the Turkishness of Kurds after their revolt.14  Hence, 
inclusion had been ambiguous, conditional and fragile.  This study argues that any analysis 
of Turkish nationalism requires exploring not only the shadows of Turkish nationalism on 
legal and religious minorities15 but also on non-Turkish Muslim groups.  Only such an 
exploration may help us to understand the conditions of inclusion and forms of exclusion 
which non-Turkish groups were subjected.  
 Thus, this part of the chapter aims to explore Turkish nationalism and its 
relationship with minorities, not only legal minorities, non-Muslims as recognized by the 
Treaty of Lausanne but especially cultural minorities, Muslim non-Turkish groups.  Since 
Circassians have always been understood by the Turkish nationalists and Turkish state as a 
part of the list of ethnic groups in Turkey,16 this part of the chapter will explore the 
relationship of Turkish nationalism with non-Turkish Muslims with a special focus on 
Circassians.  This dissertation takes Circassian diaspora nationalism not as a phenomenon 
that takes place in isolation but through profound and continuous interactions with Turkish 
nationalism.  Literature on Circassians lacks how Turkish nationalism deals with 
Circassians, how Circassians are located by the hegemonic nationalist discourse in Turkey.  
However, understanding Circassian community in Turkey requires an analysis of the 
discursive constructions of Circassians in Turkish nationalist discourse.   
 To explore how Circassians are located, identified and categorized in Turkish 
national discourse, this part of the chapter will analyze the nationalist texts that may be 
considered the constitutive elements of Turkish nationalism such as the texts produced by 
Ziya Gökalp, Yusuf Akçura, Ahmet Ağaoğlu, Mustafa Kemal, Recep Peker, Afet-Đnan, 
etc.; the political party programs and the nation-state policies to the extent that they pertain 
to Circassians in Turkey.  Such an analysis of Circassians in Turkish nationalist discourse 
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will enable us to understand the context and limitations within which Circassians are 
located and how Circassians react to and negotiate with Turkish nationalism. 
As Turkish nationalism should be analyzed as Turkish nationalisms in plural,17 the 
following part explores three historical forms of Turkish nationalism among many others: 
Turkish nationalism that emerged in the late years of the Ottoman Empire; Kemalist 
nationalism as an ideology that was intertwined with state apparatus; and extreme 
nationalism that was crystallized as the ethnic Turkist movement during the 1940s and 
politicized in the 1960s with a political party, Nationalist Action Party (MHP).   
 
 
 
4.1.1. Turkish Nationalism in the Ottoman Era 
 
 
As Turkish nationalism emerged as a linguistic movement in the late nineteenth 
century, it later developed into “a form of politics” as Yusuf Akçura (1876-1935) stated in 
his prominent article, Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset (Three Forms of Government/Politics) (1904)18 
which is called “the first systematic embodiment of Panturkism,”19 “a manifesto of Turkish 
nationalism”20 and “a concise presentation of the essence of Pan-Turkism, with the 
emphasis transferred from the cultural level, so ably fostered by Gasprinsky and his 
collaborators, to the political one.”21  This transformation from a cultural movement to a 
political ideology with –relatively- definite projects, aims, strategies and concepts took 
place in the beginning of twentieth century as a response to the multiple crises of the 
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empire, rising nationalisms of various groups within the empire and the failure of other 
political projects such as Islamism and Ottomanism that were interchangeably used by the 
center to overcome the disintegration throughout the nineteenth century.  With these 
concerns, Turkish nationalism in the Ottoman Era consisted of two different movements: 
Panturkism which was brought to the Ottoman Empire by Russian émigrés after 1908 and 
emphasized the common historical roots of the Turkic peoples and the necessity of cultural 
and political unification of these people; and the Turkish nationalist movement that 
romantically idealized the Anatolian Peasant as the real Turk.22   
Before the twentieth century, any political idea with nationalist connotations could 
be understood not as the mechanisms for attaining Turkish dominance but as the reaction 
and the panic vis-à-vis the inability to practice Ottomanism in a continuously disintegrating 
empire.23  Only with the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913 which further underlined the 
disintegration and constructed “the Others” who were once the elements of the political 
system, Ottoman patriotism was transformed into a revengist nationalism24 shaped with 
trauma.   
What was new and crucial was that the Turkish nationalist discourse –though 
vaguely- suggested totally new concepts that would replace the older ones: a new “people”, 
one that is based not on a community of believers or subjects but people –discursively- 
from the same nationality: Turks; a new identity: not Muslim, not Ottoman but Turk as the 
basis of loyalties and membership; a new polity, not the Empire that had subjects from 
multiple millets, not the Caliphate that ruled the Muslims, but a new model of government 
that rules a nation.   
However Turkish nationalism even in its birth, even in the writings of two thinkers, 
Ziya Gökalp and Namık Kemal who are considered “the direct parents of Turkish 
nationalism”25 was established in an utilitarian ambiguity.  As Turkish nationalism became 
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the basic idea, Turkish identity was not imagined as an ethnic identity but rather a cultural 
one.  For instance Gökalp stated: 
 
   “How can we regard the ones who did not leave us not only in our good days 
but also in bad ones as outside of our nation?  Especially if among them there 
are the ones that made great sacrifices and served Turkishness, how can we tell 
them that they are not Turks?  Since race has no effect on social qualities as far 
as humans are concerned, it is not right to look for race.  If another path is 
taken, then most of the intellectuals and thinkers will have to be sacrificed.”26 
 
As Gökalp underlined the cultural definition of nation rather than an ethnic one, Turkish 
nationalism that emerged in the Ottoman Empire was also positive about policies of 
Turkification, assimilation.  As early as 1878, Namık Kemal, who first used the word 
“vatan” extensively in the sense of fatherland,27 stated the necessity and feasibility of 
Turkification policies in some groups of the Ottoman Empire which would contribute to the 
emergence of a cultural union: 
 
   “Though destruction of languages other than Turkish that exist in our country 
is necessary if we were able to do it, shall we now give the Albanians, Lazs, 
Kurds a moral weapon for conflict by designating a script for them?  ….For a 
tribe to be transformed to another one, language is a stronger barrier than even 
religion.  …It is hard to generalize our language among the Greeks, Bulgarians 
but it is feasible among Albanians, Lazs, that is among the Muslims.  If some 
schools are managed in accordance with that and if our regulations on 
education are executed; then, in 20 years from now, the Laz and Albanian 
languages will be totally forgotten.”28  
 
Hence, cultural union was to be achieved among the Muslims of the empire.  What Namık 
Kemal proposed in the 1870s was to be transformed into policies with the Turkification of 
the curricula and government communication starting from Abdulhamid II.  However, the 
aim was not exactly increasing the use of Turkish language but rather increasing 
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administrative efficiency through the use of single language as a means of modernizing, 
institutionalizing and centralizing the state.29   
Parallel to other means of Turkification, the economic policies of the Committee of 
the Union and Progress also aimed Turkification of the economy. 30  The boycotting of 
non-Muslim shops and the establishment of the society for national production during the 
Balkan wars were attempts to promote a national economy.31  Yet what Turkish 
nationalism pointed towards the end of nineteenth century and the beginning of twentieth 
century was a cultural union, not an ethnic or racial one.  It was a formula to include all the 
communities which “do not leave us”.  Hence, nationalism of the early twentieth century 
was bound with Ottoman boundaries and identities.  As Muslim groups such as the 
Albanians and Lazs were regarded as groups to be Turkified, it was admitted that they were 
not Turks, and the reasons of Turkification was not racial or ethnic dominance or belonging 
but a means of survival in a disintegrating Empire.  Related to that the problem was not 
Turkification per se but rather a problem of centralization as a means of saving the state.32 
That ideal of the preservation of the state that led to the Young Turk revolution and the 
Turkish revolution was later transformed into nascent nationalisms.33   
Hence, Turkish identity was considered as a cultural identity based on 
commonalities in language, religion, sacrifices and services to Turkishness.  The alliance 
upon which Turkish nationalism was based included Muslim non-Turkish groups; for 
instance, the first strong organization of Turkish nationalism, that is Union and Progress 
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was established by five people, only one being an ethnic Turk,34 the others being Albanian, 
Circassian, Kurdish and Arab.   
As late as 1912, the nations of the empire were still considered within the alliance in 
textbooks on citizenship as Turkishness was regarded as the founding element: 
 
“Small nations because of their needs and relationships unite and form bigger 
nations.  And Ottoman nation is founded upon the alliances of Turks, Arabs, 
Albanians, Kurds, Rums, Armenians, Jews, Bulgarians, Lazs, Circassians etc. 
….It is a big nation, it is Ottomanism.”35   
 
Therefore despite the emergence of some particular themes of Turkish nationalism in the 
Ottoman era, Turkish nationalism till the foundation of the Republic was bound with its 
Ottoman past and ethnic composure.  From such a perspective, first generation of Turkish 
nationalists despite their ideas on the necessity of Turkification and hegemony of Turks 
were short of a formulation of an ethnic or racial nation; among them “people like Mustafa 
Celaleddin Paşa and Tekinalp whose ethnic origins were well known and like Ömer 
Seyfettin and Suphi Tanrıöver whose ethnic origins were a matter of doubt were well 
accepted.”36  Thus, Turkish nationalism despite its Turanist theories was based on an 
alliance of Ottoman identities.  Despite the discourse on the necessity and possibility of 
Turkifying them, these identities were never rendered invisible, to the extent that they were 
at the service of Turkish nationalism, the fact that they were pronounced was not 
considered a problem by the Turkish nationalists.  Born in a multiethnic empire, being a 
Circassian, Kurd, Albanian or Arab was not imagined as on obstacle to being an Ottoman 
and Turk by the Turkish nationalists of the Ottoman Era.  As the movement was political, 
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the nationalist program was based on ethnicity whose membership was determined largely 
by religious affiliation.37  
As the nationalist movement of the Ottoman era laid the foundations of many of the 
core ideas of Turkish nationalism,38 it was with the Republican Era that these ideas were 
put into systematical state practice.  As the very formations of Turkish national identity, 
such as the themes of treason, dislike of Christian population, military defeat and political 
humiliation, the loss of the homeland, the struggle of self-preservation, loneliness vis-à-vis 
the enemies surrounding the nation39 were historically and politically rooted in the Ottoman 
Era, it was the Republic that transformed all these themes into policies, laws and a 
relatively consistent official national ideology.  During this transformation, the alliances 
and the conditions of the alliance upon which Turkish nationalism of the first generation 
based their formulation would be reformulated.  In short, as Circassians, along with other 
non-Turkish Muslim groups, played a role as Muslims of different ethnic groups in the 
Ottoman era, in the early nationalism of the end of nineteenth century, such an inclusion 
would be questioned after the formation of the new nation-state.   
 
 
 
4.1.2. Kemalist Nationalism 
 
 
Starting from the Turkish War of Independence till the mid 1920s, Ottoman legacy 
of a nationalist alliance based on pronounced identities and national identifications was 
inherited and employed by the founding fathers of the Republic.  Throughout the War of 
Independence, the symbols and references employed were religiously determined40 such as 
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the report at the Erzurum Congress referring to “the Muslim majority consisting of Turks 
and Kurds who for centuries have mixed their blood in an intimate relationship and who 
form the community (ümmet) of one prophet.”41  In line with that, the initial aftermath of 
the war proved to be a period within which same alliances were kept for some time and the 
character of the National Pact which speaks of “Ottoman Muslims” and not of Turks 
remained intact:42  As early as 1920, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk highlighted the importance of 
the multi-ethnic alliance in terms of creating the “national borders”: 
 
   “Gentlemen…  What we mean here, and the people whom this Assembly 
represents, are not only Turks, are not only Çerkes, are not only Kurds, are not 
only Laz.  But it is an intimate collective of all these Muslim elements….  The 
nation that we are here to preserve and defend is, of course, not comprised of 
one element. It is composed of various Muslim elements…  We have repeated 
and confirmed, and altogether accepted with sincerity, that [each and every 
element that has created this collective] are citizens who respect each other and 
each other’s racial, social, geographic rights.  Therefore, we share the same 
interests.  The unity that we seek to achieve is not only of Turks or of Çerkes, 
but Muslim elements that include all of these.”43 
 
However, the discourse on the alliance of “sibling nations that live in a mixed way 
and that have totally unified their goals”44 was going to change as the new regime 
consolidated a mononational identity.  Starting from the mid 1920s, the cultural nationalism 
of Ziya Gökalp and the first generation of nationalists was considerably revised in favor of 
a dominant ethnic identity.45  Thus, during the mid 1920s, there emerged a crossroads for 
the inclusion of Circassians and other groups into the nation.  As Turkish nationalism 
moved from a civic definition of nation to an ethnic one, the position of non-Turkish 
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Muslim groups became more questioned and insecure as far these groups were concerned.  
Among the members of the alliance upon which the Republic was established, one group 
among the others became redefined and dominant: as early as 1923 Turkishness became the 
norm to be defined.  For instance, Hamdullah Suphi president of Turkish Hearths defined 
Turk as “speaking Turkish, a Muslim and the one who has the love for Turkishness” and 
the prerequisites that he stated were “commonality in terms of language, religion and 
will”.46 
The 1924 constitution was an important step in defining Turkishness.  After long 
debates on the meaning of Turkishness, article 88 of the constitution stated that “the people 
of Turkey regardless of their religion and race would, in terms of their citizenship, called 
Turkish”.  As the draft of the article did not include the term “in terms of their citizenship”, 
the term itself was put into article after long debates about a choice over a civic or ethnic 
definition of the nation.  The article today is stated to be a signifier of the existence of a 
“more authentic Turkishness other than Turkishness in terms of citizenship”47 and as a 
signifier that “the minorities were considered to be citizens but they would not be socially 
accepted as Turks unless they were Turkified in terms of language, ideals and culture.”48  
As the debates for the article pertained to minorities, non-Turkish Muslim groups were 
considered Turks.   
However, starting from the mid 1920s as the emphasis on the “vulnerability of the 
new community, on its precarious viability in the face of hostile external forces” was 
highlighted,49 the meaning of Turkishness and citizenship was being transformed.  As the 
prime minister Đsmet Đnönü’s statement in 1925 in Turkish Hearths that “we will crush the 
ones that do not respect the Turks and Turkishness.  …what we demand from those who 
serve the country is being a Turk and Turkist first and foremost.”50 signified, Turkishness 
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(not only “respecting” but also “being” Turkish) became a “first and foremost” means of 
survival in the new Republic though the definition of the “Turk” remained unclear.  Same 
year, Ministry of Education announced in a proclamation on “Currents trying to undermine 
Turkish unity” that use of the terms Kurd, Laz, Circassian, Kurdistan and Lazistan would 
be banned..51  Throughout the 1920s, several laws (such as Law on Government 
Employees, Law on Association, Press Law) substituted the term Turk for Turkish citizen.  
In 1927 the General Assembly passed the Law Nr. 1041 stating that “those Ottoman 
subjects, who stayed outside Turkey during the Independence War” and had not returned 
since then would lose their citizenship.52  In accordance with this law, for instance an Arab 
Mehmet Nasır, an Arab Nusayri Salih, a Nusayri Halil Fatum, Norisan of the Armenian 
community, Aram Kazaryan of Van, Circassian Đzzettin of Düzce, son of Hapaç” were 
denaturalized.53  In 1928 Law of Turkish Citizenship asserted that the Cabinet of Ministers 
could denaturalize people who took “the citizenship of other countries without special 
permission from the government” or joined the armies of other countries.54  Among the 
denaturalized were for instance Protestant Toma, Viktorya, daughter of Đzak Arditi, a 
Maronite Catholic, Maron Eyub, Maryos Dallalyan, an Armenian Catholic, Halil, the son of 
Kurdish Ali, Circassian Mehmet Arif and Circassian Đsmail.55  As the denaturalization 
decrees all mentioned the ethnicity of people who lost their citizenship, the lists were 
composed of non-Muslims and non-Turkish Muslims.   
After the 1927 census, the first census of the newly formed nation-state, the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs published a booklet about the census and stated that  
 
   “The population of Turkey is ethnically homogenous.  Out of the general 
population of 13.500.000, 11.777.810 which is 86 % is Turk and speaks 
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Turkish.  If the number of people who despite their Turkishness speak Kurdish 
and Arabic with the influence of the Kurds and Arabs are added to that, it is 
seen that the ratio of total Turkish population is 95 % percent of the whole.”56   
 
 
Thus, the desire that was apparent even in the interpretation of the results of the first census 
of the nation-state was formulating an ethnically homogenous society, a 95 % Turkish 
society and speaking Turkish became one of the basic criteria for Turkishness that was 
defined in the text.   
As exemplified by the “citizen speak Turkish” campaigns that started in 1927 and 
continued in 1930s, language has been a significant factor in terms of Turkification and 
homogenization of the non-Turkish elements in society.57  Parallel to that for instance 
Republican People Party’s program of 1927 underlined the importance of “common 
language and commonality in thoughts as the strongest bond among citizens” and 
“complete development of Turkish culture and language” was stated as one of the basic 
aims of the party.58  Similarly, in the Turkish Hearths meeting in 1927 one of the basic aims 
of the organization was stated as “making Turkish a spoken language” and “realization of 
linguistic unity”.59   Apart from the difference between two discourses, that 95 % of Turkey 
speak Turkish and that there is a need to make Turkish “a spoken language”, it should be 
stated that any policy and discourse regarding Turkish language concern not only 
minorities but also non-Turkish Muslim groups who were not native speakers of Turkish.  
For instance in 1934 British correspondence noted that Arabs, Circassians, Cretan Muslims, 
and Kurds in the country were being targeted for not speaking Turkish and other 
correspondences mentioned instances of harassment and arrest in various parts of Turkey.60  
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As non-Turkish groups were considered to be insignificant in terms of numbers, 
their very identities were also regarded as out of modernity, they were also defined as old-
fashioned and  meaningless claims of identity enhanced by an unintelligent few by Afet 
Đnan in a textbook on citizenship:  
 
   “In the contemporary political and social body of Turkish nation, there are 
some of our citizens and nationals who are subject to propaganda by ideas of 
Kurdishness, Circassianhood or even being Laz or Bosnian.  But these 
identifications which are the products of past eras of despotism influenced no 
individual of the nation except some desirous brainless people and a few 
instruments of the enemy.  Because this national body like the general Turkish 
community have the same common past, history, morals, law.”61  
 
Hence, as Afet Đnan associated any ethnic claim about Kurds, Circassians, Laz and 
Bosnians with incompetence, ancient regime and collaboration with “the enemy” all at the 
same time, recognition of differences was regarded as detrimental to the nation-state 
formation process.  Starting from the mid 1920s and intensifying in the 1930s, the identities 
that were announced as the founding groups of Turkish Republic in 1920 by Mustafa 
Kemal Ataturk himself were now associated with “the enemy”.   As these identities were 
regarded as prone to be used by the enemy and hence, risky as far as the well being of the 
Turkish nation was concerned, the Ottoman Empire was constructed as the antithesis of the 
new republic.  Therefore the alliance upon which the Republic was built was now being 
nullified.  Given the way ethnic claims were made insignificant and marginal by the 
emphasis on “a few” and “no individual;” threatening and risky as far as they help “the 
enemy”; old-fashioned and anti-modern; the union of the nations of Islam was transformed 
into the domination of the Turkish identity and invisibility of other ethnic identities as 
insignificant, unnecessary and ancient.   
This position is also clear in the declarations of the politicians of the early Republican 
years.  For instance, Mahmut Esat Bozkurt who was a deputy in the assembly from 1920 
till his death in 1943, minister of justice, close friend of Ataturk and one of the designers of 
the 1924 constitution and other laws of the new Republic stated in 1930: 
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   “We are living in the world’s most free country which is called Turkey.  ….I 
will not hide my feelings.  The Turk is the only master, owner of this country.  
The ones who are not of pure Turkish descent have only one right in this 
country, the right to be a servant, the right to be a slave.  Friend and foe, and 
even the mountains should know that.”62  
 
His attempt to clarify his statement afterwards by declaring that he did not mean the 
minorities but “rather the ones who were Turkish by constitution but still had claims of 
other nationalities”63  becomes more meaningful with one of his other statements on non-
Turkish Muslims: 
 
   “One of the points on which revolutionaries should be awake and careful is 
slipperiness toward their creation.  In our contemporary history the sources of 
this slipperiness are all foreigners and non-Turkish Muslims.  Like Circassians, 
Albanians, Arabs, Ilahs.  These should be given attention.”64 
 
In his book, Ataturk Revolution which is considered “the first attempt to systematize 
Kemalism”65 and written with “the directives of Ataturk”, he further exemplified the 
slippery actions of these groups.  For instance:  
 
   “I never forget that I was among the committee that was sent to the London 
Conference by the Ankara government as the deputy of Đzmir.  Our leader, 
Bekir Sami’s foremost task had been establishing a Circassian state in the 
Caucasus.  However our duty was to establish Turkish independence.   
We shall never give the tasks of Turkish state to people other than Turks.  
Nobody other than the Turks should manage the tasks of the Turkish state.”66 
 
Therefore coming to the 1930s, in 10 years later from 1920 non-Muslims were regarded as 
unreliable, slippery elements whose actions might endanger the Turkish nation and state.  
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In ten years time the so-called founders of the republic were transformed into threats whose 
surveillance was required due to their slippery behaviors.  From such a perspective, non-
Muslim Turks were much more of a danger to Turkish nation since their actions, beliefs, 
and plans were slippery.  As non-Muslim minorities were already considered non-Turks 
and excluded from Turkishness, non-Turkish Muslims were harder to detect, analyze and 
categorize.  With their embeddedness in the Turkish nation, they were much more 
dangerous as their actions were hard to guess and observe.  Only the educated eye of a 
Turkish nationalist could understand the threat they posed: unexpectedly they might be 
slippery at any moment.  This theme of “enemies inside” who seemed to be from the 
Turkish nation but who were not, who proved their tendencies and intentions contextually 
would be legacy of Kemalist nationalism to the nationalist movement that emerged in the 
early 1940s.  What is significant here is that “the hidden enemy” was considered worse 
than the obvious one because of its inclusion in the nation and its invisibility that required 
special surveillance by an educated nationalist eye.   
This understanding of non-Turkish Muslims as “unreliable” was totally in harmony 
with Turkish official historiography which called Çerkes Ethem the traitor throughout the 
1930s.  As the Çerkes Ethem affair is the elimination of the irregular troops and their 
leaders Ethem from the Turkish War of Independence in 1921, its effects in the newly 
established nation-state had continued during the following decades.  As far media was 
concerned, even in 1930 Çerkes Ethem was still in the newspapers as “cooperating with the 
sons of Şeyh Said in a meeting of the Kurds.”67  In 1931, the very figure of Çerkes Ethem 
was continuously revived in debates on newspapers:  Arif Oruç, a leftist journalist who 
with the financial help of Çerkes Ethem claimed to have published a newspaper in 
Eskisehir was called in 1931 by Falih Rıfkı Atay in his article titled “Lowness” as “the 
servant of Çerkes Ethem [who] dares to write that Mustafa Kemal holds the political power 
due to the right of conquest.”68  As the general debate took place between Yunus Nadi and 
Arif Oruç, Yunus Nadi, one of the leading journalists of the early Republican Era and a 
lifelong deputy of the assembly used the title “The Documents of Treason” regarding his 
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claims directly for Arif Oruç and indirectly for Çerkes Ethem.  Therefore the ghost of 
Çerkes Ethem and “his treason” were still alive and associated with other claims of treason.  
In these claims what was highlighted was the tendency of these non-Turkish Muslims to be 
the traitors, that they could be enemies when the time and conditions were available.   
These themes of “the potential traitor”, the unreliability and “the sneaky enemy 
masking his/her intentions” were coupled with the transformation from a civic 
understanding of Turkish nation to an ethnic understanding.  The rise of ethnic nationalism 
led not to an exclusivist nationalism but rather a multilayered definition of the nation.69  
Ironically increasing emphasis of these themes implied also the increasing emphasis on the 
nonexistence of any ethnic difference.  For instance, in 1932, a high school geography 
textbook stated: 
 
   “In Eastern Anatolia in the area that starts from the Caucasus and Iranian 
border and ends in Uzunyayla and Sivas there are many tribes.  In some 
provinces the people of the tribe forms the 85 percent of the whole population.  
Most of these tribes speak Turkish.  Though they are originally Turkish, they 
have lost their languages and tradition as they have been influenced by Arabic 
and Iranian civilizations for a long time.”70 
 
As no ethnic name is mentioned in the text, the anonymous groups are tribalized and 
considered “under the influence of other civilizations despite their Turkish origins.”  Hence, 
the presumed task becomes transforming them into their origins which is just a matter of 
time. 
Similarly, Recep Peker for instance declared that “in our country there is no 
particular nation except the Turks”71 and the few differences that exist among the members 
of the Turkish nation were regarded as false consciousness: 
 
   “We consider our citizens in the contemporary political and social body of 
Turkish nation who have been infused with Kurdishness, Circassianness, or 
even Laz and Pomak from us.  It is a duty to correct these misunderstandings in 
a sincere and friendly way which are products of long historical oppressions 
and legacies of the dark oppressive eras of the past.  The contemporary realities 
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leave no possibility to imagine a particular nation out of a body of five or ten 
thousand people, or a few hundred thousand people and even a million 
people.”72  
 
Therefore the ethnic identities were considered as mistakes to be corrected, as remainders 
of the past and unfeasible elements as far as reel politics was concerned.  As there is an 
emphasis on sincerity and friendship, the friendship is a friendship that corrects the so-
called friend, associates its origins with the “dark periods” and delegitimizes its very 
existence as unfeasible and unrealistic.  Furthermore, these people with these mistaken 
understandings on their ethnic identity are not regarded as agents capable of defining or 
naming themselves but rather the “infused” ones.  As the objects of infusion are quite clear, 
the subjects of infusion remain unclear as far this speech is concerned.   
Regarding the ways the non-Turkish Muslim groups were infused, the nationalist 
analyses go beyond description but to the means of solution.  Remembering the debates in 
Lausanne in 1923, Rıza Nur,73 the minister of education, the minister of health and the 
representative of the new Turkish Republic in Lausanne stated in his memoirs written 
between 1929-1935 in Paris:  
 
   “Europeans know three type of minorities for us: racial minorities, linguistic 
minorities, religious minorities.  ….This is a very fatal thing, an enormous 
danger for us.  ….With the concept of race they are going to put Circassians, 
Abkhazians, Bosnian, Kurds together with Rums and Armenians.  With the 
concept of language they are going to put Muslim groups with other languages 
minorities.  With the concept of religion they are going to make 2 million 
Alevites who are pure Turks minorities.  That is they are going to break us 
apart.  When I heard about this division, I got the shivers.  ….I tried a lot.  With 
a lot of difficulties I abolished them.  The lesson here is: leaving no person of 
any race, language, religion is the most essential, just and crucial task.  ….This 
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is why dismantling the Circassian and Albanian villages and resettling them as 
mixed with the Turks is the foremost task.  …If they try harder, they are going 
to make minorities out of the ants in Turkey.  ….This foreign element is a 
calamity and a germ.  With a permanent plan of assimilation [temsil] these 
groups and similarly Kurds should be isolated from having a separate language 
and being a separate race.”74   
 
This idea of resettlement of ethnic groups in Turkey so as to accelerate their Turkification 
processes would be the basic aim of the Law on Settlement in 1934.  The law was put into 
effect after debates on the problems related to ethnic groups in Turkey.  In these debates as 
Ruşeni bey, one deputy complained about the failure to assimilate Jews without referring to 
them by name and the existence of “large number of immigrants from the Balkans and 
Caucasus” who were settled in Turkey, unable to talk Turkish and hence, maintaining their 
ethnic identities, the prime minister Şükrü Saraçoğlu stated that “the assimilation of these 
immigrants was one of the goals of this law.”75  Parallel to these statements themes of 
“loyalty to the Turkish nation” and “speaking Turkish as mother tongue” became central in 
the Law on Settlement and the law differentiated between the immigrants that are of 
Turkish descent and that are devoted to Turkish culture.76  Therefore devotion to Turkish 
culture became an insufficient criterion to be considered a Turk.  As the law is regarded as 
aiming the settlement of Caucasian and Balkan immigrants in the Kurdish areas,77 it was 
based on a categorization of three zones and three groups of people.  The first group was 
considered ethnically Turk and the zone that pertains to this group could receive 
immigrants.  The second group was regarded as not speaking Turkish but belonging to 
Turkish culture (immigrants from the Caucasus and the Balkans) who was considered 
Turkish but “whose Turkishness in terms of language and culture needs to be enhanced by 
resettlement policies.”78  The third group was non-Muslim minorities and the third zone 
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that the law designated was parts of Eastern Turkey which were closed for settlement.79  
Regarding the second and third zones the law dictated: 
 
   “The Ministry of the Interior is entitled to take the necessary cultural, 
military, political, social and security measures against those who share the 
Turkish culture but speak a language other than Turkish, or against those who 
do not share the Turkish culture.  These measures, not to be applied 
collectively, are resettlement and denaturalization.”80 
 
Çağatay claims that the settlement law of 1934 with other executive acts created five 
hierarchical categories among the aspiring citizens: the first was ethnic Turks, the second 
was Crimean Tatars and Karapapaks, speakers of an eastern dialect.  The third was Balkan 
Muslims.  The fourth was Caucasus Muslims: Georgians, Lezgis, Chechens, Circassians 
and Abkhazs.  The last category was composed of Armenians, Christians, Jews, Kurds and 
other Muslims (such as Albanians and Arabs who had independent states and strong 
nationalist movements.)81   
As the policies of immigration and citizenship were designed with an emphasis on 
Turkishness; on the cultural level, starting from the early 1930s, Turkish History Thesis 
narrated a national history with an overemphasis on the Turks and Turkish Republic.  As 
the Turkish history thesis is today defined as “an investment which aimed to construct an 
identity for a nation that was politically and militarily defeated”82 and as the instance within 
which history and historians were allied with an official nationalism;83 state and 
historiography became intertwined.  Writing of history became a pragmatic task which was 
among the interests of the single party as the program of 1935 stated: 
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   “Our party considers the learning of the Turks their profound history 
extremely important.  This information is a sacred essence that nurtures the 
capacity and the energy of the Turk, his/her self-confidence and his/her 
unbreakable resistance against all movements that will harm the national 
existence.”84 
 
Hence, history was understood as a national project, to construct the ideal Turk (that is 
capable, energetic, self-confident, resistant against harmful movements) and official 
historiography became the means to create the ideal Turk and nation.  As the history of the 
Turk was regarded as profound, extremely important and useful, histories of other ethnic 
groups were out of question, the only way they could be historically analyzed was to 
speculate about the historical reasons of their false-consciousness, infusion with tribal, 
insignificant and marginal identities etc.   
In 1937, Ahmet Emin Yalman in his article “Turkish in Public Spaces” stated: 
 
   “A problem that leads to general dissent all over the country is the fact that 
the citizens who came from other countries as immigrants speak languages such 
as Rum, Bosnian, Albanian and Circassian because of their habits in their old 
countries.  It is necessary to struggle with these habits acutely in the name of 
the political and social unity and harmony of the country.  In most parts of the 
country an ugly mosaic situation is encountered.  In the villages of these 
immigrants who came to this country half a century ago it is seen that a 
language other than Turkish is being preserved.  This situation indicates the 
neglect and difference of old government rather than the lack of national 
feelings for the one concerned.  This mosaic situation should be liquidated 
immediately in revolutionary Turkey that has followed a conscious policy in 
each task.”85 
 
Therefore the public visibility of any ethnic group or language was regarded as a part of an 
“ugly mosaic.”  These complaints regarding the use of languages other than Turkish in 
public space corresponded with similar debates in the assembly that further targeted the 
groups concerned.  Rasih Kaplan, the deputy of Antalya in 1942 stated that 
 
   “Behaving shamelessly some elements are disrespectful against the language 
of the Turkish nation.  They speak the language they would like at home.  But 
in public places…  the language that some Turkish citizen speak is not Turkish.  
                                                  
84
 For the whole party program, see  T. Parla, Türkiye’de Siyasal Kültürün Resmi Kaynakları: Kemalist Tek-
Parti Đdeolojisi ve CHP’nin Altı Ok’u (Đstanbul: Đletişim, 1995), 74. 
 
85
 A. E. Yalman quoted in A. Aktar, Varlık Vergisi ve Türkleştirme Politikaları (Istanbul: Đletişim, 2006), 122. 
120 
  
Citizen! If you are a Turkish citizen, respect Turkish language.  Do not offend 
the Turks in front of you.”86  
 
Associated with shamelessness and disrespect, the speaking of any language other than 
Turkish was regarded as a direct offense to the Turks and Turkish nation.  Parallel to these 
arguments, there were some instance of legal charges against those speaking languages 
other than Turkish under article 159 of the Penal Code, the “Insulting Turkishness” 
clause.87  From such a perspective public was perceived as the place where Turkishness 
was the common element as the ethnic differences might be prevalent at home, an invisible 
space.  Hence, the demand from the non-Turkish or non-Muslim groups was a hypocrisy; 
be the Turk at the public sphere and be whatever they were in the private sphere.  
Languages other than Turkish were restricted to private sphere.  Hence, any other 
multilingual citizen of Turkey had to be extremely cautious about the use of language not to 
be disrespectful and not to offend the Turks.  There was nothing that they would transform 
from the private sphere to the public sphere.  The appropriation of these policies and 
discourses implies that the aim was to create a homogenous public sphere out of a 
heterogeneous multi-ethnic body.   
As Đsmet Đnönü stated “We try to give the Turkish children the ideals of the homeland 
with the equal feelings of justice and tenderness.  We try to boil them in the great Turkish 
pot and create Turkish patriots.”88 the tenderness of the state towards the ethnic groups in 
Turkey was boiling them in order to create Turkish patriots.  However this concept of 
assimilating pot that underlines the fact that there were different groups among the social 
body that needed to be assimilated was embedded in a discourse of commonality.  Starting 
from the mid 1930s, in conjuncture with a rising fascism and anti-semitism in Europe the 
commonality in language, culture and ideals was transformed into an argument on common 
race.  In 1947, for instance, Afet Đnan in her study, “The Anthropological Qualities of the 
Turks” highlights the racial unity in Turkey: 
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   “When mentioning other tribal names, we would like to state the Turkish 
racial unity though it exists under different names.  In the studies before this 
survey numbers especially in Anatolia were given according to some tribal 
names (for instance Kurd, Laz etc.).  We put these since they denote 
geographical regions.  In these comparisons it is seen that there is a racial unity 
in Turkey.”89   
 
As these identifications were understood as tribes, they were also understood as 
“geographical regions”.  In case of the inability to assimilate and Turkify these groups, the 
discourse of the Kemalists was transformed into a new framework that associated these 
differences with geography, rather than politics or ethnicity.  The Turkish racial unity could 
be put forth only if these differences were to be ignored, minimized, tribalized or 
understood in geographical terms.   
As the incidences of Wealth Tax of 1942, the settlements in 1934, September 6-7 
1955 events became the breaking points for non-Muslim minorities in Turkey which 
demonstrated the lack of state tolerance to ethnic diversity and the implementation of 
policies to eliminate minorities, the status of non-Turkish Muslims was more difficult and 
complicated in the Republican era.90  There was no such breaking point for the non-Turkish 
Muslims but relationships with the official nationalism were highly fragile.  Unable to 
convince itself and probably the non-Turkish ethnic groups, Turkish nationalism in the 
Kemalist era constantly highlighted the conditions of inclusion.  What took place was not 
indifference toward ethnic differences but rather an excessive interest in matters of 
ethnicity, a continuous monologue with ethnic groups.  From such a perspective, Turkish 
nationalism intertwined with the state apparatus constantly talked to the non-Turkish 
groups, especially the Muslim ones since they were seen as easier and closer to Turkify.  
As one discourse insistently emphasized the already existing homogeneity of Turkish 
nation and ignored or at best minimized the existence of any ethnic group, language and 
culture, there were other discourses on the necessity to Turkify these groups, the potential 
risks that these groups posed, the conditions of exclusion and inclusion.  As non-Turkish 
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Muslim ethnic groups in Turkey were regarded as the ones from us, they were at the same 
time regarded as the elements to be kept under surveillance, an unknown and a potential 
traitor.  Furthermore, the means of inclusion into Turkish nation were far from being clear: 
was it speaking Turkish, was it ethnic belonging, was it common history, was it a spotless 
shared past with the Turkish nation, was it total assimilation, was it participation into the 
wars of Republic, was it taking place in the state apparatus, was it loyalty and how was 
loyalty defined?  Which criteria was sufficient to be accepted as a legal and social part of 
the new Republic and not to be continuously disturbed, warned and threatened?  When was 
loyalty to the nation affirmed and accepted or was it possible and permanently achievable at 
all?   
Given the ambiguity that these questions were answered and the very practices and 
discourses of the state, non-Turkish citizens of Turkey continuously oscillated between 
inclusion and exclusion, insider and outsider positions.   They were continuously expected 
to prove their loyalty and any misbehavior, any wrong doing of them was understood in 
ethnic terms, as an extension and signifier of their non-Turkish identity, as a proof that they 
were not loyal.  To the extent that they were not trouble makers, they were considered 
Turkish.  However, given the nationalist surveillance over these groups, it was quite easy to 
be the trouble maker for the non-Turkish groups in Turkey.  As the line between the 
insiders and “the others” might have been crossed by the very acts of these group members 
such as speaking languages other than Turkish, announcing their identity, talking about 
ethnicity, most of the time the line was crossed with no particular act on the side of these 
groups.  Therefore inclusion became a contextual matter; in any moment non-Turkish 
groups might be considered out of the body of Turkish nation.  Marginalized, minimized, 
simplified, delegitimized and stupefied, an unknown amalgam was created out of them.  
The continuous attempts to render these groups invisible and simultaneously to discipline 
them created a ghost-like amalgam.   
 This undecidebility of Turkish nationalism which is undecidable in the sense that it 
has been simultaneously open and close to non-Turks as Mesut Yeğen refers in terms of the 
Kurdish problem91 is what shaped the relationships between the ethnic groups and Turkish 
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nationalist discourse in the nation-building years.  Such a discursive pendulum that 
oscillated between exclusion and inclusion, between being one of “us” and dangerous 
elements, between being accepted and being excluded, marginalized and offended would 
shape the way these identities were going to be claimed, positioned, constructed and 
transformed in the following years.  
 
 
 
4.1.3. Extreme Nationalism 
 
 
This study defines the concept extreme nationalism as an historical branch of 
Turkish nationalism that started with the Turkist groups in late 1930s and politicized in 
1960s as the Nationalist Action Party.  Despite having common discourses and intertwined 
histories the two groups mentioned were eventually separated from each other and they –
especially the former one were originally related to Kemalist nationalism till its removal in 
1940s.   
The first group includes Turanist nationalists such as Nihal Atsız, Rıza Oğuz 
Türkkan, Zeki Velidi Toğan etc. who explored the concept of the Turk from a racial 
framework.  As the idea of Turan was originally related the Turkists of the Ottoman Era, 
the Turanist movement of the Republican era gained strength between 1939 and 1944 with 
associations92 and hence, they can be categorized as second-generation of Turanists.  As the 
second generation, the Turanists of the Republican era did not define Turkish nation as 
composed of Muslim groups but rather in terms of race and ethnicity.  For them Turkish 
nation was Turkish race as Atsız stated in his much quoted article “Turkish Race=Turkish 
Nation” in 1931: 
 
   “Then what is a nation?  We should first accept this: According to us there is 
only Turkish nation.  …For Turks nationalism is foremost a blood issue.  The 
person who would say I am Turk should be from the Turkish descent.  ….But a 
                                                  
92
 G. G. Özdoğan, “Turan”dan “Bozkurt”a: Tek Parti Döneminde Türkçülük (1931-1946) (Đstanbul: Đletişim, 
2002), 229.   
124 
  
person with foreign blood even if s/he does know any language other than 
Turkish, s/he is not a Turk.  …..The person whose form looks Turkish is not 
also Turkish.  ….It is necessary to avoid those who resemble to the Turks in 
form more.  As it is known, the most dangerous of the snakes is the one that has 
the same color with its setting. 
Those who are the enemies of Turks and who openly declare it are not that 
much dangerous for the Turks.  The real danger is the foreigners resembling to 
the Turks.  Since these are good speakers of Turkish and since they generally 
do not know any other language, they are not easily distinguished.  But they 
either know or sense that their blood is different.  This is why I call them 
Türkümsü.93  They are liars, flatterers.  They smile in your face.  The ideas 
harmful to Turkishness are popular among them.  Since they are not Turks, they 
do not hesitate to commit themselves to ideas and organizations that sneakily 
injure the Turk.   We can state hundred of examples on how Türkümsü’s harm 
the Turk.  It is easy to prove this historically: ….why did Abdullah Cevdet try 
to destroy the notions of nation and religion?  Because he was a Kurdish 
nationalist.  ….Why did Rıza Tevfik betray the county?  Because he was a 
hybrid with an Albanian father and Circassian mother.  Why did Ali Kemal 
work for the enemy?  Because his grandfather was a converted Armenian.  Why 
did ganster Etem unite with the Greeks?  Because he was a Circassian.  …..As 
it happens, everywhere these Türkümsü shout for Turkishness with 
exaggeration.  But this is because of the strength of Turkishness.  Tomorrow in 
our first hard day they will betray us again.  The defect in their blood makes 
them do that.  Therefore their treasons should be considered natural.”94  
 
Hence, Greeks, Lazs, Circassians, Jews, Kurds, Albanians, Armenians, Creatans, Georgians 
were regarded as those groups that looked like Turks but that were ethnically different.  
Their ethnicity had further connotations about their character and what should be expected 
from them.  It was regarded as an automatic indicator of their future treasons just like the 
historical proofs of treason.  Hence, the Turanists of the Republican Era totally abolished 
the Muslim alliance which was essential for Gökalp and other Turanists of the Ottoman 
Era; and they separated themselves from the Kemalist nationalism by defining the nation in 
terms of race though there appeared to be no full consensus on the definition of a Turkish 
race.  From such a point of view, -whether Muslim or not- any community other than Turks 
was defective and prone to harming the nation.  Furthermore, the more these groups  
resembled the Turks, the more they became dangerous.  Thus, one can imagine that non-
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Turkish Muslims were the most dangerous elements as they fit into the setting more.  Even 
if they promoted Turkishness, this was something contextual.  Sneaky, harmful and 
unreliable, it was the blood that speaks.  The first prerequisite was defined as blood as the 
Turkish language and unity in will was the second and the third.  This was the first time 
that Turkish nation was defined in terms of absolute exclusion of non-Turkish Muslims 
from the nation.  Any event, any instance, any statement against this form of extreme 
nationalism was associated with the existence of these subversive elements as Rıza Nur 
states in 1942: 
 
   “They say that they are nationalists but they cannot somehow say that they 
are Turks.  These people who tend to define nation culturally are those who are 
not racially, ethnically Turks.  They and the world should know that the 
fundamental principle of Turkish nationalism is nationality=Turkism.”95  
 
Given their treasons which could be explained easily with ethnicity, non-Turkish groups 
were considered responsible for the failure of the Ottoman state and hence, state 
mechanism should be devoid of these people who by their very nature were dangerous, 
unreliable and treacherous.  As Türkkan stated in “The Credo of the Gray Wolf”, “The 
Gray Wolfs know that only Turks can help Turks.  Those who are not Turkish and each 
type of converts how ever they grew up in Turkish manners will never resemble a pure 
Turk and they will never be able to serve the Turkish nation like a pure Turk.”96  
 Furthermore, they were considered among the enemies which were categorized as 
internal and external in Atsız’s will in 1941:  
 
   “Yağmur my son! 
…Keep my advice, be a good Turk.  
Communism is an occupation that is an enemy for us.  Learn that well.   
Jews are the secret enemies of all nations.  Russians, Chinese, Iranians, Greeks 
are our historical enemies.   
Bulgarians, Germans, Italians, Englishmen, Frenchmen, Arabs, Serbs, Croats, 
Spaniards, Portuguese, Romans are our new enemies.   
Japanese, Afghans and Americans are our future enemies.   
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Armenians, Kurds, Circassians, Abkhazs, Bosnians, Albanians, Pomaks, Lazs, 
Lezgins, Georgians, Chechens are our enemies inside.   
To collide with so many enemies one should be well prepared.   
May God help you!”97   
 
As the enemies were categorized, these categories were not mutually exclusive but rather 
permeable.  Even communism was an ideology adopted by non-Turks.  Though the threat 
of communism in the coming years would ally Turkish nationalism with non-Turkish 
Muslim groups, especially Caucasians with the themes of anti-communism and anti-
Russian feelings which were discursively related, the Turanists of the time was beyond 
these alliances and they were in line with the rising anti-semitism of the 1940s.  As 
Türkkan stated,  “when the communists in our country are investigated extensively, it turns 
out that nine out of ten is Jewish converts from Thessaloniki, Albanians, Circassians, 
Arabs.”98   
Defining the Turkish nation in absolute ethnic terms, with reference to blood, pure 
blood, mixed blood, etc. race, that is the attainment of pure blood became one of the causes 
of the movement which was ideologically based on the notion of inequality, militarism, 
irredentism, xenophobia and racism.99  Abolishing the undecidability of Turkish 
nationalism regarding the non-Turkish Muslims, Turanists ideologically separated 
themselves from the Kemalist nationalists.  However, the real separation came in 1944 
when they were arrested and trialed in the Racism-Turanism case.  Rather than being 
opposites, till 1944 Kemalist nationalism and Turanist nationalism of the Republican Era 
was interrelated in terms having their origins in the Turkism of the Ottoman Era.100  The 
Turanist ideas were in harmony with the ethnic dimension that Kemalist nationalism 
employed, both of which were also related to the rise of fascism and withdrawal of 
democracies in Europe since thr 1930s.  With the trials of 1944, the Turkist movement was 
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transformed from a political doctrine to political opposition and located vis-à-vis Kemalist 
nationalism. 
In his defense in 1945, Nihal Atsız underlined the historical treasons of non-turkish 
elements, their future tendencies and the embeddedness of their ideas with state policies:  
 
   “The Ottoman Sultan Selim II banned Albanians’ entry into Anatolia saying 
that since they imitated the females in sexual life they were destructive for the 
morality of Turkish people.  Mahmut II signed an imperial order that abolished 
the promotion of Circassian soldiers because of their lack of intelligence.101 The 
establishment of Janissaries was also not against racism but it was a 
complementary of it.  In the heydays of the Ottoman army when the number of 
soldiers was 400.000, devshirmes would amount to no more than 20.000.  
…They were the slaves of the Sultan.  Because in Turkish state Turks would 
not be a slave.  ….Turkish history is a history that exemplifies thousands of 
treasons by the foreigners as opposed to their few of their services.  It is a 
history of treason with thousands of incidents that ranges from the Chinese 
princess who poisoned the Turkish leader to Şerif Hüseyin, Çerkes Ethem and 
Kurdish Şeyh Sait.  The genuine children of the country did not wait for high 
positions to serve the country.  They always served everywhere in every 
condition without showing off, they paid blood and life taxes.”102  
 
As history of the Turks in Central Asia, Ottoman Empire and Turkish Republic was read 
from an ethnic perspective by Atsız, Turkish history became a linear story of treason of the 
non-Turks against the Turks.  Associated with immorality, unintelligence but also the very 
ability to betray, non-Turkish groups were the “adopted” children of the country and with 
their ethnic characteristics they could only be the slaves.  Furthermore, to prove that non-
Turks were dangerous, separate and ‘racist’, in his defense he also submitted two obituaries 
of 1944 that mentions the death of a Circassian and a Bosnian:  
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   “….by obituaries other races point out that they consider themselves separate 
from Turks in every instance.  The obituary notices that I submitted to the court 
are proof to my arguments.  One of them mentions the death of Đsmet, wife of 
Murat Bey from the beys of Circassians and the other one mentions the death of 
Sabri Süleymanoviç.  Those who consider racism national publication …should 
have seen these obituaries and prosecuted those who published those obituaries 
that are the flashy versions of the claims of being Circassian and Bosnian.”103 
 
As the adaptation of non-Turks into the Turkish nationalist movement was regarded by 
Atsız as an exaggeration that only masks their non-Turkish blood and hence, their 
tendencies to betray, he claimed that the racist ideal and his sincerity was irrespective of his 
own ethnicity when his own ethnic origins were interrogated by the prosecutor: “For 
instance, even if all my descent is non-Turkish, the ideal of racism cannot be nullified by 
that.  …If I am not a pure Turk, my espousal of the ideal of racism indicates both that I am 
sincere and that this ideal is right and strong.”104  
Ironically the members of the court in 1944 trials were ethnically non-Turkish.  As 
Alparslan Türkeş, the leader of MHP stated years later:  
 
   “The files of Turkism, Turanism was now delivered to a Circassian and an 
Albanian.  Leading them is a son of an Arab.  ….Đsmail Berkok was a 
Circassian and he was not a random one.  He wrote books on this nation and 
studied a lot.  What would become the result?  …were we now in the hands of 
Albanians, Circassians, Arabs? …..the incident showed that neither Alkan is 
Albanian, nor Berkok is Circassian and Erden is Arab.  All three of them is the 
Turkish children of Turkey and they are Turkish generals.”105  
 
As the last sentence is removed from the later editions of the book of Türkeş, Reha Oğuz 
Türkkan also mentioned his appreciation of the members of the court in Tercüman in 
1955.106  Hence, the trial of 1944 was a turning point in another sense; the Turanists tested 
their arguments on non-Turkish Muslims.  The existence of Đsmail Berkok, a Circassian 
nationalist, an Albanian and an Arab in the court and Turanists’ later appreciation of these 
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people insinuated that being a Circassian, Albanian, Arab etc. and Turkish nationalist might 
not be mutually exclusive categories as the experiences of nationalist groups in the 1970s 
also affirmed.   
As the year 1944 became a turning point for the Turanists, the movement was 
marginalized despite the existence of organizations and groups after that year.  In the 
1960s, Nationalist Action Party was established and though accepted by Atsız and other 
Turanists at first, it later differentiated itself from the Turanism as a political movement 
with a political party that searched for the support of the masses.  Unlike the Turanists, the 
Idealist –extreme nationalist movement of the 1960s and 1970s was characterized by first, 
anticommunism and anti-leftism which provided the movement with new alliances based 
on anti-communism; second, a more religious perspective rather than the pagan-like ideas 
of the Turanists;107 third, the search for the support of the masses; and fourth, the use of 
paramilitary organization and systematic violence.108  
In addition and related to these differences, the movement’s attitude toward non-
Turkish Muslims was also different from the Turanists.  The two factors, the status of 
religion in their theories of nationalism and anti-communism became influential in their 
relationship with non-Turkish Muslims.   
The early statements of Türkeş, the leader of the MHP, who was the leader cult for 
Gray Wolfs highlighted the influence of Turanism in his thought.  For instance, in his 
defense in the Turanism case in 1944, the dialogue between Türkeş and the judge can be 
taken as an indicator of not only the ideological roots of his thought but also a confusion 
regarding the definition of the Turk:  
 
   “Judge:  First of all, let us ask you this question: We would like to learn your 
thought on the claim that people who are not from a pure descent and who are 
from a mixed race should not be present in Turkey today. 
Türkeş:  The principle that our state accepts and is based on is the most correct 
and reasonable principle in my opinion too.  That is assimilating the non-
Turkish elements immediately by the means of culture and inoculation while 
considering Turkishness above all.  I, too, consider this correct.  Regarding the 
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administration task, my opinion too is in favor of the administration of our 
important tasks by either complete Turks, that is, assimilated and regarding 
himself/herself nothing but a Turk or people from the Turkish race.   
Judge:  What about the mixed races? 
Türkeş:  I told it sir.  As s/he is Turkified, I would not consider interrogating 
his/her grandmother or grandfather correct.  
Judge: So you accept those who declare that they are Turks! 
Türkeş:  The ones that are totally assimilated into Turkishness…  Sir, 
declaration is not sufficient.  Today a Jew comes and says that he is a Turk.  
But his/her language is not Turkish, his/her mother is not Turkish.  Everything 
related to him/her is different.  What I am saying is being a Turk with his/her 
mother, language and everything.”109    
 
Hence, in the 1944 trial, which was the beginning of a debate among the Turkish 
nationalists, the Turkish nationalists once again oscillated between descent and culture.  
Though Türkeş’s statements on non-Turkish groups would be revised in the coming years, 
the Turanism-Nationalism case of 1944 became a legend among the Turkish nationalists, a 
signifier of the hardships that a Turkish nationalist may encounter.   As the statements of 
Turkish nationalists throughout the trial and the memory of the trial itself had been very 
influential on the nationalist movement, in the coming years Türkeş used other definitions 
of the nation and embraced Islam as an element of nationalist thought.  He defined the 
membership of the nation in terms of the feelings of belonging, loyalty and sacrifice in 
1967:  
 
   “Being a member of the Turkish nation is loving the Turkish nation and 
having the love for serving the nation with loyalty, the feeling and the state of 
mind of being loyal to the nation and making all sacrifices and working for the 
elevation of Turkish nation.  Everybody who has this feeling and state of mind 
is a Turk.  This is the basic idea of Turkish nationalism.  Everyone who does 
not have the aspiration or pretension for any other nation in his heart, who feels 
that s/he is a Turk, who embraces Turkish nation and who has the love to serve 
the Turkish nation and state is a Turk.”110   
 
This is why his definition on nation is not an ethnic definition.  Yet his emphasis on not 
having “the aspiration or pretension for any other nation in his heart” automatically 
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excludes any diasporic formation, any long distance politics. Membership to the nation was 
based on the assumption of single loyalty, single national identification.  From such a 
perspective, as the non-Turkish immigrants may be regarded as Turks, the same groups are 
not regarded as Turkish when they have some diasporic consciousness; that is, any form of 
long-distance politics or let alone politics, identification with any other nation or national 
discourse.  This is the exact line that connected some non-Turkish Muslims to MHP.  As 
long as they identify themselves as immigrants or use some hyphenated identities such as 
Caucasian Turks etc., ethnicity –the very descent is not interrogated.  As long as those 
identities are considered as a branch, form and appendix of Turkishness rather than separate 
non-Turkish identities, they are not problematic for MHP and the leader.  As long as they 
do not challenge the Turkish nation with their claims on separateness and non-Turkishness 
but rather elevate the Turkish nation with their services, these groups are accepted and 
normalized.    
The second factor that connected non-Turkish Muslims to MHP as a political 
movement is anti-communism.  As anti-communism can be regarded as a basic theme in 
Turkish politics throughout Cold War, it was particularly embraced by MHP.  Throughout 
the 1960s, the signifier of anti-communism served to provide coherence among the 
categories of Turkishness, Muslimhood and Sunnihood.111  In addition, the theme of anti-
communism connected MHP to the masses who were not turned on by Turkish nationalism 
per se but rather with the thematization of a common enemy: that is Russia.  As far as 
Circassians were concerned, this theme of anti-communism overlapped with the anti-
Russian feelings.   
The third but not the least factor that connected MHP in particular and Turkish 
nationalism in general to Circassians in Turkey (or vice versa) is a legend of Turanism that 
was inherited from the Turkish nationalism of the Ottoman era.  As Turanism and Pan-
Turkism was used interchangeably in the twentieth century, Turanism was originally a term 
that referred to a larger geography rather than just the Turkic communities.  Despite the 
interchangeable use of the two terms in the twentieth century, the Pan-Turkism/Turanism 
remained as political ideals whose boundaries were extended from time to time.  The 
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operations of Enver Paşa in the First World War in the North Caucasus and the support of 
the Ottoman Empire to the Republic of Northern Caucasus can be regarded as the instances 
of the overlap of Turanism and Circassian nationalism in terms of interests and political 
projects.   Though Turanism has been a utopian theme of Turkish nationalism which was 
not embraced by all of its currents since the Ottoman Empire, the extreme nationalists of 
1930s and to some extent MHP inherited the theme.  Turanism became the framework that 
enabled the creation of the hyphenated term, Caucasian Turk.  On the basis of Turanism, 
Circassians from time to time were regarded as an extension of Turkic communities in 
Russia, as part of “oppressed peoples”.   
Fourth factor is the ideological legacy of the Ottoman Empire to Turkish 
nationalism which underlines the priority of the state and creates a state myth that enables 
the nationalists to identify themselves with.112  Similarly Circassians since 19th century 
have been associated with the Ottoman/Turkish state state as soldiers, as bureaucrats and 
many Circassians today are defining “their loyalty” in terms of their services to the state.  
As state becomes a contested field, Turkish nationalists sometimes explain the –sometimes 
overrated- Circassian presence in the state mechanism as a plot to undermine the strength of 
Turkish state by the non-Turks.  However “service to the state” still becomes a common 
narrative between the two groups and leads to the formation of -seemingly- unexpected 
alliances between the Turkish nationalists and Circassians to “save/strengthen/protect the 
state” since the Ottoman Era.113   
Hence, despite the continuously oscillating discourse of Turkish nationalism on 
non-Turkish Muslims in Turkey, historical and ideological matrix of Turkish nationalism 
enabled multiple points of entry for Circassians.  This is how several Circassians, despite 
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their non-Turkish origins were and still are able to connect with Turkish nationalism and 
define themselves as Turkish nationalists.114   
However, despite these connections the relationship of Turkish nationalist to non-
Turkish groups in general and Circassians in particular was far from being harmonious.  As 
anti-communism was the general theme of the Turkish nationalist movement of the 1960s 
and 70s, non-Turkish groups were still regarded as targets of political propaganda.  For 
instance, before the national elections of 1977 in Turkey, a public notice distributed in 
Germany and signed by the “Gray Wolves” stated that:  
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embraced Turkish nationalism, the more he wrote about Circassians and the more he was embraced by 
Circassians either as a successful Circassian figure or as a disputable figure with unexpected alliances.   
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   “Those who destroyed this state [Ottoman Empire] were the Rums, 
Armenians, Jewish converts, Kurds, Circassians, Bosnians and Albanians…….  
How long will you, as a Turk, endure these awful minorities?  Throw away the 
Circassian, throw and kill the Kurd, destroy the enemy of the Turk.  …..Vote 
for MHP.”115  
 
Therefore neither some themes such as anti-communism which united different groups nor 
the existence of the non-Turkish groups in the movement created an equal respectable 
status for non-Turkish groups in the discourse of the Turkish nationalists.  Even in the more 
popular Islamized versions of Turkish nationalism, the conditions of inclusion and 
participation to the movement and idea were delineated.  As Osman Yüksel Serdengeçti, a 
rightist poet and politician stated, “it was not the non-Turks who came from the other side 
of the sea that saved this nation.”  Necip Fazil Kisakurek further clarified the conditions of 
the inclusion of Muslim groups in the Islamist-nationalist ideology:  
 
   “…as albanians, circassians, kurds are all equal as Muslims according to us, if 
they move towards isolation and separation from us on a level other than Islam, 
then the albanianness, circassianhood, kurdishness of each of them becomes a 
particular guilt.  Then comes Turkishness.”116  
 
Hence, even in the most inclusive and ideologically hybrid form of Turkish nationalism 
which bases itself on Muslim identity, the status of non-Turkish Muslim groups is highly 
fragile and volatile.  Even in that form of alliance, the existence of Albanians, Circassians, 
Kurds is conditional.  The conditions are predetermined and the ethnic identities are always 
a source of suspicion.   
MHP, starting from the 1960s, was criticized from within on the grounds that they 
lost their nationalist and Turkist essence as the political party tried to locate itself on a 
synthesis of Turkish nationalism and Islamism.  In the 1990s, with the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union, rise of ethnonationalism in the world and the rising publicity of Kurdish 
question, Turkish nationalism in its radical forms was revived.  Today MHP is still being 
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criticized for being insufficient in Turkish nationalism by the small groups that associate 
themselves with Turanism.   
Since the 1990s, MHP have echoed official nationalism and as a political party it is 
closer to the political center.117  Given the rise of political Islam and its representation in 
another political party, MHP’s position today is a more secularist one.  In July 2007 
national elections, among other songs the lyrics of election song was:  
 
   “If you say we have one prophet, one kıble [direction of Mecca], one 
direction, 
If you say Alevites and Sunnis are one, then it is MHP 
If you say the Kurd, the Circassian, the Bosnian, Zaza and Azeri  
Are all Turkish nation, then it is MHP 
….If you say that our country should be alive, then it is MHP.”118  
 
However the more radical nationalist groups in Turkey regard any demand of Circassians 
and even any mentioning of Circassians as a continuation of their treason.  For instance, in 
a radical Turkish nationalist website, “Circassian Treason from the Past to the Present” is 
being explored after one of the newspapers in Turkey published some interviews and news 
about Circassians in Turkey for three days:  
 
   “Circassians, the group that used the only bad feature of the Turkish nation 
most, that is Turkifying those who are not from the Turkish nation is taking 
place in some publications in the recent days.  After the monkeys, the horse 
thieves too demand education in their own language, radio-TV broadcasting 
and Circassian names.  We pretty well know that these would happen but horse 
thieves have voiced themselves before we expected.”119 
 
As the rest of the text is full of insulting expressions and historical distortions as far as 
Circassians are concerned, what is significant is the association of the Circassians with the 
Kurds labeling both groups pejoratively.  That association is typical not only for radical 
Turkish nationalists but also some larger groups in Turkish politics since the 1990s.  As the 
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rise of Kurdish nationalism has overlapped with the rise of Turkish nationalism, any debate, 
statement and demand related to ethnicity in Turkey have been understood in terms of the 
Kurdish question.  The threat of non-Turkish ethnic identifications, the indivisibility of the 
state and nation, the fear that other groups will follow the Kurdish nationalism vis-à-vis the 
Turkish nation and state have become general themes in Turkish nationalism and its 
popularized versions.  In such a context, Circassians are either regarded as the “loyal 
element” whose very existence is taken as an indicator of the fact that not all ethnic groups 
demand ethnic rights and there is not a problem of ethnicity but terror or as “the next” 
ethnic group that tends to follow the Kurds and hence, betray the Turkish nation and state.   
 
 
 
4.2. Defining the Self and Being a Circassian in Turkey 
 
 
 
 This part of the chapter aims to explore how Circassian activists define Circassians 
in Turkey and how they narrate on their experiences of being a Circassian in Turkey.   
 Circassian activists define Circassian diaspora in Turkey mostly through a series of 
lacks.  From such a perspective, diaspora is defined as a lower form in the national order of 
things in terms of political power, organization and consciousness.  The lack of leadership 
has been one of the most frequently employed themes regarding the internal affairs of the 
Circassian diaspora in Turkey as Kaya stated:  
 
   “We have a problem of political leadership.  Well, in Turkey we are a society 
without a leader, without elites.  Even the most marginal identities have some 
kind of a leadership mechanism.  Circassians in Turkey lack political 
leadership; the associations united and formed a federation.  Despite that, such 
a need, the foundation of such an organ is essential.”120 
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 The lack of a diasporic consciousness and a firm diasporic identity is also 
highlighted.  After 40 years of activism, Nezih narrates on the complex nature of Circassian 
identity in Turkey to refute the existence of a diasporic identity as far as Circassians are 
concerned:  
 
   “Are you able to make your sense and principle of belonging an ideal which 
is integrated with culture, economics, homeland, visions, mechanisms and 
ideology of homeland?  If you are not able to make it, I say that you are without 
an identity in that society.  …If you look with the perspective of sharia, if you 
look with a Turkist identity, if you look with a sympathy towards Russians, if 
you look with the class structure, if you look with pro-American tendencies, if 
you look with the terrorist mentality which is formed out of the union of 
Chechnian Wahabi brotherhood; what kind of a Caucasian identity can we talk 
about?  Which one is the Caucasian identity?  Well, I cannot see it.”121   
 
 From such a perspective, Circassians in Turkey is not able to be a diaspora or at best 
it is an unsuccessful diaspora when compared to Armanian and Jewish diasporas.  The ideal 
diaspora that was referred several times in the interviews as a diaspora which Circassians in 
Turkey is not able to match is the Jewish diaspora as Gürsoy exemplifies with his reference 
to Jewish diaspora as the successful example: 
 
   “Here is the Jewish community who did that.  That is a community that we 
have to take as an example in the world.  Diaspora makes Israel survive 
artificially.  Well, I wish we could have done one tenth of what they did.  Well, 
now all the land is being sold [in the Caucasus].  Who is buying?  No one is 
buying.”   
 
Hence, the weakness of diaspora is narrated as the lack of political power not only in the 
host community but also in the diasporic homeland.   
 Circassian activists that were interviewed for this study employed the themes of 
inbetweenness, temporariness, rootlessness, disjuncture and guilt when their experiences of 
being a Circassian in Turkey were asked.  The idea of the inability and also unwillingness 
to fit into the host community is also mentioned in historical narratives like Cezmi, aged 65 
tells his dialogue with his father regarding the unwillingness to transform the lands that 
were immigrated: 
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   “Of course when I returned from there [after his visit to the Caucasus in 
1970s], my father told me that he knew that people were not free, that he knew 
how they lived and he would not ask me what I had seen and heard there.  He 
used to read a lot.  He asked me whether there were some dilemmas that I could 
not understand.  I said, “Well, how could a people who was so close to forests, 
trees and that kind of a culture live in Uzunyayla’s arid hills?  This is a 
dilemma.”  OK, they had to; the state had settled them.  But didn’t they plant a 
couple of trees to make the land they immigrated similar to their culture?  
When I told that, a tear from his eyes dropped without showing me.  He said 
“Let alone the first generation who came from there, in my childhood, when a 
relatively big house was built in Circassian villages, older people would get 
furious, and tell “You idiot, build those houses so that you will leave Avshars 
better houses when we go back to our homeland tomorrow.””  Till my 
childhood, they could not embrace that place.  Some of our elders, women died 
without opening their chests.”122 
  
 From such a perspective, what differentiates Circassian diaspora from others is their 
inability to fit into the host community and their inbetweenness.  Diaspora is defined as 
rootless, inbetween and restless.  Diasporic nationalists frequently narrate on “here” and 
“there” without even explaining what these terms imply.  Kaya explicitly uses the theme of 
roots in a botanical sense to explain the status of Circassians in Turkey:  
 
   “This is the reason of our weakness here.  We have to problematize the fact 
that we do not have the political power of a small village in Anatolia although 
we have a large population that is expressed in millions in this geography.  Why 
is this so?  I think that the fact that our roots are not here is important at this 
point.  It is like African violet.  Societies may fade away when there are broken 
from their…  We have lived with a psychology of returning back to the 
Caucasus for years.  Psychologically, we have not settled; physically, we have 
not been rooted strong enough like the local people of this land.  This land…  
For instance, Armenians are the people of this land, this geography.  …Kurds 
are the people of this land.  We are the immigrants of this land, we have to 
accept that.  …. Psychologically we have not still decided, not even now.  
Look, we are hesitating.  Well, shall we return or shall we continue here?  This 
is a hesitation that comes from the beginning.”123 
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 In such an account, diaspora becomes the very hesitation and rootlessness that 
follows it.  In Nesibe’s narrative, what explains Circassians in Turkey becomes the guilt 
factor.  In this account, diaspora is regarded as the bearer of “a permanent guilt and shame:”  
 
   “Here is the first female painter, first female author, and first male author; 
Well, those names who formed Turkish literature were Circassians.  Here are 
the warriors, generals, admirals etc. all of whom were Circassians.  Well, 
though all of them turn out to be Circassians, why can’t any of them do 
something for themselves, produce for themselves?  Something came to my 
mind.  …I told this was the feeling of guiltiness.  …So why do we feel guilty?  
We left.  We immigrated, we were exiled, we were fired, we escaped, and we 
left.  And each moment everywhere we live its distress.  We are afraid that 
someone will reproach [kafamıza kakacak] us with that and tell that we took 
refuge here.”124 
 
 Another aspect of Circassian diaspora is narrated as the “guest position” by Esat 
who remembers his father’s self-identification: “And a continuous feeling of being the 
guest.  Well, my father grew up in Turkey naturally, but till he died when people asked 
where he was from he said that he was a Caucasian immigrant.” However, the inability to 
fit into the host community is not only internal but also further highlighted when Turkish 
nationalism uses slogans such as “Either Love or Leave.”  Nezih reminds these instances of 
exclusion: “In terms of the Caucasus, they still tell Circassians to leave Turkey if they do 
not like it [Turkey].  [This implies that] You are not the man of this land.  Well, Circassians 
still have not been the real people of here.”125   
 Being the guest, being the outsider, being the guilty one, diasporic experience is 
defined as restlessness by Özer, aged 34, a businessman and also a Phd student: “As an 
individual, I do not feel very rooted in this country; I live my life more on the fingertips.  
…I would not like many people to have the same restlessness, diasporic restlessness.”126   
 However, that restlesness is not only about not being on the lands that is called 
homeland, or being in Turkey, diasporic restlessness that Gürtuğ explains is a more 
complicated solitude:  
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   “I always remember that in our childhood there used to be books which ladies 
valued so much.  Whether or not it was Kerime Nadir, I do not know but I 
remember a book named Ruh Gurbetinde (The Soul’s Absence from Home).  I 
always feel that for myself.  The absence from home, being the stranger; that is 
the life of me and those who are like me.  We cannot coexist with people who 
do not have the Circassian qualities just because s/he speaks Circassian.  We 
cannot take it.  What else shall I say?”127 
 
 That narrative of solitude is not exactly about being here or there but rather as a 
shortcut to share any kind of critique with respect to the contemporary status of their lives, 
cities that they lived in and relationships.  In such a narrative any critique of urbanization, 
modernization and globalization is coupled with the theme of diasporic rootlessness as 
Nesibe exemplifies: 
 
   “One realizes that more especially when s/he gets older.  I realize how I have 
led a Circassian life when walking in the street.  People crash into you whereas, 
in my culture, there is nothing like people crashing into each other.  I get on a 
vehicle, one almost sits onto me whereas, in our culture, people do not touch 
each other without a reason.  They leave some distance.  Of course, that 
distance is not to bother the other person and I realize that I have already done 
that for years without giving it a name.  …We do not see these [acts] around 
and we feel very lonely.  But still, I would not want to be otherwise.” [She 
laughs.]128 
 
 In addition to the themes of inbetweenness, solitude and restlessness, Circassian 
activists interviewed for this study defined Circassians in Turkey through the concepts of 
fear, gratitude and trust.  Circassians are defined as a community with fear.  Despite their 
narratives on embeddedness in Turkish politics and state-formation process which will be 
explored in the other parts of this chapter, Kaya claims that: 
 
   “As opposed to our awesome courage on individual level, we have an 
awesome communal fear.  …Our reflexes on the communal level are very 
timid.  Circassians have given cadres at the radical margins in Turkish political 
life regardless of ideology.  Well, they have given cadres as extreme as the 
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sniper/triggerman [tetikçi] but when something about them happens, they get 
appalled and frightened.”129 
 
That fear is narrated not as something new but rather old.  Yet the narrative itself is quite 
new.  Activists of 1990s speak about silence of the previous generations as a feature of 
Circassians in Turkey like Hasan who remembers and reconstructs his encounters with the 
older people in his youth: 
 
   “We went to the village and tried to collect information about Circassians, 
sometimes we talked to older people.  Back then, what shocked me most was 
the unwillingness of the older people to talk about this, they were openly 
avoiding it.  …There is fear, there is still fear.  It is like when you do not want 
to talk about a distasteful event.  Especially when talking to the older people, 
they used to start by saying “Look, we are living in Turkey and we, too, are 
Turks.”  They were the same people who told us that we were Circassians.  
When we came back from school saying that we were Turks, they used to say 
“No, son, we are Circassians.””130   
 
Nesibe further claimed that the fear of diaspora also shaped their willingness to take roots 
in the host community, such as investing in real estate or accumulating wealth: 
 
   “Well, it is not conscious, but I think that they had a hesitation like that and 
because of that they did not think.  Because they always thought about “what 
if”, I think that they did not have an ambition in terms of wealth, property.  
Because they never knew what was going to happen to them.  They were 
always afraid.”131   
 
 Taner further employs the concept of fear to understand the current actions of 
Circassian organizations in Turkey which are, he claims, imbued with a fear that is hard to 
understand when compared to Kurds in Turkey: 
 
   “Well, are associations NGO?  I think not.  It is not possible that an institution 
that has connections with the state can be an NGO.  We said that we could 
remove that and we focused our works on that.  Our courage frightened the 
people at the associations.  They said “Alas!”, they said that after that they 
would attack us, they would destroy us just like Kurds.  Circassians were not as 
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oppressed as Kurds.  Well, not that much.  They were oppressed once but it was 
not that much dense.  They did not have a dense trauma.  After Çerkes Ethem, 
there was no rebellion or something like that.  How did they internalize that fear 
so much?  How did they get so much frightened?  I am not able to understand 
that.  …They were just frightened, they published declarations warning people 
[Circassians] not to participate in those events, that the police would raid.  
…They were considering us crazy but we were cleaning the path, we were in a 
way saying that these could be done.  We were not crazy and these could be 
done.”132   
  
 However, the fear in terms of Circassian activism sometimes is narrated as 
intertwining with the production and reproduction of fear.  Meral highlights fear as 
inseparable from its reproduction: 
 
   “I do think that they are a little bit cowardly.  Because I saw that in [some 
events that Meral’s group organized]….  Well, there were people who tried to 
pull our ears, told us to be careful and tried to scare us saying that something 
might happen to us.  Actually, whether it was fear or making us fearful, that 
was blurred.  I do not know whether it was really an attempt to protect us or it 
was an attempt to frighten us.”133   
 
 The fear that is highlighted in the narratives of Circassians is not explored in terms 
of its reasons.  Except some instances in terms of speaking Turkish in villages or the state 
policies in terms of Circassian language, no particular event is mentioned.  However, Kurds 
as another ethnic group in Turkey is always a reference in these narratives of fear.  The case 
of Kurds in Turkey is employed as a reference to understand the Turkish state’s 
relationship with ethnic groups and to that extent, it shapes Circassian narratives on 
diasporic identity.  Circassian activists define themselves as “better from the Kurds”; yet, 
the very visibility of the case of Kurds in narratives on fear highlights that fear is related to 
the experience of not only Circassians but also Kurds as Neval’s account exemplifies: 
 
   “Well, [the idea of the non-Circassian public in Turkey is that] Circassians 
are beautiful people, they are obedient, they are respectable people, they all did 
what we told them, and they fulfilled the duties that we gave them.  
Furthermore, being a Circassian woman, girl is a significant thing.  …Maybe 
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we like to declare that we are Circassians, one of those people whom they 
admire and we instantly tell that.  But we also instantly get frightened.  We 
need to state that “Well, I am not like Çerkes Ethem, I do not want the land of 
this country, and we should not be taken as similar to the Kurds.”  [“Aman beni 
Kürtlerle aynı kefeye koymayın” deme gereği de duyuyoruz.] But it is true; we 
do not have any territorial claim.  We do not want to die away; we want to live 
with our own culture and language.”134 
  
 In some of the interviews when asked about fear, the concept of fear was replaced 
by gratitude.  Hicran, for instance, defined Circassians as feeling gratitude towards first, 
Ottoman state and then, Turkish state: 
 
   “Even though we sometimes say that Ottoman Empire would not take us if it 
was opposed to its interests and it used us, there is a feeling of gratitude like 
that:  you are expelled from your own country and people accepts you.  More 
than fear, among the Circassians there is the idea that one should not be disloyal 
to the bread that s/he eats.  …s/he feels as ungrateful.  Indeed, there is no 
ungratefulness there.  You put forward your identity not because you consider 
Turks bad or not because you insult Turkey.”135  
 
 However, in some narratives, themes of fear and gratitude are accompanied by the 
theme of trust.  Circassians are regarded as trustworthy and such a perception is employed 
to explain the embeddedness of Circassians not only in Turkish politics but also in Middle 
Eastern politics as Gürtuğ states: 
 
   “As long as Circassian characters are alive, Circassians are trustworthy 
people.  Well, in Middle East qualities like being trustworthy, being loyal, 
being an honest person are not easily found.  …and we are a nation that is very 
cautious not to make people tell that we betrayed them.  Wherever we are, we 
have not been a headache.”136   
 
 The reason of trust is narrated as loyalty on behalf of Circassians.  Given the 
accounts of official history which identifies any ethnic group with treason and “stabbing the 
Turkish nation in the back” starting from the history of the last decade of the Ottoman 
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Empire till the contemporary history, Circassians consider themselves the loyal elements of 
Turkey.  Though based on the assumptions of official history such as the very continuous 
existence of traitors, such a narrative reverses its conclusions.  Treason is narrated as a 
misunderstood version of loyalty and official history is refuted without directly being 
challenged as Köksal states: 
 
   “Well, complete and pure obedience, not betraying, keeping the same position 
till the end.  This loyalty is the most significant quality of the community.  For 
instance, you see that there is the quality of being with the same persons with 
whom you started the road till the end.  This is why Circassians were torn into 
two during the War of Independence.  For instance, those to whom the Sultan 
made great favors were stigmatized as traitors by not leaving him till the end.  
…But those people who were in the armed forces with Ataturk also went on 
with him till the end.”137 
 
 Circassian activists defined Circassian diaspora in Turkey as politically and 
organizationally incompetent, restless, inbetween, fearful, grateful, trustworthy and loyal.  
The qualities that they have attributed to Circassian diaspora in Turkey are also reflections 
of their experiences in Turkey as a non-Turkish Muslim ethnic group.  They feel 
incompetence in terms of politics and organizations, solitude and inbetweenness, fear and 
loyalty, simultaneously.  As these feelings are all part of how they define their experiences 
as Circassians in Turkey, Circassians regard themselves impotent and inactive as a 
community as Neval puts “it is a weird thing to live as if no Circassians live in the Republic 
of Turkey.”138  Yet their experiences as a Circassian in Turkey is not only related to how 
they perceive themselves but also how they think they are being perceived by the non-
Circassian “others”, who are sometimes summoned as “the Turks” or “those outside”.  .   
 In terms of their image in Turkey and “others’” perceptions, the trilogy of 
Circassian Ethem, Circassian Girls/Beauty and Circassian chicken139 is a usual reference 
point in the narratives of Circassian activists.  In most of the interviews, Circassian activists 
stated that Circassians in Turkey are known by Çerkes Ethem, Circassian girls and 
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Circassian chicken as Kenan states: “Circassian girl, Circassian chicken and Çerkes Ethem.  
This is a triology, you know that?”140  As the trilogy is seen as primary in terms of the 
Circassian image in Turkey by all of the interviewees, beyond the trilogy there are different 
standpoints in terms of the image of Circassians in Turkey which are not mutually 
exclusive.  
 First, Circassian activists defined the image of Circassians in Turkey as positive.  
From such a perspective, being Circassian has some implications in terms of aesthetics and 
individual character.  Circassian identity, in some contexts, works as an individual asset.  
Zekeriya, aged 88 states: 
 
   “Though the 1919 Çerkes Ethem affair produced some sourness, Circassians 
is a people that is shown great respect.  [el üstünde tutulan] …There is no group 
in Turkey that humiliates Circassians.  …Well, Circassians do not have a 
problem of humiliation.”141   
 
That positive image is also narrated as including some implications on behalf of the 
individual.  Hence, Circassian identity that is accompanied by such a positive image is 
claimed to be an identity that is easily announced to general public as Meral exemplifies 
with her reference to a sociologist: 
 
   “In a meeting of civil society organizations, we were chatting with …[a 
sociologist in Turkey].  She told me that people do not avoid calling themselves 
Circassian because for a girl, saying that she is Circassian means that she is 
beautiful, she has a thin waist and what differentiates its meaning is the 
meaning embedded in it.  She said that for a man, it means that he is brave and 
handsome so Circassians used to say it.”142   
 
Apart from personal and physical qualities attributed to the Circassian identity, Özer aged 
34, born in Istanbul states that Circassians uses urban space differently and this different 
use of the public and private spheres has also been part of the Circassian image: 
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   “Since we lived in city for 50 years, it was the thoughts of urban people.  
There used to live a Circassian person in every 3 or 5 apartments.  The general 
perception was that they were respectful, they had a steady family life and their 
problems within the family were not carried into the public domain.  
Relationships with a distance.  …At least in our family, our use of the public 
domain was not like any other Turk or other people in the neighborhood; we 
used to use that domain differently.  …I think that for those over the age of 30 
and 35, there exists a general perception and I think that this is mostly a 
positive image and I think that the keywords that may be used in that sense are 
respect, dignity, solidarity, pride and  trustworthiness in his/her words.”143 
 
That positive image is a relative one which is formed in comparison with other non-Turkish 
ethnic groups in Turkey as Köksal narrates on the difference between Kurdish and 
Circassian images:  
 
   “Circassians in Turkey, today, is an elite and fully accepted group and with its 
contemporary meaning, it is seen as a source of pride not only by Circassians 
but also other communities.  This is the interesting point, a person who attains a 
better status and who states that s/he is a Kurd is instantly…  But when s/he 
says that s/he is a Circassian, in a way it becomes a source of pride, s/he can tell 
it easily and instantly.”   
 
However, Kaya highlights that this positive image of Circassians is limited to the 
intrapersonal and intra-group relations:  
 
   “Circassians usually have a positive image like that: in the eyes of the people 
on the street, Circassian is a good image, it is a good thing.  It is like being the 
white person.  Well, something happens when you say Gypsy, when you say 
Armenians in Turkey or currently, Kurds.  We have credit from the beginning, 
it is formed that way.  When you say I am Circassian, this is a situation that is 
envied.  This changes when it comes to those who think and work a little on 
Turkey’s social structure, political geography etc.”144   
 
The positive image of the Circassian that the activists narrated has its reservations as Taner 
explores these limitations:   
 
   “Let me tell you something unusual.  We, as Circassians, are spoiled in terms 
of expressing ourselves.  We can easily say that we are Circassians, we are 
splendid, that our music, traditions, our everything is good.  The weird part is 
that Turks can not oppose that.  Why can’t they?  Because that is true.  …We, 
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of course, have such an advantage: since Kurds are in a position to have 
territorial claims and other claims that they are a constitutive and older group 
on these lands and since the Turkish-Kurdish relationship is turned into a 
bloody conflict, they prefer to hide themselves.  We, Circassians, are in no 
position like that.  Let alone hiding, Circassians do want everything saucily and 
this is being tolerated by Turks.  But under the condition that it is limited to a 
certain level.  When it comes to the point of “demand”, they say to stop there 
and not to go any further.  …But apart from that, they tolerate and this is an 
advantage for us but we cannot fulfill that advantage till now.”145 
 
 Hence, the positive image of Circassians is based on a positive understanding of 
Circassian culture, lifestyles and principles that are related to the culture.  Such an 
understanding does not necessarily correspond to any political understanding of ethnicity. 
 Secondly, added to the positive image that activists claim to be identified with 
Circassians, Circassian activists highlighted the use of a second type of image regarding 
Circassians.  The second group of perceptions on Circassians mostly considers Circassians 
as a statist group which is regarded as an extension of the state apparatus.  Şener, for 
instance, explains the identification of Circassians with a certain image that revolves 
around the centrality of the state: 
 
   “There are even those who regard Circassians as settled and established; as a 
group that is in good status and has no problem with the state, or even a group 
which is the armband [kolluk].  Well, [for them] Circassian is not an ethnic 
identity, not a people; it is like an armband, they are a status group, a class; they 
are in good terms with the state, they have tasks in the crucial units of the state, 
they are especially preferred, they are loyal to the state, they have no demands.  
There is no ethnic group without demands, Kurds have those, Alevites have 
those.  …In the eyes of the leftists, Circassians have a particularly negative 
image.  …The [Turkish] left considers Circassians pro-Caliphate, religious, 
Islamist, Turkist and Turanist.  Well, don’t they have a point in that?  They are 
not very wrong indeed.  Despite the attempts of intellectuals with leftist 
tendencies to produce a different image, Circassian community occupies a fan 
that ranges from central right to the far right.”146  
 
Circassian activists, especially the ones embedded in leftist movements and some 
intellectual circles, claim that this kind of a perception is dominant as far as intellectuals 
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and leftists are concerned.  Kaya explores such an understanding of Circassians as an 
extension of the state apparatus: 
 
   “We participated in a meeting with civil society organizations that focus on 
some themes.  In fact, that surprised them [the people in the meeting] very 
much in the beginning.  Then, they got used to that.  They asked whether 
Circassians participate in these events.  Because by the intellectuals of Turkey, 
regardless of whether they are rightist or leftist intellectuals, Circassians are 
perceived as statist, as soldiers, as the police, as part of MĐT [National Security 
Organization].  [For them] It is a community that gives cadre to and embedded 
in these organizations.  Indeed, it is a valid perception.”147  
 
Kenan, a politically active leftist in 1970s states that such close relationships with the state 
apparatus are not only part of the Circassian image in Turkey but also a historical fact:  
 
   “It is the closeness to the sovereign that their connections with the Palace 
brought to those people.  It was the Sultan back then; it is the other units 
afterwards.  There are people who serve with loyalty despite all their documents 
of treason.  That has continued.  …For them to survive, for the next generation 
to survive there was the idea of staying close to the sovereign.  A very ugly way 
of perception emerged: the man of the order, the man of the system, the 
protectors of the system, and the guards of the order.  This is still so.”148 
 
Such an image of Circassians as an ethnic group that has organic connections with the state 
apparatus, such as army, MIT, police etc. may also be helpful in understanding why 
Circassians in Turkey is underresearched group when compared to Kurds or Alevites.  
Given such an image they are seen as a part of state apparatus and beyond ethnic politics as 
Circassians.   
 Thirdly, Circassian activists state that Circassians in Turkey is considered a tightly 
bound community, a network working like a brotherhood.  Gürsoy narrates on such an 
image:  
 
   “It is being assumed from outside that there is an organized movement like 
that: these people are very connected to each other and they recruit each other 
by supporting and giving a hand to each other.  Indeed, there is nothing like 
that, there is absolutely no such thing.  They are all people who have proved 
                                                  
147
 Kaya, interview by author, 7 June 2007, Đstanbul. 
 
148
 Kenan, interview by author, 20 August 2007, Đstanbul. 
 
149 
  
themselves individually and who have reached that position without the support 
of Circassians.  People outside regard us as very organized, connected and 
bonded people but in reality there is no such thing.  Well, after the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union in 1980s, 1990s and with the increase in relationships [with 
the homeland], identities came into prominence.  To be correct, they started to 
be declared.  Afterwards, the wars in Abkhazia and Chechnia made a leap for 
these identities.  People came to the point where declaration of the particular 
identity was a source of pride.  Now they are again being closed.  Because that 
particular identity is now being a disadvantage in Turkey.  Now, we do not see 
it being declared so loudly.”149 
 
Regarding the “disadvantage” that Gürsoy refers, the implications of the notion of close 
and bounded community is varied in Turkey.  It ranges from the conspiracy theories that 
have been part of the popular political research that has been done on for instance the 
Sabbatteans to multiple mechanisms of gaining political power.  1990s and 2000s has been 
a period in which this kind of research has abounded in the popular press and public 
agenda.  Hence, such an image of Circassians as a closed and bounded community working 
as a network is not a neutral analysis but rather a claim that is embedded in such conspiracy 
theories.  Hasan further implies that such an image has some similarities with these popular 
conspiracy theories:  
 
   “They always think that we are a very closed group, like Sabbattean; that we 
have very strong relationships with each other and that we protect each other 
very much.  …I always say that this is invalid.  It is just the opposite, 
Circassians are the strictest on that; we do not favor each other.”150  
 
Gürsoy further explains the implications of the image of “bounded community”: 
 
   “Therefore when somebody is in an important position and when you say “I 
know him, he is Circassian”, what I just mentioned happens.  “Well, of course 
you know him/her because everywhere you have…”  The outside perception is 
that there is no Circassian that does not know each other.  A Circassian myth 
similar to the Sabbattean myth of Yalçın Küçük has emerged.  [The idea is that] 
These people are significant in Turkey, they are an interest group, they are a 
lobby, their people are everywhere, i.e. bureaucracy, business, and politics… 
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…There are people who think that this is a dividing group that will be a 
calamity tomorrow and they say “Shall we deal with them, too?””151 
 
Such a perspective regards Circassians as a potentially dangerous group whose power is 
invisible and kept consciously hidden.   
 Fourth type of image that Circassian activists narrated on is related to the 
implications of “bounded community.”  Such an image is based on a different 
understanding of ethnicity in Turkey.  In such an understanding, non-Turkish ethnic groups 
are seen as real or potential trouble makers.  The more their very existence is pronounced, 
the higher the possibility that there will be trouble as exemplified by Nesibe who tells about 
a meeting organized by Circassians: 
 
   “In the 75th year of the foundation of the Republic [in 1998]…  We said that 
we built it [the Republic], the other groups were in minority when compared to 
us.  …So we said “let’s do something as Circassians, why do we stand aside?”  
…We said that we had been talking among each other since years so we should 
do something outside, something that would be heard, and something to raise 
our voice.  …So we organized a panel on the role of Circassians in the Ottoman 
Empire and Republic of Turkey. …in a university [in Turkey]…  Our panelist 
was X.  [a Circassian researcher]  …The panel started.  …X was the last 
panelist, he started his talk.  After his first or second use of the word Circassian, 
some people from the front rows did some gestures to the chair of the panel.  
We were seeing the chair, he just got bizarre.  X continued his talk.  … Then a 
man from the front row stood up and made a gesture to stop.  Then the chair 
tried to warn X that his time was up. When the chair finally said that they 
already loved Circassians, that the beauty of Circassian girls was famous and 
Circassian chicken was tasteful, X said “Sir, I did not come here today to say 
rhymes about April 23st.  Furthermore, why don’t I have a nationality while the 
chicken has one.””152  
 
Such an image is based on the argument that Circassians as a non-Turkish ethnic group 
may be trouble makers and/or the announcing of the Circassian identity is problematique as 
far as the unity and indivisibility of Turkey is concerned.  Metin states that such an image 
of Circassians is not valid as far as the peoples of Turkey are concerned but rather a 
reflection of official ideology: 
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   “Turkish society does not have negative thoughts about Circassians.  When 
you look at the people’s level, people accept us with our ethnic characteristics.  
Our neighboring village does not become restless that we speak Circassian.  
They say that “Of course, they are Circassians, we are Turks.  Of course, 
everybody will speak his/her language.”  But the problem is at those who have 
spent long time in the bench of official ideology.  …Really, there is no problem 
among the less educated people; the problem is among educated people.  This is 
a very bizarre contradiction indeed.”153 
 
Neval further claims that such a contradiction of acceptance and uneasiness about 
Circassians which takes place simultaneously is not totally new but especially unease is on 
the rise given the political developments in Turkey:  
 
   “I know this fear from my childhood.  They had an unease like that.  Well, the 
source of that may be Çerkes Ethem for sure.  [The idea was that] “They are 
unfaithful people, they can betray, they can be traitors.”  On the other hand, 
they loved us, they used to wish to marry our girls, they loved our food but still 
that fear has always existed in the country that we have lived.  Somehow they 
have always been afraid of the different.  …Those people outside us regard 
Circassians as very clean, respectful and chaste people.  But they have an 
unease with Circassians.  “Do they want to divide this country like Kurds?”  
When Circassians demand the right of the use of Circassian language, they 
always think that Circassians will divide this country like Kurds; that 
Circassians, too, are divisive people.  I realize that.154 
 
Therefore, Circassian image in Turkey, the ways they are perceived and the ways 
Circassians think they are being perceived is highly affected by the politics of Turkey and 
the roles ethnicity and ethnic groups play in politics.  Such an image that questions the 
trustworthiness of Circassians as an ethnic group in Turkey is not related to the Circassian 
community in Turkey per se but rather to the changing meanings of ethnicity and ethnic 
groups and the rise of Turkish and other nationalisms due to the Kurdish question. 
 
 
 
 
                                                  
153
 Metin, interview by author, 5 February 2008, Ankara. 
 
154
 Neval, interview by author, 6 February 2008, Ankara. 
 
152 
  
 
4.3. Relationships with the State Apparatus 
 
 
 
 This part of the chapter aims to explore how Circassian activists define state and 
their relationships with the state.  Despite the popular belief that Circassians are different 
and advantaged, when compared to other ethnic groups in Turkey, especially Kurds in their 
relationships with the state; their relationships with the state are far from being 
homogenous.  Circassian activists in Turkey employ several narratives to explain their 
relationships with the state and these narratives do not necessarily exclude one another. 
 In terms of its actions state is defined as ignoring Circassians as a community.  
Nesibe, with an example that concerns the relations of diaspora with the diasporic 
homeland, argues that the Turkish state ignores Circassians:  
 
   “In those days, I think, the prime minister was Bülent Ecevit.  An ultimatum 
came from Russia stating that the [Circassian] associations were the schools of 
the terrorists and hence, they should be closed down.  It was the time when the 
Chechnian refugees came into prominence.  It was saying that the associations 
should be closed down.  And the Republic of Turkey did not reply that except 
sending the police [to the associations].  …And I felt so awful back then, you 
do not exist.  You are nothing.  …You are not counted at all.  If I had the power 
to do that, I would just announce to the media next day and say that we were 
leaving Turkey as a number of people and returning to the Caucasus.  But 
unfortunately I do not have such a power, I do not have support to do that but I 
would have liked to do that.  Well, would Turkey care about that?  I do not 
know that either.”155   
 
 Circassian activists argue that Turkish state regards Circassians with a question 
mark.  From such a perspective, state is beyond being ethnically blind but it is particularly 
interested in ethnic groups, Circassians being one of them as exemplified with the words of 
Kaya and Turgay, respectively: 
 
   “Despite the cadres that we give to the state, I think that state has always 
regarded us as a question mark.  Even if we are unaware of our identity, the 
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state has always known that we are Circassians.  Even if we presume ourselves 
to be Turks, the state knows that we are not.”156 
 
   “How does it [the state] perceive?  I think that it thinks of Circassians as a 
community which is not a trouble for Turkey but also upon which an eye 
should be kept.”157 
 
As these kind of arguments range between question mark, unease and fear, Esat employs 
the notion of threat and states that Circassian may have a particular position among other 
ethnic groups in Turkey in terms of the state’s perception of threat:  
 
   “I think that state has two perceptions; first, I regard Circassians as an 
element which may be historically beneficial in some events or turning points.  
…There are lots of examples for that but we can see the second perception 
when the National Security Council did fişleme:158 it was the claim of being 
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Abkhazian and Circassian, not the claim of being Bosnian or Albanian.  …In 
state politics which is based on general perceptions of threat, we can think that 
Circassians are perceived as a small threat in the margins.”159 
 
 Circassian activists also argue that the Turkish state does not consider Circassians a 
harmful group.  Especially when compared to the Kurds in Turkey, Circassians are 
relatively in harmony with the state as Hakan argues:  
 
   “Circassians are generally regarded as loyal citizens who are in harmony with 
the state, dominant in its organization and who protect the state; they are not a 
problem in that sense.  Furthermore, with this Kurdish problem, there has 
emerged a general discourse that takes Circassians as an example, as an ethnic 
group that do not demand those things.”160 
 
As far as the relationship with the state is concerned that difference from the Kurds in 
Turkey is also highlighted by Hicran.  Such a perspective regards Circassians harmless for 
the state politics when compared to the Kurds:  
 
   “We generally gained the rights that the state of Turkey gave us because of 
Kurds.  It is not like we struggled and they gave us the rights.  They are the 
rights that we gained in the process of accession to European Union.  But 
before, nobody in Turkey could establish associations called Kurdish 
Association but in Turkey an Abkhazian Association was founded.  Because 
they were not seen as dangerous.  Since Circassians are among the founders of 
this state, since they are everywhere, since they never give priority to their 
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ethnic identity and since they have no such demand, they are seen as 
harmless.”161   
 
However, that harmonious relationship is not always explained by a total harmony but 
rather some activists regard that harmony as intertwined with fear and Circassians’ 
embeddedness in state mechanism.  For instance, Kenan says:  
 
   “It is a fear that is formed out of a protective mentality and they are using that 
fear.  And that is bad.  Well, the call of our elders that we call thamade not to 
resist too much…  For instance, after the elections X [a Circassian activist who 
may be considered a thamade] said that “they are a bunch of people, do not pay 
attention to them.” [vis-à-vis a group of Circassian activists who organized 
some public meetings with some independent candidates in the last national 
elections.] What did those people say so that he said not to pay attention to 
them?  He openly gave a message to the Turkish state that these were a bunch 
of people, that Circassians were still on the state’s side and he warned them not 
to pay attention to those.  …the reasons for the development of that fear 
producing instinct then become different, that is getting engaged to the 
sovereign state structure.  …You have a standing and a status as a Circassian 
bourgeoisie.  If you tell something that is in contradiction with the system, or if 
someone from your community voices those too much, and if you continuously 
have meetings in the state level, then somebody may pull your ear.  Most 
probably that happens to some of them.  Well, they do pull their ears.”162   
 
Hence, the narrative on the harmony of the state and Circassians may turn into an argument 
on Circassian embeddedness in the state mechanism, and the emphasis on harmony on the 
side of Circassians may be transformed into the notion of fear on the side of Circassians 
and surveillance by the state.  Yasemin takes state surveillance for granted and claims that 
in her life story which is embedded in activism in Circassian organizations, surveillance by 
the state mechanism has been insignificant:  
 
   “I do not like being extreme.  For sure, a country will have some precautions, 
some measures of security and controls, and I have never blamed Turkey in that 
sense.  And I have always been grateful.  Since the day I know myself, I have 
openly declared that I am a Circassian, I have told my objectives.  …I always 
had visitors and letters [from the Caucasus] and how I worked was being 
known.  I was not disturbed for one day and I knew pretty well that there were 
certainly some files about me in MĐT (National Intelligence Organization) and 
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they [these files] had to exist.  …Nobody prevented us.  Here are our lives, here 
are our letters.  What else could we do?  We certainly were working for the 
peoples of the Caucasus and nobody disturbed us.  This is another facet of 
truth.”163   
 
 Finally, Circassian activists narrate on Circassian embeddedness in the state 
mechanism.  As the real extent of embeddedness in the state apparatus is unknown and 
beyond the scope of this work, the mechanisms of such a relationship ranges from having a 
task in a state institution to being an informal part of the intelligence and security 
organizations as far as the claims of Circassian activists are concerned.  Nesibe explains 
such a relationship with the state as a consequence of the insecurity of the migrant: 
 
   “We are a refugee community.  This is different from the Kurds; they are the 
people of Anatolia.  We came from outside.  And therefore we would like to 
stay here, put our feet on the ground.  This is why we always take refuge in 
secure settings.  We take refuge.  This is why we chose to be in the state tasks, 
in the army.  We chose to be in those settings so that we would not be expelled 
again.”164   
 
 In terms of whether such an embeddedness in the power structure works for the 
benefit of Circassians as an ethnic group in Turkey, activists argue that such a relationship 
often works in reverse directions.  The harmony that is aforementioned is regarded as a 
result of this relationship with the state.  Those members of the community who are in such 
relationships with the Turkish state are claimed to be the bufferzones and the brakes of 
Circassian community in Turkey.  They were claimed to be functioning as the producers of 
the apparent harmony between Circassians and the Turkish state as Metin explains:  
 
   “On the individual level, it might have some benefits in terms of advancement 
and assignment etc.  But when we think in terms of Circassianhood, in terms of 
a movement with national substance, they always had harms.  They had always 
been the brakes, they had always been those who repressed.  We had so many 
ministers for instance, which one did produce the slightest benefit for 
Circassianhood?  None of them.  On the opposite, it is “For Heaven’s sake!  Do 
not!”  With their effect, our parents used to pressure us stating that they would 
not know any better than them.  So our movements are always repressed.  In 
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that sense the success in bureaucracy is not for our good, but it is harmful for 
us.”165 
 
However, embeddedness in state mechanisms is not limited to the individual level but also 
it is claimed to be apparent as far as the Circassian organizations are concerned.  Taner 
argues that the organic ties of associations with the Turkish state explain their 
contemporary conformism in terms of ethnic demands:  
 
   “Since associations are bound by laws in Turkey and they have so little that 
they can do.  Also since those working in the associations are connected to the 
deep structure of Turkey, by deep I do not imply illegal formations; since they 
are in very good relationships with the bureaucratic and military elites; and 
since they do not want to spoil those relationships, and since they happily lead 
their lives in such a situation; since they do not demand anything, you naturally 
cannot tell anything in these settings.  It is now impossible to do something 
with them.  I have seen that.”166   
 
Yet claims of embeddedness in the state mechanism sometimes goes beyond rejection of 
associations and search for alternative means of organization on the side of activists and it 
sometimes becomes very particular in that it focuses on a particular institution in Turkey, 
MĐT (National Intelligence Organization) and its relationships with Circassians.   
 To better understand the relationships of Circassian activists with the Turkish state 
and how these narratives and discourses are formations of Circassian diasporic identity in 
Turkey, the remaining parts of the chapter will explore Circassian activists’ narratives on 
MĐT and education.   
 
 
 
4.3.1. Myth of MĐT (National Intelligence Organization) 
 
 
 Throughout the interviews when I asked about the relationship between the Turkish 
state and Circassians, Circassian activists always referred to MĐT as an institution with 
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close ties to the Circassians in Turkey.  From such a perspective, MĐT and other institutions 
of intelligence are significant to understand Circassian organizations and their participation 
into Turkish politics as Meral criticizes the organizations: 
 
   “In our associations, always very conservative views are dominant.  The 
associations were always being managed by people who were trying to keep 
young people outside politics with a protective mentality, who, if I question a 
little further, did not have very good intentions in the simplest sense.  I do not 
want to say people who were “directed by some others.”167   
 
Similarly, Mert argues for the significance of these intelligence mechanisms in the 
Circassian community and  perceives their existence on a very individual level: 
 
   “I believe that our associations are being guided by the state.  I also know that 
those who are not being guided by the state are being prevented by our own 
institutions or our own people in the state who have either bad or good 
intentions.  I also believe that if there is going to be a problem about me, they 
will protect me by saying that I am indeed a good and chaste man when it is 
necessary.  But I also believe that they can make the computers of the 
newspaper that I publish stolen since all data is loaded in that computer.”168   
 
 The idea of MĐT and its significance for Circassians in Turkey is beyond the 
institutional level for Circassian activists.  Surprisingly, several of them narrated on their 
personal encounters with MĐT and other mechanisms of intelligence with laughter but 
sometimes with lower voices.  Without even my questions, they shared their encounters 
with MĐT while they were part of the associations.  Kenan, for instance, who was arrested 
in the end of 1970s for political activism that was not related to Circassians highlights the 
significance of such mechanisms:   
 
   “But when you were being interrogated there, it was not just that [political 
activism] that is being interrogated.  They also asked “What do you want to do 
in Turkey as Circassians?” and they knew a lot.  Well, it is always said that 
there are many Circassians in police force and MĐT.  [He laughs]  Yes, there 
are.  It is not something to hide, it is very evident.”169   
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The three accounts that I will now quote are from three prominent activists among 
Circassians in Turkey who worked actively in associations and had close ties with the 
Caucasus:170 
 
   “Before, they used to come from MĐT when something happens in the 
Caucasus asking my opinions and comments and I used to tell them.  When 
their visits have decreased recently, I asked them that they used to come more 
often.  They told me that they did not need to come and that in our internet 
websites everything was there.”171 
 
   “Well, after 1972, a Circassian…  from the police department… he told me 
that someone from MĐT who is …the head of that unit… called him one day 
and told him,  these are his words: “Friend, we have a demand from you.  Tell 
those Circassians to revolt if they have a revolt vis-à-vis the state.  If they do 
not have one, they shall not make us doubtful with some palavers, to use 
today’s terminology.  Since the War of Independence, we inspected Düzce, 
Hendek, Adapazarı172 at least 20 times by furrowing, that means separating into 
parcels.  But Circassians do nothing but create fuss.  Either they shall not create 
fuss and make us move by provoking us or they shall do something after the 
fuss.””173 
 
   “One month before September 12 [1980], someone, the regional director of 
MĐT came.  …He told me that he would like to talk to me if possible.  I went 
there.  …He asked the places where there were Circassian associations.  I told 
him to pass that question and ask the ministry of internal affairs.  …He laughed.  
He told me that I did not trust them at all.  He told that there were associations 
abroad and asked their places.  …But this is interesting, maybe you are the first 
person that I am telling this.  I said “Look boss. Let’s not be misunderstood.  
Ask something normal and I will tell; we have nothing hidden.  I do not know, 
there are a couple of associations in Europe that Turkish employees go but I 
really do not know their addresses.  Even if I know, I would not tell you that.  
Because I do not have to tell.”  He insisted.  Sometimes you have to be firm.  I 
said “Look boss.  You now like to add something to your file.  But this is no 
news for MĐT.  I do not want to talk on these matters.  Let me tell you another 
                                                  
170
 In these quotations I will not use even the pseudonames.  During their narration of these encounters, they 
did not ask me to quit recording, yet they used very low voices.  Since the number of prominent Circassian 
activists who were in such key positions are quite limited in Turkey, I prefer to keep their names anonymous 
in line with research ethics.   
 
171
 Đzzet, interview by author, 10 February 2008, Ankara. 
 
172
 Düzce, Hendek, Adapazarı are three locations in the Marmara region within which large groups of 
Circassians are settled. 
 
173
 Nezih, interview by author, 17-18 August 2007, Đstanbul. 
 
160 
  
thing then.  Since you insist, about that question that you just asked, MĐT 
entrusted the head of X [Circassian] association, it paid his travel expenses, it 
sent him to Europe in….[recent dates] and he went there and visited each 
association there, he recorded etc.  He gave MĐT those so this will not be news 
for MĐT.”  Then he got shocked.  [he laughs]  He asked me how I knew that.  I 
said “Sir, it is not that far.  We are Circassians.  We are a society.  We hear 
things from each other.  Do you think that ÇĐT is asleep while MĐT is 
working?”  [“O kadar da uzun boylu değil, biz de Çerkesiz, toplumuz, bir 
şeyler birbimizden duyarız.  MĐT çalışıyor da ÇĐT uyuyor mu zannediyorsun 
sen?” dedim.]  He did not understand what ÇĐT was.  …[The other person] [a 
Circassian in the lower echelons of MĐT who was also present in the talk] told 
him that I was joking.  He was trying to acquit me.  He told that Circassians 
[Çerkesler] made jokes like that by putting Ç in front of the words, such as 
turning TĐKKO into ÇĐKKO and that meant Circassian Intelligence 
Organization.  He explained that since Circassians knew each other, they heard 
these kinds of things from each other.  I told him that this was actually how it 
happened.”174   
 
However, the idea of MĐT in the narratives of Circassian activists is not limited to personal 
encounters with MĐT but also constitute accusations between people in terms of who is a 
part of MĐT.  Some narrate on accusations and claims that are made about them like Gürsoy 
who mentions the claims about him: 
 
   “I still have the proceedings of that [some meetings].  Since there was no 
legal structure in those times, I did not give them to anyone.  Why?  To put a 
bookmark on history.  According to some people I was giving those to MĐT, to 
the police.  I have labels like that.”175   
 
However, those who are accused may easily and instantly turn into an accuser as Kenan 
exemplifies:   
 
   “Was it Einstein who told that it is more difficult to smash prejudice than an 
atom?  There is a real prejudice.  …For instance, they say that this newspaper is 
being published with the support of Chechnian mafia.  …I cannot believe it.  
On the other side, [there are people telling that] we are being funded by the 
intelligence service of Jordan.  There are those never-ending stuff.  …Let me 
tell you very frankly, in our community, there are people who take directives 
from their brothers.  These gossips do not just come from nowhere.”176   
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Hence, any dispute can be transformed into such claims as far as Circassian activists are 
concerned.  What matters, what is not known but still what is most debated becomes who is 
related to MĐT.  It is like a murder mystery game but the difference is that this game is 
continuous: there are always suspects, claims and proofs.  In any moment, the accused may 
turn into accused and vice versa.  As the objects and subjects of such a narrative is open to 
constant change, the idea that some Circassians are part of MĐT and this can be anyone is 
always there.  Parallel to those accusations of being entrusted by MĐT to some tasks is a 
common accusation that can be employed in any controversy as Cezmi explains his 
controversy with a childhood friend:   
 
   “When I asked him whether he was entrusted a special task to repress those 
instead of praising them, he just stood up and asked who the entruster was.  I 
said the Republic of Turkey was showing some carrot not to be disgraced vis-à-
vis European Union and probably using such people to repress those.  What 
does that mean?  It means “you are a spy, you are the man of MIT.”  How else 
shall I say that?  He took his hat, got furious and left.”177  
 
Nezih repeats one of those claims about his friends with whom he had been competing in 
the associations and who was arrested in the coup d’état of 1980: “They were interrogated 
for 6 hours and they were set free in an advantaged way.  This is why it was said very often 
in those days that they were spies of MĐT.  That label is still prevailing.”178   
 Yet the narratives on MĐT also go beyond the claims and accusations between 
activists.  As many activists stated that they knew about the identity of those entrusted 
people among them, few narrated on particular instances of deciphering.  Hasan tells such 
an event that happened just after the coup d’état of 1980:  
 
   “Like him, two people were arrested.  There were people who were tortured 
after arrest.  [In another city] two people got arrested and they were tortured.  It 
was a result of a denunciation [ihbar] from the association.  The one who 
denunciated was probably a Circassian whose identity we guessed.  …That was 
very evident.  The proofs back then were strong.”179   
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Regarding the same turbulent years, Nezih who was similarly arrested states that he met his 
denunciator in the following years:  
 
   “Nezih: Because those who denunciated me were Circassians, I was not 
guilty. 
Setenay: So you know that? 
N: I know.  Those who denunciated are also evident, I know.  
S: Did they tell that to you? 
N: One of them confessed.  I also know why I was denunciated.  I also know 
the denunciators.  But the interesting part is that [afterwards] I have not been 
hostile to them.”180 
 
 Hence, surveillance is frequently normalized by Circassian activists.  Surveillance 
by the state is taken for granted.  Furthermore, regardless of the extent to which they 
represent the reality, these narratives are employed to gain some significance as Circassian 
activists.  This is why these narratives on MĐT and embeddedness in the state which may 
well be unacceptable in other contexts are easily taken for granted by Circassian activists.  
To the extent that MĐT has some control in associations, some people working for it etc. 
any dispute, conflict, differences in terms of homeland, politics in Turkey, diaspora politics 
may be explained and explored.  Furthermore, such a dominant image of MĐT is also 
implicitly employed to legitimize and explain the very apolitical status of Circassians in 
Turkey.  Such a myth of MĐT as everywhere and everybody, as the all-present but 
unknowable is employed by the activists to explain the reasons of the so-called failure of 
the Circassians in Turkey as a diasporic community.  As the arguments of Circassian 
embeddedness in the state is open to debate and part of the conspiracy theories which have 
become popular since late 1990s, what is evident is that such a normalization and 
acceptance of surveillance on the side of activists is in itself a form of embeddedness in the 
state mechanism and mentality.  To the extent that MĐT, intelligence services and 
organizations, and their formal and informal attempts to collect information about ethnic 
groups in Turkey are normalized; their acts, attempts are regarded as something to laugh at, 
a memory in life history, a fact of life at the diaspora.  From such a perspective, diaspora 
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copes and mocks with surveillance by the state through normalizing and unveiling it.  
Hence, though it creates and eases embeddedness in the mentality of the nation-state, such a 
myth also works as a mechanism of resistance which provides diaspora activists with a 
voice that narrates, suspects, “knows” and guesses.   
 
 
 
4.3.2.  “The Others” in Education 
 
 
In 1961, in a political humor magazine, Akbaba a columnist, Yusuf Ziya Ortaç 
criticized the Turkish educational system for its so-called failure and “insufficiency” to 
influence the ethnic groups in general and Circassians in particular:  
 
   “…Thirty nine years later from the victory of Independence, here is a young 
handsome reserve officer and teacher in Çanakkale who burns the photographs 
of Ataturk and says that he is a Circassian, an Abkhazian.   
Circassian!...  Let me list the first easy questions that come to my pen:  
So you are Circassian, aren’t you boy?...  Here is Europe, here is Asia, here is 
Africa…  Take the binoculars and show me a spot: a spot as big as Kaşık Island 
that is written Circassian on it.  Is there anything like that on earth?   
Leave the map…  Here are the waving flags of the countries…  This is French, 
this is English, this is Greek, this is Ethiopian!...  Among them there are even 
ones whose name we do not know….  Which one is the Circassian flag?... 
Leave the flags…  Can there be a nation witho 
ut literature, music?   
Can you show me one Circassian poet, one Circassian novelist, one Circassian 
composer?...  Especially a Circassian on stage?...  That could only enter into 
Karagöz (shadowplay) in Ramadan nights to make the Ottoman audience laugh.   
….In that case primary school, secondary school, technical school, all those 
years of education were insufficient to make an Abkhazian boy embrace 
Turkishness, to make him forget his Circassianhood which is without a history, 
a victory and art!   
What would you say?  Are we still going to say that “we have a ministry of 
education” with the optimist smile of stupidity on our face?  
For our national existence, this Circassian boy is more dangerous even than the 
Çerkes Ethem gang.”181 
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As this text can be an instance of popular nationalism in the magazines of the time as 
exemplified by Bali in his studies on Jews in Turkey,182 this part of the chapter ironically 
aims to explore the same question with the humorous author: that is the relationship 
between the Circassian ethnic identity and educational settings in Turkey.  In addition to 
understanding the formations of ethnic identities in Turkey in general and Circassian 
diasporic identity in particular, this exploration aims to contribute to the recent studies on 
educational system in Turkey.   
Starting from the mid 1990s and intensifying throughout the 2000s, social scientists 
have explored education in Turkey from a critical point of view. As the policies of 
education at particular epochs have been studied,183 education in Turkey has been examined 
on political and ideological levels.  One of the studies on educational policies in Turkey, for 
instance, states that starting from the early years of Turkish Republic, Turkish educational 
system has been based on an authoritarian nationalist-statist ideology that has aimed to 
exalt the Turkish nation and Turkish state and associates any foreign idea and influence 
with harm.184   
Parallel to the studies on educational policies in Turkey, the mid 1990s and 2000s 
have also witnessed the proliferation of studies on textbooks as documents of official 
curriculum, as guides for teachers that are used nationwide and as a means of state to create 
the national identity, the ideal citizen and the ideal Turk.  Mostly, the findings underline 
that textbooks used in primary and secondary education is flawed with militarism, 
intolerance, xenophobia, “passages, phrases and expressions that are prejudiced, 
degrading”, gender discrimination and Ataturkist nationalism.185  The stereotype of 
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“internal and external enemy”, the external enemy being the more ambiguous one;186 
indoctrination as an implicit objective, the image of the Turks as “superior, privileged and 
even more divinely empowered than others”,187 admiration of power, violence and 
authority188 are stated as among the frequent themes in textbooks in Turkey.  Regarding the 
minorities, it is stated that the language of the textbook oscillates between an assimilationist 
approach, a discriminatory language and silence which implies ignoring or denying the 
matter outright.189  Also some statements in the textbooks assume Turkish nation as 
homogenous rather than composed of various ethnicities and ignore variation, and consider 
any difference threatening: as Muslim non-Turkish groups are ignored and seen as threats, 
non-Muslims are excluded from the definitions of the nation.190 Hence, since the 2000s, 
social science has dealt with educational practices from a critical perspective, with the aim 
of democratizing and reforming education.    
As this research is originally about diaspora nationalism and gender, throughout the 
interviews I had no particular question regarding education.  Yet, in all of the interviews I 
realized that in the narratives of Circassian activists, regardless of my questions, education 
had a significant role in constructing their identities, that they loved to talk about their 
educational experiences without being asked, that they had an agenda on education, that 
they believe narrating on the way they were educated is a way of narrating on who they 
think they are.  Most of the Circassian activists that I interviewed automatically talked 
about their educational experiences as Circassians in Turkey when talking about identity, 
difference and life histories.  Hence, their very narratives of education, indeed, warned me 
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about the significance of education not only as a tool to explore the state policies vis-à-vis 
the various ethnic communities in Turkey but also as a factor that shapes diasporic 
experience, identity and consciousness.  This part of the chapter considers education as a 
heuristic tool to explore the relationship between state and ethnic identity in Turkey.  Also, 
it aims to further our understanding of educational system in Turkey by focusing on the 
educational experiences of a cultural ethnic group in Turkey.  Education is one of the 
various settings in which meanings and practices of nationalism, identity and citizenship 
are created and recreated.  I argue that exploring the way Circassians relate to educational 
institutions, curricula and practices sheds light on the way Circassians as a non-Turkish 
Muslim minority group historically relates to the Turkish state, official historiography in 
Turkey and state policies such as education in Turkey.   
I argue that there are three types of educational experiences that Circassians narrate 
on.  These narratives of Circassian activists highlight that their experiences pertain to three 
interrelated levels.  The first level considers the management of ethnic identity in 
educational settings, i.e. what being a Circassian means in a school, classroom; what young 
Circassians are advised when going to schools etc.  The second level deals with language 
education as an educational policy and coexistence of other languages in educational 
settings.  The third level considers a particular topic in educational curricula which is 
significant for Circassians in Turkey, the topic of Çerkes Ethem in history classes.   
 
 
 
4.3.2.1. Managing the Ethnic Identity 
 
 
For the Circassians in Turkey, educational institutions have been one of the first –
but not the least- settings within which Circassians as individuals relate with state.  In this 
encounter with the state, Circassian identity gains additional meanings: for instance, openly 
declared identities are transformed into hidden identities in schools; native language itself 
becomes something very different; the historical figures and local histories are transformed 
into insignificant and false knowledge.  Mostly schools are the first setting within which 
167 
  
young people with Circassian origins encounter with the state, and this encounter shapes 
the conditions of Circassian existence in public sphere.   
Nevertheless, before actually going to the school and meeting with the teacher or 
reading the textbooks, the community, relatives and friends inform the students about these 
conditions, like “an introduction to being a Circassian in school: 101” course.  Mostly the 
advice from parents and grandparents point to the necessity of hiding the ethnic identity 
(talking about the 1930s):  
 
   “I listened from people of the previous generations from other Circassian 
villages.  “Don’t!” they were told, “don’t tell that you are Circassian, don’t 
speak Circassian, if they understand, they won’t let you get educated, they will 
prevent you, they will stop you.”191 
 
Though Circassians declare themselves to be publicly known as Circassians in their daily 
lives, in the streets, villages, apartments etc. that they live, the constant advice and reminder 
for a Circassian student is to hide their identity in schools and classrooms.  From such a 
perspective, schools are not the continuation of daily life and social habitus but a setting 
which may exclude what is legitimate in other settings.  It is a public area within which 
identities should be kept hidden.  Especially troublesome is the expression of identity; it 
seems that it is not the ethnic identity that is being problematized but the very expression of 
it in that particular setting.  The advices before going to school are sometimes successfully 
obeyed by the young Circassians.  However, the obedience does not bring ease or comfort 
as another quotation highlights since the demanded obedience is based on hypocrisy.  And 
the result is narrated as regret, a feeling of discrepancy and shock: 
 
   “While I was leaving for school, my grandmother advised me not to reveal 
that I am a Circassian.  It was a big city that I was going.  I had not seen it 
before.  But my grandmother also had not seen it before but she told me not to 
reveal that I am a Circassian, why…. She was never schooled, she did not know 
Turkish, despite that she told me not to reveal that I am a Circassian.  This was 
a shock for me, a question mark just appeared, if I am a Circassian, why should 
I need to hide it?  …These old people told us these.  There was a huge 
discrepancy about what they told us and what we were being taught in schools 
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but listening my grandmother’s advice I was not able to tell that I am a 
Circassian, I was not able to say “this is not so” but this has always been a bitter 
regret for me.”192 
 
These advices are based on the assumption that the expression of ethnic identity is a reason 
of discrimination in educational setting.  With such an assumption, Circassian identity 
becomes a hidden identity that is limited to daily lives and private sphere.  Hence, 
classroom and schools are seen as not an extension of life in its entirety and richness but a 
space devoid of any personal difference, such as ethnic identity, cultural practice and 
languages other than Turkish.  Education as a state mechanism is perceived as intolerant to 
the expression of different ethnic identities and ethnic identity itself is understood as a 
potential troublemaker within these setting, as a reason to be discriminated, excluded, and 
prevented.   
However, there are also narratives on the instances of resistance.  Some Circassian 
activists state how they openly declare their Circassian identity in some instances, for 
instance when national anthem was being sung, when the subject was the life of Mustafa 
Kemal Atatürk (by the statement that “Atatürk is not the type of man who you think he is” 
which is followed by the warning of the parents) or the history of the Turkish War of 
Independence.  Despite some resistances and some punishments that followed these acts of 
resistance as narrated by the Circassian activists, education in Turkey is perceived and 
experienced by the Circassians as a domain within which expression of ethnic identities is 
not acceptable.  
Apart from the problem of declaring or hiding the Circassian identity in the schools 
and classrooms, educational setting in Turkey is perceived by the Circassians as ignorant of 
the needs of a child with a non-Turkish ethnic identity who is the native speaker of a non-
Turkish language:  
 
   “My aunt was so knowledgeable about that, I grew up hearing Sosruko and 
Seteney193 from her.  ….And I was worried that no one else knew Seteney, I 
was worried that my aunt would die.  As I was thinking about what to do, I 
made a Latin script for myself and with that script I wrote all the tales that she 
told, I was 13 years old.  One day my Turkish teacher was looking at my 
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notebook, and I forgot those tales there.  …..He took it, and looked at it, he did 
not make any sense out of it; he was not able to read it.  He was not a person 
related to pedagogy, he was more of a dictator, he shouted at me asking what 
that was, he took me out of the classroom.  There the teachers were gathered, 
they asked me “what is that, are you a spy?”, what would I be spying in 
Şarkışla?194  That much intolerant they were, and they informed my father 
about the issue.”195 
 
Though, in the end, his father who was also a respected educator complained the state 
authorities about the teacher and made the teacher sent to other parts of the country which 
is called exile by the civil servants, not all students have these instances of empowerment 
(which he summarizes as “after that I became famous as the boy who sent the teacher 
away”).  The quotation above highlights that any unidentified sign, culture, cultural practice 
or need tend to be associated with a threat, i.e. spy and the threat has no limits: it can be in 
Şarkışla, Sivas; it can be associated with 13 years old student etc.  Circassian activists’ 
narratives highlight that educational settings in Turkey in general are perceived as ignorant 
and intolerant to and fearful of ethnic identities and needs.  Such a perception also 
highlights that Circassians in these settings are not portrayed as students with special needs 
(such as writing Circassian tales heard orally from the aunt) but as students who are 
expected to hide their identity which includes a whole way of life; language, memories, 
tales and songs.  From such a perspective, discipline and punishment mechanisms work to 
make ethnic identities invisible and unannounced, and educational policies, practices 
disciplines the difference which is displayed on either individual or group level by making 
it invisible, insignificant and potentially harmful.   
Yet, not all identities were rendered invisible in education settings.  As the “Turk” 
had been constantly defined and glorified with supreme qualities, other non-Turkish 
identities had been situated through the Turkish identity.  Hence, many Circassian activists 
narrate on themselves asking their elders about their Turkishness and trying to prove the 
Turkishness of Circassians: 
 
                                                  
 
194
 Şarkışla is district of Sivas, a city in central Anatolia.   
 
195
 Cezmi, interview by author, 7 February 2008, Ankara. 
 
170 
  
   “When I started to go to associations in 1977, I was a typical young person 
with rightist orientations endowed with the official ideology and education of 
the Republic of Turkey.  I was doing research in the libraries to find out my 
identity.  I was working on Circassians and I was trying to find out that they 
were Turks.  …While looking for clues of their Turkishness, I went to other 
directions.  I used to see the word Circassian in a book of 300 pages just in a 
minute.  It was a bit pathological.  …With that misinformation, that ideological 
premise that I am a Turk, we were of course trying to discover that we were 
Turks.  But as we tried to discover, we saw that we were not…”196 
 
As Circassians from time to time are called Caucasian Turks in textbooks, this is an 
ambiguous term since there is no dialectical similarity between Turkish and Circassian 
dialects, since Circassians do not call themselves Turks but call non-Circassian people as 
Turks.  Furthermore, given the memories of advises to hide the ethnic identity and 
insistence to speak Turkish, many Circassian activists state that they became suspicious that 
they were not Turkish.  Hence, that oscillation between being the glorious Turk and being 
the insignificant other whose knowledge, culture and language is presumed to be non-
existent indeed creates the “pathological” attempt to search for Turkishness.  Given the 
relative impotency of Circassian culture, identity and language vis-à-vis the Turkish 
identity, being non-Turkish becomes quite unacceptable for many students:  
 
   “The real turning point came when I was at secondary school.  When our 
political perceptions started to develop, we were hearing the stories that we 
were special Turks, qualified Turks, Caucasian Turks.  ….One day I asked my 
grandfather, we had a good communication with him, I asked “are we Turks?”, 
he said “no, we are not.”   That had such a negative influence on me.  I was 
trying to prove that we were Turks and he told that in such an ordinary, 
indifferent manner.  I was perceiving not being a Turk as a very bad thing.”197   
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4.3.2.1.  Learning Turkish and Unlearning Circassian 
 
 
The second level that the Circassian narratives highlight pertains to language 
education that prioritizes Turkish as the mother language and European languages as 
foreign languages.  Article 42 of the constitution of 1982 of the Republic of Turkey states 
that “No language other than Turkish shall be taught as a mother tongue to Turkish citizens 
at any institutions of training or education. Foreign languages to be taught in institutions of 
training and education and the rules to be followed by schools conducting training and 
education in a foreign language shall be determined by law.” Circassian language is not one 
of those foreign languages taught in schools.  But apart from the legal choice of the 
language of education, the use of the languages of the ethnic groups in Turkey is strongly 
discouraged in the classrooms.  Most of the Circassians in Turkey till 1980s, till the years 
of urbanization when Circassians were transformed into an urban community from a local 
one were native speakers of Circassian dialects.  Most of the Circassians, especially the 
elder ones from the villages that I interviewed highlighted that they learned Turkish when 
they started primary school.  Another group stated that their Turkish was poor in terms of 
grammar and vocabulary.  Hence, Circassian experiences with education are highly 
intertwined with learning Turkish.  I argue that Circassian narratives underline four 
mechanisms through which Turkish is learned:  Turkish courses for the members of the 
ethnic community of all ages; acts of physical or oral punishment and disapproval by the 
teacher in the classroom; statements by the teachers that warn the parents about the use of 
language; and finally appraisal and approval for excellence in Turkish.   
The first mechanism is the Turkish language courses.  As “Citizen Speak Turkish” 
campaigns of 1930s warn the people of Turkey to use Turkish, Circassians’ memories 
about speaking Turkish is particularly about Turkish courses which are organized 
specifically by the state for people of all ages.  As the narratives of Circassians from 
various villages of Turkey underline that use and learning of Turkish has been a primary 
state mechanism to Turkify the people, the mechanism itself worked with multiple forms of 
resistance in their own locality: 
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   “My mother did not know Turkish much.  When the instructor came, he tried 
to teach all of them Turkish.  But finally he had to learn Abkhazian.”198 
 
   “My mother told me that they sent a teacher to the village to teach them 
Turkish; that all people from all ages were gathered in a classroom and forced 
to speak Turkish; that in 1930s, they were punished by the teacher when they 
spoke Circassian; that they used to make Circassian jokes when they got angry; 
that the teacher used to ask what they talked about him.  My mother personally 
experienced that, it was absolutely forbidden to speak Circassian in the village, 
everybody would speak Turkish, this was a state policy and there was a teacher 
sent.  There was a particular pressure.”199   
 
 
The quotations above underline the fact that teaching of Turkish is not narrated as a 
regular language education which may benefit people in their own lives, associations, 
relationships with state, neighbors etc. as far as Circassians in Turkey are concerned.  The 
attempt of the state to teach Turkish and the resistance of Circassians to use their own 
language underlines the fact that policies of education and language are contested fields.  
Furthermore, the very discourse on the Turkish courses that “puts pressure on Circassians” 
is an indicator that language education is still a contested issue.  As far as the Circassians 
are concerned these courses are regarded one of the reasons of why most of Circassians in 
Turkey today are not native speakers of Circassian dialects or speakers at all.   
Apart from the Turkish courses for adults, there are more tangible and contemporary 
instances of the way Circassians have learned Turkish.  As far as Circassians are concerned, 
primary school teachers have been one of the first people that they met who punished them 
for speaking Circassian and Abkhazian instead of Turkish: 
  
   “Being slapped is something very humiliating for Circassians.  It is something 
like a reason of murder.  But I was first slapped by my primary school teacher 
because I was talking to the boy sitting next to me in Abkhazian.  That was a 
lesson: Turkish had to be spoken.  After all, the school curriculum was based on 
Turkish language; maybe the teacher did that to imply that “my stupid boy, if 
you don’t learn this language, you will be very sorry for that tomorrow.”  Or 
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maybe he wanted to tell me that speaking Abkhazian was not something good.  
That slap made me serious about Turkish.  [he laughs] But it was humiliating.  
After those years, I have been subject to several beatings and tortures but I have 
always felt that slap here.  Though I have been slapped several times after that, 
that slap is always there.  Because it was about language.”200 
 
   “It was just after the coup d’état of May 27th [in 1960], back then high school 
and university graduates used to make their military service as teachers.   We 
had a teacher like that.  ….one day they complained us to the teacher, and then I 
was beaten harshly just because I was talking Circassian.  I never forgot this.  If 
I was going to be the enemy of the Turks, I would be one with this event.  Then 
my teacher regretted a lot, I presume.  Then I learned Turkish very quickly and 
I became one of his favorite students.  Afterwards, he apologized me for that, 
he said that it was for my own good, that I would not have learned Turkish 
otherwise, that I would never forget Circassian but Turkish was what I needed 
to be educated.”201   
 
The presumption of the teacher that he would never forget Circassian proved to be true 
though he did not have any formal chance to improve it and though the younger people in 
his family have not learned Circassian, let alone forgetting.  So classrooms are the first 
setting within which a non-Turkish community learns the difference between an official 
language and “the other language” through physical and oral punishments.   
In addition to punishments and some forms of humiliation inflicted on students in 
the classrooms, speak Turkish rule also applies to home and families.  As teachers warned 
them, it is one of the duties of Circassian families to speak Turkish with their children.  
Ironically, most of the families who were asked to speak Turkish for the well-being of their 
children were not native speakers of Turkish themselves:   
 
   “Well, in the village our teachers used to have parent meetings while we were 
at primary school.  They used to warn our families not to talk Abkhazian at 
home because they [the students] would not be able to learn Turkish if they 
spoke Abkhazian at home, then they would fail at school.  This was an 
unbelievable dilemma, meanwhile we were also called the Caucasian Turks.   
Turkish state, in our villages, tried to destroy the languages at first by 
oppressive measures and then by convincing measures.  The oppressive 
measure is the “Citizen, Speak Turkish!” campaigns but later on there had been 
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some work to abandon the languages used in the villages and substitute them 
with Turkish especially with the help of teachers.  But these were made in such 
a subtle way that it did not become a problem for the Circassian society.  For 
instance, in my childhood my poor grandmother who did not know the %10 of 
Turkish language was trying to speak to us in Turkish since the teacher warned 
her to do so.”202  
 
Hence, learning Turkish becomes not only a personal matter but a collective one within 
which all relatives, grandparents and parents should take part.  The presumption of these 
warnings to insist on speaking Turkish is that knowledge of Circassian would prevent 
learning of Turkish which is the language of the education.  From such a perspective, the 
language of everyday life becomes a barrier to overcome, a language to unlearn.   
These mechanisms of punishment and warning are also supported with praises as far 
as Circassians are concerned:  
 
   “They would make the children spy the one that talked Circassian at home.  
Well, they had done such things.  It was mostly based on repression and 
violence.  ….In some cases, it was the reverse.  When we were working for the 
documentary, we asked the elder people to talk Circassian.  One elder insisted 
on speaking Turkish.  Why?  It is the same psychology, it still continues.  When 
he was in primary school, of course everybody spoke Circassian and there were 
so less speakers of Turkish, his teacher would praise him that his Turkish was 
very good.  It seems that it had been very influential, he is speaking Turkish.”203 
 
Being in command of Turkish language becomes an asset, a quality to be proud of.  
Command of any other language or perfection in any other language becomes insignificant 
and useless; the non-language does not count as an ability or knowledge but as a reason of 
incapability as Timuçin explains his experiences of languages: “When I was young I would 
think why I was not being educated in my mother tongue, why I was forgetting it and why I 
was trying to learn another one though I was not able to do it.”204  
Similarly some of the Circassians that I interviewed highlighted that their Turkish is 
“exceptionally good, unlike others.”   The very educational system ignores the capability of 
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students in terms of language: in such a setting, a native speaker of Circassian dialects –
even though s/he is in command of several dialects simultaneously- becomes an 
unsuccessful and incapable student.   
Hence, the schools are the setting within which an ethnic group learns the difference 
between the language that can be spoken in public and the language that is limited to the 
private sphere.  Furthermore, most Circassian people did avoid teaching their children 
Circassian languages, because the native language, since 1930s, has been considered 
harmful, preventive and implicitly useless.   
Discursively, Circassian activists today regard these mechanisms not only as 
mechanisms to learn Turkish but also to unlearn Circassian.  Given that Circassian dialects, 
the very language of everyday life for native speaker students is associated with a “non-
language”, a barrier to education, a habit to be forgotten and controlled; a crime and 
derivation that deserves punishment, educational experiences of Circassians in Turkey are 
far from a multicultural approach.  As the learning of Circassian is prohibited by law, as 
there is no textbook in Circassian, there are particular acts of teaching staff that discourage 
speaking Circassian, and encourage getting excellence in Turkish.  From such a point of 
view, the use of two languages simultaneously is unacceptable.  Circassian dialects become 
languages that are insignificant, useless at best, and causes of physical or verbal 
punishment and harassment in class at worst.  To that extent, they become the undesired 
languages that have been relegated to the private sphere, and even that existence in private 
sphere was claimed to have some serious costs for the “well-being of children” as a barrier 
to learn Turkish, hence, a barrier to education and career opportunities.  As the national and 
official language of the public sphere, that is Turkish, is being learned, language itself loses 
its connection with daily life, memories, interaction, childhood tales and songs and identity.  
Language itself –which implies an act of speaking up becomes an act of masking the 
difference.     
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4.3.2.3.  Çerkes Ethem Affair 
 
 
Çerkes Ethem affair turned out to be very significant in the narratives of Circassian 
activists in Turkey partly due to the ways historical event is represented in history books 
and classes.  Çerkes Ethem affair is the elimination of independent guerrilla forces in favor 
of a regular army in the 1920s during the Turkish War of Independence which is 
historically considered to be the constitutive war of the Turkish Republic.  However, apart 
from historical debates, this part of the chapter explores its implications for the Circassian 
narratives on education.  As there are multiple evaluations of Circassians regarding the 
Çerkes Ethem affair ranging from the arguments of political correctness to historical 
validity, what is common for Circassians is that they all narrate about the feelings of 
“presence” in the classroom while their own identity was being associated with a so-called 
historical traitor.   
One extreme example of how this identification of Circassian identity and Cerkes 
Ethem is displayed in educational settings can be Çerkes Ethem's niece Güner Kuban who 
states that  
 
   “I still remember the other children calling me the daughter of the traitor.  
...Then, I registered at the school as the daughter of Aytek Şay, my brother. 
This was the first step to a life based on a lie. ...It was a history lesson.  My 
teacher told that Çerkes Ethem brothers were communists.”  ...I said “No sir. 
They are not.” He asked “How would you know? You are talking nonsense.” I 
said “Sir, I am not talking nonsense.  Saruhan deputy of the time, Çerkes Reşit 
Bey is my father.  And my mother sewed those red broadclothes on their 
kalpaks.”  Then he shouted and asked me to leave the class.  I left.  And I 
played the most pleasant game of my life.  The lie was over.”205   
 
Yet it was not just the close relatives of Çerkes Ethem that tried to hide their 
identity.  Circassians had been implicitly considered the relatives of Çerkes Ethem.  
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Association of the name Circassian with “traitor” has led Circassians to hide their 
Circassian origins as much as possible.  The ones whose Circassian origins were known 
had sometimes been called “grandsons / granddaughters of the traitor Ethem”: 
 
   “The history teacher would make me lecture, throughout the high school 
years I lectured.  ….When I was lecturing on Ethem affair, I lectured 
differently, different than the textbook since I knew elderly people who knew 
the affair and talked about it and the villages exiled after the Ethem affair.  I 
said that though the books officially claimed so, the reality was different, that 
Ethem had suppressed many riots in Anatolia and most of the soldiers were 
Circassian.  He just burst from the chair…. And he just hit my head with his 
prayer beads [tespih], the beads were spread, and he said “see if you do not 
crush the head of the snake, the tails will be left alive and try to be heads.”  
Such offensive words, can you imagine?  ….After that he never made me 
lecture.”206 
 
Hence, there are instances of direct association of Çerkes Ethem with Circassians.  History 
classes and official history becomes the setting within which Circassian identity is 
associated with treason.  From such a point of view, Çerkes Ethem is not a historical figure 
but a figure that carries an ethnic identity among many leaders and soldiers of the Turkish 
war of Independence whose ethnicity are unmentioned.  Despite the differences in terms of 
analyzing the Çerkes Ethem affair, regardless of whether or not he was a traitor as far the 
history of the Republic of Turkey is concerned, there is a consensus among Circassians that 
the way history courses, textbooks, teachers etc. depict the historical event is humiliating, 
embarrassing, and discriminating as far as Circassians are concerned:   
 
   “Well, I was ashamed about the Ethem affair in high school history course 
because all of my friends knew that I was a Circassian, and when the subject 
was put as Çerkes Ethem, I felt as if everybody was staring at me…. Well, I 
told that he was not a traitor but it should also be discussed.  ….It is interesting 
that my father had the same troubles in high school history courses.  So each 
generation has its share from Ethem affair.”207  
 
   “I have always been sympathetic to this language, these songs and this culture 
and I never denied my identity.  When I graduated from primary school, I went 
to teachers’ school and there were other Circassians there but I was the only 
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one whose Circassian identity was known because I was the only one that did 
not hide but also confess it.  And my father told me “when you go to school, 
you will meet something and it is going to slap in your face.”  I was surprised 
and wondered what that was, and he told me about Çerkes Ethem affair.”208 
 
Most of the Circassians that I have interviewed mentioned that the moments that Çerkes 
Ethem affair were being lectured were the moments of trouble not only for themselves but 
also sometimes for the whole classroom.  Their reactions range between debating and 
challenging the history teacher and using physical violence in some extreme instances:    
 
   “Well, we had a history teacher, he had been my teacher for a semester, and 
then my father changed my class so that I would not be in conflict with him.  
When he came to the class, he would say [with loud voice] “Traitor Çerkes 
Ethem whose extensions are now here,” he would say it openly.  I did not 
become a target of his anger but when he told that continuously, my younger 
brother and his friends one day took him to the basement and beat him.  He 
could not complain about them, he just left the village.”209 
 
   “When they said Çerkes Ethem, everybody would turn and look at us if we 
were seated in the back seats.  Most of those who turned are the grandsons and 
daughters of people who registered themselves as gypsies [Kıpti] not to defend 
their homeland.  ….When the teacher said “traitor Çerkes Ethem”, when they 
turn and look at us, Circassians got furious, shout at them.  There were 
Circassians before us who left school because of these, objected the teacher or 
even battered the teacher.  There were people who gave up education because 
of that.  Though we did not deserve it… What was our guilt?  That our families 
were extinguished.  We did not need to go to the Greek frontline to be the 
traitor, that you could become anywhere.  But they stood up and went to defend 
the country.  ….We are no traitors.”210 
 
As the Circassians are associated with treason, they attempt to find other traitors.  So the 
question becomes who the traitor is.  Such a context is in line with the findings of textbook 
analysis: there are always threats and foes; the problem is finding who they are.  Hence, one 
can imagine that classroom environment is far from being collaborative and friendly, but 
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rather produces and reproduces new forms of hostilities, threats and conflicts among 
students with different ethnic origins.  
The way the ethnic name Çerkes (Circassian) associated with Çerkes Ethem and 
treason is one of the many forms of discrimination and othering that can be find in official 
history.  Yet as far as Circassians are concerned, this is personal and emotional.   
 
   “I may be in the first or the second year of high school. When our teacher was 
lecturing on Çerkes Ethem and Green Army in the history course, I got furious.  
And when he finally called Çerkes Ethem the traitor, I left the classroom 
without the permission of the teacher, it was an emotional reaction.  I told 
nothing, I did not ask for permission, it was not proper but it was humiliating.  
….there was another Circassian student in the classroom, I knew him since my 
family knew his family.  In the break, I rebuked him for not leaving the 
classroom, I said the teacher called Çerkes Ethem bad, he called us bad, we are 
not bad.  …I had a discipline punishment; I had a warning for leaving the 
classroom.  After this, the teacher’s approach towards me was not very nice and 
that year I failed in history.  ….Well, this was one of the things that disturbed 
me; while we already had so many things in terms difference and questioning, 
encountering such an insult, it was not personal but….”211 
 
The only way that Circassian community is named in textbooks, schools and classrooms is 
the Çerkes Ethem affair.  Apart from Ethem, there is no mentioning of Circassians, that 
they live in Turkey, that they are a people.  Hence, with such a neglect, indifference and 
avoidance the ethnic community is treated as a non-community.  It is only with Ethem that 
history textbooks, teachers and courses remember Circassians.  Circassian identity, like 
other non-Turkish identities in Turkey, is taken into account only when it is perceived as a 
threat, as a foe, as a harmful element.  Apart from that, as their language is a non-language, 
their history is insignificant, their historical roles are important to the extent that an internal 
enemy, a potential troublemaker is highlighted.  The way Çerkes Ethem becomes a subject 
of history courses signals the students that Circassians are not “from us”, that they had been 
traitors in history and that they can still be potential trouble.  What Circassians experience 
is exclusion from history in general and republican history in particular, and the feeling that 
this history is not their history.  Hence, some activists today state that after these courses 
they rushed to look for their history, history of Circassians, any knowledge on Circassians 
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to “defend themselves” vis-à-vis the claims of treason.  It is ironic that within all 
assimilationist discourses and policies, by way of being associated with treason and 
excluded from “the glorious history of us” Circassians are made to explore the non-history 
of the non-community:  
 
   “February 12th was the independence day of Maraş.  And a commander of the 
army came for the history course.  He spent the whole class with the traitor 
Çerkes Ethem, traitor Çerkes Hasan, traitor Çerkes Hüseyin.  I couldn’t tell 
anything, I did not have knowledge; it was just the first year of secondary 
school.  I started to cry extremely, he asked the reason, and I said “I am 
Circassian, too”, he left. Second time when he came, he started to glorify 
Circassians.  This was 1957.  ….Then I got out of the class and went to library 
to find books on Circassians.  ….I borrowed Caucasus in History212 from the 
library and I memorized it like the Holy Book.”213   
 
Though some of the Circassians do not feel much of a sympathy for Çerkes Ethem due to 
some of his actions towards Circassians during the War of Independence, since 1923 
Circassians are left in a position to defend his actions, decisions and character.  Since the 
foundation of the Republic, Circassians are doomed to live with the ghost of Çerkes Ethem; 
they have to talk about him, they have to defend him or reject him as they are automatically 
associated with him: “The thing that angers me most happened to everybody; I debated and 
quarreled a lot with my teachers about the issue of Çerkes Ethem.  Because it is wrong.  If 
what Ethem did was treason which I don’t agree, that is not about his ethnic identity.  Ask 
Ethem about that, don’t ask my people about that.”214   
 Since the 2000s, with some initiatives of the Caucaus Federation there have been 
some changes in terms of Çerkes Ethem in the history books.  Despite the attempts of 
Circassians to separate their ethnic name from Ethem, the identification still persists 
partially in the textbooks and more extensively in daily usage.  Vis-à-vis the association 
with Ethem, Circassians today emphasize their massive participation into the War of 
Independence and hence, the foundation of Turkish Republic.  However, as this claim is 
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empowering as far as the community is concerned, Çerkes Ethem is still called Çerkes 
Ethem and he is still the traitor and no historical figure (either a founding father, or a 
soldier, or a politician) other than Ethem is called Circassian.   
This analysis of education in Turkey is based on narratives of a group of Circassians 
in Turkey.  These narratives on their experiences with education highlight that that the way 
they are educated does not lead to the full development of human personality and respect 
for human rights and fundamental freedoms.  Circassians in Turkey experience education in 
Turkey not as understanding, tolerance or friendship but quite the opposite: education is 
confrontational, it promotes hostilities not only in textbooks but also in classrooms, 
educational practices exclude or assimilate but never tolerate or accept difference; it is 
insecure vis-à-vis any form of difference.   
For most Circassians just like other Turkish citizens, education has been their first 
extensive relationship with the state and Turkish official historiography.   Hence, education 
has been one of the basic mechanisms Turkish state has used to relate to the Circassians in 
Turkey.   The narratives of Circassian activists in Turkey which pertains to the period 
between 1930s and 1980s highlight that education in Turkey prioritizes Turkish identity 
and Turkish language and consider other ethnic groups -in our case a non-Turkish Muslim 
group- a deviation from the norm, a group that should be Turkified, a group that should be 
nationalized and disciplined, “the others” that should be disciplined or at best persuaded to 
become proper Turkish citizens.  From such a perspective, experiences of Circassian 
diaspora in educational settings range between neglect, exclusion, assimilation or even 
humiliation and multiple forms of resistance.  Educational system in Turkey contributes to 
the relegation of Circassian languages to private sphere and to that extent contributes to the 
indifference that Esat, aged 38, a lawyer highlights:  
 
   “Well, the most efficient violence is violence which fulfills its aims without 
recognizing it.  This is a violence: let me put it that way, for instance my 
parents used to talk Abkhazian, it was very often being spoken at home.  
Another language was being spoken outside.  I was naively presuming that 
there was a street language and a home language, that everybody spoke a street 
language and a home language till I went to school.  After I started school and 
started going to my friends’ houses for homeworks etc., I realized that their 
street language and home language was the same.  [He laughs]  Till that 
moment, I did not know about being Circassian or Abkhazian, I was so young, I 
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was unconscious.  Well, that is a violence for sure in the sense that it is being 
regarded as non-existent, not being counted.”215 
 
However, given some reforms in education and educational curricula; and the 
decrease in the number of native speakers of Circassian, there have been some changes in 
the last two decades which is beyond the scope of this work.  As these changes are far from 
being consolidated, the main problem is the embeddedness of Turkish educational system 
in Turkish nationalism.   
Ironically and unexpectedly, this part of this dissertation has worked as a tool for me 
to explore this embeddedness when it was presented in a conference on education in 
Sweden in September 2008.  Among the questions that I received after the presentation was 
a question and several comments from a professor of an education department in Turkey 
where primary and secondary school teachers are educated.  As the question started with a 
statement of the “political” nature of the issue rather than educational, he asked me the 
percentage of the Circassians in Turkey.  After I gave the estimated number of Circassians 
in Turkey as varying between 1 million and 6 millions, he declared that it is 1%, that I 
should “correct and learn” the number of Circassians in Turkey and that there are 500 
cultural groups in Turkey.  He highlighted the impossibility of the state teaching all these 
languages and said in a relatively loud voice “Can you come to Sweden and say I will talk 
Turkish?  Is it possible?  The same for immigrants in Germany.”  Despite my affirmation of 
the parallels between the Turkish and European contexts, after the conference he stated that 
“you are just coming here and complaining to Europe about Turkey”, that this study is 
neither scientific nor valid, that “these are the attempts of minority groups to enlarge their 
rights.”  Furthermore, he explained the insignificance and invalidity of my arguments by 
saying “you, as a Circassian, can have your Ph.D. in one of the best universities in Turkey 
and come here and present papers like that and I, the son of a Turk (Türk oğlu Türk) cannot 
do that.”  As we were at that moment chatting with another Turkish graduate student from 
Europe who was studying Turkish immigrants in Europe, the professor was ironically left 
in a position to defend the cultural rights of Turks in Europe and marginalize and 
underestimate the Circassians in Turkey by saying that as Turks have a glorious state, flag 
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and history, Circassians have no language, no state, no history and that they are no nation 
and hence, their education is not an issue.  Throughout the debate, it was hard not to 
remember Yusuf Ziya Ortac’s reaction 37 years ago; and think about its contemporary 
duplications in the field of education and the very embeddedness of education and 
nationalism in Turkey.    
 
 
 
4.4. Conclusion 
 
 
 
 This chapter aims to explore the Circassian relations with the host community and 
host state.  The common idea that Circassians is an advantaged group in Turkey is quite 
misleading.  The part on education which takes education as a tool to explore the 
relationships between the state and ethnic identity in Turkey highlights that most of the 
Circassian activists narrate on neglect, discrimination and rejection of differences.  
 Furthermore, the other common idea that Circassians are pro-state or embedded in 
Turkish state is oversimplified.  Circassian relationships with the Turkish state are far from 
being homogenous, and they range between neglect, inclusion, exclusion, trust, gratitude 
and harmony.  As this relationship has less tension when compared to the relationships of 
some other ethnic groups in Turkey, there are some reasons of this apparent lack of tension.  
As Circassian relationships with the state are not exempt from fear, oppression or being 
ignored on several levels, Circassians in Turkey have other forms of relating with the state.  
Through the myth of MĐT, Circassian activists do normalize state surveillance over ethnic 
groups in Turkey and also resist such surveillance through overnormalizing and 
demystifying the very practice of surveillance by the state.  By the discourse of the 
constitutive element which has its origins in the Circassian participation into the wars of the 
Republic, activists claim agency in Turkish history and state.  The narrative on Circassian 
embeddedness in the state mechanism also normalizes relationships with the Turkish state 
and it also empowers Circassian activists to some extent.   
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 All of these narratives are used to explain the current status of Circassian diaspora 
in Turkey, its incompetence and failures.  While the Circassian community and the 
organizations in Turkey were toughly criticized, the critique of state mechanism mostly 
came through the critique of educational settings.  However, despite the narratives on 
assimilation, Turkification and homogenization by the state, Circassian activists are today 
in a position to demand multicultural policies and positive discrimination from the Turkish 
state which will be further explored in the following chapter.   
 Finally, I argue that Circassian activists in Turkey employ an undecidable position.  
Such a position constantly shifts between the migrant, the citizen, the founders of the state, 
lonely and rootless strangers.  I argue that this undecidability in terms of defining the 
community and relating with the host state and host community is one of the basic 
formations of diaspora.  Yet such an undecidability, when coupled with and supported by 
the rising waves of Turkish nationalism and Kurdish nationalism also contributes to the 
formation of a highly insecure diaspora. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
DIASPORA IN TRANSFORMATION 
 
 On March 4, 2007, in a daily national newspaper published in Turkey, an article on 
Circassians focused on the transformation of Circassian identity in line with the current 
political developments in the Caucasus and Turkey and explored Circassians’ demands and 
enthusiasm to learn the Circassian culture and language and visit the homeland.  
Furthermore, the article quoted the president of the KAF-FED (Caucasian Associations 
Federation of Turkey) as stating: “Turkish citizenship is prior and indispensable for us.  
There is no family that did not have martyrs or veterans during the foundation of modern 
Turkey.  Hence the protection of the secular and democratic indivisible structure of Turkey 
that we built together is very significant.”1 
 On January 5, 2009, same organization, KAF-FED, a federation formed among 56 
Circassian associations in Turkey met the Turkish President Abdullah Gül.  In the meeting, 
representatives of KAF-FED demanded first, Turkish citizens’ freedom of travel to 
Abkhazia which, they believed, “will be prestigious and beneficial for Turkey in the region 
as well as it will please Circassians living in Turkey.”  Secondly, they demanded the 
inclusion of Circassian language and literature in the university curriculum.  Thirdly, they 
stated that Circassians in Turkey thought that they deserved sufficient broadcasting in their 
own languages and cultures in the radio and television channels of the Republic of Turkey 
                                                  
1
 See “Çerkesler Kültür Ayaklanması Başlattı”, Star, 4 March 2007, 
<http://www.stargazete.com/pazar/cerkesler-kultur-ayaklanmasi-baslatti-65380.htm> (11 February 2009). 
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“within which 6 million Circassians are citizens who represent the Republic of Turkey in 
politics, bureaucracy, art, sports; in short, in all spheres of life proudly and rightfully.”2 
 I argue that these two events are not only instances of the Circassian claims in terms 
being ‘the constituent element’ of modern Turkey but also the transformation of the 
Circassian diaspora, its demands and relations in Turkey since the 1990s with the impacts 
of the processes of globalization, end of Cold War and liberalization in Turkey.  One 
should also note the impact of the Turkish-EU accession process here as a critical variable 
that has contributed to the liberalization of Turkey since the mid 1990s.   
Globalization is not only the mobility of people beyond national boundaries and 
borders but also the problematization of boundaries and borders that creates the possibility 
for a condition of post-nationality which is marked by the production of “diasporic public 
spheres” and “nonterritorial principles of solidarity”.3  Hence although establishing an 
                                                  
2
 This meeting took place after TRT 6, state channel that broadcasts in Kurdish for 24 hours a day, started 
broadcasting in January 2009.  Turkish media, including leading newspapers and news networks covered the 
meeting and consider it in line with the initiation of TRT 6.   For some of the news on newspapers, see 
“Çerkezler de Yayın Đstedi,” Hürriyet, 6 January 2009, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/10706499.asp>  
(6 January 2009); “Çerkesce Kanal Açılacak mı?” Yeni Şafak, 6 January 2009, 
<http://yenisafak.com.tr/Gundem/?c=1&i=160923> (6 January 2009).   In one of the newspapers, Hürriyet, 
among the 107 reader comments, there were several reactions to the news.  Among the readers who 
commented on the news and stated that they were Circassians, some of them consider this demand acceptable 
and stated that the Turkish state ignored Circassians till today since they did not have any destructive and 
divisive activities while some of them stated that these demands concerned only KAF-FED, not all 
Circassians and “Circassians have gratitude to Turkish history.”  Other reader comments evaluated the 
meeting in various ways.  First, it was seen as the best way to divide Turkey as a nation-state.  Secondly, it 
was seen as a result of the populist policies of the government and a potential problem which would end up in 
each group demanding broadcast in its language.  Thirdly, the demand of Circassians as one of the ethnic 
groups in Turkey was seen as rightful.  Fourthly, some of the readers stated that they, too, wanted 
broadcasting in their languages as the other ethnic groups in Turkey.  Fifthly, some readers asked “Who is the 
next?”: from such a perspective, TRT 6 was regarded as an opportunity for ethnic groups in Turkey and each 
group would demand such a right; the meeting was seen as the Circassians embracing ethnic nationalism and 
hence attempting to divide Turkey just like Kurds.  Sixth type of comments was based on mocking the 
demand itself by underestimating and marginalizing the languages of broadcast such as “I am a bird and I 
would like a channel that broadcasts in bird language.” (Bird language is a made-up language used by 
children in Turkey.  The exact phrase used in Turkish is “Ben de bir kuşum, kuş dili ile yayın yapan bir kanal 
istiyorum.”)  Another example for this type of reactions was “We are a nuclear family.  We use the çan çunu 
gak guk language that we formed among ourselves.”  (No such language exists and the original comment in 
Turkish is “Kendi aramızda kendi geliştirdiğimiz bir dil olan çan çunu gak guk dilini kullanıyoruz.”)  The 
final type of reader comments in this particular newspaper was concerned about the status of the original 
Turks in Turkey: “I, as a Turk with Turkish origin have become a MINORITY in my own country.” (As 
minority is originally written in capital letters, the original reader comment is “Kendi ülkemde bir Türk asıllı 
olarak AZINLIK olmuşum.”)  For the reader comments on Hürriyet, see “Çerkezler de Yayın Đstedi,” Hürriyet, 
<http://haberyorumlari.hurriyet.com.tr/ListArsiv.aspx?HaberID=10706499> (24 January 2009). 
 
3
 A. Appadurai quoted in S. Shami, “Circassian Encounters: The Self as Other and the Production of the 
Homeland in the North Caucasus,” Development and Change 29(1998): 617- 646. 
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exact causal connection between “diasporization” and globalization is hard, diasporas are 
disproportionately advantaged by some aspects of globalization such as global economy; 
new forms of international migration; the development of global cities; the creation of 
cosmopolitan and local cultures; and finally, deterritorialization of social identities which 
challenges the hegemonizing claims of the nation-states.4  As “alternate public spheres” 
diasporas refer to globally mobile categories of identification5 that are complex and 
contested on various levels.  Hence, since the 1990s, diasporas are regarded and studies as 
processes rather than being organic and unproblematic entities. 
This chapter deals with how Circassians, a Muslim non-Turkic ethnic group in 
Turkey redefine and transform the knowledge of its own identity, history and diasporic 
experience in the post-Soviet conjuncture which overlaps with the processes of 
globalization.  It claims that though there has always been a group that has embraced 
diaspora nationalism within the Circassian community in Turkey, after 1990 in a particular 
historical context that has been available through the processes of globalization and post-
Soviet conjuncture, Circassian diaspora nationalism has gained strength.  Only within that 
context, diaspora nationalism of Circassian elites become more visible, extensive and 
'recognized'.  Thus, rather than being a taken-for-granted, diaspora nationalism of the 
Circassians in Turkey is an emergent phenomenon that should be explored in the light of 
globalization, nationalism, ethnicity and diasporization.    
 This chapter analyzes the transformation of Circassian diaspora in the 1990s on 
three interrelated levels.  The first level concerns the homeland: it explores the relations 
with the homeland during the Cold War to better understand the transformation in the 
1990s and then discusses post-Soviet encounters and relations with the homeland.  The 
second level is related to the relations with the host community.  It aims to analyze the 
transformation of Circassians’ relations with the Turkish state and how Circassians situate 
themselves in terms of ethnicity in Turkey.  To explore the second question, perspectives of 
Circassian diaspora nationalists on current ethnic problems in Turkey, namely the Kurdish 
question and claims of Armenian genocide will be explored.  The third level aims to 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
4
 R. Cohen, Global Diasporas: An Introduction (London: UCL Pres Limited, 1997), 157. 
 
5B. Axel, “Context of Diaspora,” Cultural Anthropology 19(1)(2004): 26-60, 27. 
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explore the transformations on the community level and understand how the Circassian 
community’s constructions of its past and future have been transformed in line with these 
developments.   
 
 
 
5.1. Initial Encounters in the Soviet-Era 
 
 
 
 As the end of Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union is generally 
considered the starting point for encountering the homeland as far as Circassians are 
concerned, such an argument that takes 1990 as a turning point needs to be used with some 
reservations.  The idea that all encounters and communication with the homeland starts 
with the 1990s is missing the fact that there were some forms, instances and memories of 
communication with the Caucasus since nineteenth century and starting from the 1960s, 
with the return movement which argued for the necessity of returning to the homeland, 
these chaotic and unexpected encounters with the homeland and other Circassians have 
been relatively more frequent.  Though post-Soviet era for the Circassian diaspora in 
Turkey means a direct access to the homeland and regular relations and visits; before the 
1990s, there were always some forms of communication with varying frequency and risks 
involved in the act of encountering.  Before discussing the post-Soviet encounters, tensions 
and relations with the homeland, this part of the chapter aims to explore relations with the 
homeland in the Soviet Era.   
 As there are stories on the instances of initial returns from the Ottoman Empire to 
the Caucasus after the deportations in late 19th century; starting from the Second 
Constitutional Period of 1908, Circassians in the Ottoman Empire had some political and 
social connections with the Caucasus through their own organizations as a result of the 
opportunities provided by the First World War, Bolshevik Revolution and support of the 
Ottoman government.  Starting from the mid-1920s, as both regimes within which 
Circassians were settled, namely Turkish nation-state and Bolshevik Russia were 
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consolidated in terms of political power, these connections between diaspora and homeland 
faded away.   
 The earliest encounter between Circassians in Turkey and the Caucasus that 
Circassian activists personally remembered and shared in the interviews pertains to the 
1940s. Köksal whose family came to Turkey in the 1920s for instance states that in his 
family, a very loose form of communication with those relatives in the Cauasus persisted 
throughout the 1940s:  
 
   “But somehow they sent us pictures and photographs before I was born.  I do 
not exactly know the channels through which they were delivered.  …But in the 
Soviet era, when somebody was going abroad, they gave him/her letters, things.  
For instance we used to receive a letter from Italy.  Well, when s/he went 
abroad, s/he went to Italy; delivering from Russia was hard, I presume.  S/he 
delivered the mail from there.”6   
 
 Similarly Nesibe tells her father’s encounters with the Circassians from the 
Caucasus in Istanbul which might have taken place in the 1950s or the early 1960s.  
Knowing that a group of Circassians came to Istanbul, her father mobilized a group of 
Circassians in Istanbul to meet them.  ‘Meeting them’ meant dealing with bureaucratic 
procedures, KGB and other institutions of the nation-states in the Cold War years:   
 
   “My father told this but I did not very well know how it happened.  Later a 
friend of him, one of our elders told me before he died.  One day my father 
requested from the police stations for the Circassians, Abkhazians, whoever 
there were to come.  [Çerkes Abaza kim varsa gelsin.]  …[Because of his job] 
he had acquaintances everywhere, his network was very large.   This was how 
his friend [who told me the story] met my father, he told him that a ship came 
to the harbor and there were Circassians in that ship.  He told that they would 
do everything to take them out of the ship [onları ne yapıp yapıp gemiden 
çıkaracağız] and arrange something.  …They met a Circassian, Abkhazian 
commissary while dealing with the permission.  Well, in those days, they could 
not…  They were coming with a man of KGB, and they could not do anything, 
they could not get out of the ship, they used to go to the bazaar like that.  But 
they could [go out only] with a commissary or police etc.  Well, he and my 
father went to the ship and met them.   They took them with their guides.  They 
traveled, ate together.  They spend three days together.  When they were 
returning, when they were on the ship, when the ship was leaving, those in the 
ship started to sing a song.  [silence]  …My father and the others came with a 
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group, I presume.  Everybody including those who were there for the other 
passengers cried.”7   
 
 Neval also remembers such a visit to her neighbors in Sivas when she was a child in 
the early 1960s: 
 
   “This did not happen to our family but I remember something in Sivas, 
somebody from Ossetia came.  …An elder from the X family came, I do not 
know how they contacted him or how he came.  He was the relative of a friend 
of my father.  My father and his friends told about how he was welcomed in 
Sivas, they told us about the soil of the homeland that he brought.  He told them 
“you are here; I brought you the soil of the homeland inside a fabric.”  I even 
wrote a poem on that on 1977s, …it was like “what dispersed in the peron was 
a handful of soil.” [bir avuç topraktı işte peronda yayılan].”8   
 
Nezih explores the limitations of these visits from the Caucasus and highlights the 
difference between these and the later practices of returnists starting from the 1960s:  
 
   “Well, it was not only in 1950s, there were people who came in 1940s, too.  
But they used to come on a ship, they were being taken out of it, they had the 
men of MĐT [National Intelligence Organization] with them, they had Russian 
police and soldiers with them.  Let alone that, even in 1970s MĐT interrogated 
in our house since we met them in a hotel.  In that sense, it was not much of a 
system that provided communication, these things more or less started after 
1967.”9 
 
What is interesting in these early visits and encounters is that they had been initiated from 
the Caucasus.  It was the homeland and Circassians in homeland who visited diaspora, not 
vice versa as it had been before the formation of the Turkish nation-state.  Hence starting 
from the 1920s until the mid 1960s, Circassians in Turkey kept an absolute silence and 
refrained from the idea of the Caucasus.  I argue that such a silence and disconnection was 
a diasporic maneuver which resulted from the formation of a new nation-state; the 
memories of the affairs of Çerkes Ethem and pro-Sultan riots in Marmara region during the 
War of Independence; the loss/assimilation/silencing of Circassian intellectuals and urban 
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elites as remnants of the Ottoman regime; and the ideological bipolarization that shaped 
Cold War.  Therefore in these early and very timid connections with Circassians in the 
Caucasus, Circassians in Turkey were passive receivers; they were not those who helped 
the Caucasus as they had been in the early decades of twentieth century.   
 Apart from these exceptional and mythical visits and visitors from the Caucasus, the 
most commonly used channel that was open for Circassian diaspora in Turkey was radio 
broadcast from the Caucasus.  These broadcasts were regularly followed by the parents of 
the interviewees of this study, as they claimed.  Cezmi remembers that the unknown and 
incomplete maps of the Caucasus were filled with the pieces of information that were 
attained through these broadcasts:  
 
   “There were always dreams.  Since my childhood, I used to open the atlas.  
…I used to make my father buy a larger atlas so that I would be able to see the 
details.  I used to read it; I remember that I shouted when I saw the word 
Çerkessk.  I showed my father, he told me that that was our district.  When I 
told him that there was also Nalchik, he told that it was the capital city of 
Khabardeys as far as he was concerned.  Because in the village in those years, 
my father used to listen radio broadcast from the Caucasus.  In the 1950s, 60s, 
the broadcast used to start with songs in Adyghe language sung by sopranos, 
we used to listen them with envy.”10   
 
Turgay, who was a young Circassian in the 1960s and the 1970s in Ankara, narrates on the 
transformation from these radio days to face-to-face encounters that were less personal, 
more frequent and systematic when compared to the previous ones:   
 
   “For us, the Caucasus was a country that we heard its voice and which existed 
with the music broadcast on the radio of Maikop from medium wave on Fridays 
at 8 p.m, if I am not mistaken.  …For us, it was different to dance [kafe, 
sheshen] with that music.  That used to excite us. Then in those years, there 
happened to be people who came here for the first from the Caucasus, we met 
them.  It was 1970s.”11   
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 Cezmi, interview by author, 7 February 2008, Ankara. 
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Starting from the mid 1960s, a group of young Circassians who came to the cities from 
more rural parts of Anatolia for education and socialized in Circassian associations, 
respectively, in Istanbul and Ankara, “returnists” as they would call themselves in the 
coming years criticized this disconnectedness with the Caucasus with the idea of return.   
 Just like first generation diaspora nationalists, second generation Circassian 
diaspora nationalists were influenced by the ideas that surrounded the young people in 
Turkey such as 1968 movement and politicization. Metin, as a returnist in the 1960s and 
1970s narrates on their critique of the Circassian organizations and elders as elitist and 
underlines the fact that they were regarded as communists in line with the Cold War 
terminology:  
 
   “After the Republic, there was still a search to remove this loneliness, to keep 
our traditions alive even in the most primitive sense so that our children would 
not lose it entirely.  …So they had a mentality to be happy for playing the 
accordion, knowing how to dance their own dances, meeting in the funerals, 
sharing the happiness and grief.  [akordeon çalmayı, oyunumuzu oynamayı 
biliyorsak, düğünlerimizi beraber yapıyorsak, cenazelerimizde buluşuyorsak, 
acımızı sevincimizi paylaşıyorsak şükür buna der gibi bir anlayış 
içerisindeydiler.]  …There were moonlight tours for example.  Grand balls 
were being organized.  These were what we reacted because these balls, tours 
had very high fees that addressed the economically higher parts of the society; 
because that was a practice that showed that they did not care about the lower 
income groups and look for their needs.  This might be the reason of why we 
were considered communists.  [he laughs]  We really took entertainment out of 
luxurious hotels and brought it to the wedding saloons, Şehzadebaşı Yenisaray 
Wedding Saloon.”12   
  
 Nezih further clarifies that there was a class dimension in their critique as returnists 
but he also highlights that the basic fault line between the returnists and other activists 
before the 1960s were on the Caucasus:   
 
   “I will explain this like that.  For example in 1961, in a ball that I joined, they 
made us hold their coats so that their irons would not be spoiled.  We could not 
enter the room which the elders entered.  We could not eat the food that they 
had eaten.  We could not oppose what they said, we could not tell anything.  
They had an absolute rule: “We have no intention.  We do not intervene in 
state’s business.  Our only goal is to organize a ball, a trip, a picnic once a 
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year.”  That ball was very trendy.  …Dosteli Yardımlaşma Association in 1946, 
North Caucasian Association in 1951, Caucasian Cultural Association in 1952, 
in all of these there was no policy but opposition towards the Caucasus.”13   
 
 Starting from the mid 1960s, this new and young group of Circassian activists 
reconnected with the Caucasus.  During the mid 1960s and 1970s, the timid welcomes that 
took place in the exceptional and unexpected encounters of the 1940s and 1950s were 
transformed into conscious searches for people from the Caucasus in the ships that came 
from the Soviet Union as Cezmi explains: 
 
   “In the 1960s, 1970s when tourists from Russia started to come and when 
there happened to be Circassians among them; we used to find out the hotels 
they used to stay when they got off the ship.  Sometimes, there happened to be 
no Circassian.  We used to go and ask from the records.  Their dates of births, 
etc. were written there.  Sometimes there happened to be Russians born in 
Nalchik or Çerkessk.  Well was s/he a Circassian?  But we used to look at their 
surnames.  We found so many people like that and they became so happy that 
those who were there got revived as they received news about us.  It was not a 
one-way thing indeed, it was mutual interaction.  As our news reached them, 
they started saying “Thank god, they did not disappear.  So they are still 
alive.”14   
 
The searches for the Circassians in the tourist ships from Soviet Union were also followed 
by the attempts of the diaspora nationalists to learn the Cyrillic alphabet and gain the ability 
of reading and writing in Caucasian languages.  Returnists considered Cyrillic alphabet 
necessary to connect with the homeland and in the coming years, their knowledge of 
Cyrillic and Caucasian languages would be tested in the books and letters sent from the 
Caucasus.  Already a native speaker like most of the returnists, Cezmi explains his attempts 
to learn Cyrillic alphabet:  
 
   “In 1968.  …When I learned that Circassian was being written in Cyrillic, I 
thought about how to learn it.  The departments of History and Geography had 
night classes back then.  I went to the night classes of the department of 
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Russian Language and Literature.  …Meanwhile, an author from the Caucasus 
brought me a Cyrillic typewriter when s/he heard about my works.”15  
 
 Returnists, at the beginning, learned the Cyrillic alphabet which they seemed 
necessary to contact with the Caucasus from the most unexpected settings as Metin tells the 
story of how he learned the Cyrillic alphabet:  
 
   “Probably, towards the end of 1967, I learned how to read and write.  How 
did I learn?  They used to give Russian lectures to the students in the military 
college, there were Circassians being educated there.  They were a little older 
than us or we were almost at the same age.  They used to know the letters more 
or less.  Through that, we started to recognize the letters.  Then x [abi] [name of 
an older Circassian] went to the Caucasus, he brought some books, we 
advanced with those.”16 
 
Unlike their elders who refrained from Russia as a result of the Cold War anti-communism, 
returnists were not terrified with the idea of returning to a communist Caucasus.  Though 
communism was not particularly their reason of return, they were well aware of the fact 
that they would be in a position to deal and bargain with Soviet Russia to “return” to the 
Caucasus.17  Timuçin further exemplifies how returnists utilized the nation states’ 
mechanisms in the beginning and the kind of relationship they envisaged with the Russian 
state:   
 
    “Timuçin: There was much anarchy back then.  We used to go to our 
association and work there, we were learning the language; for example, the 
learning of how to read and write was fulfilled in that phase.  We made Cyrillic 
alphabets to be brought from the Caucasus.  For example I learned reading and 
writing in Circassian, in Cyrillic, in Kabardian dialect.   
 
Setenay: How were the alphabets being brought? 
 
Timuçin: We demanded them with letters.  We frequently requested them.  We 
even requested from the consulate, Russian consulate.  There was not much of a 
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 Metin, interview by author, 5 February 2008, Ankara. 
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 After the Cold War and the end of Soviet Union, this tendency of returnists to sideline with Russia has been 
a major source of criticism from the other Circassian groups as it will be discussed in the other parts of this 
chapter.   
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problem about the books.  If you were caught with that, they might ask what it 
was but what might have happened for an alphabet?  There was a Latin 
alphabet written in Turkey but it did not fit.”18   
 
The letters and requests that Timuçin mentioned were sometimes addressed to state 
organizations in the Caucasus such as Rodina.19   However, some requests and letters were 
also addressed to the penpals of the activists in the Caucasus.  Yasemin explains the 
beginning of such a penpal relationship as a result of encounters between Circassians of the 
diaspora and homeland:  
 
   “It was the year 1970 or 1971, slowly people started to come here.  For the 
first time, a group came; they were the authors who were being educated in 
Moscow.  There was an Abkhazian among them, he took our addresses.  We 
had, of course, learned reading and writing in the Cyrillic alphabet.  When he 
took our addresses, for the first time I received a letter from an Abkhazian 
young man.  …What they asked most were their relatives.  This was the first.  
Finding the people of their own lineage, finding their relatives was their 
problem.  The second was genealogy.  They found it very important.  Thanks to 
them, my consciousness of research developed; [they helped me] in terms of 
what I should be doing, what I should collect such as the sagas.  Then of course 
they started sending books.”20 
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ad&order=0&thold=0 (16 May 2009). 
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 Metin explores the limitations and risks involved in communication with the 
Caucasus.  As the limitations were huge given the pace of international mail, the risks 
involved were high given the restrictions of nation-states’ policies:  
 
   “Metin:  I personally had many penpals, I had tens of penpals.  We wrote 
letters to each other.  …Of course our letters were being opened and read.  But 
we had nothing like…  Even if we had, we would not have written it since we 
knew that they were being read.  But we were exchanging letters regularly.  It 
was almost in 20-22 days that a letter came.  It took that much of a time for the 
other side to receive the answer.  Well, we received and sent a letter in 45 days.  
[he laughs] 
S:  Do you still keep the letters? 
Metin:  I cannot find them immediately but probably there are some that I have 
kept.  Since my house was interrogated and cleaned out twice, presumably there 
are not many left now.  But still, some may have been left in one or two 
places.”21   
 
 The surveillance over the letters to and from the penpals in the Caucasus was 
mentioned by most of the interviewees of this study: for instance Mert, who started these 
personal correspondences in 1977 as an activist who was younger than the initial returnists 
states that all of his letters came as opened and some of his friends received their letters in 
the police station.  Yasemin explores the practice of surveillance and the role of MĐT 
(National Intelligence Organization) and those Circassians who were part of MĐT in these 
correspondences.  She employs the myth of MĐT which has been discussed in the previous 
chapter:   
 
   “Let’s be frank; back then, our associations were extremely scared.  In Turkey 
of those days, the Caucasus meant Russia, Russia meant communism, 
communism was the pain in the neck, and according to them we were all 
communists.  There was no doubt about it, we were all communists.  And later 
on I learned that all letters that were sent and received were very well 
controlled.  And this was done by our own people.  [She lowers her voice]  
They were being controlled by our people in National Security.  But the 
sincerity in our letters…  [she laughs] Later on those who controlled them told 
me that they used to read our letters with tears in their eyes.”22  
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During the late 1960s and 1970s, Caucasian penpals; books and alphabets from the 
Causcasus; and encounters with Circassians in the tourist ships from Soviet Russia were 
followed by visits to the Caucasus.  Four of the interviewees of this study were the early 
visitors to Caucasus of the Soviet Era in the 1970s.  Nezih, who personally went to the 
Caucasus in 1972 with his wife, tells the story of their trip.  After long bureaucratic 
processes, he went to Caucasus almost without any information on geography and politics 
of the Caucasus:  
 
   “It was the Breshnev era, it was the strictest period of communism.  They 
gave us [visa for] Dombay.23  They did not make a problem for Abkhazia 
because there was Intourist24 in Abkhazia.  For the North Caucasus, they gave 
visa to Dombay.  To be frank, I did not know where Dombay was.  We had no 
information on the Caucasus.  It had neither a map nor geography.  It was 
written as the Caucasus in the maps that we had here and there was nothing 
else.  They said that Dombay was far away from Nalchik, they said that 
Pyatigorsk25 was closer, I gave a petition for Pyatigorsk, they let me go.  …We 
went to Yugoslavia, there was no flight from Turkey to Moscow.”26 
 
After spending a couple of days in Moscow and later in Abkhazia, Nezih, who wanted to 
go to Nalchik, after several bureaucratic encounters, petitions and bribes etc. came closer to 
Nalchik: 
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 Dombay is a resort settlement in Karachay-Cherkessia in Russia.  Tourists are the main visitors of Dombay.  
Winter is skiing season and summer is for mountain hiking. 
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 Intourist was the Soviet travel agency that was founded in 1929 by Joseph Stalin to control domestic and 
foreign tourists as they were shepherded sternly around the Soviet Union. It became one of the largest tourism 
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   “Nezih:  We got on the plane, we got off at a place called Mineralnye Vody.27  
I never heard about Mineralnye Vody, I never knew something like that.  
Where was that?  We got off the plane.  A girl like you greeted us, I asked her 
“xetxe vırapğu?,” I asked which family’s daughter she was.  [Kimlerin kızısın 
dedim.] because I thought that she was a Kabardian.  She did not reply.  I asked 
her whether she knew English, she said she knew English and she was Russian.  
I asked her whether there were Circassians there, she said no.  X [Nezih’s wife] 
started crying.  She said that I brought her to annihilate her.  [Beni dedi, beni 
yok etmeye getirdin buraya]  
Setenay:  You did not have any maps? 
Nezih:  None.  We knew nothing.  We did not know Mineralnye Vody either.  It 
was the only airport there and it was 130 kilometres away from Nalchik.  How 
could we know?  There was nothing here [in Turkey].”28   
 
After spending the night in the Mineralnye Vody and panicking that their entire trip would 
be a shame for him since he could not go to Nalchik as opposed to his wife who went to her 
country; Nezih made a walk in Mineralnye Vody.  It was here that he finally found a trace 
of the homeland that he was literally searching:   
 
   “I was walking.  I saw a group, an old woman, a young girl, one was the bride 
I presume, and an old man with a squint eye.  I thought that these irregular 
walks were definitely Circassian.  I followed them, I waited for them to say 
something, they were looking at the shops.  When she said “Tha sihomey 
nene”, “I do not want,” I just went to the old woman and said “Yade,” in 
Circassian, “our mother, I am Circassian too and I came from Turkey.”  She did 
not make a sound Seteney.  [Hiç tınmadı Seteney]  I understood that there was 
no other option, I shaked her and said “Don’t you understand, I am Circassian, 
too.  I came from Turkey.  I am looking for Circassians.”  She just turned and 
looked at me.  She said “Yawwey muga”, “you, poor” [vay zavallı]; she said 
“are you one of those Circassians who went to the place called Turk and got 
vanished?”  The old woman started to cry.  She was mumbling something like a 
ğıbze, like a requiem.  When she started crying, the other one started crying too.  
It just turned into a phase of lamenting.  I said there was no need to cry.  
…Later on I found her relatives in Kaynar.”29   
 
                                                  
27
 Mineralnye Vody is a town located in Stavropol Krai, Russia.  Mineralnye Vody serves as a gateway to 
Caucasian Mineral Waters. It has an airport connecting Mineralnye Vody with some other major Russian 
cities as well as some international destinations.  It is not in Kabardino Balkaria that Nezih and her wife 
aimed to go.   
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Despite several bureaucratic correspondences and attempts, Nezih was not permitted to 
enter Kabardino-Balkaria and Nalchik, its capital city.  However, through this initial 
encounter, Nezih was visited by his relatives:  
 
   “We waited just like that.  The maid of the hotel came to my room and she 
told me something, I did not understand.  She [Nezih’s wife] said “you will 
now see”, we were just like enemies there.  Something would happen when I 
went downstairs.  There was no news of my family.  “Will they do anything to 
me?” That was the problem.  Two men were standing near the stairs, and I was 
going down the stairs.  Two ugly guys who were like me…  When I looked at 
them, I said “these are from us.”  Just at the beginning of the stairs, one shouted 
at me “Turkum kiga X’er vera?” [Are you X –family name- who came from 
Turkey?”], I said “seras.” [“It is me.”]  They hugged me on the stairs, I went 
down the stairs on them.  I went down and my loneliness was over.”30 
 
Spending the day with them and the next day in a dinner in a restaurant named after 
Russian romantic writer and poet Lermontov, “a friend of the Caucasus,” Nezih felt that he 
was being tested by his relatives in the homeland as a Circassian from the diaspora:  
 
   “Next day or the day after, they came with such a ceremony.  They came with 
12 cars, each including 4-5 people. They came with men and women, it was 
such an order, it was just the traditional Circassian way. ..I told her [his wife] to 
see that, now I was made the hero, I asked her whether these happened in 
Abkhazia. …They hired the restaurant; a very long table was set. …Here, listen 
to me very carefully. There was a 107 years old man.  …he rose his glass, and 
said “…this bride and son of ours, since they were exiled from the Caucasus, 
are the first people who have come to their own homeland and who know their 
mother tongue.  So if you let me, I will make him sit before me.”  Everybody 
applauded him.  I told myself “here comes Khabardey fickleness.”  They were 
trying to test me.  There were people from my family there who were 97 years 
old.  How would I go and sit before them?  …I requested to talk and said that 
“according to traditions [xabze rules] that our ancestors and fathers taught us, 
…those people who were made to leave their homeland unwillingly were not 
considered guests when they came back to their homeland.  If you treat me as a 
guest now, I will be sad.”  Even in terms of sitting, I gave my first exam.”31 
 
Hence, the search for the homeland, the relatives and the lineages was not complete after 
meeting them but it was just the beginning for both sides.  Embedded in excitement, hopes, 
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feelings of affinity and fulfillment of dreams were always the attempts of diaspora 
nationalists to prove themselves that they knew the language, the tradition [xabze], social 
life etc. as much as those in the homeland.  In addition to those tests between the homeland 
and diaspora, Nezih summarizes the reactions of his family and those Circassians he met in 
the Caucasus: 
 
   “They were surprised how I came.  …Another reaction was that we were all 
from the same roots; yet we were scattered, divided.  Another reaction was that 
we were from the same roots and “God helps us to come together.”  A common 
reaction was that whoever was guilty, God shall damn him; there were curses 
like that.  …Another reaction was that they would be Circassians till death and 
would not do the same mistake again.  Maybe the most interesting part was that 
most of them regarded coming here [to Turkey] as a fault.  …The general 
question that was always asked concerned their own families.”32   
 
As Nezih was not officially permitted to go to Nalchik, he could have a 20 minutes tour in 
Nalchik in a car.  Different from Nezih’s trip, in 1978 Cezmi went to the Caucasus with 
three of his friends, two of whom are currently living in the Caucasus.  As a committee 
invited by Rodina, Cezmi tells his trip to the Caucasus:  
 
   “We were in Nalchik, a group from the television of Nalchik came, they 
interviewed us.  They used that interview with a title such as “those who, for 
the first time, came to these lands where the bones of our grandfathers are 
buried as a committee and those who turned their faces toward here instead of 
Kaaba.”  …I saw a magnificent picture of Oşhamafe, Elbruz on the wall.  It 
continuously caught my eye.  He said “this mountain is sacred.  …And it will 
call you just like it called my grandfather to come to his homeland.” While 
leaving Nalchik to go to Cherkessia, he took the painting from the wall and 
packed it.  I still have it on the wall of my house.”33  
 
 As these early visits to the Caucasus in the Soviet Era were exceptional and risky, 
their effects had been greater than personal adventures.  Each of these visits to the Caucasus 
inspired the returnists’ arguments; each of the visits brought new relatives, penpals, books, 
maps and information to those diaspora activists in the diaspora.  As Timuçin states, “They 
even found our relatives, they specifically recorded their voices and made them tell about 
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their conditions, life styles.”34  All of these initial visits and encounters contributed to the 
formation and intensification of the feelings of affinity and rootedness on the side of 
Circassian activists.   
 I argue that in terms of the communication of the Circassian diaspora in Turkey 
with the homeland in the Soviet era, returnists were a different phase.  Willing to reconnect 
with the Caucasus despite the existence of a communist regime; -sometimes literally- 
searching for the homeland, relatives and maps; they were the initiators of the first –
relatively- systematic contacts with those Circassians in the Caucasus.  Yet, it was in the 
1990s that these encounters would be more frequent and normalized.   
 
 
 
5.2. Encountering the Post-Soviet Homeland 
 
 
 
The meanings and effects of the Post-Soviet conjuncture; that is, the collapse of 
Soviet Union, end of the Cold War, and the formation of new nation-states, which implies 
simultaneously the formation of several newly formed diaspora communities, have been 
multiple for the Circassian community in Turkey.  
The Circassian community in Turkey has always referred to a homeland that is 
considered sacred. Even when discourse on the homeland has not been accompanied by a 
discourse on exile before the 1990s, the homeland has been regarded as the site where 
Circassians were once 'rooted'.35 Yet for most of the Cold War era, there were almost no 
actual relationships with the homeland: what remained as the homeland for most of the 
Circassians in Turkey were in songs, folk tales, and narratives of the elders on immigration 
and resettlement.   
                                                  
34
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Starting from the 1990s, the Caucasus has been accessible for the Circassians in 
Turkey.   During the early 1990s, Circassians in Turkey and especially activists visited 
Circassia in several forms: collectively and individually, by air, car, sea etc.  Most of the 
interviewees of this study declared that they went to the Caucasus after 1990.  Their 
narratives on the first moments of these initial post-Soviet encounters help us not only to 
understand these first –relatively- massive encounters between diaspora and homeland but 
also to explore their imaginations of the Caucasus and homeland.  Yasemin and Nesibe, 
two Circassian women are more generous than male interviewees in terms of sharing their 
feelings in these moments.  The famous mountains of the Caucasus for which diaspora 
nationalists had been writing poems, stories, and songs for more than a century had been 
transformed into panoramas, tours, and flights.  The language which they tried to learn, 
practice, read and write despite some risks involved was just on the radio.  During the 
interview, interviewees’ excitement, silence and sometimes tears had been the reflections of 
the very emotional side of these instances:  
 
   “We landed beyond the mountains.  I had never seen such a beautiful 
panorama.  Of course, he [her husband] started to cry.  We all cried; we were 
touched.  When we landed, for the first time…  We landed and we got on the 
car.  When I heard Abkhazian on the radio, I just let my tears go.”36 
 
   “The first thing I read was Ismail-Bey by Lermontov.  I read it when I was in 
the primary school.  Since that day, when you say the Caucasus, Lermontov’s 
description comes to my eyes.  The description that Lermontov used when he 
described the moments when a cavalry was climbing the hills.  …In 1992, I 
went to the Caucasus.  …We were 33 people.  We went with a bus.  We entered 
through the Sarpi border. We made a tour with a helicopter on the mountains.  
When we came to the mountains, on the mountains, [it was as if] a soldier came 
out of each tree.  [silence]  and I started to cry.  [Her voice weakens, she cries] 
They [Circassians in the Caucasus] asked me why I was crying and whether I 
was crying since we came to Adygea.  [She laughs]  It had nothing to do with 
that, I did not care about Adygea but of course they did not think like us, they 
did not know.”37 
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Furthermore, their excitement was well received by the Circassians in the Caucasus.  
Especially the early visitors were being celebrated and honored in public events.  Hasan, 
Đzzet, and Meral narrate on their experience of the initial welcomes in the Caucasus:  
 
   “When we went to the concerts, they announced us; everybody stood up and 
applauded us.  A quiet emotional thing was taking place.  …Maybe now it does 
not happen that much, because there have been many visits.”38  
 
   “We went to establish World Circassian Federation as delegates.  Back then 
they put us on Abkhazian TV.  Of course those were unexplainable.  …The 
president met us; I made my speech for the first time in my mother tongue in 
the parliament.  …It is the parliament of your own people.”39 
 
   “We went to Abkhazia through Georgia.  There was a little bit tension but we 
were not much aware and conscious of it since there was less communication.  
…Well, it was like a feast for us.  They made theatrical performances for us.  
For example, we went to a football game; they said “our people from Turkey 
came, our siblings from Turkey came” and all people in the stadium stood up 
and applauded us.”40   
 
As the initial visitors of the Post-Soviet era more or less witnessed the same forms 
of celebration, the implications and meanings of their own presence in the Caucasus were 
different for each Circassian visitor from Turkey.  Each searched for what they thought 
were missing and lacking as a diaspora in Turkey.  Their initial experiences of the 
Caucasus were reflections on their diasporic experiences in Turkey as Özer, Neval and 
Meral explore:    
 
   “The idea of having a country of my own.  That always distressed me.  From 
time to time, I might have had feelings which can be called shame.  Sighing.  
[Đç çekme] This is why I feel very relieved when I go there.  Especially when I 
went to Nalchik, I remember that I took a good breath in that sense.  …In the 
emotional level, the classical sensational adventure took place of course when I 
was above the mountains.  …But those mountains should be thought as the 
homeland that could never exist.  [O bir türlü olmayan vatan]  Into that you can 
also put even this: I remember that even the very daily things such as we did 
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not have a national football team were hard for me.  …I had not supported the 
Turkish national team by heart and soul for a long time.  Though I want it very 
much, I still cannot do that; I am not able to, I will not lie.”41   
 
   “I was very touched.  For the first time I watched a theater in my own mother 
tongue, in Kabardino-Balkaria, in Nalchik.  …It was called Ğıbze.  It was a 
magnificent thing; that atmosphere, watching that play in that language…  I 
never had that satisfaction during time I lived in Turkey though I started my life 
speaking Turkish here.  Despite that, I did not get that satisfaction.”42  
 
   “Apart from the scenic beauty, things that seem to be insignificant might 
affect you: such as a person on the street who speaks Circassian, a very small 
child speaking Circassian, going to a restaurant and ordering psihalive.  Or, 
how shall I put it, having a düğün in Lenin Square with 1000 people gathered.  
There are those Italian feasts in Fellini movies; there [in the Caucasus] one 
experiences that feeling very intensively.”43 
 
Small things that they were looking for such as people speaking Circassian on the 
street, public düğüns in the city squares, a national team, a theater performance in 
Circassian language were all self-reflections on what Circassian diaspora in Turkey was 
missing in the host state.  As the initial search was towards the homeland, what they found 
in the homeland was their own reflections as Circassian diaspora in Turkey.   
Yet these initial encounters also included some disappointments, still ongoing 
bureaucratic problems and negative observations on the homeland.  Nesibe, Köksal and 
Mert narrate on these problems and observations that they witnessed in their first visits to 
the Caucasus:  
 
   “It was very beautiful.  Of course, many people said that many things were 
not found there; the soups were bad, toilet papers were bad etc, that it was 
awful etc.  Everyday somebody complained.  It just came to my mind, I had 
never thought about it before, I said “why are you complaining so much?”  
…When did you forget those days when something that needed to be packed 
was packed in newspapers?  …Why should I back out of this place just because 
the soup is melting?  Well, you will ask me whether or not I think about 
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returning.  I always think about it but I am scared about how to live there, I do 
not know the language.  Neither Russian nor Adyge language.”44 
 
   “From those 80 people, 40 were those whom I knew closely.  We landed.  It 
is interesting of course, for the first time a plane from a foreign country landed 
there.  Well, we landed.  They put us into a small room like this one as 80 
people.  We were dying because of stuffiness.  There was nobody taking care of 
us.  We waited there for 5 hours.”45  
 
   “I wrote my memories with the title Caucasus Slavery of 21 Days [21 Günlük 
Kafkasya Esareti].  I did not publish it.  I made my close friends read it; they 
said that people would roast me if I published it.  And I wrote everything, but 
everything I saw and lived.  They made me a prisoner for 21 days for example.  
There is a saying in the Caucasus that guest is the prisoner of the host.  We 
really became prisoners.  I would have liked to walk on this beautiful street 
with my wife alone, I would have liked to walk in this park with my wife hand-
in-hand.  They did not let me.  There was that much of an interest.  But after 
years, I realized that among all that interest, there were people who had been 
there with me for observation and surveillance.”46   
 
Instead of commonality and a naturalized ethnicity, these post-Soviet encounters 
with the so-called homeland have generated an experience of difference, disjuncture and a 
sense of rupture.47 The other Circassians that were encountered in the homeland were 
regarded as different in terms of appearance and life styles as Şener’s and Meral’s 
statements imply:   
 
   “While I was going, what did I know?  I knew nothing.  I just wondered very 
much how people looked like, how they were dressed, what they ate, how they 
strolled, were they using horses, were they wearing Circassian costumes. 
…There was wonder but alcohol etc. did not bother me much, their extensive 
consumption of alcohol etc.  I cannot drink that much, I still cannot but it did 
not bother me.  Their lack in terms of religion did not bother me at all.”48 
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   “Sometimes I wonder whether I exaggerate the situation but it is like two 
separated siblings who come together and they start to talk the same language.  
This is impressive.  …For instance, recently a guest from Adygea came.  S/he 
was very modern.  If s/he did not talk, you will think that s/he is from Turkey.  
His/her appearance and his/her everything advanced.”49 
 
Furthermore, the perceived difference between two groups of Circassians, namely 
diaspora in Turkey and homeland was also experienced by the Circassians in the homeland.  
In several instances of return after 1990s, the Circassians who left Turkey (or other 
countries) and returned to their “homelands” had been dubbed “Turks,” “Syrians,” etc. for a 
long time as Nesibe and Esat highlight: 
 
   “Recently, one of our girls who is an instructor there came.  We talk when we 
have time.  …She said “I have been there for many years; I am working as an 
instructor in university and they still tell me that I am not a native of this place 
[buralı], they still consider me a foreigner.”  I told her “For sure, they do regard 
you as such.  …They had been conditioned for that for the last 80 or 90 years.  
Furthermore, they too had pain there.  There is something which they have been 
taught that we left them, we left them behind.  …So do not expect them to 
consider you in good terms.  If I were the one who stayed there, I might have 
thought the same way. …From now on, we have to think like this.  We will 
think like both us and them.””   [Hem kendimiz gibi düşüneceğiz, hem de bir de 
onlar gibi düşüneceğiz.]50 
 
   “There are those comments from the visitors or those people who thought 
they found the opportunity to do this.  Comments such as we are more attached 
to our values while they are quote en quote more degenerate.  …On a healthy 
level of relationships, differences do not become a problem, they might add 
new colors.  On an unhealthy level, you might be the Turk when you go there.  
There are also stories like that.”51   
 
Hence, for the Circassian diaspora in Turkey, these encounters with the people, politics and 
problems of the homeland had been multidimensional.  These interviews demonstrate that 
the Circassian community in Turkey today has its multiple ties to the Caucasus.  In the 
formation of these connections, the 1990s proved to be significant.  Experiencing 
commonality and difference; enthusiasm and disappointment simultaneously; Circassians, 
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since the 1990s, have been faced with a real diasporic homeland with which real and 
systematic relations should be established.    
 
 
 
5.3. Relating to the Homeland 
 
 
 
For the Circassians in Turkey, as the 1990s have brought their 'roots', their relatives 
and imagined homeland into reality,52 the concerns, politics and geography of the 
“homeland” had also become accessible for the Circassian diaspora. When compared to the 
1970s and the very early 1990s when travels to the Caucasus were done without any kind 
of map of the Caucasus, today Circassian diaspora nationalists not only own the maps of 
the homeland but also observe the transformation of these maps in line with Russian 
politics as Đzzet is concerned about the removal of the Caucasian mountains from the maps.  
He is concerned that the mountains of the homeland which have been turned into real in the 
1990s for the Circassian diaspora nationalists after years of dreaming about it “do not exist 
in Russian maps any more.  …The Caucasus which has existed for centuries, which has 
existed in the time of communism is now getting out of the maps.  Those maps in Turkey 
too keep up with this.  Here is this map, it was advertised as the touchpad atlas.  The 
Caucasus does not exist in those maps.  This is a very important danger for the future.”53 
 Meanwhile economy of the Caucasus also became accessible for the Circassian 
diaspora as the socialist Soviet Block was being transformed into capitalist economy.  Here 
some entrepreneurs within Circassian community related to the homeland in terms of 
economics as Şener witnessed during his first trip to the Caucasus with his father and some 
economically and politically affluent Circassians from Turkey: 
 
                                                  
52Throughout the encounters with those relatives in the homeland in the early 1990s which took place either in 
Turkey or Caucasia, apart from the information regarding the families to fill out and complete “the family 
trees”, I, as a child remember that gum, socks, vodkas, chocolates filled with liqueur, and Noël adornments 
were exchanged as gifts between newly found relatives. 
 
53
 Đzzet, interview by author, 10 February 2008, Ankara. 
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   “For the first time I went [to the Caucasus] in 1992, we went with a crowded 
group.  It was my father’s first time, too.  [He lists some Circassians who are 
retired soldiers and members of the Parliament as among their group]  It was a 
severe group.  [ağır bir gruptu]  …Upper-level contacts took place, presidents 
were visited.  The mission that the group attributed to itself was to support the 
transformation in the Caucasus, to support their transformation to market 
economy, to give know-how support; I mean, “we can give you this support 
from Turkey if you would like; we may send you the necessary cadres.””54 
 
Yet the problems of the diasporic homeland proved to be more than the 
transformation to free market economy.  During the 1990s, the Caucasus proved to be the 
most unstable region of the former Soviet Union, witnessing five wars: Nagorno-Karabagh 
(Armenia – Azerbaijan, in 1989-1995), South Ossetian - Georgian (in 1991-1992), 
Abkhazian - Georgian (in 1992-1993), North Ossetian - Ingush (in 1992), and Chechen - 
Russian (in 1994 - 1996).  Each of these wars had led to the mobilization of Circassians in 
Turkey either in the form of donations or as volunteer soldiers serving in the Caucasus.55  
The affects of these wars in the Caucasus on the Circassian diaspora in Turkey had been 
multiple.  For Hasan, these wars produced an image of the Caucasus that had been 
associated with war and militarism by the Circassian diaspora in Turkey:  
 
   “Soviet Union dissolved.  But more importantly, I think that the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union was not a problem per se.  There could have been 
organizations after that.  But the emergence of wars in Abkhazia and Chechnia 
changed the flow of the events.  I think that it also affected the return 
movement negatively.  It led to the emergence of the perception that there was a 
war there.”56 
 
Gürsoy, a Chechen underlines the fact that wars in the Caucasus meant the revival of ethnic 
identity on several grounds; it implied increasing communication and cooperation among 
the Circassian community in particular and Caucasian community in general:  
 
                                                  
54
 Şener, interview by author, 18 June 2008, Đstanbul. 
 
55
 For instance, at the outbreak of the war in Abkhazia several Circassians (not only Abkhazians) were 
immediately gathered at the Abkhazian Association in Istanbul. The association was turned into a 
headquarters from where communication and political connections with Abkhazia were managed.  
 
56
 Hasan, interview by author, October 2007, Abkhazia. 
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   “After 1990, I am telling this from my point of view, the two wars that were 
witnessed made the diaspora in Turkey totally in touch in itself.  If these wars 
did not take place, other things would have happened.  But I do not think that it 
would be on this level.  Well, we, for instance, learned about Chechens in Muş, 
in Sivas, in Uzunyayla, Kars, when you go beyond Turkey, those in Australia, 
Japan, America, everywhere.  We got into communication with each other.  
…That wind produced communication also within the Adyghes.”57 
 
For Özer, who is in his mid 30s, the 1990s and the wars in the Caucasus meant 
normalization of his relations with the Caucasus:   
 
   “Normalization with the idea that there is a country there, I can live there, I 
can start a life; that it is not beyond the mountains.  [The facts] That there had 
always been people who went to war, that I had friends who went there made 
the Caucasus put on its feet for me.  [çok ayakları yere basar hale getirdi benim 
için]  …In very early times, I rationalized that this place was livable; I 
constructed the idea that a life could be built there.”58   
 
The post-Soviet conjuncture and processes of globalization proved to be a fertile 
ground for diaspora politics at the international and local levels as far as organization and 
communication are concerned. The end of Soviet Union which meant the expansion and 
liberalization of networks between the homeland and diaspora communities in terms of 
scope and extent was simultaneously coupled with the rise of ethnic identities in Turkey in 
line with Turkish nationalism and other nationalisms.   
Within this context, Circassian identity, which has been limited to the activists and 
associations up until that time, became more pronounced, visible and public. Hence the 
post-Soviet conjuncture implied a revival of Circassian identity and politics, which also 
reflected itself in the production and reproduction of culture by the Circassian diaspora in 
Turkey.  For instance, major nationwide newspapers and magazines had focused on 
Circassians: many celebrities had publicly announced their Circassian origins. For the first 
time, in 1995, a Circassian music cassette, Çerkes Ezgileri (Circassian Melodies) was 
                                                  
57
 Gürsoy, interview by author, 23 July 2007, Đstanbul. 
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 Özer, interview by author, January 2008, Đstanbul. 
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produced for consumption on the national market;59 it was soon followed by Çerkes Halk 
Şarkıları: Wered 1 (Circassian Folk Songs).60  
Furthermore, starting from the 1990s, Circassian diaspora in Turkey has started 
using new channels of communication.  Since the 1950s, Circassians in Turkey has 
published several magazines such as Yamçı, Kafkasya, Marje, Nart, Kafkasya Yazıları, and 
Kamçı which have been the unique sites of communication -except associations and 
personal networks.61  Although Circassian community in Turkey today still have 
magazines, I argue that there are other –quite contemporary- channels through which 
members of the diaspora communicate and meet each other, act and decide as the diaspora, 
and participate into diaspora politics.  Recent Internet practices have invited social 
scientists to deal with the new modes of subjectification in general and the formation of 
diasporic subjects through Internet in particular.62  As computer-mediated communication 
has the capacity to build online communities from a sense of belonging based on a group 
identity and a claimed homeland (as mythological as all of these can be),63 the 
characteristics of these practices remain controversial.  Contemporary research on Internet 
claims that in cyberspace there is the potential for more voices to be heard 
simultaneously.64  Yet real life hierarchies and inequalities continue to be perpetuated on 
                                                  
59
 See A. Toğuzata, Çerkes Ezgileri [Circassian Melodies] (Istanbul: Ada Muzik, 1995). 
 
60
 K. Doğan, Çerkes Halk Şarkıları: Wered 1 [Circassian Folk Songs: Wered 1] (Istanbul: Majör Müzik, 
2000).  Circassian Folk Songs was also advertised on television, which was something totally novel for 
Circassian artifacts that had always been produced for in-group consumption. When it first appeared in the 
national market, there occurred some debates in the Circassian e-groups on how to make it more popular. One 
idea that was repetitively voiced was individually going to several music markets and asking whether or not 
they had it so that particular cassette/CD would appear popular.  Commercially, Circassian Folk Songs had 
not been very successful since it had not gone out of ingroup consumption.  Despite that, it was still received 
as a source of pride by the Circassian community; they were proud that they had such a professional music 
artifact.  For Circassians, it served as a proof that their culture could be professionally studied, reproduced and 
marketed.  In year 2008, Çerkes Halk Şarkıları: Wered 2 has also been on the market.  (K. Doğan, Çerkes 
Halk Şarkıları: Wered 2 [Circassian Folk Songs: Wered 2] (Istanbul: Serbesler, 2008). 
 
61For a more detailed list of magazines published by Circassians in Turkey, see Appendix II. 
 
62B. Axel, “Context of Diaspora,” Cultural Anthropology 19(1)(2004): 26-60. 
 
63H. H. Hiller and T. M. Franz, “New Ties, Old Ties and Lost Ties: The Use of the Internet in Diaspora,” New 
Media and Society 6(6)(2004):731-752.  
 
64M. Poster, “Postmodern Virtualities,”in Cyberspace/Cyberbodies/ Cyberpunk: Cultures of Technological 
Embodiment, eds. M. Featherstone and R. Burrows (CA: Sage, 1995), 79-96. 
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the Net.65  Gender is one of those inequalities reproduced in the cyberspace; building on 
advanced computer technology traditionally developed and used by men, the Internet as a 
medium connotes masculinity66 and net-mediated discussion remains still heavily 
dominated by men.67  Since the late-1990s, Circassians utilized e-mail discussion lists such 
as Marje, Adige, Çerkesler, Demokratik Çerkes Platformu, Nart Kültür, Çerkes Sohbeti and 
Zekoşnig (meaning brotherhood).68 Despite their differences, these e-mail discussion 
groups have been the grounds for the nationalist debates after the mid 1990s.  Though some 
of the members of the groups do not primarily identify themselves as nationalists, active 
members who bother to participate are nationalists.  Hence diaspora nationalism and 
Circassian identity set the limits, scope and norms of discussion in these e-mail groups in 
addition to several blogs, websites and currently, Facebook groups etc.69    
 The 1990s had proved to be significant also in terms of the organizations of 
Circassian diaspora in general.  After several congresses with the participation of many 
groups of Circassians from different countries and the homeland, the World Circassian 
Federation was established in the mid-1990s. In Turkey, Kaf-Der (Caucasian Association), 
which was established in 1993 as an umbrella organization, constituted the largest 
Circassian associational network in Turkey until 2004 when it was replaced by a larger 
organization, KAF-FED (Caucasian Associations Federation of Turkey).70  
                                                  
65E. N. Ignacio, “Ain't I a Filipino (Woman)?: An Analysis of Authorship/Authority Through the Construction 
of “Filipina”on the Net,” The Sociological Quarterly 41(4)(2000): 551-572.   
 
66J. C. H. Bromseth, “Constructions of and Negotiations on Interaction Norms and Gender on Electronic 
Discussion Lists in Norway,” Nora 9(2)(2001): 80-88, 80. 
 
67S. Herring, “Gender Differencesin CMC: Findings and Implications,” The CPRS Newsletter 18(1) (2000).  
Available on htttp://www.cprs.org/publications/newsletter/issues/2000/Winter2000/herring.html.   
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 For a more detailed list of e-mail discussion groups that are going to be used for this dissertation, see 
Appendix III. 
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 For analysis of these virtual dynamics of the Circassian diaspora, see A. Çakır, Building and Maintaining 
Online Communities, presented on the Fourth International Cyberspace Conference on Ergonomics, 
Johannesburg, 2005 available on http://web.wits.ac.za/NR/rdonlyres/95111AC7-6654-411F-92B5-
18FFE681314A/0/build2.pdf (17 May 2009).   
 
70In addition to former Kaf-Der and KAF-FED, the two other major associations are Kafkas Vakfı and Birleşik 
Kafkas Derneği, both of which are relatively Islamic-oriented. Also there are minor micro-ethnical 
associations, for the Ossetians, the Alan Culture and Support Foundation established 1989 in Istanbul, 1993 in 
Ankara and 1997 in Izmir; and for Abkhazians, the Abkhazian Cultural Association in Istanbul.  
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As the 1990s has implied the formation of new organizations and new forms of 
activism for the Circassian diaspora, it has also meant totally new challenges, problems and 
questions for the diaspora.  The collapse of Soviet Union and its aftermath have challenged 
all the Circassian activist groups in Turkey and the existing discourses with regard to 
identity, culture, homeland and ethnicity.  In the 1990s, no revolutionaries were left and the 
so-called “utopia of return” was challenged by the changing meanings of 'homeland': 
instead of being a space that symbolized the timeless qualities of Circassians and the 
immemorial past, the homeland became a real territory71 which could now be settled and 
repatriated by the Circassian diaspora in Turkey.  While Glasnost and the collapse of the 
Soviet Union fuelled an initial enthusiasm about the homeland, return,72 and repatriation;73 
living the ideal proved to be far from unproblematic.  First, Circassians as habitants of 
Anatolia for more than one hundred and thirty years were emotionally embedded in Turkey 
as Cahit highlights:  
 
   “Well, they, especially middle aged and older people there [in the Caucasus] 
often ask me: “Why don’t you come?  This is your country.”  I tell that we do 
not come because we are Abkhazians.  They get surprised.  …I say if you were 
in our place, graves of our fathers are there; graves of our grandfathers are 
there; before all, graves of our siblings are there.  It is not that easy to leave 
those and come.  I ask them whether they could leave. They say “you are right.”  
…Emotionally they say “it is their country, they shall come” but they would do 
the same if they were in our place.”74   
                                                  
71S. Shami, “Circassian Encounters: The Self as Other and the Production of the Homeland in the North 
Caucasus,” Development and Change 29(1998): 617- 646, 643. 
 
72See for instance, S. Çelik and H. Karadeniz, “Türkiye'deki Çerkesler: Kafdağına Dönsek mi?” [“Circassians 
in Turkey: Shall We Return to Kafdağı (the Mythical Mountain)?”] Đkibine Doğru, 12 March 1989, 11; A. 
Görmüş, “Çerkesler: Kafkasya'ya Dönüyoruz,” [“Circassians: We are Returning to the Caucasus”] Nokta, 17 
June 1990, 24; “Türkiye'deki Çerkesler Kafkasya'ya Göçüyor,” [“Circassians in Turkey Are Emigrating to the 
Caucasus”] Milliyet, 28 April 1991; “Çerkesler Kafkasya'ya Dönüyor,” [“Circassians in Turkey Are 
Returning to the Caucasus”] Ekonomist, 28 April 1991, 17; U. Ertem, “Çerkesler'e 'Dön' Çağrısı,” [“The Call 
of Return to Circassians”] Güneş, 19 June 1991; M. Uçar, “Çerkeslere Davet,” [“Invitation to Circassians”] 
Milliyet, 12 November 1991; Z. Erdal and E. Özcan, “Türkiye'deki Çerkeslerden 'Gelin!' Çağrısına Yanıt: 
'Gideriz, Ama...,” [“The Reply of Circassians in Turkey to the Invitation to Come: ‘We Will Go But…’”] 
Milliyet, 12 November 1991; H. Soysü, “Çerkesler'de “Kafkasya'ya Kesin Dönüş” Tartışmaları,” [The 
Debates of Final Return to the Caucasus among Circassians] Đkibine Doğru, 12 January 1992. 
 
73See for instance, J. Colarusso, “Circassian Repatriation: When Culture is Stronger than Politics,” The World 
and I, Washington, DC: Washington Times Publishing Corporation, 1991), 656-669. 
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Secondly, return as a nationalist diasporic project was from the beginning a masculine 
project.  Hence, most of the Circassian women rejected to live in the Caucasus when their 
husbands talked about settling in the Caucasus.  Today wives are still regarded as a 
problem for the idea and practice of return by the diaspora nationalists in Turkey as Mert 
and Đzzet, respectively, exemplify their wives’ opposition to any form of settlement in the 
Caucasus:  
 
   “With my wife, we went through the highway in year 1990.  After the day I 
went with my wife in 1990, my wife said that she would neither go and live 
there nor let her children live there.  But I am very glad that I went and I am 
still going.  …[When we returned from the Caucasus] I always told the good 
sides, she always told the negative sides.  This was how we became even.”75   
 
   “I would never like to lose my connection.  If my wife was as concerned as I 
was, I might have spent the late years of my retirement there.  …I still keep that 
hope.  We have never disagreed till this day but we do not have the same ideas 
on this subject.  Her approach is different.”76   
 
Thirdly, some Circassian activists regarded the Caucasus as socially different since 
returning to the homeland not only implied the fulfillment of nationalist goals but also 
adaptation into a new life style.  Coming from urban centers in Turkey, some felt that the 
Caucasus was much more rural in terms of social relations and life styles as Kaya tells his 
experience of leaving Istanbul and starting a life in the Caucasus in 1990s: 
 
   “Another thing is the problem of social relations on the town level.  That 
attracts you for a while.  It attracted me when I went.  At first you like 
everybody’s interest in what you say and what you do.  But after a while you 
see that it affects your private life and it owns you just like a clamp.  So you 
conclude that towns are not places that you can easily bear.  This is how it 
happened.  Since I got used to Istanbul, it was hard for me.  …The Caucasus is 
my homeland, I speak the same language, I share the same feelings.  …Moscow 
was a fully foreign city for me but it was a metropolis.”77   
 
                                                  
75
 Mert, interview by author, 12 June 2007, Đstanbul. 
 
76
 Đzzet, interview by author, 10 February 2008, Ankara. 
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The fourth problem in terms of settling in the Caucasus which is also the one which is 
mentioned the most by the diaspora nationalists concerns the economy.  As the socialist 
economy was being transformed into capitalism, the plans of return and repatriation that 
were designed for returning to a homeland in a socialist state became meaningless.  What 
the returnists in 1960s and 1970s imagined was a massive and systematic return movement 
which would be economically supported by the socialist policies of the Russian state: the 
Soviet state would economically take care of those activists who returned to the Caucasus.  
Yet, in the Post-Soviet era, there has been no such state to economically support the people 
from the Caucasus.  Hence, settlements in the diasporic homeland have been irregular, 
personal and they have based on the personal wealth of the individuals.  Metin and Nezih, 
two activists of 1960s and 1970s, respectively, explore the implications of such an 
economic and social transformation in the Caucasus in particular and Russia in general as 
far as the plans, projects and visions of Circassian diaspora nationalists were concerned:  
 
   “When we said ‘return’ before, we would not have a problem of survival if 
we could have managed to return.  Socialist state would give a house to live, we 
would somehow live, and we would not have much of an economic problem.  
We would have such a guarantee because of the characteristics of the state.  But 
now in capitalist conditions, since it is all about capital, all about money, there 
is no possibility of return though there is the freedom to go.  ...But this was not 
the return that we envisaged.  ...From now on, return has become an economic 
matter if you look through the individual level.  If you have money, if you can 
prepare the conditions on your own, then you can return.  ...We are not able to 
find an answer except “those who takes his/her luggage may go” [valizini alan 
gitsin].  Since we cannot find it, we are not able to formulate it as a policy and 
strategy.”78 
 
   “For instance, I give you myself as an example.  I went to the president.  I am 
one of the two or three most prestigious people there.  I told him that I would 
like to immigrate here [to the Caucasus].  He said “Wow! That would be good.”  
This was 8-10 years ago.  I said “But I am a lawyer, I will tell you how I may 
be useful in terms of archival work, legislation.  But I would like to have a 
salary with which I can live comfortably.”  He looked and looked, and then he 
laughed.  He said “Also bring some money with you.”  [I asked him] “How 
much will I bring?”  He said “Bring something like 150.000-200.000 dollars.”  
Well, now that is the story.”79   
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 Metin, interview by author, 5 February 2008, Ankara. 
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Hence, as a result of these multiple reasons, systematic and massive settlements in the 
Caucasus by the Circassians in Turkey which were expected in the early days after the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union did not take place.  The continuous calls from the homeland 
to return to the Caucasus were ambiguously received by the Circassian diaspora nationalists 
in Turkey as Taner’s dialogue with his friend living currently in the Caucasus highlights:  
 
   “We are losing the homeland.  I am pro-return.  Someone from Aktüel [a 
magazine in Turkey] made an interview with me.  It was also published in 
Aktüel.  I used an unlucky sentence such as I would like to die in my homeland.  
[He laughs]  Then there is a friend of mine in Nalchik [who went there from 
Turkey]…  she mailed me…  She said “If you are going to come, come now!  
This place is not a cemetery.”  I laughed a lot at that.  That is true.”80 
 
Furthermore, as resettlements were far from being systematic and massive, the rare 
examples of returns from Turkey to different regions of the Caucasus have also produced 
new debates and diasporic tensions among the Circassian diaspora in Turkey.  Timuçin, a 
returnist during the late 1960s and 1970s, narrates on the difference between two groups, 
namely the returnists who imagined return in the 1960s and the 1970s and those who have 
fulfilled return since the 1990s.  For him, the two groups had different characteristics, 
different aims and motivations:   
 
   “If we had those opportunities when we were young, a very useful group 
would then be able to immigrate and the Caucasus would have been different 
today because there was a very idealist and realist cadre in Turkey.  In love 
with their traditions, language, homeland and nation; a very honest and sincere 
group would act.  But back then there were obstacles, we could not open up.  If 
we had those positive contacts with Russia, we would have been useful to that 
region and our contacts would have been different.  These happened afterwards.  
And those people who were after their own interests and loots made the 
contacts.  They became negative examples.  They defrauded there, they made 
them [those people in the Caucasus] addicted to drugs, some tried to pull them 
to bigotry, some tried to pull them to fraud.  Those people who knew 
himself/herself and loved his/her nation and identity could not reach there.”81   
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For Nezih, these settlers in the Caucasus from Turkey since 1990 harmed the image of 
diaspora in the homeland:   
 
   “Return.  If you are going to raise those people’s life standards there, then 
work for that.  But if you would like to fit into their life circumstances and 
standards, if you struggle together with them and adopt yourself to them, then 
you will be counted as someone who has returned.  Otherwise, X has a villa 
[daçe] there, here he was a doorman, he married a doctor there, she gets 
ashamed when she sees me; that guy  …cannot finalize his divorce.  There is no 
return like that.  [Böyle dönüş olmaz.]  …What is our name now?  They call us 
Turkish Circassians.  [Şimdi adımız ne, Türk Çerkesleri diyorlar bize]  …Tax 
dodgers, women sellers, gamblers, enemies of the state.  Believe me, there we, 
those who went from Turkey, have more negative identities than we have 
here.”82 
   
 In addition to those critiques on the motives and patterns of resettlements in the 
Caucasus, post-Soviet encounters with the homeland and the political events that took place 
in this period in the Caucasus and Turkey led also to the formation of new fault lines for the 
Circassian diaspora in Turkey.  As the old debates were affected by the ideological 
inclinations of Cold War, after the 1990s the ideological camps were transformed into 
groups which openly and explicitly discuss the future of the Caucasus and the relations of 
the diaspora with the Caucasus.  The basic debate here concerns the relationship between 
diaspora and homeland based on questions such as how diapora should act, to what extent it 
can part and parcel of homeland politics; to what extent it can intervene in the affairs of the 
homeland; whether long-distance nationalism is a viable option or it is a form of diasporic 
arrogance which ignores the political conditions and reel politik of the homeland; how 
relations with the Russian state should be managed, whether it should be based on 
remembering and resisting Russian state for the exile and its dividing or policies and 
politics or these relations should be shaped by bargains and negotiation.  Şener’s and 
Köksal’s statements on these relations of the diaspora with the homeland are examples of 
the two sides in these debates.  For Şener, diaspora cannot be the savior for the homeland 
and it should adopt itself to the politics of homeland which may be in cooperation with 
Russia if the interests of the republics in the Caucasus require such cooperation:    
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   “Saving the Caucasus etc. is no more valid.  Because there are no people in 
the Caucasus who want to be saved.  Who will you save and from whom will 
you save?  In that sense, the Caucasus, too, may save [those Circassians in] 
Turkey.  If they say “Diaspora! Do you have radio channels?” No, we do not.  
“Do you have schools?”  No, we do not.  “Do you have alphabets, books, TV 
channels?”  We have none of these.  If it says “then I shall save you,” it will be 
right.  So we should give up these ideas of saving or being saved etc.”83 
 
On the other hand, Köksal argues that diaspora may and should intervene in homeland 
politics; it does not have to act as the exact mirror of the short-term interests and politics of 
the homeland.  For him, there is no hierarchy between the homeland and diaspora in terms 
of having a say in the Caucasus:  
 
   “They are criticizing that we have been supporting those people in opposition 
there by giving them material support.  This is a perspective.  Then I may also 
say that they help the oppression of people by supporting the governments 
which are servants of Russia, and this is the truth.  Today the easiest thing to do 
there is to cooperate with governments who operate in line with the status quo, 
Putin and make toasts with them.  I am doing the harder thing.  …They act in a 
mentality such as we would create problems for the people living there.  They 
say “we shall let those people living there to decide about their own destiny.”  I 
criticize that harshly.  Because diaspora and homeland is a whole.  I, too, have 
rights there.  I, too have relationships there.  …Now the number of Circassians 
living in Turkey is higher than the number of all those Circassians in the 
Caucasus.”84   
 
 As the debates on the nature and dynamics of the relationships between diaspora 
and homeland have dominated the Circassian diasporic sphere in Turkey since the mid 
1990s, the much debated concept of return in the 1970s and initial enthusiasm for return in 
the 1990s have been part of this general discussion on the relationships of the diaspora with 
the homeland.  Yet, despite these discussions and conflicts in terms of the role of diaspora 
which are to some extent results of those post-Soviet conflicts and wars in the Caucasus, 
most Circassian activists interviewed for this study have prioritized homeland in terms of 
the establishment  of the relations.  Almost all of them state that homeland should feed and 
inspire the diaspora.  As Nezih’s statements highlight, Circassian diaspora nationalists in 
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Turkey argue that Circassian diaspora in Turkey is not powerful enough to lead the 
homeland because of its status in Turkey as an ethnic group:   
 
   “I think that presently the formation of the nucleus for return and a structure 
that will represent return is not possible for Circassians.  That is gone.  [Bu gitti.    
Veleddalin Amin] …[What is crucial] is the dialogue and good relations with 
our people in the homeland.  How can this happen?  It may be being educated 
there, it may be settlement, it may be visits.  …According to me, these relations 
will be sources for the nourishment of culture here.  Because it [homeland] is 
luckier than here in term of written examination of Circassian culture, 
education, publication.  Because there are opportunities for that.  Here you do 
not have the means to publish a book but there they can publish hundreds of 
books.  …This will give Circassian culture a guarantee and courage.  …Well 
the person in Khabardey Republic has now a characteristic; s/he is more self-
confident that we are.  Why?  Because s/he says “this land is mine, it is not 
given to me by anyone.”  And this is very significant, it is a registered right.  
They have the self-confidence which is provided by that [situation].  This is 
why they are stronger than us on this level.”85   
 
Hence, in terms of educational institutions, rights and collective participation into public 
domain, Circassian diaspora activists in Turkey today do not regard themselves in a 
position to lead the homeland.  In that sense, they are different than the first generation of 
Circassian activists and nationalists who could envisage not only supporting but also 
leading and in some cases “saving” the Caucasus during the late years of the Ottoman Era.  
Yet, despite their lack of confidence for mimicking these visions of the Ottoman 
Circassians, Circassian diaspora activists today refer to these first generation diaspora 
nationalists on other levels: as part of their past; as Circassians just before the “break” 
which will be explored later in this chapter in terms of the changes in the boundaries of 
knowledge since the 1990s.   
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5.4. New Claims of Citizenship 
 
 
 
 This part of the chapter aims to explore how Circassian activists, since the 1990s, 
have been redefining their relationships with the Turkish state.  I argue that since the 1990s, 
Circassians in Turkey have been trying to develop new relationships with the Turkish state 
based on multicultural citizenship policies. I further argue that Circassians’ search for new 
relations with the Turkish state is part of larger debates on the redefinition of the notion of 
citizenship during the 1990s as a result of globalization processes and the rise of politics of 
identity.   
 Citizenship is a concept with various meanings, “an essentially contested concept” 
which is “contested at every level from its meaning to its political application, with 
implications for the kind of society to which we aspire.”86  Despite its contested character, 
most of the political scientists and sociologists consider citizenship crucial as “a ‘classical 
ideal’, one of the fundamental values” that is “inherent in our ‘civilization,’”87 as “one of 
the central ongoing features of Western political discourse.”88  Yet, starting from the 1980s, 
the concept of citizenship has been criticized from various strands while its various 
components were rejected by many groups as either insufficient or deceptive.  Its 
universality has been challenged on the ground that “universality of citizenship in the sense 
of inclusion and participation of everyone, stands in tension with the other two meanings of 
universality embedded in modern political ideas: universality as generality, and universality 
as equal treatment” both of which create the demand for homogeneity and perpetuating the 
already existing oppression and disadvantage for some groups.89  Using the motto ‘personal 
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is political’, feminist scholarship with the help of multiculturalists has criticized the neutral 
language of citizenship that brings a deceptive and oppressive equality before law, and an 
imposed identity that actually excludes these groups.  For them, “neither the equal 
opportunity of liberalism nor the active, participatory democratic citizenship of all the 
people can be achieved without the radical changes in personal and domestic life.”90   
 The same critiques of citizenship also have found their counterparts since 1990s in 
Turkish politics in line with the rise of Kurdish nationalism, political Islam, feminist groups 
and the issue of Turkey’s accession to European Union: the concept and practices of 
citizenship have been not only criticized but also redefined.91  Furthermore, for most of the 
accounts on the redefinition of citizenship, this search for new citizenship practices and 
rights have been part of a larger process which has been called as the crisis of Kemalist 
project of modernity which is from-above, ‘for the nation, despite the nation.’92 Yet, for 
Keyder, the crisis of Kemalist project of modernity may not mean the end of the 
modernization project and ideals of Enlightenment only if the project is “to divest itself of 
its modernizationist encumbrance” which has been shaped by the elitism of Kemalism; 
binary oppositions constructed through a local Orientalism that values new, universal and 
Western while devaluing and denying ancienne, Eastern and local; its sharp definitions of 
what constitutes modern and what constitutes progressive.93    According to Keyder, what is 
needed therefore is a “radical surgery on the moribund state tradition in order to prepare the 
legal and political coordinates within which the public space of autonomous individuals 
may flourish” through the recognition and institutionalization of full citizenship rights.94  
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This part of the chapter claims that Circassian activists since the 1990s have been part of 
this transformation of the meanings, rights and claims of citizenship in Turkey.   
 Since the 1990s, Circassian activists have been defining themselves as the 
constitutive element (kurucu unsur) as far as the Republic of Turkey is concerned.  In 
several interviews conducted for this research, despite the emphasis on some tensions and 
different levels of relationships with the state of Turkey, the discourse of ‘the constitutive 
element’ was repeated several times.  Such an argument includes not only the contemporary 
existence of Circassians in state institutions but also historical claims, such as the 
significant roles of Circassians in the Ottoman Empire, modernization processes which 
took place throughout nineteenth century, the War of Independence and the foundation of 
the Turkish nation-state.  Okan narrates on such an overarching role of Circassians in 
Turkey: 
 
   “Circassians are people who are in upper positions in Turkish armed forces 
and security forces; they are preferred.  They do not earn that but they are 
preferred.  This is a tradition that has started from the foundational years of the 
Republic and continued till today.  Well, they say that the foundational base of 
the Republic of Turkey is culture.  I make fun [of that argument].  The 
foundational base of the Republic of Turkey is Circassians because in security 
forces, intelligence service, armed forces, never mind the rest…  …literature, 
art…  I would start with Sait Faik and count till Kemal Tahir. 95  …Actor, 
author…  Well, Circassians are really beyond the autochthonous people of this 
peninsula.”96   
 
 Therefore, for the Circassian activists defining Circassians as a diasporic 
community which is in touch with a distant historical homeland is not an impediment to 
consider themselves as a significant actor in Turkey and have some claims over history, 
geography and culture.  Being the diaspora does not negate the claim of being the 
constitutive element.  The claim of being the constitutive element, indeed, is strategic to 
demand equal rights as the citizens of Turkey as Taner states: 
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   “And we, as the constituents, as the constituents of the Republic of Turkey 
are in a state of demanding equal rights.  What are these equal rights?  I had not 
been able to give Circassian names to my children till the last couple of years.  I 
had not been able to use my Circassian family name.  I had not been able to 
speak Circassian.  There is no school for that, no Circassian music, no 
Circassian broadcasting, there is no state support for the development of 
Circassian culture.  Doesn’t the ministry of tourism collect the taxes of 
Circassians?  It does.  Doesn’t the Turkish state collect the taxes of all 
Circassians?  It does.  Don’t the children of Turks in Turkey learn Turkish in 
schools?  They do.  So what is the impediment of my child learning his mother 
tongue?  Fine, Turkish shall be the official language but Circassian should be 
taught in schools as an elective course.  …Well, they permitted the Circassian 
broadcasting in TRT, and it is once a week and 20 minutes.”97  
 
Hence the claim of being the constituent element is strategic as far as Circassians are 
concerned.  To the extent that they define themselves as the founders of the republic who 
are as significant as the autochthonous people of Turkey, they are in a position to state their 
demands from the state as a policy making mechanism and this is related to another change 
in their relationships with the Turkish state: the demand of multicultural policies.  
 Starting from the mid 1960s and 1970s, Circassian activists regarded themselves as 
the object of state policies and state as a policy making mechanism.  In the narratives of 
activists in the 1960s and 70s, Turkish state was criticized for assimilation, Turkification 
while Ottoman state was criticized for the resettlement of Circassians in Anatolia 
strategically in accordance with the Ottoman interests.  Gürtuğ mentioned assimilation as 
among state policies:  
 
   “When you start from the Ottoman era, we see that this [state’s] policy has 
changed a lot.  However, it has one basic quality: we should be assimilated.  
The best Circassian, let him be Circassian but upon the condition that s/he is 
assimilated; there is a thought like that.  There comes a time when this is severe 
and there comes a time when it is loose but it is always there.”98   
 
 
Furthermore, diaspora activists remember the 1960s, ‘70s and to some extent, ‘80s as “hard 
years” in terms of their relationships with the Turkish state.  In those years, oppressive 
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policies and laws were abundant though they were not strictly enforced.  Yet some cases 
are still remembered as Cahit narrates on such an event in those years: 
 
   “Though it was not enforced in recent times, the punishment of having a 
cassette in Circassian language at home was something between 3 and 10 years.  
Now many people who consider themselves intellectuals reject that when you 
talk to them.  They say that no such thing happened.  Well, there was something 
like that.  …It was illegal.  Let me give a very simple example, his name was…  
He was put on a trial on the basis that he said “I am Circassian.” in a meeting.  
One of our best lawyers defended him.  …In years close to ‘90s.  …Because he 
said that he was Circassian in public sphere.  …Think about it.  Though there 
have been events like that; when you say something, today people, even those 
who consider themselves very intellectual, just because of their interests and 
national feelings, challenge you and say that nothing like that happened in 
Turkey.  I say “How can that be?  The guy was put on trial, I know him.  Let 
me bring you the legal documents.”  They say “no.””99 
 
Compared to those hard years for the activists, the 1990s and the last decade are regarded 
as the “golden years” by the activists.  In addition to general liberalization that followed the 
coup d’état of 1980, Turkish state recently initiated some policies regarding the ethnic 
groups and the issue of EU membership enlarged the space within which ethnic groups in 
Turkey can voice themselves.  During the late 1990s, demands for group rights – especially 
the right to education in the mother tongue – and independent relationships with the 
European Union have dominated the recent debates in the Circassian public sphere.100 
Furthermore, some initial contacts with EU also contributed to the rise of expectations on 
the side of diaspora activists in Turkey:  
 
   “When we were talking to the committees from European Union, they had 
approaches that raised our morals.  They told us that they thought that 
Circassians were the significant reformist power of Turkey based on their 
historical and sociological knowledge.  …Well, this observation was based on 
the previous processes.  They knew that Circassians had a more open family 
life, their gender relations were different, and they were more egalitarian and 
individualistic.  Not individualistic but based on individual.  [They knew] That 
Circassians did not have the herd reflex.  Indeed we have an aggregate cultural 
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plaster [toplam kültür harcı] that may fit into the general European cultural 
structure more.  But within Turkey’s history, this plaster ate the alum of first 
Turkification, then Islamization, then another Turkification and another 
Islamization.  So the description of Turkey’s significant reformist power is a 
pleasant description but it is a little bit in suspense.  I hold unto that when I am 
stuck.  I hold unto this word so that it makes me a little more comfortable.”101   
 
As the most dominant way of relating with the Turkish state had been narrating on 
assimilation in the 1970s for the activists; today in the first decade of 2000s, Circassian 
activists start to imagine regeneration and revival through state policies and call for positive 
discrimination in terms of broadcasting, language education, and culture.  Unlike the 
activists’ discourses of the 1970s which regard Turkish state as an assimilating, Turkifying 
and homogenizing mechanism which implicitly or explicitly, consciously or unconsciously 
works for the vanishing of Circassians in Turkey, Circassian activists today can demand 
multicultural policies from the state for the achievement of a substantive equality among 
citizens of Turkey:  
 
   “Well, Circassians in Turkey now is in need of positive discrimination like 
other small peoples in similar conditions.  In a point, saying that “you are equal 
too, do whatever you do” is not valid, this is the approach that the world accepts 
today.  In that sense, groups and people who are having trouble in terms of 
reproducing itself and transforming itself to the future, who are having 
hardships in terms of producing that energy are being supported in the civilized 
world.”102   
 
However, state’s policies beyond assimilation which aims to give some cultural rights to 
ethnic groups in Turkey are regarded by Circassian activists as insufficient when compared 
to the positive rights that they envisaged.  The broadcasting in Circassian language and the 
right to learn their mother language in special and paid courses which had produced long 
public debates and controversies are useless as far as Circassian activists are concerned.  
The next part of the chapter will explore one of those instances of Turkish state’s policies 
with regard to ethnic groups and it aims to understand the tensions and problems involved 
in these policies that also concern Circassians as an ethnic group in Turkey. 
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5.4.1. The Broadcast in Circassian: “Our Cultural Richness” 
 
 
 The broadcasting that Taner and Köksal mentioned during the interviews has started 
as a result of seven reform packages that had been enacted between 2002 and 2003 as a 
result of the Turkish state’s desire to realize the EU accession criteria and covered a wide 
range of legislative provisions.  Restrictions on the music albums and movies which are in 
different languages and dialects have been removed by lifting some of the articles of the 
Anti-Terror Law No. 3713 and the Law on Broadcasting in different languages and dialects 
other than Turkish No 2932.  “The Regulation on the Language of Television and Radio 
Broadcasts” prepared by RTÜK (Radio Television Supreme Council) entered into force on 
December 18, 2002.  According to this Regulation, Turkish Radio Television Corporation 
(TRT) has been entrusted with the sole right of broadcasting in various languages and 
dialects traditionally used by Turkish citizens in their daily lives.  The Regulation, in 
Article 5, states that  
 
   “Broadcasts can also be made in the different languages and dialects 
traditionally used by Turkish citizens in their daily lives.  Broadcasts in the 
different languages and dialects traditionally used by Turkish citizens in their 
daily lives shall be made by the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation.  In 
these languages and dialects, broadcasts can be made for adults on news, music 
and culture. No broadcasts can be made towards the teaching of these languages 
and dialects.  …The duration of radio broadcasts in these languages and dialects 
shall not exceed 45 minutes per day and a total 4 hours per week. TV 
broadcasts shall not exceed 30 minutes per day and a total of 2 hours per week. 
TV broadcasts shall be accompanied by Turkish subtitles which will fully 
correspond to the broadcast in terms of timing and the content. As regards radio 
broadcasts, a Turkish translation will be broadcast after the program.”103 
 
The sixth harmonization package, approved in July 2003, introduced in its Article 14 an 
amendment to Article 4 of  the Law No.3984 on the Establishment of Broadcasting by 
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Radio and Television Channels, stating that ‘... public and private radio and television 
corporations may broadcast in different languages and dialects traditionally  used by 
Turkish citizens in their daily lives.’  On January 25, 2004 “Regulation Concerning Radio 
and Television Broadcasts in Languages Used Traditionally by Turkish Citizens” was 
published in the Official Gazette. The Regulation, issued by RTÜK, aims at allowing 
broadcasts of languages and dialects used traditionally by Turkish citizens along with 
Turkish language. According to the Regulation, these broadcasts should be in compliance 
with the rule of law, the general principles of the Constitution, fundamental rights and 
freedoms, national security, general moral values, the basic characteristics of the Republic 
enshrined in the Constitution, the indivisible integrity of the state with its territory and 
nation, the Law No. 3984, the essentials and principles based on the regulations enforced 
with respect to this law and the conditions and commitments envisaged by the RTÜK.104  
 In June 2004, just before the broadcast began, the President of RTÜK stated that 
there would be no problem in terms of the content the broadcast.105  In June 2004, the 
broadcast in different languages and dialects traditionally used by Turkish citizens in their 
daily lives started on TRT3.  As the broadcast on TRT3 had been initially announced as a 
one-hour program; then, in line with the 5th article of the Regulation quoted above, it was 
announced that broadcasts would be 45 minutes.  In June 2004, the broadcast on TRT3 
started with 30 minutes once a week.   
 In the beginning, in June 2004 the program was supposed to start at 10:30 a.m at 
TRT 3 and 6:10 at Radio 1 [Radyo 1].  Yet in April 2007, without any explanation by TRT 
or any request of explanation by any ethnic group, the schedule of broadcast on TRT3 had 
been changed from 10:30 a.m to 7:30 a.m.  
 Initially, the program was broadcast in Bosnian on Mondays, in Arabic on 
Tuesdays, in Kurmanji on Wednesdays, in Circassian (Khabardey dialect) on Thursdays, 
and in Zaza on Fridays.  Yet, in 2009, with the opening of TRT 6, state channel that 
broadcasts in Kurdish for 24 hours a day, the broadcast in Kurmanji and Zaza were 
abolished.     
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 After the initial broadcasts which led to various discussions in Turkey in terms of 
national language, national identity and the relationships between the state and ethnic 
groups, many Circassian activists regarded the broadcasts in Circassian as a sham and a 
disappointment; but still a turning point as far as the policies of Turkish state were 
concerned.  Alternatively, the foundational president of the Düzce Caucasian Cultural 
Association stated that the broadcast was liked and broadcast in other dialects would be 
demanded.  Another Circassian in Düzce was quoted as stating that this was a very 
important and positive step and Circassians submitted their “deepest gratitude to our state 
and people working in TRT for this enormous cultural service.” [“Devletimize ve TRT 
çalışanlarına bu büyük kültür hizmetinden dolayı en derin şükranlarımızı sunarız.”]106   
 The thirty-minutes program in Bosnian, Arabic and Circassian languages is still 
being broadcasted on TRT 3 once a week.  The television program called “Our Cultural 
Richness” [Kültürel Zenginliğimiz] is broadcasted in Circassian on Thursday mornings 
between 7:30 a.m and 7:58 a.m.   
 I will now briefly explore one of those broadcasts in Circassian on TRT 3.  On 
January 5, 2009, the first ten minutes of the program was the news.  “The Summary of the 
Week” that started at 7:30 a.m was composed of news on a speech of the prime minister of 
Turkey on ethnic nationalism, a project of Housing Development Administration of Turkey 
(TOKĐ), the change in the state subsidies for agricultural products,  a project between the 
municipalities of Batman and Istanbul for 500 students from Batman to spend their 
holidays in Istanbul, the errors in terms of the use of the stoves; the commemoration of 
those who were killed by the terrorist organization, PKK in Mardin; and a social project for 
the women in Mardin.  At 7:40 a.m, a cartoon that explained the traffic rules followed the 
news.  Between 7:40 a.m and 7:44 a.m, the types, uses and names of the daisies were 
narrated with a video on daisies.  Between 7:44 a.m and 7:49 a.m, a video of a Circassian 
dancing troupe whose name, location and date was anonymous was broadcast.  Yet, given 
the techniques of screening it was obvious that the video was not contemporary.  It may be 
predicted that the video belongs to 1980s.  From 7:49 a.m to 7:58 a.m, a piece of a 
documentary called “the Beauties of Anatolia” [Anadolu Güzellikleri] was on broadcast.  
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During those 9 minutes of the documentary, six waterfalls of Sinop, a city in the Black Sea 
region of Turkey were visited.  The voice that was hardly heard in the back implied that 
documentary was shot in Turkish years ago and put into use for this occasion.  When I 
searched for some additional data on the documentary, it turned out that a columnist in a 
daily newspaper who wrote that the broadcast of TRT was just a fiasco and a showcase of 
disrespect also mentioned that same documentary in June 2004.107  Hence within these five 
years, the same documentary was either broadcasted continuously or repetitively.  
 As this is the common pattern of broadcasting as also narrated by Circassian 
activists, this pattern may change on special occasions.  For instance, on October 30, 2008 
which was the day after the commemoration of the foundation of the Republic on October 
29, a documentary on the history of the foundation of the Republic was broadcasted in 
Circassian.  Coincidentally, I watched the documentary with a taxi driver who had a mini 
television in his cab and who was trying and “studying” to learn Circassian to visit the 
Caucasus.  As he told us his plans to visit the Caucasus, he also said that he was called by 
the name of the ethnic group that he belonged by the other taxi drivers.  It was 7:30 in the 
morning and as we were trying the avoid the traffic jam, we, three people with Caucasian 
roots were listening the history of Turkish Republic in Circassian language and for the first 
time seeing the speeches of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk translated into Circassian.  Ironically, 
we hardly understood the meanings of the Circassian words while we perfectly knew the 
content and audio visuals of the documentary.  The very local and daily language of the 
ethnic community was transformed into a state language that narrated the official 
historiography: for instance, the concept of thamade which means the elder and respected 
people of the Circassian community who earn wisdom through experience, age and proper 
behavior was substituted for the members of parliament.     
 However, the broadcast seems exactly what the Turkish state aims it to be as TRT 
describes the program in its webpage:  
 
   “This is a program that helps to give consciousness to the people as citizens 
of Turkey who are aware of their responsibilities and duties towards the 
Republic of Turkey which is a democratic, secular and social State that is 
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respectful to human rights; to strengthen people’s trust and respect in the State 
[the first letter of state is originally capitalized]; to explain that racial 
differences are natural [tabii] as well as cultural differences such as religion, 
language and sect; to prevent  abuse in terms of these matters; to place the idea 
that the State of Turkish Republic is an indivisible unit with its nation and 
country; to make our country’s cultural richness known; to make the people 
think about the solutions of its own problems; to be informed about the 
happenings in the world, Turkey and its regions; to provide correct information 
vis-à-vis the various broadcasts (radio, television, newspaper, bulletins etc.) 
from other countries which are intended for our citizens inside or outside the 
country.”108   
 
 
For most of the Circassian diaspora activists, broadcast in Circassian has been a source of 
disappointment.  After it had started in June 2004, it was neither debated nor watched: 
despite so many early discussions and tensions in terms of the meanings and implications 
of these broadcasts, they had been as insignificant, boring and old-fashioned as they could 
have been.  Köksal, just like many activists interviewed for this study, criticizes these 
broadcasts in particular and Turkish state’s contemporary policies in general as 
meaningless and insincere except being a turning point as far as the overall policies of the 
Turkish state are concerned: 
 
   “…Because I do not think that the broadcasting in Turkish is…  It is 
insignificant.  Well, it is a breaking point in some sense but it is no use for us.  
They made it the most important issue of Turkey.  Let me ask you today, when 
did you last watch the broadcast on Thursday?  Did you watch it recently?  
Why not?  Because there is nothing special about it.  If you ask those people 
who struggled for that, they did not watch it either.  In the program, it tells me 
about the characteristics of anemo tulip that is found in Manisa mountains in 
Circassian.  God damn it, what is the use of it?  They just put that program in 
TRT to make people hate.  …Well, now people will come to paid courses for 
what they did not come to the associations when it was free of charge.  …Do 
not make me laugh.  …When this is being done, positive discrimination should 
be applied.  …Otherwise, how are we going to deal with that all by 
ourselves?”109 
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Hence, broadcast in “programs in vernaculars and dialects still practiced today in daily lives 
of Turkish people” is related to anything but the demands and needs of those ethnic 
groups.110  As the initiation of the broadcasting created great fuss in the Turkish public, the 
broadcasting itself has been insignificant and trivial in terms of its contents, schedule and 
popularity.   Unlike these broadcasts, TRT 6, state channel that started broadcasting in 
January 2009 and broadcasts in Kurdish for 24 hours a day, has become a different phase in 
terms of Turkish state’s policies on ethnic groups in Turkey.   
 
 
 
5.5. New “Others” 
 
 
 
 For the Circassian diaspora in Turkey, post-1990s also has meant the formation of 
new “others” as a result of new dynamics of Turkish politics.  As Turkey has been in a 
position to deal with the rise of Kurdish nationalism and the problematization of the 
Armenian deportation in 1915; Circassian diaspora, as an ethnic group in Turkey also have 
been in a position to situate themselves vis-à-vis these questions and ethnic groups.  Next 
parts of this chapter will deal with how Circassian nationalists deal with these two ethnic 
problems in Turkey and how they situate themselves vis-à-vis these ethnic groups and their 
claims: namely, Kurds and Armenians.   
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5.5.1. On the Kurdish Question 
 
 
 In February 2009, one of the most influential newspapers in Turkey, Sabah 
broadcast a new advertisement on TV.  The advertisement video, as it started with the 
photo of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk that turned into the map of Turkey, moved on to other 
slides with some key words.  Meanwhile, the voices that followed the slides and constantly 
changed not only in terms of gender but also in terms of pronunciation and dialect were 
reading a text which said  
 
   “We built the Republic of Turkey.  Some of us were civilians, some were 
soldiers.  Some of us were urban, some were workers.  Some of us were Kurds, 
some were Circassians.  There were Sunnis and Alevites.  There were educated 
and less educated.  There were young and old.  This was how we became what 
we are.  Brothers/sisters, which part of us shall we give up?”111   
 
As the advertisement is quite interesting not only for Sabah but also for the Turkish media 
and advertisement sector which usually and strategically employ Turkish nationalism; in 
the part that mentions Kurds and Circassians, there is a big tree that stems from the soil and 
in front of the arms of the tree, the words Circassian and Kurd are written.   
 This coexistence in the same slide and in the same category as two non-Turkish 
ethnic groups in Turkey which this advertisement also highlights is what I will try to 
explore in this part.  This part of the chapter aims to explore how Circassian activists regard 
Kurdish question as an ethnic group in Turkey.  Such an exploration aims to understand not 
only the dynamics of this coexistence but also Circassian perspectives on Kurdish question 
which is related not only to Kurds per se but also other ethnic groups in Turkey and their 
relationships with the Turkish state.   
 As Kurdish question has been narrated as a crucial reference by Circassian activists 
to understand the relationships between the Turkish state and Circassians, there are variable 
approaches on the Kurdish question per se.   
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 First, Circassians consider Kurdish question and its effects in Turkish politics as an 
opportunity for Circassians in particular and other ethnic groups in general.  Şener, for 
instance, highlights that the contemporary developments in terms of broadcasting in 
languages other than Turkish are a result of Kurdish question: 
 
   “If we are going to speak in the name of Circassians, Circassians should 
absolutely stand by the territorial integrity of Turkey.  But it is also evident that 
Kurdish question will bring some democratic openings.  As a matter of fact, TV 
broadcasting etc. is all results of those questions.  Circassians will also benefit 
from that, whether or not they want it.”112    
 
Kaya explains this as a reason to be thankful to Kurds despite the problems it created: 
 
   “We should thank Kurds.  I am telling this for those Circassians who care 
about their identity.  Because they [Kurds] put that problem of identity on 
national and international agenda by struggling.  This is mostly an advantage, 
sometimes it becomes a disadvantage but it is OK, we shall take its 
advantages.”113   
 
 Secondly, Circassian activists regard Kurdish question as an impediment as far as 
the ethnic groups and Circassians in Turkey are concerned.  From such a perspective, the 
very existence of such a problem inhibits any possibility of dialogue and contributes to the 
rise of Turkish nationalism.  Hasan, for instance, argues that it is hard to demand group 
rights when any ethnic demand is perceived as a challenge to the territorial integrity of 
Turkey and as a possibility of armed resistance: 
 
   “The right to protect one’s culture and to use one’s language are rights that 
should be recognized.  When we think in the name of Circassians, the fact that 
Kurdish question is such a crucial question impedes the solution of cultural 
problems in Turkey.  …If the Kurds were not seen as a threat in Turkey, then 
Turkey might have had some openings in terms of cultural rights.  But the 
situation is that if there is going to be an opening, then it will be seen like a gain 
that has resulted from the armed resistance of PKK and then the state will be 
seen as compromising.  So the idea is not to give such a compromise before the 
armed phase is over.  For sure, this is a process that impedes the granting of 
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cultural rights.  The impediment of these rights naturally affects other ethnic 
groups living in Turkey.”114   
 
Thirdly, Circassian activists regarded Kurdish question as having some similarities with the 
problems of other ethnic groups in Turkey.  From such a perspective, the problem is not 
Kurds per se but rather the ways the Turkish state deals with ethnicity and ethnic groups.  
Timuçin and Meral, respectively, narrate on such common problems of ethnic groups in 
Turkey:  
 
   “Kurdish question, too, is a reality.  If that group that we call Kurds are living 
in this country and if they grew up here, then you shall let them use their own 
language and their traditions.  …There are still people in the East who do not 
know Turkish.  We were like that too, we did not know how to say come and go 
till we started school.”115  
 
   “Indeed, calling that Kurdish problem makes me restless.  Well, it is not 
Kurdish question actually.  It is the problem of all people who are not Turkish.  
When we say Kurdish problem, it becomes something negative for the Kurds, it 
makes them lonely.  …Well, supporting and approving PKK or any kind of 
terrorist event is impossible for me.  …There is a problem of democracy in 
Turkey.  …It is not right to call it Kurdish problem, such a problem exists for 
the Armenians, and it exists for the Circassians.”116  
 
Fourthly, despite the existence of similarities, Kurdish question is also regarded as the 
problem of an ethnic group that is different from Circassians.  Gürsoy for instance states 
that the ways ethnicity is politicized are among those differences:  
 
   “Unfortunately, the state had wrong policies for 80 years.  It followed the 
policy of ignoring.  …In year 1986, I did my military service and there I saw 
the Kurdish problem.  I saw how Kurdish boys were beaten there since they did 
not know Turkish.  This is a problem for them.  It was forbidden to own a 
Kurdish cassette; unfortunately, it was the same for the Circassian cassettes.  
Since we did not have any further claims, these were forgotten, it was overcome 
as a cultural question.  But for the other side, since there are other strategic 
games in the region, there occurs unease.  With manipulations, what can be 
overcome with democratization turns into syndromes of disintegration.”117   
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Nezih argues that Kurds and Circassians are historically different and Circassians, as a 
diasporic community, are different from the Kurds who are regarded as the autochthons of 
Anatolia.  For him, Kurdish ability to connect to land which is an actual, not a diasporic 
land differentiates Kurds from Circassians:  
 
   “Kurds are very different.  On the land over which they have some claims, 
they are stem cells.  And they slowly attain that consciousness.  …We should 
prove everything so that they will accept it.  We will not gain anything if we 
wait for the recognition and granting of these by others.  Thus, in Turkey in 
terms of human rights, Copenhagen criteria and use of language, not even a 
single Circassian contributed a word.  They were all result of Kurdish struggle.  
…That is why I say we are different from Kurds.  We have difficulty in that 
sense.  If Kurds protect the Southeast region, then homeland and people 
become connected.  In our case, to connect to the homeland, we should either 
use Caucasian identity well or accept the identity of being part of Turkey 
[Türkiyelilik] by giving up Caucasian identity.  I do not know.”118   
 
From such a perspective, Circassian activists feel that Kurds have stronger roots in Turkey 
as they are tied to a region in which they are historically autochthons.  Despite their 
narratives on being the founders of the state, being entrusted at the key positions of the state 
and being the loyal elements of the Ottoman and Turkish state; their diasporic position 
makes them less secure in politics.  Kurds is seen as the rightful owners of some claims 
while Circassian activists regard themselves as the guests who are unable to have some 
demands and raise his/her voice.   
 Fifthly, Circassian activists criticize Kurds for the way Kurdish question has been 
politicized since the last decades.  In the interviews, almost all of them highlight the 
significance of the integrity of the Turkish state and state that any other action beyond that 
is unacceptable for them.  Köksal argues that he cannot support and empathize with Kurds 
on such a level: 
 
   “If Kurds are having a struggle for freedom in Turkey, I will be with them till 
the end.  This is not what they struggle for.  [It is] Beyond the claims of 
speaking Kurdish, it is dividing and disintegrating the country.  I will not be a 
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cover for that.  About Kurdish language or about cultural rights, I will be with 
them till the end.”119 
 
Mert criticizes Kurds on the ground that their nationalism is excluding other ethnic groups 
in Turkey, and their organization and political demands are based on a single ethnic group.  
Such a perspective highlights that, with the emergence of Kurdish question, Turkish 
politics is shaped by two nationalisms that are equally exclusive as far as Circassians are 
concerned: 
 
   “Kurds are acting opportunistically.  What are they doing?  First, they do not 
demand what they demand for themselves for other ethnic groups.  Second, in 
order to reach an end they are ready to shed blood, this is wrong.  …Well, they 
speak as if there are only Turks and Kurds in Turkey.  I am against that, this is 
wrong.  …Vis-à-vis Turkish nationalism they have formed a Kurdish 
nationalism, and they reject me.  Why?  Because I am lesser in terms of 
number.  Because I do not demand anything.  These are very wrong things.  I 
may be smaller in population, I do not evaluate people by the counting the 
heads.  Who told that I do not have any demands?  I do.  …Well, Kurds will 
one day understand that they shall not reject but accept us.”120 
 
Rüstem criticizes Kurds for being politically insufficient despite their advantages that 
Circassians do not have due to their diasporic and historical conditions: 
 
   “Kurds are strong due to the fact that it is their geography; they are strong in 
terms of the land on which they put their feet.  Except that, they are nothing; 
they are neither as nationalist as Circassians nor as strong as them.  For the 
Circassians, it was the policy of the Ottoman Empire and it was the policy of 
the empire, it should not be grudged.  What was it going to do?  Would it make 
a calamity out of Circassians by settling them together?  They even tried to 
establish a state, they would have done that if they had been together and 
nobody would have prevented that.  …Kurds tell me that “Circassians are good 
people but they always support state and prevent revolution, they do not 
participate to it.”  …I always tell them that there are several millions of Kurds 
in this country and if a group of Circassians which is one tenth of that Kurdish 
population would be settled and lived together somewhere, we would not have 
demanded anything from anyone, we would just deal with it and get it.  [Bu 
memlekette bilmem kaç milyon adamsınız, sizin onda biriniz kadar bir yerde 
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Çerkes bir arada yaşayabilseydi, oturabilseydi, biz zaten kimseden bir şey 
istemez, kendimiz halleder alırdık diyorum.]”121 
 
 
 
5.5.2. Remembering Armenians: “We Do Know Armenians More Than...” 
 
 
 In December 2008, a group of intellectuals in Turkey signed an online declaration 
that apologizes for what they call "the great catastrophe" that overtook Armenians in 
Turkey in 1915, and stated that they share "the pain" of their "Armenian brothers and 
sisters, and apologize to them."122  As the very act of apology itself was hotly debated in 
Turkey, the historical debates once again followed the polemic that the apology triggered.   
 Throughout these debates, among the crucial questions was which groups were 
responsible for the deportation and the ethnic composition of the military units that dealt 
with the deportation.  Along with the Kurds, Circassians has been named among the ethnic 
groups that dealt with the deportation of Armenians.  Yet, the association of Circassians in 
Turkey with Armenian deportation is older than these debates which are triggered with the 
apology of the intellectuals in Turkey.  Within the last ten years, Circassians have been 
increasingly named as one of the leading groups in 1915 events in studies on Armenian 
deportation or genocide.  Arsen Avagyan, in his book on Circassians published in 2004, 
focuses on Armenian deportation as the key to understand the relationships between the 
state and Circassians in Turkey.  In his study which is mostly based on Russian archives, 
Avagyan calls Circassians as used efficiently by the Committee of Union and Progress to 
fulfill the policy of Armenian and Rum deportation.123  Taner Akçam underlines the 
importance of the migrants who migrated to the Ottoman lands from the Christian 
oppression in terms of increasing the hatred among the people and organizing massacres 
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against Christian population.124  Canefe further explains the geographical origins of these 
migrants as Balkans and the Caucasus, and states that the memories of these communities 
and their resettlement in Anatolia as their last resort for survival and as their homeland to 
be claimed through defending it against invasion by others might explain the nationalist 
resort to a final solution in the last years of the Ottoman Empire.125  Zürcher uses a 
different terminology and states that “genocide was a product of the reactive Muslim 
nationalism that motivated the Young Turks” and that the persecution of the Armenians can 
be understood only in the context of the traumas suffered by those fugitives from Russia 
and the Balkans.126  Another study mentions the role of ‘93 immigrants in terms of raising 
the anger towards the non-Muslim minorities in Anatolia and states that they aimed to take 
part in the economic activities that non-Muslim minorities were engaged.127  Berktay, in his 
column on a daily newspaper, reiterates the argument by stating that special tools of 
violence had been created by the Ottoman State since the Tanzimat Era and this process 
had gained new dimensions in 19th century when the Caucasian tribes that had been exiled 
by Russian expansionism and, therefore, had vengeance for everything that was 
Russian/Armenian had been used in the genocide of 1915.128  Baskın Oran, in an interview 
done by Haçik Muratyan and published in both Armenian and Turkish newspapers, states 
that the events of 1915 did not start at 1915 but had its origins in 1850s when the Muslim 
Circassians were exiled to Anatolia and chose “the easiest way to get food” which was to 
plunder the people who possessed things but who were not protected by the Ottoman 
state.129     
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 Starting from these arguments on Circassians and genocide /deportation/ violence/ 
massacre, this part of the chapter aims to explore how Circassians in Turkey remember 
Armenians in their daily lives, and how they evaluate the events of 1915 and the claimed 
participation of the Circassians in those events.  As the “historical truth” regarding the 
events of 1915 and the participation of Circassians in 1915 as vehicles of state violence is 
beyond this study, I argue that any understanding of the events of 1915 and the Armenian 
question would be missing without the memories of the peoples of Anatolia.  Furthermore, 
archival research on which most historians base their account is insufficient in terms of 
reaching the very memories of ethnic groups.  In archival research, the social scientist hears 
the voice of the states, their accounts and their correspondence.  What matters in studies 
based on archival research is the numbers, strategies, oppressors versus oppressed, or the 
vehicles of violence used by the state.  What this part of the chapter aims to ask is how the 
grandchildren of the Circassians who are claimed to be the agents of the events of 1915 
evaluate these arguments, how they remember Armenians, what they heard about 
Armenians and what they were told.  Regardless of the historical validity and political 
correctness of these claims of agency in deportation, any account on Armenian question 
that emphasizes the participation of Circassians should be complemented by Circassian 
accounts, memories and stories.   
 In the beginning of the field research, I expected that the questions regarding the 
argument of Circassian participation into the events of 1915 might get the highest reaction 
from the interviewees.  Yet, as I did the interviews, it seemed that Circassian activists were 
not in a sense of denial or anger in terms of these claims.  Kaya, aged 49, a businessman 
and an activist in several Circassian organizations highlights the embeddedness of 
Armenian question with Turkish nationalism to explain the link between Armenian 
question and Circassians: “It is more about claiming the reflexes of Turkish nationalism.  In 
the Turanist ideology, Armenians are something, it is based on the perception that they are 
an obstacle to overcome.”130  Đzzet, aged 62, an independent researcher shared his 
experiences in the field regarding the events of 1915:  
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   “Since we are in a position of serving, getting the commands wherever we go, 
since we are not in our homeland, it is being delegated to us.  …But I have 
voice recordings with people who personally lived those events of Armenian 
events and who practiced those orders in the hierarchy; I cannot declare or write 
these.  …there are directly our people but not as Circassian people or Circassian 
state or Circassian nation but as the Ottoman soldier.  He was the soldier, he 
was the commander, he was given the command.  What would he do?  There is 
the task of cleaning the dirty staff you know, they are usually assigned to those 
tasks.  [Pis işleri temizleme olayı var ya, oralara genellikle seçilmişler.]  …I 
have some analysis and recordings on why Kanlıdere131 in Sivas is bloody river 
and Karakuyu132 is Karakuyu.”133 
 
 As most of the interviewees plainly stated that they do not know and hear anything 
regarding the participation of Circassians, almost every interviewee mentioned that there 
were other sides of the story even if there was participation by Circassians.  Hakan, aged 
46, a language instructor and an independent author exemplifies one of these other sides:  
 
   “For instance, kaymakam of Pınarbaşı.  Well, he was from the X’s [a 
Circassian family name] and he saved a bunch of Armenians by sending them 
to Circassian villages.  There was a clause like that: the artisans, the ironman 
could stay by being resettled in Turkish villages.  Based on that, he sent them to 
Circassian villages though they were not artisans.  He hid some of them in the 
caves.  Well, it is not just Circassians, there are lots of people doing that in 
those personal stories.”134   
 
 As the most commonly reference was to the Armenian children saved by the 
Circassians, it was mostly people over 60 years old who met these Armenians and who 
know them by person.  The young people just heard about them from their families.  Meral, 
aged 51, a businesswoman and one of the woman activists is an exception from such a 
point: “I even know that there are Armenian families and children taken and protected by 
Circassian families.  For instance, I have a relative in Uzunyayla that is originally an 
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Armenian but taken by a Circassian family.  Well, today s/he is my relative, I call her/him 
my relative.”135   
 Yet it was those people who were activists in late 60s or early 70s that personally 
met those people who were originally Armenian but also close friends/relatives for 
Circassians.  Gürtuğ, aged 62 tells the story of two such encounters:   
 
   “Circassian people never did those things, as people.  Because in those 
events, there had been many Armenian and Rum children who were saved by 
and trusted to Circassians.  Some of them had lived like Circassians.  Open the 
telephone directories in Istanbul; you will see many Armenians whose 
surnames are Çerkesoğlu, Çerkesyan.  Once one of our brothers told us 
something, it was almost 35 years ago.  One evening he said, in one of the 
neighborhoods of Istanbul, there is the voice of the accordion.  He said “Well, 
there should not be any one here that we do not know.  If there is a meeting, we 
would know it.”  They were the young Circassian people of the time and there 
was a Circassian meeting [düğün] somewhere.  “Well,”, he said, “we just got to 
the second floor, and we saw the accordion, there are Circassians dancing, they 
are talking in Circassian.”  He said “My goodness! We know none of them.” 
Then he said when they were asked, they told that they were Armenians.  They 
told that they were Armenians who once took refuge in Circassians in 
Uzunyayla, that they had the Circassian culture, language.  They told that when 
they were bringing a bride, they did it in Christian way and afterwards had 
Circassian marriage.  There are things like that.  …One day Istanbul Caucasian 
Culture Association was unable to pay its rent.  Again a brother told that.  He 
said that the president [of the association] told him to go to an address in Grand 
Bazaar [Kapalıçarşı], a shop and tell them that we needed that much amount of 
money and that “you come from us.”  He went there, an old gentleman meets 
him, he told him and when he said he was coming from the Caucasian Culture 
Association, the old man said “welcome and come in”.  The old man asked, and 
he gave the message.  The old man, he says, said “Certainly, my son.” [Hayhay, 
evladım.] and immediately opened the safe and said “tell them my greetings, 
and whenever they need it, you are welcome”.  [“Evladım selamımı söyle, ne 
zaman ihtiyaçları olursa buyurun.”]  He said that he went back and said “there 
are Circassians like that!” [“Ne Çerkesler de varmış.”], the president laughed 
and said that he was not a Circassian, he was an Armenian.”136   
  
 Hence Circassian memories of Armenians do not only include the terms of 
deportation, massacre, genocide etc., and their memories do not contain numbers of 
                                                  
135
 Meral, interview by author, 7 June 2007, Đstanbul. 
 
136
 Gürtuğ, interview by author, 3 February 2008, Ankara 
 
241 
  
deported or massacred people but very personal stories which are engaged in each other, 
which continued for almost a century.  In these stories, Armenians are relatives, friends; 
they are people with names and stories.  Cezmi, aged 65, tells Zeynep’s story which is 
embedded in his family’s story and which extends to the Republican era:   
 
   “In 1910s, on a day of fall, a Circassian group with 8-10 carriages moved 
from the village of Gemerek137 to an Armenian village called Burhan.  …Close 
to the village, my grandfather …heard the sound of guns and told the carriages 
to stop.  Then an Ottoman gendermarie battalion came and advised the group to 
leave, they told that this village should be sent to Lebanon or Syria but that the 
Armenian gangs that took refuge in this village opened fire.  The Circassian 
carriers who were going back to Uzunyayla shouted my grandfather, they told 
them they heard a baby cry among the bushes.  My grandfather who got off 
from his horse and looked at the bushes saw a baby who was almost 6 months 
old; her mother left her while she was being sent to death.  …When they got 
home, they gave the baby to my father’s nursing mother, one of the 
wunewuts,138 slaves.  They called her Zeynep.  Zeynep became the sister of my 
father.  ….They were raising Zeynep as their own daughter, both the family and 
the village was trying a lot to avoid Zeynep from learning about her origins.  
One day my uncle’s wife …requested water from Zeynep, they waited a long 
time for Zeynep who went out to take water. …They looked everywhere in the 
village but she never came back.  My old grandfather who lost his daughter got 
sick because of desolation, my father who lost his sister was a child back then, 
and our house was burdened with a deep mourning.  …After this, almost half a 
century passed.  One day gendermarie brought our home an envelope with a 
heading of General Secretariat of the President.  ….Inside the envelope, there 
was a letter to my father from our aunt Zeynep.  …It was the years of Democrat 
Party government, 1950s.  …the president of the time Celal Bayar in his trip to 
America where he was invited by Eisenhower was in a visit to a motor factory 
and there was a young person among the guests with a very sad face …he told 
them that his mother came to America from Turkey while she was a kid and 
since then she was crying and looking for a Circassian family who raised her.  
He told that her mother wrote that letter when their visit to factory was heard.  
…the president who got very influenced by the event ordered his secretariat to 
deal with the issue.  ….My father who opened the letter cried that Zeynep was 
still alive.  Our aunt Zeynep came to Turkey afterwards, I saw her too.  Our 
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aunt was taken to America like that: her uncle, brother and husband of her aunt 
who got alive from the conflict in Gemerek came to Turkey as American 
citizen.  Starting from Gemerek, they followed the trails of their daughter.  
After they found about her location…  When they found her alone, they made 
her pass out with ether.  …Zeynep cried for days, they told her that she was 
Armenian and their daughter.  …They went to Beirut from Hatay and then 
arrived to America.  After a couple of years, she became the bride of a rich 
Armenian family that owned the motor factory.”139   
 
 Furthermore, Circassian memories of Armenians point to dates later than 1915.  In 
these relationships as deportation/massacre/violence is the theme, there are other themes 
such as cooperation, trust and friendship.  Cezmi tells the end of such a relationship:  
  
   “They were his children in Şarkışla, they had a big store, they had a draper 
store.  When the events of 1956-57 in which the minorities were ravaged took 
place, they got so afraid.  I never forget, it was a summer day, a truck came 
from the road of Şarkışla to the village.  My mother asked them “Welcome, 
Ohannes Usta,140 are you selling something?”  They sometimes used to come to 
the village and sell fabric.  “No,” he said, “this time our visit is painful.  We 
decided; we are leaving our homeland.”  …Then my father came, he asked 
what happened, they told that when those events happened in Istanbul, Ankara; 
in the bazaar that drapers were located, people were hitting them with shoulders 
and telling them things, that they had no chance of survival.  “So what are you 
going to do?”, “Well, we came here for that”  …he told “I know that your 
house is big, your barn and warehouse is big, all of these are naphtalined, they 
are balls that will not be spoiled.  …Let them stay here.  Starting from today 
count ten years.  Within ten years, if one of us will return back, we believe that 
you will give us these without even a missing meter.”  They trusted so much, 
they did not give to any Turkish family.  …Well, we do know Armenians more 
than Avagyan.”141   
  
 None of them returned.  Ten or eleven years later, when Cezmi’s family started 
spending less of their time in the village, her mother got concerned that those textile balls in 
their yarn would get spoiled.  She refused to use the textile and with the help and advice of 
müftü [the state official for religious affairs in the districts], Cezmi convinced her that these 
textiles could be used.  They, finally, gave them to a girls’ orphanage in Talas, Kayseri and 
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the textiles were transformed into dresses by a woman group to be worn by the girls on a 
national commemoration.   
 Based on these memories with Armenian friends, foster children, relatives, and 
neighbors; Circassians claim that the accounts of Armenian genocide/deportation/massacre 
that call Circassians participants ignore their memories, their voice and their experiences.  
After telling his simultaneous encounters with Armenians, Cezmi reacts to one of these 
accounts:  
 
   “I wonder if Arsen Avagyan knows about the existence of hundred of 
Armenian kids with life histories similar to Zeynep who lived in Central 
Anatolia and who were protected by the Circassians.  Or while analyzing 
Armenian and Circassian relationships, did he need to look at the relationships 
of friendship and neighborhood between the Circassian people and Armenian 
people which are beyond the soldiers and administrators that took orders from 
the Ottoman Empire?  Of course, what they call as agents of genocide was 3-5 
soldiers who were given orders; this is easy to explain.  Well, he is saying that 
by way of using the documents of official ideology which do not need to be 
explored.  Through scapegoating an ethnic group which is unable to voice 
itself, which he considers defenseless, [this is] having a thesis in the easiest way 
and getting on the agenda with a popular issue.”142 
 
 However, the concerns of Circassians vis-à-vis the claims of agency in the 
Armenian question are beyond the arguments of Arsen Avagyan.  Their concerns over how 
knowledge is being and going to be produced in the near future regard the way Turkish 
state is going to deal with the Armenian question.  Metin, a lawyer, aged 62 voices these 
concerns over the very selective and political nature of the production of knowledge:  
 
   “I am afraid of this: there will be a time when Turkey will no longer be able 
to deny it, there will be proving documents everywhere.  As a result, Turkey 
will have to accept it.  I am afraid that, then, they will say that this is done not 
by Turkey but by Circassians and Kurds.  I am afraid that they will make us pay 
the bill.  I am concerned that this is going to be both the state’s official policy 
and unfortunately, intellectuals will lead this.”143   
 
 In terms of the debates on Armenian questions, the very politically correct search 
for a public sphere to share and voice pain ironically represses the very voice of the people 
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who claim that they remember, share and hear about these events.  From such a perspective, 
their relationship with Armenians is not just massacre, genocide, violence, deportation or 
economic confiscations but also friendships, cooperation, trust, neighborhood and solidarity 
which all worked as mechanisms of resistance vis-à-vis state violence.  Without exploring 
these relationships, what remains is the absolute categories of oppressor and oppressed in 
the bloody lands of massacre and genocide.  Such an approach creates monolythical blocks 
of victims and victimizers as the people and groups of Anatolia have several stories to tell 
about its multiethnic, multireligious and multilingual history. 
 
 
 
5.6. Changing the Boundaries of Knowledge: Talking about the Silence and the Break 
 
 
Since 1990s, Circassian activists have reclaimed and reconstructed the diasporic 
past through the notions of the silence and the break.  Circassian activists reinvent the past 
and hence transform Circassian identity through “unveiling the silence and the break”.  
 Circassian activists, since 1990s, narrate on the memoirs of a break which is the 
elimination of the Circassians from the public sphere with the transformation from the 
Empire to nation-state.  The argument that has been frequently used since 1990s is that this 
transformation from a multi-cultural and multilingual empire to a nation-state that is based 
on one language, one ethnic group and one religion had been destructive for the Circassians 
in the newly-formed Turkish republic.  As the newly established republic lost its urban 
bourgeoisie with population exchanges, migrations and wars; Circassians also lost its own 
urban bourgeoisie and intellectuals.   
 Most Circassian I interviewed highlight that throughout 1960s, 1970s they were 
unaware of Circassian organizations, newspapers and their activities of the last decades of 
the Ottoman Empire.  Circassian Union and Mutual Aid Association (established after 1908 
and closed in 1923 by the republican regime) the first Circassian school in Istanbul, 
Circassian women’s Mutual aid society, newspapers Guaze, Đkdam and Diyane were all 
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beyond the knowledge of the second generation of Circassian activists that emerged after 
1960s: 
 
   “We were not aware of these organizations, newspapers.  Today we start to 
learn and think about them.  But back in those days we had no idea.  Now I 
realize that I used to know the people who were in those organizations.  But 
they were not talking.  And we never asked.  I wish we would have asked.”144 
 
   “Unfortunately this is a reality.  Of course, I heard about it. But we absolutely 
had no information on those organizations.  The people active in those 
organizations and wrote in those newspapers mentioned a little.  But they kept 
it for themselves like a privilege.  I don’t know whether or not they had an 
intention like that.  I don’t want to blame them but this is the practical 
conclusion.  They could not present that to us, they did not.  I met the Guaze 
newspaper in 1978.  This is so late.  I should have learned about that at least in 
1968.”145 
 
The unwillingness of the first generation to speak, to inform, to share their experiences and 
stories with the next generation is quite critical here and this silence about the past is 
narrated by the Circassian diaspora nationalists as mostly related to newly established 
Turkish Republic which prioritized Turkish identity, Turkish language and Sunni Islam.   
 Hence, Circassian associations which were opened in 1950s and Circassian activists 
of the time started anew without any idea of the previous organizations.  It was as if they 
were the first group of Circassian activists and it was as if before them there was no activity 
as far as Circassians were concerned.  The lack of knowledge of a Circassian school, 
organizations and newspapers deprived the Circassian activists of a history of activism and 
organizations.  
 Without the acknowledgement that they were the continuation of a group of 
Circassian organizations, intellectuals and activists; Circassian activists narrated, thought 
and organized as if they were “the first”.  Furthermore, –this time- coming from the rural 
areas of Turkey they lacked information on the experiences of the Circassian urban 
bourgeoisie which was part of the Ottoman administrative elite.  Hence Circassian activism 
from 1950s till 1990s lacked information on the first generation of Circassian nationalists.  
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The second generation of 1960s started anew only with a history of immigration and an 
idea of a distant homeland.  The first generation, the Circassian urban bourgeoisie and 
intellectuals were unwilling to speak up and willing to be assimilated.  This break between 
the two generations which is due to the transformation from empire to a nation-state shaped 
Circassian society.   
 Since the 1990s, ashes of the first generation Circassian activism during the 
Ottoman era are being found.  Explorations into the past are quite shocking for the 
Circassian activists.  Research on these organizations, publications, the translations of the 
newspapers and documents produced at the time are now being done.  For instance. Guaze, 
the first Circassian newspaper published in 1911 in Ottoman and Adyghe, is now –in year 
2008- being translated into Turkish.  Family albums are now being explored to follow the 
tracks of these first generation activists.  Contemporary activists today find their origins not 
in the 1970s but in the early twentieth century, not in a nation-state but in a multilingual, 
multiethnic and multireligious empire.  Narrating on the break means to reconstruct a new 
past not only shaped by the policies of the nation-state but also first generation of 
Circassian activists who displayed agency as Circassians and Ottoman patriots, 
simultaneously.   
 Quite related to “the break” the people I interviewed mentioned about the silence 
when I asked them what they heard from their relatives, elders, on particular instances such 
as exile, Cerkes ethem Affair, Citizen speak Turkish campaigns.  Mostly the answer is 
“they would not talk,”  “they would just stare, look far away and they would not talk”.  As 
silence in itself may tell a lot, the pain, the trauma, the displacement, the fears of being the 
migrant again, “the shame of being the migrant, the guest;” narratives of Circassian 
activists on silence are also significant in terms of post-1990s.  The very act of 
remembering, voicing and unveiling the silence and the break is empowering as far as 
Circassians are concerned.   
 In 1975, in a magazine published for by Circassians, a poem by Karden D. calls for 
a diasporic voice. 
 
   “This is the return of the Circassian  
To Circassianhood 
This is the growth of the crops… 
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The eyes are sharper 
And this time the vision is very clear. 
This space should be ours, 
This game should be from us.  
And our voice should be as loud as it can be. 
This time we should talk.   
This is the time. 
We should write,  
Shout 
 Tell.”146 
 
 
This demand for a diasporic voice to break the silence is going to be public in the 1990s 
when the Caucasian (Kafkas) Associations and some Circassian activists considered the 
year of 1864 the “Great Circassian Exile” (Büyük Çerkes Sürgünü) which has been 
symbolically commemorated every year, on May 21. During the last decade, statements on 
Circassian exile have become public notices in some newspapers. One of these statements 
declared:    
 
   “Up until this day, we have survived, fought and died for others.  Up until this 
day, we have become the heroes for others’ ideologies, religions, aims and 
interests.  Up until today, we have sung the songs of others’, played their 
games.  Up until today, we have had others’ dreams.  From now on, we are 
asking ourselves: will that continue?.. Will we be indifferent to our removal 
from history?  Will we be quiet while all of our tribes are disappearing like the 
Ubıkhs? 
Black Sea was a sea of death and exile for us.  We want to reconcile with Black 
Sea.  We want to reconcile with our history and geography.  We want to 
reconcile with ourselves, our culture and we want to exist.  We want our songs 
and our dreams.”147   
 
Reconciling with history means reconstructing the past.  The reconstruction of a past which 
tells a lot about the silence and the break transforms Circassians in Turkey from being a 
group with no actual historical and geographical links to the homeland, other diasporic 
                                                  
146
 Karden D., Yamçı 2 (December 1975), 45.   
 
147
 From the declaration of Democratic Circassian Platform (DCP), on May 20, 2001that was published on 
some of the national newspapers with the donations of several Circassians.  The next declaration in 2002 was 
titled “We Want Our Dreams and Our Songs Back.”  For the declaration in May 2002, see the DCP website 
<http://demokratikcerkesplatformu.org/surgun.htm> (20 May 2009). 
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communities and the host country to an historical entity who has relationships with the 
homeland, transnational networks and host community.  These multiple diasporic 
connections have been intensified with the processes of the globalization: the diaspora is 
now linked to the homeland and other diasporic communities politically, economically, 
culturally through tourist tours, conferences, social and political organizations, cyber space 
etc. However, the processes of globalization also change the boundaries of knowledge on 
Circassian society, history and identity.  Reconstruction of the past, narrating on the break 
and the silence are the mechanisms of breaking the break and the silence.  Voicing the 
break and the silence becomes a diasporic strategy not only to overcome these historical 
conditions but also redefine Circassian identity and diasporic experience as agents.  Since 
the 1990s, Circassians in Turkey becomes a diasporic group with a history and a voice to 
talk about it.  From such a perspective, Circassians in Turkey is an instance to explore how 
boundaries of knowledge pertaining to identity, inclusion, exclusion, ethnicity, past and 
present are challenged, deconstructed, reclaimed and reconstructed within the processes of 
diasporization and globalization.   
 
 
 
5.7. New Visions of a Diasporic Future 
 
 
 
 The final part of this chapter aims to explore how Circassian activists in Turkey 
envisage the future as a diasporic community.  Apart from the various personal projects of 
collecting antiques, writing books and dictionaries, producing documentaries, opening 
exhibits, publishing journals and newspapers, translating multiple books, and working in 
the organizations; Circassian activists have also some reflections on future.   
 Among these reflections are the changes in the meaning of the name “Circassian.”   
In the future, Circassian identity may be further transformed into new identifications in line 
with new political developments in the homeland.  For Hasan, such a process of the 
249 
  
formation of new identities beyond “Circassian” has started even before the 1990s; yet, it 
has accelerated with the political events in the Caucasus: 
 
   “It particularly accelerated after 1990 but it started before.  Daghistanis, 
Chechnians, Abkhazians started establishing organizations of their own.  So 
when we came to the mid 1990s; there was Daghistani association, Chechnian 
association, Ossetian association, Abkhazian association.  There was no 
association titled as Adyghe.  In 1990, when the associations were united [in a 
federation], some of our friends proposed to use Circassian as a name.  
Circassian is a more political name, it is not neutral.  …The decision was made 
as Caucasian.”148 
 
What Hasan highlights is the emergence and consolidation of micro identities -such as 
Chechnian, Ossettian, Abkhazian which can be explained in terms of the developments in 
the homeland, such as the Abkhazian War, Chechnian War, and the conflict in Ossetia.  
Each of these wars and conflicts has been experienced as a result of different problems and 
relations.  Hence these developments in the homeland have led to the differentiation of 
respective groups in diaspora who have different problems in the homeland.  Therefore, 
starting from the mid 1990s, Circassians in Turkey have been discussing which groups can 
and should be considered Circassian.  This process of consolidation of new national 
identities and their divergence from the name Circassian is also experienced in terms of 
organizations: each of these groups today have their own associations bearing their own 
ethnic names.  For Şener, these developments in the homeland have different implications 
for each diasporic group: 
 
   “In the current situation that we have reached, each group should live its own 
processes.  Well, this should be set: Adyghes and Abkhaz are two different 
peoples.  Chechnians, Ossetians, Daghistanis, Karachays are different.  They 
are all common in destiny; exile made all these [groups] common in destiny.  
…They all have diasporas.  …The assimilation of 5000-10000 Chechnians or 
Ossetians do not influence the destiny of Chechnia or Ossetia.  But assimilation 
of Adighes and Abkhazs in diaspora will result in the disappearance of Adyghe 
and Abkhaz culture from world history.  The situation is that much 
dramatic.”149 
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 As the meanings of the name Circassian is still an ongoing debate, Circassian 
diaspora nationalists in Turkey also state that after the 1990s, the responsibilities of the 
Circassians in Turkey as a community have increased.  Meral highlights that there has 
emerged new missions for the diaspora and diaspora should aim to go beyond the 
protection of culture:  
 
   “After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the raison d’être and claims of 
Circassians living in Turkey have been transformed.  Before it was coming 
together, having organizations, celebrating the culture and making it survive.  
After that, the low caliber [düşük kalibreli] claim of protecting and developing 
the society and culture, protecting the culture, dances etc. is suddenly 
transformed into a claim of existence in history.  Because we saw that 
Circassians in the Caucasus were on a fragile ground.  It was understood that 
they were on very fragile ground with their population density, economic 
situation and their power in the Republics which bear their names.”150 
 
As the necessity of the Circassians in Turkey acting as a diaspora is highlighted as a vision 
for future, the traditional elements of Circassian identity are also being redefined.  For 
example, as the activists beyond the age of mid 60s constantly highlight the significance of 
the protection of the language as a national asset, today some Circassian activists in their 
middle ages narrate on alternative national identifications that go beyond language.  The 
reasons of such a turn is pragmatic, today most young Circassians living in urban centers 
are not speakers of Circassian at all and currently, there are no attempts by the state nor the 
Circassians to open new educational institutions within which Circassian can be taught in a 
systematic way in early ages of childhood.  Hence activists highlight the necessity of other 
definitions of Circassian identity that go beyond language as Şener, Kaya, and Hakan, 
respectively state: 
 
   “We have to prepare ourselves to those days within which we can be 
Circassians without Circassian language.  And we have to refrain from reducing 
Circassian identity solely to language.  Because language is a very fragile 
notion.  We have to be Circassians while speaking Russian.”151 
 
                                                  
150
 Meral, interview by author, 7 June 2007, Đstanbul. 
 
151
 Şener, interview by author, 18 June 2008, Đstanbul. 
 
251 
  
   “Language is a good thing if the life of your language is sustained.  But if it is 
not, it is not the end of everything.  Today there is still an Irish culture but it is 
not a culture that lives in its language.  Many examples can be given.  …There 
is also a reality that we have to accept.  Globalization is a process that will 
accelerate the disappearance of languages in the coming days.  It seems that we 
will accept it.  Rather than laments, [vah vah değil de] we will accept it a 
little.”152    
 
   “We have to have some works on that.  But on the other hand, language 
should not be considered as the first determinant of being a Circassian anymore.  
Because identity and national belonging are not always defined through 
language.  Though nationalist ideology proposes that…  Especially in Turkey, 
speaking Turkish is one of the basic parts of being a Turk.  …But there are very 
different examples in the world.  …The fact that all of us speak Turkish does 
not necessitate that we are Turks.  …We may speak Turkish, our mother tongue 
may be Turkish, we may not know or we may know our language to some 
extent and we can still say that we are Circassians.”153   
 
Therefore Circassian activists envisage a future within which these new formulations of 
Circassian identity will be explored.  Through these new formulations they aim to 
overcome the –Russian and Turkish- nation-states’ policies.  
 As the activists search for new identifications that are less based on traditional 
notions and categories for the future, they also envisage new forms of relating to Caucaus 
in the future.  These new relations which they hope to build in the near future are 
alternative means of relating to the homeland as a diasporic community.  The idea of return 
which was hotly debated in the mid 1960s and 1970s is now being replaced by multiple 
means, forms and routes of connecting to the homeland.  Almost all of the Circassian 
activists regard the Caucasus as a part of their personal visions of future.  Yet most of them 
imagine a “six months here, six months there” future in addition to commercial relations, 
touristic trips, researches on the Caucasus, educational activities etc.  Şener, Köksal, 
Hakan, Hicran and Özer respectively explore the role of the Caucasus in their future plans: 
 
   “We already have organic ties.  I am already connected with commercial 
reasons even if nothing else happens.  But what is important for me is buying a 
house there, spending some seasons or some months of the years there.”154 
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   “Going to the Caucasus, owning a house there.  Even if  I do not spend all my 
life there, spending 5 or 6 months there and 5 or 6 months in Turkey.  I think 
about living as a person who has a house both here and there.  But I do not 
know when I will have that chance.”155 
 
   “I do not think that in that sense.  I do not think that as leaving everything 
here and starting a new life there.  But I will absolutely have a relationship with 
that place.  Based on future conditions, I would like to have a house there, I 
would like to go in particular periods.  Even if that does not happen, my child 
may go to a summer camp there, s/he may somehow come and go.  I think 
about such a relationship for myself.  But still there should be a project of 
return in the community level.”156   
 
   “I think about it in the long run.  I do not necessarily plan to spend the whole 
year there.  Maybe I will live six months.  It is a phase of transition.  Because 
all my family is living here.  I cannot tell them that I am going and they, too, 
can come; they would not come anyway.  …You do not have to disconnect, 
why should you disconnect?  …Wherever I am, it will be a part of my life, it 
will either be part of my research or I will frequently go there.  I feel restless in 
those years within which I do not go to Abkhazia.”157  
 
   “A lot of projects such as my son’s opening of a rock café in Nalchik or 
Maikop who may be a rocker in the future, producing in Circassian language, or 
having a mountain house comes to my mind sometimes.  But I also care about 
living multilocational.  …I would like my child or children to learn Circassian 
if I can manage it.  I may think about bringing a nanny.  …I do not know 
whether it will be my primary place of living.  …But I would very much like 
that: it can also be on the individual level, it can be as a family; we will go more 
frequently as a family, that is for sure; but I would like to go there more 
frequently though not completely.”158   
 
 As most of the activists plan a future that is embedded in the Caucasus in ways that 
are not based on return per se, old ideas of return also find an exceptional place in some 
narratives.  Yet even in these narratives of future plans of return, Circassian activists 
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imagine a life that is very related to Turkey and Turkish politics as Neval’s future plans on 
returning to the Caucasus highlight: 
 
 “What I would like to realize is returning to the homeland and creating the 
conditions for that.  That task will not remain as undone.  For that matter, there 
is something that I have been waiting for.  …There are a couple of years for 
that.  …After that, my work will not still be completed.  Even if it will be from 
there, I would like to contribute to the democratic struggle for Circassians who 
will remain behind.  …During the times that I live here, efforts for the 
democratization of Turkey should be made.  Because this will benefit us.  
Because of that I have criticized our associations and those people in the 
associations for years.  We lived very enclosed, we should have been more 
open.  We should have told more about ourselves.  It would not be called 
leftism, it would not be called communism.  Done carefully and consciously, it 
would not be dividing the Republic of Turkey.  But we should have explained 
that we should have had some rights and that we had been disappearing.  Civil 
society organizations were the ideal place for that.”159   
 
 Therefore to the extent that the Caucasus is part of the future that they imagine, 
politics of Turkey and particularly democratization in Turkey are significant in terms of 
their visions of future.  As a diasporic community, they regard themselves as located in two 
geographies and two countries more when compared to the 1970s and before.  Hence -
literally- all of the activists demand dual citizenship to fully situate themselves as a 
diasporic community.  Their ideas on future are focused on dual citizenship, dual identities, 
multiple concerns and multiple locations.   
 
 
 
5.8. Conclusion 
 
 
 
 This chapter aims to explore the transformation of Circassian diaspora nationalism 
in Turkey during the last two decades.  Starting from 1990s, the end of Soviet Union and 
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Cold War, globalization processes, liberalization in Turkey, Turkey’s relationships with  
European Union and the rise of various nationalisms in Turkey have all contributed to the 
transformation of Circassian activists and Circassians in Turkey.  Parallel to these 
developments, it has been argued that the minority strategy that took place in the 1990s as a 
reaction against the rise of Turkish and other nationalisms is now being substituted by a 
diasporic identity, which has become the principal strategizing tool of Circassians in 
Turkey.160  
 I argue that rather than an emergence of a diasporic identity anew, Circassian 
diaspora activists have gained strength in terms of their claims vis-à-vis the nation-states.  
During the last two decades, Circassian diaspora in Turkey have been more visible and 
active not only on the organizational level but also in terms of their relationships with the 
homeland, host state, and other ethnic groups.  Hence 1990s have acted as one of the 
formations of Circassian diaspora nationalism in Turkey.  However, the processes of 
diasporization of 1990s have also brought new problems and tensions.  When compared to 
the steady, timid, limited and predictable years of Cold War; Circassian diaspora activists 
have been dealing with diasporic chaos in terms of their group dynamics and their 
relationships with the homeland, host state, and other groups for the last two decades.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
DIASPORA NATIONALISM AND GENDER 
 
 In September 2006, Mustafa Aksu, in his book called “Being a Gypsy in Turkey” 
gave a list of artists and politicians who were originally Roma and stated that being a Roma 
in Turkey means hiding the ethnic identity.1  Among the list that was quickly appropriated 
by the media was Türkan Şoray, who is considered the Sultana of the Turkish cinema since 
1960s and who is claimed to be a typical Turkish woman with certain qualities.2  As the 
artists who were mentioned in the list reacted to the list immediately; in some Turkish 
nationalist internet groups, the claim about Türkan Şoray was rejected on the basis that she 
was definitely a Turk.  A month later, in an interview, Şoray rejected the claim that she was 
a Roma and declared that she was a Circassian and that her beauty made her Circassian 
origins obvious.   In the interview, she was asked whether she had ever played the role of a 
Circassian girl as she had played the role of a gypsy girl several times.  Şoray replied that 
she had never played the role of a Circassian girl.3  Meanwhile as the Sultana was trying to 
                                                  
1
 See “Çingeneler Kitap Sayfalarına Girdi,” Sabah, 14 September 2006,  
<http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2006/09/14/gny/gny119-20060914-200.html>  (17 April 2009). 
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Modern Turkey, eds. D. Kandiyoti and A. Saktanber (London, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2002), 147-170, 158. 
Similarly, Atilla Dorsay, the famous cinema critique in Turkey who analyzed the legend of the Sultana in his 
book called The Prisoner Woman of the Hyacinth Street [Sümbül Sokağın Tutsak Kadını] stated that Türkan 
Şoray is “very much Turkish just like Catherine Deneuve is very much French and Sophia Loren is very much 
Italian.”  Dorsay also states that his own celebration of Sultana as the pure and chaste star with her own rules 
in cinema indicates that “he, too, is a typical Turkish man.”  See “Türk Erkeği Gibi Bakmışım,” Milliyet, 26 
November 1997, <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/11/26/entel/entel.html> (15 April 2009).   
 
3
 In reality, Şoray could have never played the role of a Circassian girl because unlike the gypsy girl 
character, Circassian girl is not part of the Turkish movies.  The invisibility of the Circassian girl in Turkish 
movies which is different from the gypsy girl is ironic given the different meanings attached to the two 
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get rid of her place in the list of gypsy artists and politicians without hurting Roma in 
Turkey, Circassians on the internet were celebrating Sultana’s announcement of her ethnic 
identity:  the Sultana of the Turkish cinema who was celebrated as the ideal Turkish woman 
was a Circassian who was now searching for her ethnic past and family history;4 the 
interview with Sultana was published with the title “An Interview with a Circassian 
Woman: Türkan Şoray” on some Circassian websites.5  The list and Sultana’s declaration 
of her ethnic origins afterwards also triggered some ongoing debates on the internet about 
Circassians and their claimed Turkish origins: some claimed that Circassians were not a 
nation per se and they were originally Turks while some others claimed that Sultana’s 
declaration was just another instance of minorities’ racism vis-à-vis “we, the Turks.”6 
I argue that the debates on the ethnic origins of Sultana are instances of the 
gendered relationships between the Circassian diaspora and host community.  It is an 
instance of how two nationalisms –the dominant one and the diasporic nationalism- 
struggle through gender.  Diaspora nationalism is shaped not only by challenging the 
nation-state but also by a more subtle web of relations with the host community, homeland 
and other nationalisms, especially the hegemonic nationalism in the host society.  This 
                                                                                                                                                        
identities as exemplified with Şoray’s statement.  In terms of invisibility, there is an exception.  In 1974, when 
Turkish cinema was dominated by pornographic movies, a movie called Babayiğit  [The Virile] was shot by 
Behçet Nacar. As the original subject of the movie is “the story of a tough guy and looters who are searching 
for a treasure” (see  
<http://kvmgm.kultur.gov.tr/BelgeGoster.aspx?F6E10F8892433CFF404F9755767D76FF56515916B329A1F
> (10 April 2009)), it seems that in the porn movie a girl or some girls were explicitly stated as Circassian.  
As one of the interviewees told me in his life story, the movie created a great fuss in Düzce.  He stated that 
Circassians in Düzce were gathered in a school yard and they were ready to protest.  They later on gave up the 
protest as the mayor and the governor intervened to resolve the issue.  Circassians were told that “Behçet 
Nacar is not a person like that.” and the film was not displayed again.  Similarly another Circassian from 
Düzce, in his presentation in a youth meeting organized by the Caucasus Federation in 2001 criticized the 
Caucasian organizations in Turkey and mentioned the same event as “the disgrace of the movie Babayiğit in 
history” [tarihte Babayiğit film rezaleti] See H. Jan, “Derneklerimizde ve Diğer Kurumlarımızda Örgütlenme 
Đhtiyacı,” <http://www.kafkasfederasyonu.org/genckaffed/2001/bildiri_hakanjan.htm> (6 April 2009).  As 
Behçet Nacar shooted 142 movies as the actor or the producer, not all of his movies are available for 
screening and Babayiğit is among them.   
 
4
 “Çerkes Kızı Olmak Hoşuma Gidiyor,” Vatan, 28 December 2003, 
http://haber.gazetevatan.com/haberdetay.asp?Newsid=19912&Categoryid=1 (30 March 2009).   
 
5
“Bir Çerkes Kadını Türkan Şoray’la Bir Söyleşi,” 
http://zesoga.azbuz.com/readArticle.jsp?objectID=5000000002101903 (17 April 2009).   
 
6
 For an instance of these online debates in year 2006, see http://www.frmtr.com/genel/608404-turkan-soray-
da-cingene-olmadigini-acikladi-2.html (10 April 2009).   
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chapter argues that these interconnections are made available to diaspora nationalisms not 
only by political and technological developments but also by a particular gender regime.  
These interconnections of diaspora nationalism are significant to understand the terms of 
survival, resistance and regeneration for diasporas. 
 The basic hypothesis of this dissertation, that diaspora nationalism is a gendered 
discourse also implies that the connections of the diasporic community with the homeland 
and host community are also gendered.  Hence, this dissertation deals with the question of 
how these nationalist constructions link the diasporic community to the host community or 
simultaneously differentiate it from the host.  Circassian diaspora in Turkey defines itself 
through gender.  It proposes that a particular gender discourse has been fundamental for 
Circassian diaspora nationalism in Turkey to define and to locate itself vis-à-vis/through 
Turkish nationalism and other ethnic groups in Turkey.   
This chapter is an attempt to explore these gendered interconnections, tensions and 
alliances through the case study of Circassian diaspora nationalism. In particular, it is an 
analysis of the gendered settings of nationalism in Turkey other than Turkish nationalism.7  
I argue that studying only the modernist nation-building project of the Republic is not 
enough to understand the relationship between gender and nationalism in Turkey.  Gender 
studies should pay attention not only to the meanings of all kinds that flow through the 
images of women8 and men but also to the very diversity of the sources of the flows that 
give meaning to, define, delimit and enable the categories of masculine and feminine.  In 
the case of Turkey, ‘other’ nationalisms which are different from the Turkish nationalism 
and the Kemalist project of modernity, yet very related to and effected by them are the 
discourses through which meanings flow through and construct the images of women and 
men.   
                                                  
 
7For the few analyses that explore the ways in which the 'other' nationalisms in Turkey, coexisting with 
Turkish nationalism are gendered, see S. Mojab, ed., Devletsiz Ulusun Kadınları: Kürt Kadını Üzerine 
Araştırmalar (Đstanbul: Avesta Yayınları, 2005); L. Yalçın-Heckmann and P. Van Gelder, “'90'larda 
Türkiye'de Siyasal Söylemin Dönüşümü Çerçevesinde Kürt Kadınlarının Đmajı: Bazı Eleştirel 
Değerlendirmeler,” in Vatan, Millet, Kadınlar, ed. A. G. Altınay (Đstanbul: Đletişim Yayınları, 2004), 325-355. 
 
8
 Warner quoted in S. Graham-Brown, Images of Women: the Portrayal of Women in Photography of the 
Middle East, 1860-1950 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 4. 
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Circassian diaspora nationalism, coexisting with Turkish nationalism is one of those 
'other' nationalisms within which gendered dimensions of nationalism are constantly 
narrated, experienced, reformed and recreated.   Hence, to explore nationalism of the 
Circassian diaspora in Turkey that is different from but profoundly interweaved to the 
Republican project of nation-building will bring us the category of women and men whose 
very subjectivities, oppressions and resistances are shaped not only by multiple discourses 
such as Turkish nationalism, Kemalism or modernity but also by multiple nationalisms in 
Turkey.  
 Thus, this chapter investigates the roles of the Circassian women in terms of 
shaping the Circassian national consciousness in Turkey and the Turkish perception of the 
Circassians.  This chapter will first explore the literature on diaspora, nationalism and 
gender.  It will then explore the image of the Circassian Beauty as a historical category 
which is crucial for diaspora to locate itself vis-à-vis homeland, host community and other 
geographies such as Europe.  Finally, this chapter aims to explore the gendered dimensions 
of diaspora nationalism.   
 
 
 
6.1. Gendering the Diaspora Literature 
 
 
 
 In 1885, in his article “The Laws of Migration” delivered to the Journal of the 
Statistical Society of London, the pioneer theorist of international migration, E.G. 
Ravenstein noted that “woman is a greater migrant than man” since females are more 
migratory than males within the kingdom of their birth, but males more frequently venture 
beyond.9   
                                                  
9
 E. G. Ravenstein, “The Laws of Migration,” Journal of the Statistical Society of London 48(2)(1885): 167-
235, 196-197.  
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 Despite Ravenstein’s argument, until 1970s, research on migration focused 
exclusively on male migrants and considered women passive companions.10   “The 
invisibility of women in international migration scholarship does not correspond to the 
reality of international migration.  Women migrate across international boundaries at 
approximately the same rate as men.”11  Starting from 1970s and 1980s, scholarship on 
migration has attempted to correct this lack of women in the accounts of migratory flows.  
During the last decade, the study of the relationships between gender and migration has 
offered insight into the feminization of migration flows and the establishment of 
transnational families whose networks expand globally and which are fundamental for the 
operations of economy and culture in late capitalism.12  Yet there are still topics that remain 
under-appreciated, under-researched and under-theorized.  For instance, apart from those 
studies which, following the feminization of labor in the early 1980s, often have stressed 
the dangers for women from developing countries working in nightlife industries abroad,13  
migrant women selling sex are claimed to be ignored in migrant and diaspora studies just 
like male, transsexual and transgender migrants who sell sex.14  Similarly Pessar and 
Mahler argues that areas such as the role of the state and social imaginary in gendering 
transnational processes and experiences are previously neglected and in need of inquiry and 
understanding.15   
 
 
                                                  
10
 P. R. Pessar, S. Mahler, “Transnational Migration: Bringing Gender In,” International Migration Review 
37(3)(2003): 812-846, 814.   
 
11
 D. L. DeLaet, “Introduction: The Invisibility of Women in Scholarship on International Migration,” in 
Gender and Immigration, eds. G. A. Kelson, D. L. Delaet, (New York: New York University Press, 1999), 1-
17, 13. 
 
12
 L. Passerini, D. Lyon, E. Capussotti and I. Laliotou, “Editors’ Introduction,” in Women Migrants From 
East to West: Gender, Mobility and Belonging in Contemporary Europe, eds. L. Passerini, D. Lyon, E. 
Capussotti and I. Laliotou, (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007), 1-20, 2.   
 
13
 A. Hisdon, “Transnationalism and Agency in East Malaysia: Filipina Migrants in the Nightlife Industries,” 
The Australian Journal of Anthropology 18(2) (2007): 172-193, 173.   
 
14
 L. Agustin, “The Disappearing of a Migration Category: Migrants Who Sell Sex,” Journal of Ethnic and 
Migration Studies 32(1)(2006): 29-47.   
 
15
 P. R. Pessar, S. Mahler, “Transnational Migration: Bringing Gender In,” International Migration Review 
37(3)(2003): 812-846, 812.   
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 Diaspora studies employ and enhance gender as a category of analysis16 even less 
when compared to the scholarship on migration. There is a tendency in the theoretical 
accounts of diaspora to “to talk of travel and displacement in unmarked ways, thus 
normalizing male experiences”17  and analyses that focus on the domains of diasporic 
complexity such as gender and class are mostly lacking.18    Even for the studies on African 
diaspora which has virtually exploded in the early 1990s, the use of gender as a category of 
analysis remains as a challenge.19   
 Yet diasporic experiences, formations, histories and narratives are not independent 
of gender but grounded on gendered meanings, practices, hierarchies, discourses and 
experiences.  Such a perspective considers “gender relations playing an important role in 
reproducing social capital, reinforcing the cultural norms of the historic ‘homeland’ and 
negotiating the provision of care.”20  Furthermore, women play a key role in the staging of 
diasporic origin through the family and complex, dynamic and critical processes that lie at 
the heart of new understandings of cultural identifications.21  Highlighting the need to 
gender the diaspora literature, Anthias refers to two different levels that diaspora studies 
should analyze: first level considers the ways in which men and women of the diaspora are 
inserted into the social relations of the host community, within the diaspora communities 
and within the transnational networks of the diaspora; second level explores how gendered 
relations are constitutive of the identities of the groups themselves.22 
 The existing studies on diaspora with a focus on gender have revealed that the way 
the nation and the diaspora are interlocked is shaped by particular gender ideologies, 
                                                  
 
16
 J. Scott, Gender and the Politics of History (NewYork: Columbia University Press, 1999).   
 
17J. Clifford, “Diasporas,” Cultural Anthropology 9(3)(1994): 302-338, 313. 
 
18F. Anthias, “Evaluating “Diaspora”: Beyond Ethnicity?” Sociology 32(3)(1998): 557-580, J. Clifford, 
“Diasporas,” Cultural Anthropology 9(3)(1994): 302-338. 
 
19
 S. Gunning, T. W. Hunter, M. Mitchell, “Introduction: Gender, Sexuality, and African Diasporas,” Gender 
and History 15(3)(2003): 397-408, 398. 
 
20
 V. Evergeti, “LĐving and Caring between Two Cultures,” Community, Work and Family 9(3)(2006): 347-
266, 347.   
 
21
 G. Tsolidis, “The Role of the Maternal in Diasporic Cultural Reproduction –Australia, Canada and Greece,” 
Social Semiotics 11(2)(2001): 193-208, 193.   
 
22F. Anthias, “Evaluating “Diaspora”: Beyond Ethnicity?” Sociology 32(3)(1998): 557-580, 572. 
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constructions and relations: gender ideologies are a fundamental subtext which informs the 
individual strategies that men and women use to straddle the gap between ‘nation’ and 
‘diaspora’.23   Diasporic identities and belonging are contested, forged, negotiated and 
reaffirmed through and alongside gender.24  
 When analyzed from a gender perspective, diasporic communities enhance 
collective identities that are formed through the patriarchal dominance of male diasporic 
leaders; the exploitation of diasporic women, women's cultural invocation as objects of 
male gaze; and the formulation of a particular role imposed on and expected from women.25  
The attempt to maintain the connections with the homelands, with kinship networks, and 
with traditions may renew patriarchal structures.26  While defining diaspora as “potenatially 
the sites of hope and new beginnings”, Brah regards diaspora also as conjuring images of 
violence and trauma where women’s lives are shaped by ‘articulating relations of power’.27  
Mojab and Gorman, in their study of Kurdish women’s organizations in Canada, Britain, 
Sweden and Iraqi Kurdistan, argue that state and patriarchal violence surrounding these 
women’s organizations is erased when their efforts are viewed through the lens of 
transnationality and diaspora theories.28   
 Though these accounts are crucial in unmasking gender hierarchies in diaspora 
communities, they do not pay attention to how diasporic condition and identities may 
empower the members of the community.  Some transnational diasporic organizations built 
by women allow women to transcend their local identity as ‘victims’ and gain a  
professional and personal liberation within the limits set by the diasporic contexts that 
                                                  
 
23
 B. S. A. Yeoh, and K. Willis, “‘Heart’ and ‘Wing’, Nation and Diaspora: Gendered Discourses in 
Singapore’s Regionalization Process,” Gender, Place and Culture 6(4)(1999): 355-372. 
 
24
 L. Siu, “Queen of the Chinese Colony: Gender, Nation, andBelonging in Diaspora,” Anthropological 
Quarterly 78(3)(2005), 511-542.   
 
25
 Respectively F. Anthias, “Evaluating “Diaspora”: Beyond Ethnicity?” Sociology 32(3)(1998): 557-580; G. 
Gopinath, “Bombay, UK, Yuba City: Bhangra Music and the Engendering of Diaspora,” Diaspora 
4(3)(1995): 303-322; S. Gold, “Gender and Social Capital among Israeli Immigrants in Los Angeles,” 
Diaspora 4(3)(1995): 267-301. 
 
26J. Clifford, “Diasporas,” Cultural Anthropology 9(3)(1994): 302-338, 313, 314. 
 
27
 A. Brah, Cartographies of Diaspora (London: Routledge, 1996), 193, 90.   
 
28
 S. Mojab, and R. Gorman, “Dispersed Nationalism: War, Diaspora and Kurdish Women’s Organizing,” 
Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies 3(1)(2007): 58-85, 60.   
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assign women the role of the guardian of the national boundaries.29  In addition to that, 
women in the diaspora may use their educational and employment achievements to 
renegotiate gender relations.30 From such a perspective, greater economic power may give 
women a stronger and more authoritative voice as decision makers in family and financial 
affairs and hence, blur the traditional markers of gender and social status.31  Geschwender’s 
findings on the Chinese diaspora in California, British Columbia and Hawai suggests that 
the expanded participation of Chinese women in North America strongly suggests, but does 
not unequivocally demonstrate, that a normative change took place in which the cult of 
domesticity was rejected or modified.32  
 Yet, drawing from interviews with software engineers in Silicon Valley and 
Bangalore, Radhakrishnan argues that a new discourse of belonging to India is a 
fundamentally gendered one that relies on the ability of professional women to make 
delicate balances between an “Indian” home life and a “global” professional life.33  
Furthermore, analyzing the ways in which different classes in India accommodate the 
diaspora in their imaginations, Moorti underlines that as the presence of the diaspora in 
popular culture helps produce new subjectivities such as that of the new Indian woman 
through which diaspora extends the terrain of India beyond the contours of the nation-state, 
the female body remains a site where a range of anxieties about globalization is encoded 
and hence, a site shaped by and regulated by ‘tradition’ and Indian values.34  Hence, it is 
                                                  
 
29
 P. Werbner, “The Place Which is Diaspora: Citizenship, Religion and Gender in the Making of Chaordic 
Transnationalism,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 28(1)(2002): 119-133; D. Kostovicova and A. 
Prestreshi., “Education, Gender and Religion: Identity Transformations among Kosovo Albanians in 
London,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 29(6)(2003): 1079-1096. 
 
30H. Ramji, “Engendering Diasporic Identities,” in South Asian Women in the Diaspora, ed. N. Puwar 
(Oxford: Berg Publishers, 2003), 227-242.  
 
31
 C. A. Babou,”Migration and Cultural Change: Money, “Caste,” Gender, and Social Status among 
Senegalese Female Hair Braiders in the United States,” AfricaToday 55(2)(2008): 3-22, 17.   
 
32
 J. A. Geschwender,”Ethnicity and Social Construction of Gender in the Chinese Diaspora,” Gender and 
Society 6(3)(1992): 480-507, 503.   
 
33
 S. Radhakrishnan, “Examining the “Global” Indian Middle Class: Gender and Culture in the Silicon 
Valley/Bangalore Circuit,” Journal of Intercultural Studies 29(1)(2008): 7-20, 7.   
 
34
 S. Moorti, “Uses of the Diaspora: Indian Popular Culture and NRI Dilemma,” South Asian Popular Culture 
3(1)(2005): 49-62, 49.   
263 
  
quite debatable whether this “emancipated but unliberated”35 condition is experienced as 
empowerment as far as women are concerned.  Transnational practices may “not always be 
celebratory demonstrations of immigrant agency, but can also act as a mode of transmission 
for the expansion and perpetuation of traditional gendered hierarchies.”36 
  In short, diaspora studies that focus on women are limited.  Yet masculinity in the 
diasporic contexts remains unexplored as far as social science is concerned.  Helmlich, for 
instance, describes diasporas as masculinist projects of transnational community formation 
which are characterized by the metaphor of the scattering of seeds and which “refer us to a 
system of kinship reckoned through men and suggest the questions of legitimacy in 
paternity that patriarchy generates.”37  Similarly, Siu plays with Benedict’s Anderson’s idea 
of nation as “a horizontal comrade-ship” between men within which nation is imagined not 
as a hierarchical structure but as a structure within which men see each other as equals and 
argues that diaspora is a “brotherhood of patrilineages” that is “a non-hierarchical 
relationship among men of the same generation and among their respective generations of 
ancestors and descendents who reach beyond the temporal and territorial space of the 
nation.”38  Sorensen, in her study of Dominican migrants in New York argues that while 
women do not necessarily appear to suffer from some confusion of identity, men seem to 
face many more difficulties as a result of the conflicting demands embedded in the 
Dominican concept of machismo.39  Hence, diasporic identities along with migration may 
create new masculinities and new ideals of manhood while challenging the old ones.  This 
dissertation aims to contribute to diaspora and gender studies through exploring these 
unexplored fields.   
                                                  
 
35D. Kandiyoti, “Emancipated but Unliberated?  Reflections on the Turkish Case,” Feminist Studies (1987): 
317-338. 
 
36
 M. Walton-Roberts, “Transnational Migration Theory in Population Geography: Gendered Practices in 
Networks Linking Canada and India,” Population, Space and Place 10(2004): 361-373, 361.   
 
37
 S. Helmrich, “Kinship, Nation and Paul Gilroy’s Concept of Diaspora,” Diaspora 2(1991): 243-249, 245.   
 
38
 L. Siu, “Queen of the Chinese Colony: Gender, Nation, andBelonging in Diaspora,” Anthropological 
Quarterly 78(3)(2005), 511-542, 520. 
 
39
 N. N. Sorensen, “Roots, Routes and Transnational Attractions: Dominican Migration, Gender and Cultural 
Change,” in Ethnicity, Gender and the Subversion of Nationalism (Special Issue of European Development 
Research), eds. F. Wilson, B. F. Frederiksen (London: Frank Cass, 1995): 104-118, 110.  
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 Given the limitations of the diaspora literature on gender, a gender study of diaspora 
communities and diaspora nationalism requires to be complemented by gender theories 
which have underlined and explored the profoundly gendered discourses and spaces of 
nationalism.40  National projects that aim to build the nation, nation-state and the ethnic 
group are simultaneously gender projects41 which operate on various levels.  Yuval-Davis 
and Anthias list the five major ways in which women have tended to participate in ethnic 
and national processes: first, as biological reproducers of members of collectivities; second, 
as reproducers of the boundaries of the groups; third, as transmitters and carriers of its 
culture who contribute to the ideological reproduction of the community; fourth, as 
signifiers of ethnic/national differences; and finally, as participants in national, economic, 
political and military struggles.42   
 Yuval-Davis and Anthias' list implicitly summarize the feminist approaches to 
nationalism.   Gender studies provide us with the following approaches to nationalism.  
First group of gender studies analyze nationalism as embedded in nation-state policies.  
Exploration of state policies regarding education, citizenship and reproduction from a 
gender perspective reveals that these  policies of the nation-state, even the ones that claim 
to be the most 'benevolent' work for the ‘nationalization’ of women as part of the 
                                                  
 
40
 For the literature on nationalisms and gender in general and in the case of Turkey, see for example, M. 
Ahıska, “Gender and National Fantasy: Early Turkish Radio Drama,” New Perspectives on Turkey 22 (2000): 
25-60; A. G. Altınay, ed., Vatan, Millet, Kadınlar (Đstanbul: Đletişim Yayınları, 2004), F. Berktay, “Doğu ile 
Batı'nın Birleştiği Yer: Kadın Đmgesinin Kurgulanışı,” in Modernleşme ve Batıcılık: Modern Türkiye’de 
Siyasi Düşünce (Cilt 4), ed. U. Kocabaşoğlu (Đstanbul: Đletişim Yayınları, 2002), 275- 284; A. Durakbaşa, 
Halide Edib: Türk Modernleşmesi ve Feminism, (Đstanbul: Đletişim Yayınları, 2000); K. Jayawardena, 
Feminism and Nationalism in the Third World (London, New Delhi: Zed Books, 1986); D. Kandiyoti, 
“Identity and Its Discontents: Women and the Nation,” in Nationalism, eds. J. Hutchinson and A. Smith (New 
York: Routledge, 2000), 1489-1505; D. Kandiyoti, ed., Women, Islam and the State (Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 1991); A. McClintock, A. Mufti and E. Shohat, eds., Dangeorus Liaisons: Gender, Nation, 
and Post-Colonial Perspectives (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997); M. V. Moghadam, ed., 
Gender and National Identity: Women and Politics in Muslim Societies  (London: Zed Books, 1994), G. L. 
Mosse, Nationalism and Sexuality: Middle-Class Morality and Sexual Norms in Modern Europe (Madison, 
WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985); A. Saktanber, Kemalist Kadın Hakları Söylemi,” in Kemalizm: 
Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce (Cilt 1), ed. M. Ö. Alkan (Đstanbul: Đletişim Yayınları, 2001), 323-333; N. 
Yuval-Davis, Gender and Nation (London: Sage Publications, 1997); N. Yuval-Davis and F. Anthias, eds., 
Woman-Nation-State (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1989); Y. Zihnioğlu, Kadınsız Đnkılap: Nezihe Muhiddin, 
Kadınlar Halk Fırkası, Kadın Birliği (Đstanbul: Metis, 2003). 
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 S. Walby, “Woman and Nation,” in Mapping the Nation, ed.  G. Balakrishnan (London: Verso, 1996), 235-
254. 
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 N. Yuval-Davis and F.Anthias, “Woman-Nation-State,” in Nationalism, eds. J. Hutchinson and A. D. Smith 
(New York: Routledge, 2000), 1475-1488. 
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nationalist projects.43  Nation-state as a national project is not gender neutral but profoundly 
gendered.  Though such an approach is crucial to unmask the claimed neutrality of the 
nation-state and understand how nation-states as national projects create gender hierarchies, 
it prioritizes the nation-state which is one among the many sources of patriarchy and 
oppression and does not take into account the fact that some nationalisms precede or lack 
nation-states.     
 Secondly, gender studies focus on women as the direct participators in nationalist 
struggles and argue that once the nationalist struggle is over, feminist nationalists often 
become entrapped in a new form of patriarchy.44  Hence, nationalism in the form of a 
national struggle may work for empowerment as far as women are concerned, yet that 
empowerment has limits drawn by nationalism itself.  Such an approach explains the 
limitations of nationalism in taking women into the 'brotherhood'.  However, focusing on 
particular historical national struggles does not explain how nationalism permeates and 
genders the tissues of everyday life, beliefs and practices of individuals, groups and 
nations.     
 Related to such an argument, a third approach in the feminist scholarship studies 
nationalism as a project that is sustained by gendered discourses, iconographies and 
meanings.  Multiple images of women are considered to be central elements of the 
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nationalist discourse which construct women simultaneously as victims of 
underdevelopment, as symbols of modernity of the new nation, as the symbols for national 
honor, as the mothers of the nation, as the subjects who will protect the spiritual sphere of 
the community and its cultural authenticity, as goddesses and as the preservers of the past.45  
National historiographies which construct men in battles, governments and politics and 
women as the icons of national domesticity and morals are markedly gendered.46  Defining 
the “national” man and woman different from the other nations, discourse of nationalism 
aims to recreate and reproduce its own national essence through these presumed differences 
in gender relationships and constructions.47  Nationalisms are gendered to the extent that 
they reproduce different and particular discourses, constructions and images of masculinity 
and femininity: while ‘national’ man is portrayed as “the martyr/protector/soldier/hero” in 
the nationalist discourse, female is cast as “mother/guardian, the carrier of the tradition and 
cultural mores”.48  In line with this approach, this chapter on gender is essential for this 
dissertation which aims to explore the formations of diaspora nationalism.   
 Fourthly, the scholarship on militarism as an ideology that goes hand in hand with 
nationalism further elaborates the gendered discursive practices of nationalism.49  This 
literature differentiates military as an institution, militarism as an ideology that glorifies the 
domination of the use of coercive structures and practices, and militarization as a social 
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process that glorifies practices and norms related to militaries.50  From such a perspective, 
the control of women is of greatest significance to guarantee the success of the militarizing 
enterprise at hand.  Hence, ideas about feminine respectability, duty, and sexuality have 
been the crucial as far as the ideology of militarism and the processes of militarization are 
concerned.51  What militarization implies is not just the control of women as human beings, 
as prostitutes, mothers, wives and workers but also ideas about femininity.  The 
constructions of multiple femininities are at the center of the nationalist project, 
militarization and militarism as an ideology.  The existence of women as the national honor 
to be protected or conquered, and the control over the images and meanings of femininity 
normalize the domination of the militaristic values and enterprises that sanctify death over 
life.52  Such a focus on militarism as a crucial element of nationalism extends the debate on 
gender and nationalism to further include masculinity as a crucial element of the discursive 
space of nationalism. 
  Analyses of the relationships (conflicts, alliances and tensions) between 
nationalism and gender necessitate not only analyses of femininity but also an 
understanding of masculinity and the ways in which masculinities are reproduced and 
constructed as parts of the nationalist projects.  Nationalism sustains itself not only through 
women as symbolizers of the community, active participators, reproducers of the national 
'stock' etc. but also through a set of masculine images which define multiple masculinities.  
Nationalism as a culture that emphasizes masculine cultural themes such as honor, 
patriotism, cowardice, bravery and duty, and as the path to the nation-state proves to be a 
significant setting to achieve masculinity.53  The processes of militarization and the 
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ideology of militarism do not just need women and ideas about femininity that will support 
the militarist project.  To the extent that these processes and ideologies are masculine 
projects that prioritize men, they also need particular constructions of masculinity.  Such a 
perspective claims that military institutions generate particular versions of hegemonic 
masculinity.54  Militarism and militarization which are embedded in nationalism define and 
designate manhood, masculine experiences and masculine values.  Militarist practices and 
institutions such as military service and war making which form the classical bondage to 
citizenship proves to be crucial for us to understand the broad historical contexts within 
which militarism, masculinity, nationalism, femininity and citizenship are linked.55    
I argue that diasporas are embedded in these broad historical contexts and they are 
the crossroads through which multiple connections between militarism, nationalism, 
ethnicity, globalization and gender can be explored.  Studying diaspora nationalisms is one 
of the ways to explore these interconnections that are embedded in diasporic discourse.  
Given the literature on nationalism and gender, one of the major questions is the similarities 
and differences between diaspora nationalism – which is “a very distinctive, very 
conspicuous, important sub-species of nationalism”56 – and state-linked nationalisms that 
have either completed their state formation or aimed to form its own state. This chapter 
argues that when analyzed from a gender perspective, although they are quite similar, 
diaspora nationalism is different than state-linked nationalisms.  Furthermore, diaspora 
nationalisms are sustained by particular constructions of masculinity and femininity.  As 
women in general have been ignored in the literature on diaspora and migration, this 
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conflicts and ignores the notion of women as reproducers of the community and the 
multiple roles attributed to them. 
Re-reading the diaspora from a gender perspective will shed light on the centrality 
of particular types of masculinities and femininities within diaspora nationalism and 
diasporic communities.  This chapter will turn to exploring these gendered dimensions of 
diaspora nationalism through the case of Circassians in Turkey.  
  
 
 
6.2. The Circassian Beauty 
 
 
 
 The Circassian Beauty is a historical image of idealized feminine aesthetics that is 
attributed to the women of the Caucasus.  Taking the image of Circassian Beauty as a 
diasporic strategy to straddle the gap between nation and diaspora and as a mechanism 
through which Circassians in Turkey, as an ethnic group in Turkey, relate to the peoples of 
Anatolia and other geographies and vice versa, this part of the chapter aims to explore the 
multiple meanings attached to the notion of Circassian Beauty and the ways these meanings 
are historically transformed.  This part will explore the concept of Circassian Beauty on 
three interrelated levels: first as an Orientalist theme and figure in European literature, art 
and knowledge production; second as a historical figure that also finds its place in Turkish 
popular culture and third as an item on the agenda of diaspora nationalists.  All these three 
levels enable us to better understand the Circassian women’s role in the construction of 
diaspora and diaspora nationalism in Turkey.   
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6.2.1. Circassian Beauty as an Orientalist Figure 
 
 The inflow of Circassians into the Ottoman lands took place in the nineteenth 
century as a result of immigration which Circassian activists in Turkey today calls “Great 
Exodus” that took place after Crimean War (1853-1856) at the peak of Russian 
expansionist policy.  As there were previous relationships and contacts between the 
Ottomans and Circassians, during the nineteenth century the initial contacts had been 
intensified, and individual visits and relations had been replaced by massive inflows by the 
Circassians into the Ottoman lands.  The image of Circassian Beauty is related to these 
increasing Circassian inflows and the historical fact that throughout 19th century 
Circassians had been the human stock of Ottoman slave market.57  The other related factor 
that contributed to the formation of the image of the Circassian girl is the existence of a 
high number of Circassian women in the Ottoman Palace.  However the image itself is not 
limited to Ottoman lands but also has its parallels in the European Orientalist literature in 
18th and 19th century.58   
 Orientalism is a discursive space that defines what is West, what is East through 
binary oppositions.  Orientalism, whether as an academic field, whether as the literary one, 
or whether as the colonial policies that are biased towards West is a power relationship 
which is “shaped to a great degree by the exchange with power political (as with a colonial 
or imperial establishment), power intellectual (as with reigning sciences like comparative 
linguistics or anatomy, or any of the modern policy sciences), power cultural (as with 
orthodoxies and canons of taste, texts, values), power moral (as with ideas about what “we” 
do and what “they” cannot do or understand as “we” do).” 59  Therefore, one cannot restrict 
Orientalism to colonial policies solely, but it is a multi-layered discourse that finds its way 
in science, art, values, norms, culture and politics; “it is, rather than expresses, a certain will 
or intention to understand, in some cases to control, manipulate, even to incorporate, what 
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is a manifestly different (or alternative and novel) world.”60  On one layer of Orientalism, 
we find the image of the Circassian Beauty.   
 As the image is found in the novels and theatrical plays of 17th century, the 
consolidation of the image as the Circassian Beauty pertains to 18th century.  Starting from 
18th century, due to the perpetual conflicts of Circassians with Czarist Russia, Circassia 
becomes a geography that became part of European knowledge.  In the third edition of 
Encylopedie ou Dictionnaire Raisonne des Sciences, Des Arts et des Metiers published in 
1778, the Enlightenment thinkers Diderot and D’alembert defines Circassia as  
 
   “The big Asian country between Volga and Don rivers that is limited with 
Daghistan, Kingdom of Caret, country of Mingrel and Black Sea.  Its 
inhabitants have a religion that is partly Muslim and partly Christian.  Some 
part of this country is under Russia’s rule, the rest is independent.  The primary 
commercial products of Circassia consist of fur and also women that they sell to 
Turks and Persians; these women are famous for being more beautiful than all 
of the other women in Asia.”61   
 
 Similarly in 1911, Encylopedia Britannica defines Circassia as inhabited by 
Circassians who are a peculiar race and who attracted the attention of the other nations of 
Europe in a high degree as a result of their long-continued struggles with the power of 
Russia, during a period of nearly forty years.  Furthermore, Circassians are defined as “an 
object of interest to the student of the history of civilization, from the strange mixture 
which their customs exhibited of chivalrous sentiment with savage customs” most of which 
“must now be regarded as in great measure things of the past.”62  The article states that  
 
   “The greatest stain upon the Circassian character was the custom of selling 
their children, the Circassian father being always willing to part with his 
daughters, many of whom were bought by Turkish merchants for the harems of 
Eastern monarchs. But no degradation was implied in this transaction, and the 
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young women themselves were generally willing partners in it. Herds of cattle 
and sheep constituted the chief riches of the inhabitants.”63   
 
Circassia, as a geography was conceptualized as famous for beautiful women that were 
being sold willingly.  Hence, the knowledge on Circassia, from the beginning, was 
intertwined with the construct of Circassian Beauty as an exclusively feminine 
characteristic that was associated with female availability. 
 European literature had been more creative in terms of defining and elaborating on 
Circassian Beauty.  For instance, in the eighteenth century literature, Circassian women 
were imagined as beautiful and sexually available as it was in 1715 that Montesquieu wrote 
in Persian Letters: 
 
   “YESTERDAY some Armenians brought to the seraglio a young Circassian 
slave whom they wished to sell. I made her enter the secret apartments; I 
undressed her, I examined her with eyes of a judge; and the more I examined, 
the more beauties I found. A virginal shame seemed anxious to hide them from 
my view: I saw how much it cost her to obey: she blushed upon beholding 
herself naked, even before me, exempt, as I am from the passions which can 
alarm decency, and entirely delivered from the dominion of the sex-the servant 
of modesty in the freest actions, looking only with the chastest glance, and 
capable of inspiring nothing but innocence.  
      From the moment I judged her worthy of you, I cast down my eyes, and 
threw over her a scarlet cloak; I placed a ring of gold upon her finger, I 
prostrated myself at her feet, I adored her as the queen of your heart. I paid the 
Armenians, and hid her from every eye.”64  
Voltaire, in 1778, Letters on English who also personally knew Aisse, a Circassian girl in 
French saloons,65 wrote that  
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   “The Circassians are poor, and their daughters are beautiful, and indeed, it is 
in them they chiefly trade. They furnish with beauties the seraglios of the 
Turkish Sultan, of the Persian Sophy, and of all those who are wealthy enough 
to purchase and maintain such precious merchandise. These maidens are very 
honourably and virtuously instructed to fondle and caress men; are taught 
dances of a very polite and effeminate kind; and how to heighten by the most 
voluptuous artifices the pleasures of their disdainful masters for whom they are 
designed. These unhappy creatures repeat their lesson to their mothers, in the 
same manner as little girls among us repeat their catechism without 
understanding one word they say.”66 
For Lord Byron, in 1813, in A Fragment of a Turkish Tale, Circassian Beauty is the 
Circassia’s daughter:   
 
   “Their bloom in blushes ever new; 
Her hair in hyacinthine flow, 
When left to roll its folds below, 
As midst her handmaids in the hall 
She stood superior to them all, 
Hath swept the marble where her feet 
Gleamed whiter than the mountain sleet 
Ere from the cloud that gave it birth 
It fell, and caught one stain of earth. 
The cygnet nobly walks the water; 
So moved on earth Circassia’s daughter, 
The loveliest bird of Franguestan!”67 
 
In 1859 Dickens, in The Haunted House mentioned the general perception of Circassian 
Beauty in Europe:  
 
   “Now, Miss Pipson, having curly hair and blue eyes (which was my idea of 
anything mortal and feminine that was called Fair), I promptly replied that I 
regarded Miss Pipson in the light of a Fair Circassian.  
"And what then?" Miss Bule pensively asked.  
I replied that she must be inveigled by a Merchant, brought to me veiled, and 
purchased as a slave.”68 
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The construct of Circassian Beauty similarly found its counterpart in Orientalist art of 18th 
and 19th centuries.  Among the list are the engraving by Richard Austin Artlett called The 
Circassian Captive in 1843, David Wilkie’s painting Circassian Lady in 1850s, George 
Baxter’s painting Circassian Lady at Bath, Tscherkessische Ware [Circassian Products] by 
Johann Heinrich Bamberg in 1799, Dame Circassianne Voilée by Jean-Léon Géerome in 
1870s and the engraving called The Circassian Slave by Emile Boilvin which was drawn 
for the 1892 English edition of Montesqieu’s Persian Letters.69  
 Meanwhile the European interest in Circassian Beauty was beyond literature, art 
and encyclopedias.  Circassian Beauty was the image where Orientalism and the theme of 
whiteness as a racial category intertwined.  For instance, in 1865, Blumenbach, the German 
anthropologist who first used the term Caucasian for white race and whose work is 
considered to be a turning point in the history of race and science70 listed five varieties of 
mankind: Caucasian, Mongolian, Ethiopian, American and Malay; and defined Caucasian 
as “Colour white, cheeks rosy; hair brown or chestnut-coloured; head subglobular; face 
oval, straight, its parts moderately defined, forehead smooth, nose narrow, slightly hooked, 
mouth small. The primary teeth placed perpendicularly to each jaw; the lips …moderately 
open, the chin full and rounded.”71  As Blumenbach uses Caucasian as the “kind of 
appearance which, according to our opinion of symmetry, we consider most handsome and 
becoming,” to which  the inhabitants of Europe and those of Eastern Asia, as far as the river 
Obi, the Caspian Sea and the Ganges; and lastly, those of Northern Africa belongs;72 he 
states that he has “taken the name of this variety from Mount Caucasus, both because its 
neighbourhood, and especially its southern slope, produces the most beautiful race of men, 
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I mean the Georgian; and because all physiological reasons converge to this, that in that 
region, if anywhere, it seems we ought with the greatest probability to place the 
autochthones of mankind.”73  Hence, the idea of whiteness was from the beginning 
intertwined in the construct of the Circassian Beauty.  Yet being part of Orient and yet 
being “white” made Circassian Beauty an obsession in the European imagination.  To that 
extent Circassian Beauty was both “us” and “them.”74   
 However, it was in 19th century when the interest on Circassian Beauty and 
Circassia both of which were hard to separate from each other bloomed.  In 19th century, a 
number of travelogues such as Edmund Spencer with Travels in Circassia; James Bell with 
Journal of a Residence in Circassia During the Years 1837, 1838 and 1839; David 
Urquhart, a British diplomat in Constantinople and J.A. Longworth, a Times correspondent 
with A Year Among the Circassians appeared.  As the British interest in Circassia vis-à-vis 
an expanding Russia bloomed since 1830s, the travel books and literature on Circassia 
bloomed.75  Similarly British newspapers regularly reported the Circassians' struggles with 
Russia from the mid1830s onwards, reaching something of a peak in early 1844.76  It was 
in this period that Bell and Spencer “encouraged the Circassians to resist Russian 
penetration, promised them British intervention and supplied them with smuggled weapons 
and ammunition.”77  It was Bell who “therefore freely took part in the councils of the 
natives, and gave them the benefit of such knowledge as our experience and reading had 
afforded us, I counseling them as to the particular species of warfare which seemed best 
suited for the troops they could bring into the field.”78  As European knowledge and interest 
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was redefining the Circassia and Circassian struggle vis-à-vis Tsarist Russia, the idea of 
Circassian Beauty was being consolidated.   
 Edmund Spencer, in Travels in Circassia in 1837 defined the Circassian 
countenance as “perfectly classical, exhibiting, in the profile, that exquisite gently curving 
line, considered by connoiseurs to be the ideal of beauty” and stated that  
 
   “Both sexes are passionately fond of dress; and, I assure you a handsome face 
and a good personal appearance are as much valued among these people, as by 
the most refined nation in Europe.  If to this we add that the one is distinguished 
for easy deportment, and a natural elegance of manners; and the other for a 
dignified warlike bearing; it is not much to say that, perhaps no half-civilized 
people in the world display so pleasing an exterior.”79 
 
 As Bell, Urquhart, Spencer, and Longworth travelled to Circassia and wrote their 
books based on these travels, some travel books were written without travelling to 
Circassia.  For instance Favell Lee Mortimer, as the English Evangelical author of 
educational books for children, in Far Off which she wrote in 1849 described Circassia as 
“there is no country in the world where the people are as kind to strangers as in Circassia”, 
where women “are not shut up as Hindoo, and Chinese and Turkish ladies are” and where 
men “must be wild, bold, restless, and ignorant.”80  Circassia was, once again, defined 
through gender constructions on European imagination. 
 Similarly, in 1851, Maturin Murray Ballou, American novelist, travel writer, editor 
and publisher in his book The Circassian Slave defines Circassia as  
 
   “The land of beauty and oppression, whose noble valleys produce such 
miracles of female loveliness, and whose plains are the vivid scenes of such 
terrible struggles; where a brave, unconquerable peasantry have, for a very long 
period, defied the combined powers of the whole of Russia, and whose 
daughters, though the children of such brave sires, are yet taught and reared 
from childhood to look forward to a life of slavery in a Turkish harem as the 
height of their ambition –Circassia, the land of bravery, beauty and romance, is 
one of the least known, but most interesting spots in all Europe.”81 
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 Hence, the ideas of Circassia and Circassians were never independent of the notion 
of Circassian Beauty and the practice of slavery.  Throughout the 19th century, Circassian 
slavery had been the theme of many official correspondences as it had been observed by 
many travelers not just in Circassia but also in the Ottoman Empire.  Mark Twain, in 
Innocents Abroad which is a travel book based on an actual expedition, in a retired Civil 
War ship (the USS Quaker City) with numerous stops along the coast of the Mediterranean 
Sea, as well as a train excursion from Marseilles, France to Paris for the 1867 Paris 
Expedition, and a side trip through the Black Sea to Odessa, all before the ultimate 
pilgrimage to the Holy Land wrote: 
 
   “Circassian and Georgian girls are still sold in Constantinople by their 
parents, but not publicly. The great slave marts we have all read so much about 
-- where tender young girls were stripped for inspection, and criticised and 
discussed just as if they were horses at an agricultural fair -- no longer exist. 
The exhibition   and the sales are private now. Stocks are up, just at present, 
partly because of a brisk demand created by the recent return of the Sultan's 
suite from the courts of Europe….  Under these circumstances, if the American 
metropolitan newspapers were published here in Constantinople, their next 
commercial report would read about as follows, I suppose: 
SLAVE GIRL MARKET REPORT. 
 
"Best brands Circassians, crop of 1850, £200; 1852, £250; 1854, £300. Best 
brands Georgian, none in market; second quality, 1851, £180. Nineteen fair to 
middling Wallachian girls offered at £130 @ 150, but no takers; sixteen prime  
A 1 sold in small lots to close out -- terms private.  
 
"Sales of one lot Circassians, prime to good, 1852 to 1854, at £240 @ 242 1/2, 
buyer 30; one forty-niner -- damaged -- at £23, seller ten, no deposit. Several 
Georgians, fancy brands, 1852, changed hands to fill orders. The Georgians 
now on hand are mostly last year's crop, which was unusually poor. The new  
crop is a little backward, but will be coming in shortly…”  
 
   I think the above would be about the style of the commercial report. Prices 
are pretty high now, and holders firm; but, two or three years ago, parents in a 
starving condition brought their young daughters down here and sold them for 
even twenty and thirty dollars, when they could do no better, simply to save 
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themselves and the girls from dying of want. It is sad to think of so distressing a 
thing as this, and I for one am sincerely glad the prices are up again.”82  
 
 However, the idea of Circassian Beauty took place on the market not only through 
slavery but also through commodification processes in 19th century Europe.  It was in this 
century that W. S. Kimball & Co., a cigarette company in USA gave a set of cards entitled 
“Dancing Women” which featured dancers from around the world in dresses which were 
assumed to be traditional and which included a card of Circassian woman.83  It was in 19th 
century that the name Circassian became the brand name that could be seen in the 
advertisements of a hair dye,84 a face ointment, cream and hair oil.85   
 Furthermore, Circassian Beauty took its place in the commercialization of 
entertainment in the 19th century.  Phineas Taylor Barnum, American showman and circus 
entrepreneur for instance in May 1864 requested one Circassian girl from his former manager to 
display with the other “oddities and amusements” in his circus and museums:86  
   “My dear G,  
I still have faith in a beautiful Circassian girl if you can get one very beautiful. 
But if they ask $4000 each, probably one would be better than two, for $8000 in 
gold is worth about $14,500 in U.S. currency. So one of the most beautiful 
would do, but be sure & get a decent-looking chap of 16 years old or more. If 
you can also buy a beautiful Circassian woman for $200 [$2000?], do so if you 
think best; or if you can hire one or two at reasonable prices, do so if you think 
they are pretty and will pass for Circassian slaves. But in any event have one or 
two of the most beautiful girls you can find, even if they cost $4000 or $5000 in 
gold. Don't fail to have rich-appearing costumes for her and the eunuch, & 
bring one girl alone with eunuch if you think they will be attractive enough to 
pay. But of course one or two additional girls will help it if they can be hired 
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right & are pretty, especially if one can pass for a Grecian. But after looking the 
thing over, if you don't find one that is beautiful & possesses a striking kind of 
beauty, why of course she won't draw and you must give it up as a bad job & 
not get them, for there is nothing in her to attract & fascinate, and the papers 
would cry her down & it would prove a loss. But if she is beautiful, then she 
may take in Paris or in London or probably both. But look out that in Paris they 
don't try the law and set her free. It must be understood she is free. . .  
Yours truly,  
P. T. Barnum  
If you get the woman with horns, let American newspapers & correspondents 
understand that you had a big race for her with European showmen & that the 
price paid for her was immense. Remember to find every avenue for publicity 
of the fact that an agent of Barnum's Museum is in the East seeking curiosities. 
Also, when you get to Paris you had better advertise that an agent for Barnum's 
Museum, now in Paris, is anxious to secure novelties for America. You had 
better write all the French which would be likely to give you any new ideas. 
Write here to the editors giving items of intelligence, among which name the 
agency. Also describe any curiosities that you may secure, then give the editors 
here your address (privately). They will publish your letter because it comes 
from so far.”87  
In response to the request of Barnum, a Circassian Beauty was procured for the museum 
though woman’s origin and circumstances in which she was obtained remains as a 
dispute.88  In a brochure that announced the opening of American Museum of Living 
Curiosities in London by Barnum, a marvelous assemblage of strangest human beings and a 
world of oddest and most amazing physical exceptions were being promised to the 
audience: among the last of the mysterious Aztecs; wondrous long-haired women; famous 
and only skeleton dude;  littlest, loveliest ladies of the world; human obelisks; the tiniest 
and prettiest dwarfs; phantom-like living skeletons; most enormous fat folk; the only full-
bearded lady; amazing armless writers were the celebrated beauties of Circassia.89
 Orientalism, scientific racism, commodification, and the interest in geography as an 
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imperial knowledge production mechanism all contributed to the idea of Circassian Beauty.   
As the idea of Circassian Beauty is part of European Orientalism and the image is highly 
related to slave trade, it is also related to the expansion of Russia into the Caucasus and 
increasing tensions of Circassians with Russia which resulted in increasing Circassian 
relationships with the European countries.  It is not a coincidence that the Circassian 
Beauty is savage, she is charming, yet she is miserable since Circassian Beauty is the 
European reflection on Circassia and Circassians vis-à-vis Czarist Russia.  Yet her 
existence and status in literature, knowledge production and art is similar to Kuchuk 
Hanem, a famed beauty and Egyptian dancer who became a key figure in Flaubert’s 
Orientalist accounts of the East.  Edward Said defines how Flaubert’s accounts depict her 
encounter with the Western man:  
   “She never spoke of herself, she never represented her emotions, presence or 
history.  He spoke for and represented her.  He was foreign, comparatively 
wealthy, male and these were historical facts of domination that allowed him 
not only possess Kuchuk Hanem physically but to speak for her and tell his 
readers in what way she was “typically Oriental.””90  
In the case of Circassian Beauty, she was the reflection of Circassia in European 
imagination; savage and beautiful, Eastern and Western, resistant and doomed to fail vis-à-
vis Russia.  This European image of Circassian Beauty is significant not only to explore the 
power formations of 19th century imperialism between the West and the East but also to 
understand how multiple identities have been constructed as a result of these historical 
encounters.   
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6.2.2. Circassian Beauty as a Historical and Popular Image in Turkey 
 
 
 O. Patterson in his study on slavery lists eight means of enslavement: capture in 
warfare, kidnapping, tribute and tax payment, debt, punishment for crimes, abandonment 
and sale of children, self-enslavement and birth.91  According to Hakan Erdem, the last 
three means of enslavement were more dominant in terms of the acquisition of the 
Circassian slaves during the Ottoman Empire.92  A combination of different factors 
contributed to the Circassian enslavement; the existence of a hereditary slave caste among 
the Circassians: loss of control by the chiefs/slave-owners; poverty; the desire of parents to 
secure a better life for their children and themselves; and willingness on the part of the 
slaves themselves to live better lives.93  As social conditions and cultural attitudes produced 
a clear hierarchy among Ottoman slaves which was expressed in price, employment and 
social standing, at the top were Circassian and Georgian slaves.94  Circassians were 
traditionally regarded as the most-preferred slaves by the ruling elite.95  A preference for 
white women prevailed among male members of the Ottoman imperial elite in the 19th 
century and even before which led the agents for the imperial harem and agents of leading 
households to recruit young women among the Circassian and Georgian populations of the 
Caucasus96 and later of the Ottoman Empire after the mass deportation of Circassians into 
Ottoman territories.  Towards the end of 19th century the recruitment declined as a result of 
Ottoman policies and yet it did not vanish.   
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 Starting from the 19th century, Circassian Beauty had been a character of not only 
Ottoman elite households but also of literature.  Sergüzeşt by Sami Paşazade Sezai tells the 
miserable story of a Circassian girl who was deported from the Caucasus and worked in 
elite households as a female servant.97  Nezihe Muhittin, in 1929 in Benliğim benimdir 
similarly tells the story of Zeynep, another Circassian girl who has been sold by her 
parents.98 
 Although the practice of Circassian slavery and involuntary marriage decreased in 
theory since the end of 19th century and in practice since the second half 20th century, the 
idea of Circassian Beauty is still alive.  As the notion of Circassian Beauty is currently 
emancipated from its history of slavery and forced marriage, the image of Circassian 
Beauty is historically related to the practice of slavery and this relationship with slavery 
and forced marriage is the ghostly part of the image of Circassian Beauty.  For instance, for 
Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, Turkish politician and intellectual, the status of Circassians in 
Turkey and the construct of Circassian Beauty are inseparable: 
 
   “Turkey received Caucasian immigrants well.  …In their new homelands, 
these protected their presence by conserving their tribal organizations with their 
languages and own traditions.  Furthermore, they established a domination on 
the local people which is almost based on force.  The fact that Circassians who 
were a graceful and beautiful race gave the palace and elite household’s of 
Istanbul girls, ladies or even Sultanas provided their relationships with the 
palace and Istanbul.  It provided them with some benefits.”99 
 
 Any investigation on Imperial Harem as an historical institution of the Ottoman 
Empire contributes to the revival of the relationship.  This is why Circassian community in 
Turkey and particularly in Đstanbul is regarded as a source of information by the producers 
of the movie Harem Suare by Ferzan Özpetek.100  Furthermore, the memoirs of the last 
Circassian concubines in the Ottoman palace and similar works on the women of the 
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Imperial Harem also revives the idea that Ottoman harem were composed of Circassian 
women who were sold to the Palace.   
 Apart from these historical connotations, Circassian woman has been the theme of 
several poems and songs.  As there are some Turkish classical songs on Circassian Beauty, 
the image appeared other musical genres.  For instance in year 2001, a Turkish pop-rock 
singer had a song titled Circassian girl with lyrics such as  
 
   “In my unfinished songs,  
You were missing like a whole 
You, the Circassian girl of the far aways 
You aged my consolations.”101 
 
 In 2005, Ahmed Ahmedov, a singer from Azerbaijan produced an album called 
Circassian Beauty with a song with the same title:  
 
   “It is as if you came from a fairy tale,  
It is as if you are a goddess. 
Where does this beauty, charm come from? 
It is as if you are not from this world. 
 
Dance Circassian Beauty. Take me to my dreams. 
Take me to my country.”102 
 
 Meanwhile, starting from the mid 1990s, many Turkish models declared that they 
had Circassian origins.  In that context, being a Circassian is equated with being beautiful 
and charming.  Ayşe Güneş-Ayata, in her research on Circassian women living in the 
shanty areas of Ankara states that Circassian women are known for being beautiful, 
respectful, obedient and good housewives with talents in houseworks and hence, being a 
Circassian becomes an asset, a symbol of status and an advantage for women in urban 
areas.
103
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 In 1999, Songul Aktürk, known as Sultana and also known as the first woman 
MC104 in Turkish Rap Music produced an album called Circassian Girl.  Within the album 
of Sultana who has also Circassian origins, the song Kuşu Kalkmaz [Your Bird Can’t Fly] 
was the first rap song that was prohibited by RTÜK.  The song is basically about a man 
who cheats on her wife, batters her and leads a night life etc.:   
 
   “I am kick it 
For my girl while 
You ask how 
Cause people in the world are living so faul 
I manifest a tune about this eye 
“Kuşu kalkmaz” means 
Your bird can’t fly 
While your wife and kids are locked up at home 
And you are at the strip club headed 
For the zone 
Brizzle and ice sucked up all your stones 
By the time you get back home 
Your baby done grown 
Cause you were stuck at the spot line a fool to rasclat 
Trying to get at what the new girl got not conscios of the 
family 
Not acting like a father 
When you’ve seen her in the light, 
Man that’s your daughter”105 
 
I argue that it is ironic that this banned song is being sung by a Circassian woman using the 
name of Sultana just like Türkan Şoray.  It is an instance how products of popular culture 
can be mechanisms of resistance:106 through Sultana, Circassian Beauty who is constantly 
defined by the Orientalist gaze and contemporary popular culture artifacts gains a voice.  
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On such a ground, Kuşu Kalkmaz and Sultana is one of the infrequent instances within 
which the common discourse on Circassian Beauty is challenged, transformed and 
reversed.   
 
 
 
6.2.3. Circassian Beauty on the Agenda of Diaspora Nationalists 
 
 
 The times when Circassian Beauty was celebrated and commodified in Europe and 
Ottoman Empire pertains to the times when the Caucasus had been the target of an 
expanding Tsarist Russia.  Hence, from the start, the image of Circassian Beauty is 
interrelated to the project of nation-building and hence, it has always been on the nationalist 
agenda in diaspora with the idea that the fall of the nation pertained to the fall of its women 
from the beginning.   
 As the trade in Circassian slaves had been reduced considerably by the end of the 
19th century as a result of Ottoman policies, the demand by the harems of imperial family 
and the households of the well-to-do elites remained.107  It was in 1908 with the Second 
Constitutional Period that the emancipation of Circassian women in the imperial harem was 
put on the political agenda.  Committee of Union and Progress hand in hand with 
Circassian Committee of Union and Progress urged the Sultan “to rescue the hundreds of 
Circassian girls who were in the palace and to send them away to their villages.”108  Hakan 
Erdem states that the emancipation of the Circassian women in the palace was a result of 
the CUP’s desire to win the goodwill of the Circassians, some of whom loathed the 
employment of their kin as slaves.109  Aksoy and Özgürel underline the significance of 
Circassian attempts in terms of the emancipation of Circassian women in the imperial 
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harem: for Aksoy, it is Circassian Committee of Union and Progress who demanded help 
from Çerkez Deli Fuat Pasha110 whereas for Özgürel it is the Circassian youth that visited 
Pasha and demanded his intercession for the emancipation of women in the Palace which 
they regarded as a matter of honour since all Circassian women were treated as odalisque 
because of Circassian existence in the Palace.111  As the exact chronology and actors of the 
events are not well known, it is obvious that Circassians on individual basis or in terms of 
organizations were part of the process.  After the deposition of the Sultan Abdulhamid in 
1909, the dispersal of the Imperial Harem started: the CUP government sent telegrams to 
the Circassian settlements in Anatolia notifying the Circassians that their relatives were free 
and they could collect them.112  Towards the end of 1909, the Council of Ministers 
deliberated a report on the “prohibition of selling and buying of male and female Circassian 
and other [white] slaves.”113  Whether officially abolished by the 1908 revolution or only 
later, by the Turkish Republic, “Ottoman slavery died piecemeal, not abruptly, with the end 
of empire.”114  As there had been many attempts by the Western states in terms of 
abolishing white slavery, it is not a coincidence that Circassian slavery had been 
problematized after the establishment of the Circassian Committee of Union and Progress: 
the Committee saw it, not only as misery on the side of slaves, but also a national matter as 
far as Circassians were concerned.  What we saw at the end of 19th century vis-à-vis slavery 
is a reaction of first generation Circassian nationalists who did not separate the idea of 
being Ottoman from being Circassian.   
 In 1914, a member of the same generation, Mehmet Fetgeri Şoenü (1890-1931), a 
Circassian intellectual among the founders of BJK Sports Club wrote an article called 
“Circassian Women in Ottoman Social Life.”115  This article, he claimed, was written to 
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reply Celal Nuri who, as Fetgeri claimed, regarded Circassian women as one of the reasons 
of the decline of the Ottoman Empire.  Fetgeri, in his article, did not write the book or 
article of Celal Nuri which he was referring.  He just stated that “those severe sentences 
which hurt his feelings and national pride” could be seen “with short but bitter sentences in 
a work of Celal Nuri.”116  Celal Nuri (1882-1938), an Ottoman intellectual in favor of 
Westernization and a member of parliament in the new Turkish state for 26 years, wrote 
approximately 2400 articles on newspapers and periodicals and 50 books and most of these 
books are not translated into Turkish.  As Celal Nuri, in Kadınlarımız [Our Women] 
published in 1915, stated that “Caliphate can abolish the use of odalisques.  Because, first 
of all, it is beyond morality.  …In the Caucasus, Aziziye, Adapazarı there are “human stock 
farms” [insan haraları] as our friend Cenab Bey117 says.  These breed and sell odalisques.  
Fathers sell their daughters.  Beys, using the girls of their groups give them to others in 
exchange of money.”118  As the book Kadınlarımız cannot be the book that Fetgeri referred 
to, it is highly probable that he refers to Tarih-i Tedenniyat-ı Osmaniye Mukadderat-ı 
Tarihiye published in 1914 within which Celal Nuri discussed the reasons of the decline of 
the Ottoman Empire.  As the book is not translated to Turkish, in the book he grouped the 
reasons of Ottoman decline in eight headings: internal, compositional, administrative, 
economic, religious, intellectual, particular and internal reasons.  Among the particular 
reasons, he stated that the incapability of the family unit in society, the lack of women’s 
status in social life, the moral degeneration as a result of despotism, protocols and flattery 
affected the state negatively.119 It is probable that under the particular reasons Celal Nuri 
mentioned the existence of Circassian women in the Palace.   
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 Fetgeri elaborated on the current image of Circassian women in the Ottoman 
Empire:  “When you say Circassian, still the noble but fallen children of the past who are 
responsible for breeding girls to satisfy the demands and the lust of some people who 
appear as the girl merchants and many pleasure-seekers come to mind.”120  After 
mentioning the Hattian origins of Circassians with reference to the “Caucasian History” of 
Met Çınotıko Đzzet,121 another Circassian intellectual; Fetgeri argued that Circassian 
women had not been harmful for the Turks as Celal Nuri claimed.  Fetgeri explored the 
existence of Circassian women in Turkish society on the side of “the Turks:”  
 
   “How can Turks who marry and become relatives with the girls of a breed 
who are attached to their high and elite morality in such a loyal and high degree 
say “out of nobility and dignity came defeatism, I am damaged?”  How can 
such a statement be accepted?  …I wonder if the girls of this high nation have 
become only the tools of entertainment for the Turks.  …[I wonder if] They 
caused social disintegration of the Turks.  …Never…  It is probable that Turks 
took these girls as a tool of entertainment, but they fulfilled their educational 
duties –maybe unconsciously; thus they ensured the beautification of the 
spiritual purity and physical appearance of the Turks.  …Circassian girls did not 
harm the Turks in terms of civilization and development; on the opposite, they 
changed their nation towards beauty and maturity.  …[Even if that is not true], 
who is responsible for that?  For that, one should not look at Circassianhood, 
Circassian women but at Turkish social life and Turkishness.”122 
 
As Fetgeri reversed the power relationship between the slave and owner, the Circassian and 
the Turk, he also explored the contemporary situation and criticizes Circassians harshly for 
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the still ongoing practice of selling their girls and discusses the reasons of such an act.  
According to him, the act of selling the girls was being done to reverse the national 
humiliation that Circassians survived after the immigration to Ottoman Empire:  
 
   “Really today there are no slave markets, slave merchants like the older times.  
But still there are hidden sales..  Female trade that went on in private places 
before is now available in all saloons and meeting places.  This is a reason of 
grief for our nation.  …the fallen goddess of today, Circassian women who are 
an old part of womanhood and a big nation that is insulted every day as a result 
of the bad conditions within which they found themselves come to my 
imagination with all its humiliation.  …Where are those thinkers who state that 
Circassian girls are the tools of destruction for the Ottoman Empire?  
…Desperate for leaving their homeland, worried for not making their nobility 
recognized and spending their wealth, poor Circassians were encouraged in 
several ways.  …Especially there was an encouragement which was applied by 
the government of those times before and became apparent in these days; that, 
more than anything, effected the weakened souls of Circassians.  That was the 
silver threads, ornaments, swords which were worn to the fathers whose girls 
went to the palace of the sultan.  It was as if the honour of Circassians which 
was destructed in the Caucasus was being regained by these.  …I claim that this 
is a stain, shame. …Ottoman Turks are as responsible of this stain as 
Circassians.”123 
 
The shame that Fetgeri mentioned pertained to the nation as a totality.  It was not the 
misery of individuals but it was a national matter since it stained the national history and 
traditions.  On such a ground, the existence of Circassian girls in the Palace or the practice 
of selling/buying girls harmed not the Turks of the Empire but for Fetgeri it was the 
Circassian nation that was harmed by these practices: 
 
   “What is harmed because of this is not Turkishness but it is Circassianhood.  
Circassian girls who leave their home this way most of the time cannot return 
their homes, in the places that they go they most of the time marry a miserable 
man or spend their lives as odalisques or concubines.  …This is how 
Circassians waste their Circassianhood.  With each girl that is separated from 
them, from home Circassian social life does not lose one person but a chain of 
families reaching to the future.”124 
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 Hence, the problem of slavery and the practice of human sale, from the beginning, 
were seen as national issues as far as Circassian diaspora was concerned.  Fetgeri was not 
the last person to focus on the issue as a source of national humiliation. Whenever 
Circassian diaspora nationalism was on the rise, the image of Circassian Beauty was being 
explored and problematized.  In 1970s, when the second generation of diaspora nationalists 
was on the peak of activism, they explored the practices of forced marriage and the 
implications of Circassian Beauty in nationalist terms.  It was in December 1975 that 
Karden D., a Circassian woman writing in Yamçı stated that “The times when Circassian 
woman who has an elite status in the world with her beauty, respect, virtue will be 
emancipated from her appearance as a commodity and a product that is being sold with the 
maximum price and will enhance her rights and national rights are not far.”125  Kanuko 
Cemil’s poem published in the same magazine in February 1976 is an instance of much 
employed themes of forced marriage and human sale in the magazines of 1970s which were 
published by diaspora nationalists:  
 
   “Far away…  In the East 
Maybe in Ahlat, Otluyazı 
Circassian girl is in the arm of the foreigner 
Circassian girl, the mother of the future 
The father of her child should be Circassian 
In the spring of her life 
Circassian girl was 19 years old 
When she was sold shamefully 
The foreigner took the girl, he was sixty years old 
Another signature of dissolution  
It is sad but its reflection is true 
…The master is on the mirror of shame.”126   
 
Hence, the problem of slavery and involuntary marriage in exchange of money is not only a 
problem of human rights; it is rather a national problem since it is seen as a source of 
assimilation and the way Circassian community is mixed with “the foreigners” who are 
generally summarized as “the Turks” like Fetgeri uses the term almost 60 years ago.   
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 The current perspectives of Circassian diaspora nationalists have the remnants of 
Fetgeri’s argument but Circassian Beauty is a construct that has two facets for them: it is an 
image that makes them simultaneously proud and ashamed.  Included in the construct of 
Circassian Beauty as narrated by Circassians is the story of Circassian diaspora 
nationalism: Russian expansion, loss of the homeland, immigration, assimilation, 
encounters with the so-called “Turks,” intergroup marriages, assimilation and nationalist 
concerns on dissolution.   
 Circassian Beauty is a mechanism through which diaspora nationalism relates with 
the host community and other groups.  The image is celebrated as the difference from the 
other ethnic groups in Turkey as Đzzet explained: 
 
   “But despite all, Circassian girl as a spouse is different.  Whoever that is, the 
understanding of moral responsibility of the Circassian girl is still different 
today; despite the degeneration produced by urbanization, it is still different.  
Especially when we look at the society within which we live.  …The general 
structure of Circassian girl, her sense of responsibility in the family, her support 
of her husband, her ability in forming a family…  With these qualities, she is 
not similar to any of the ethnic groups, there are 25-26 ethnic groups in Turkey, 
she is different.”127 
 
 The difference of the Circassian women is measured not only in terms of traditional 
female roles but also on the basis of the project of modernization.  According to Yasemin, 
Circassian women were exactly what the founding fathers of the Turkish nation-state and 
other early modernizers of the Ottoman Empire constructed as “the modern woman”:   
 
   “It is very visible; even today when you go to the street and bring a thousand 
people, you will still notice that Circassian girl, at least physically.  Still you 
will notice her kindness.  Still we are not dead in the fullest sense.  [Daha tam 
anlamıyla ölmedik.]  …Atatürk, in order to better this society, organized 
republican balls, women had worn evening dresses.  A woman was uncovered, 
she put a rose here and opened her two legs like this; she sat just like this.  Well 
my sister, you ought to know how to sit, too; the work is not finished at the 
clothes.  [Kardeşim oturmasını da bileceksin, giyinmekle bitmiyor iş.]”128 
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 The difference of the Circassian woman is also employed by diaspora nationalists to 
explain the image of Circassian Beauty.  On such a ground, Circassian Beauty is a legend 
that is based on the Circassian social life and it is the encounter with “the Turks”, “the 
others” of diaspora nationalists that produced the image of the Circassian Beauty as Cezmi 
states:  
 
   “Given the physical appearance, structure of the Avshar woman and given her 
neglect of herself; suddenly there comes a character which is very slender in 
beautiful clothes.  Oh my god, she is like a fairy.  It starts from there.  Also 
when Circassian girls’ attitudes, their behaviors in accordance with xabze,129 
their dances were so opposite with the Anatolian woman or even the Thracian 
woman, all Ottoman aristocracy ran after the Circassians.”130   
 
 The argument on the difference of Circassian women also rests on the idea of 
necessity of in-group marriage as exemplified by Gürtuğ who states the qualities attributed 
to the Circassian woman: 
 
   “Politeness, grace, honesty, the necessity of having good attitudes, protecting 
the personality, the tradition of not making herself oppressed but I do not mean 
not making herself oppressed in a quarrelsome manner [cavcav bir şekilde 
kendini ezdirmemekten bahsetmiyorum.]  When raising their daughters, 
Circassian families -men do not tell that, of course- used to raise them by 
warning them to protect the honor of the family, not to make them ashamed, not 
to be quarrelsome.  A couple of days of ago I read somewhere, somebody took 
a foreign bride and they say that in 10 minutes they [foreign brides] say what 
our brides used to say in a year.”131   
 
 Through the arguments on the difference of Circassian woman, diaspora nationalists 
highlight their difference from the so-called Turks.  As the basic qualities attributed to the 
Circassian women and totalized under the rubric of Circassian Beauty are often beauty, 
grace, and well manners; several times highlighted in the interviews is the idea that 
Circassian women serve well to their husbands and families.  It is “the prototype of loyal 
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Circassian woman who serves.” [“hizmet eden sadık Çerkes kadın tiplemesi.”]132  Hicran, 
for instance explores the implications of such an image: “Well they are there with the 
notion of beauty.  I think that the basic quality is beauty and their loyalty, they show full 
respect, they serve well, they become good mothers and wives etc.  That is a good thing but 
there is a Circassian identity similar to servant, for sure that is not agreeable.”133   
 However, the image of Circassian Beauty is more than an ideal type of beauty and 
femininity but in the context of Circassians in Turkey, it is a construct through which 
Circassians situate themselves in the host community.  With the idea of Circassian Beauty, 
we can indeed explore diasporic relationships with the host community as mentioned in 
some of the interviews.  As Şener states, the idea of Circassian Beauty plays a significant 
role for the Circassians in Turkey: “I think that the appearance of Circassians as in good 
terms with the establishment and the state that we find in the popular culture is partly due to 
Circassian girls.  But when we think about it, it is not much of a pride according to me. 
[Çok da yüz ağartıcı bir şey değil bence.]”134    Furthermore, through the construct of 
Circassian Beauty, Circassian diaspora nationalists situate their nation in the Ottoman 
history.  On such a ground, they become part of the Ottoman history as actors as Taner 
speculates on the implications of such an existence and displays his ambivalence in terms 
of such an existence: 
 
   “But the Circassian domination in the Ottoman dynasty has been a source of 
pride for us.  …In the historical process, that is obvious, when we look at the 
contemporary reflections of history, it is obvious.  It is a dominant theme in the 
books.  Well, then it is being said: “You, Circassians [ulan siz Çerkesler yok 
musunuz], you were like that in the palace, you are in the MĐT (National 
Intelligence Organization), you are in the armed forces.”  It is a feeling that 
range between assault and envy, this is what the other side feels.  That makes 
me a little proud.  Though it makes me proud, when you say Circassian, if 
somebody says “Circassian girls are very beautiful”, then sorry but ….[he 
swears].  I say whether there is nothing else about Circassianhood that remains 
in his mind.  Then I get angry.  Well it is also our mistake.”135 
                                                  
132
 Gürsoy, interview by author, 23 July 2007, Đstanbul. 
 
133
 Hicran, interview by author, September 2007, Đstanbul. 
 
134
 Şener, interview by author, 18 June 2008, Đstanbul. 
 
135
 Taner, interview by author, 15 August 2007, Đstanbul. 
 
294 
  
 
 As the mistake that Taner mentioned concerned the inability of diaspora to explain 
itself, the construct of Circassian Beauty is generally narrated in terms of a national 
mistake, a national problem by the diaspora activists.  Especially those who are over 60 
years old and born in Anatolia explore the mistake and their own reactions of the time.  
Đzzet, for instance tells his experience of what Circassian Beauty means in the 1950s:  
 
   “Those were the mistakes of our elders of that time.  They really sold them.  
They really did not understand their value.  They gave their daughters to men 
who were at the age of their fathers.  I lived these.  It was because of the 
mentalities of the elders before 1965, it was because they did not see them as 
something.  …I survived them in the two daughters of my uncle.  …I also know 
that an older girl in Tokat was given to a man who was at her father’s age and 
she was consumed like a maid.”136   
 
Similarly, Turgay highlights that in 1960s there raised a reaction vis-à-vis these forms of 
marriages in exchange of money:  
 
   “Well, when we look at the Circassian women, they are raised in a self-
confident manner in the society, they become good mothers, good housewives 
and they have a protective side.  Well, in our childhood rich people, rich people 
of the towns used to compete with each other to take the most beautiful girls of 
the villages.  There had been many Circassian girls who had become brides in 
this way.  Why?  Because they know housework, raising children.  …we saw 
that there had been many struggles on that, that young people had tried to 
prevent them from giving the girl but finally we saw many of our girls marrying 
because of the material and better opportunities.”137   
 
Nezih further explains his experience of Circassian Beauty at the end of 1950s:    
 
   “Between 1950 and 1963, our Circassians survived a full drama of selling 
their daughters.  I personally know 12-13 girls in …[his neighborhood] who 
were sold in this manner.  I even have a very interesting memory on that.  7 or 8 
people, some religious people were gathered at our house and they were 
discussing the issue.  My uncle was a good imam there and he told that “who 
will marry whom is written on the receipt.  Saying that I gave [my daughter] to 
the Turk or else is against Islam.”  And the others there supported that.  …It 
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was 1958 or 1959.  I said whether I could ask a question, I was bringing tea to 
the table, I was waiting there, and they permitted me.  I asked whether God was 
a Turk; that was the question.  …I told them that there were at least 20 
Circassian girls in this village and no bride who was Turkish.  Secondly, I told 
that among these 20 Circassian girls there was not anyone who married a 
bachelor.  They were all second wives, kuma.  I told that among these 20 girls 
there was not anyone who was married legally.  All of them were religiously 
married.  The price was 3000 liras back then, it was the price of the girls.  They 
were all given in exchange of 3000 liras.  Fourthly, I told that among these 20-
25 girls, there was none who was not raped by the sons of her husband.  I asked 
them whether God was acting so partially.  [Allah bu kadar mı yanlı davranıyor 
dedim.]  This was my rebellion in 1958 or 59.  …There were so many examples 
of that. Someone told that he went [to his daughter’s house] and that his groom 
did not greet him.  Then he told his daughter that he was not greeted and asked 
whether there was a problem, the girl said “Father, it was not him that you sold 
me.  Now they are bringing my husband, I will show you him.”  His hands were 
tied, he did not have one of his legs, the other leg was half disabled and the girl 
said “Here is the man to whom you gave me.”  …The price was 3500 liras, the 
negotiator took the 500 liras, the owner of the girl took 3000, and the imam 
took 250 liras.  …This is a naked truth, and we survived that as a very 
degenerated and a very dirty reality.  This did not get erased easily.  This is why 
the Turks have stigmatized us that Circassians are selling their girls.  Well, it is 
true.”138   
 
 Starting from the mid 1960s, diaspora nationalists regarded the construct of 
Circassian Beauty as a national problem.  It was regarded as national humiliation vis-à-vis 
the Turks.  As involuntary marriages in exchange of money was not a particularly 
Circassian problem but a nationwide practice in Turkey; the ways Circassian girls were put 
on sale and the general demand for Circassian girls in Anatolia were regarded by the 
Circassian diaspora nationalists as a national problem which was the result of the fall of the 
nation.  Hence, second generation Circassian nationalism just like the first generation 
among whom Fetgeri was included resented the idea of involuntary forced marriages as a 
symbol for the fall and failure of the nation.  Therefore, whenever Circassian diaspora 
nationalism is on rise, the image of the Circassian Beauty is regarded as a national 
humiliation or it is revised as the difference from other ethnic groups.   
 The diaspora nationalist discourse on Circassian Beauty also reverses the image of 
Circassian Beauty as Köksal exemplifies: “Circassian girl is found in these novels as a 
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symbol of pride, nobility, beauty and elegance.  There had never been a negative image in 
the novels, literary products.  There is not a bit of that; there is nothing that symbolizes 
immorality, disgust, unchastity.  This is why it is a basic theme in the songs, folk songs and 
this is a privilege.”139  For the diaspora nationalists, the exotic and available Circassian 
Beauty turns into an asexual construction as Zekeriya, aged 88, as a Circassian elder 
unexpectedly mentions the lack of sexuality in the image of Circassian Beauty: “As a 
necessity of tradition, most of the Circassian women are educated in a way that leads to a 
high level of maturity.  Their clothes are beautiful but they do not provoke sex.”140  Thus, 
Circassian Beauty is a contested image through which the idea and the strength of the 
nation can be claimed, reclaimed and constructed.   
 
 
 
6.3. Gendering Diaspora Nationalism 
 
 
 
The primary question of this chapter is indeed rooted in my early childhood; the 
times when I used to accompany my father going to the conferences, congresses, and 
events that the Circassian community in Turkey organized. From those days, I remember 
that it was always Circassian men doing the political talk. Women – if there were any – 
used to sit in their respectful and dignified manners.  As an adult woman in the following 
years, I have watched Circassian women in their respectful and silent manners in several 
Circassian meetings within which there was no female voice. Ironically, Circassians have 
always been proud of the way they behaved towards women: “Circassians do not beat their 
wives,”141 “Circassian women are freer when compared to the other women in [Turkish] 
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society,” “They are the most respected group in Circassian society.” That contradiction of 
my community has produced the initial spark that motivated this work: How could a culture 
that is so proud of the high status of women in society and its respect for women can have 
so many silent women?  Starting from a personal curiosity, this part of the chapter aims to 
explore the diasporic constructions of femininity and to some extent masculinity among the 
Circassians in Turkey.  It aims to ask the questions of how diaspora nationalisms construct 
masculinities and femininities and what role these constructions play in creating a 
“common we”,
142
 a diasporic identity.  This study argues that diaspora nationalism is a 
gendered discourse on several levels.  It is these levels that the remaining part of this 
chapter aims to explore.   
 
 
 
6.3.1.  Roles and Missions 
 
 
 Discourse of diaspora nationalism is gendered to the extent that it has provided men 
and women of the diaspora with different constructions, missions and roles.  In the 
nationalist discourse of Circassians in Turkey women are designated as the members 
responsible for the reproduction of the ethnic community and protection of the ethnic 
boundaries of the community.143  On that ground it is a feminine responsibility to protect 
the cultural heritage of the community as Gürtuğ explains the failure of Circassian women 
in terms of this national responsibility: 
 
   “In every family, there were two or three swords and wedges.  What else 
would they bring?  They had armors.  In Uzunyayla, women had cut them and 
made [other things out of them.] What make a nation are their women.  If they 
are conscious, then human communities become nations.  …What transform 
human communities into nations are women with all their existence.  If they 
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gave the wealth of the nation to the salesmen [çerçi] for plastic bowls, if they 
threw those saddles to the trash…  and this is how it happened.”144   
 
 Femininity is the site where differences are supposed to be displayed and protected 
vis-à-vis the assumed threats of assimilation and ‘loss of the Circassian culture’.145  
Furthermore, it is the women’s duty to highlight men as Metin narrates on the role of 
Circassian women.  In such an account, women are the invisible actors in terms of 
supporting men and their tasks:   
 
   “You bear the name, we have the theme of Seteney Guashe.  This is the 
woman of wisdom but usually Circassian woman has wisdom, Seteney Guashe 
is just an example, it is a prototype.  …Well, we can say that there are so many 
examples of this wise woman now.  She knows that man should appear superior 
to her, this is why she always puts him forward.  By putting him forward, she 
remains behind.  Actually, in a way, it is women who inspire, direct, impose 
him and his actions.     But this is not so in appearance, it is how it is in the 
background.  So our society is matriarchal in the background, patriarchal in 
appearance.  There is a difference like that because in our society women do not 
compete with men.  Man is man, woman is woman; she thinks that if I make 
him superior, I will be superior.  But women have such qualities of wisdom that 
men cannot do anything without asking her, he always consults with her.”146   
 
 While women form the group responsible for the ethnic and cultural reproduction of 
the community, men are immune from this reproductive role or mission.  Furthermore, it is 
the men and their masculine affairs (such as war making, politics, diplomacy) hand in hand 
with militarism that claim to ‘earn’ the citizenship in the host country.147  Both 
constructions serve for the 'survival' of the diaspora.  Yet the service is gendered.  The 
discourse of Circassian diaspora nationalism is gendered to the extent that it has provided 
men and women of the diaspora with different constructions, missions and roles. 
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 Within the nationalist discourse of Circassians in Turkey, 'in-betweenness' is 
portrayed as a tenet of both the masculine and feminine identities.  Yet, while the 
'inbetweenness' of the Circassian man locates him as the actor in two geographies, the 
'inbetweenness' of the Circassian woman works to locate her as the protector and 
reproducer of the cultural and ethnic identity between two geographies.  Hence, not only 
diaspora nationalism but also its discourse on 'inbetweenness' has different and gendered 
implications for men and women of the diaspora.   
 
 
 
6.3.2. Connecting with and Differentiating from the Host Community  
 
 
 What makes diaspora nationalism different from other nationalisms is their ability 
to deal with dual territorialization and dual locations that encompass both the so-called 
homelands and host societies.148  When asked about difference, identity, the meanings and 
implications of being a Circassian, most of the interviewees highlighted the importance of 
gender in terms of Circassian identity.  What makes Circassians in Turkey different from 
other ethnic groups is narrated in terms of gender as Meral explains: 
 
   “I think that the relationships between women and men are very different for 
instance.  Still today, when compared to a Turkish family in Turkish society, 
there is a significant difference. Well, it starts from the way the child is raised, 
the ways s/he relates with the parents, her relationship with her social circle 
when she becomes a young woman.  In our associations, for instance; well it 
also gets degenerated with assimilation but when I look at my own youth, I can 
see that.  For instance, when a Circassian boy comes at your house and rings 
your bell, he can be trusted and bring the girl [of that house] to association, to 
events and after that he can deliver the girl to her house.  I think that this is very 
different from other groups.”149   
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 For most of the Circassian diaspora nationalists, gender relationships are what make 
Circassians different in Turkey.  Similarly, Hasan regards gender relations as one of the 
basic differences between the Circassians and other groups, especially “the Turks”:   
 
   “I think that the relationship between man and woman is different than the 
Turks.  At least the relationships that we have witnessed.  I realized that in high 
school.  I was a boarding student.  When you are boarding student in high 
school, you have so much information on their family lives, you live together.  
Your friend comes to you, he is sad, he went home, he tells you this and that 
happened.  In all of these I was shocked at how these could happen.  For 
instance, he tells you that his father swore.  Swear!  …I never heard my father 
swearing.  …I never witnessed a quarrel like that.”150   
 
 Circassian nationalists consider Circassian women ‘different’ from other women in 
Turkey: they are much better housewives; they are chaste, well-educated and respectful. 
Interestingly, the concept and the image of “Circassian girl” are also very well known in 
Turkey among non-Circassian groups.  Although Circassians complain about being known 
in the Turkish public for their girls and foods, they indeed agree that Circassian women are 
different in terms of chastity, beauty and manners. For the Circassian activists, the 
relationships between men and women, the status of women in the society are all factors 
that defined Circassians and their difference.  On such a level, Circassian society is 
considered a more modern and advanced social form when compared to the so-called 
Turks.  Köksal and Cavit, respectively employ the word advanced for the Circassians in 
Turkey: 
 
   “The status of women in Circassian society is far more advanced than other 
societies.  I look at other societies, if the divorce rate among Turks is 10 
percent, it is 1 percent among Circassians.  …Well, whether that is because of 
love or social pressure, it is very hard to have a statistic on that.”151 
 
   “Let’s say I went to a social gathering [düğün] with my sister.  …When we 
came to the place of gathering, we just got separated.  My sister would never be 
with me.  Why?  To let her talk to her male friends easily.  Can you think of 
such a mentality?  If you say that today in Turkish society, what would they 
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think?  So that my sister could talk to her male friends easily, that she could 
make alaf,152 talk about marriage etc.  This is not seen in Turkish society, it is 
rascality, isn’t it?  This is a situation which Turkish society can reach in 50 
years, not today.”153 
 
Yet, gender is significant for diaspora not only to differentiate itself from the host 
community but also relating to it.  In the historical accounts or life stories, gender becomes 
an important factor through which diaspora nationalists relate with the host and these 
relations are not always narrated as positive encounters.  For Rüstem, the Circassian riots in 
Marmara region during the War of Independence can be understood in terms of gender 
based tensions and alliances between multiple groups: 
 
   “If you look at it, months before a newspaper in Bolu wrote that “we will 
exile those rascal Circassians, we will make their wives concubines, we will 
make their daughters etc.”, it is written on paper.  …On the other hand, there is 
the Sultan, he is their Sultan since they gave 3-5 girls.  He publishes something 
stating that these people of the National Forces [Kuva-i Milliyeci’ler] are totally 
infidel.  So what are you going to say?  …What will the average Circassian 
peasant do?”154 
 
In the life history of Nezih, the early encounters with the Turkish state were gendered 
encounters between the Circassians and “the others.”  In Nezih’s narrative, the state’s 
oppression on the ethnic community coincides with a national humiliation as far as 
Circassians are concerned: 
 
   “I remember, the head of the district [kaymakam] and others used to come.  
The village girls were gathered with commend, they were made dance 
gatherings [düğün].  For once my father did not send my sister, they would 
almost whip my father.  Well, it happened.  They did not understand Circassian 
culture.  They made their girls courtesans and that thing of man and woman…  
This is new in Turkish folklore, otherwise in Turkish culture there was no such 
dancing within which men and women are together.  …Now they are owners of 
everything.  [Şimdi herşeyin sahibi kendileri mübarek.]”155 
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 In the nationalist discourse of Circassian diaspora in Turkey, while femininity is 
constructed vis-à-vis the threat of assimilation, hegemonic masculinity is highly militarized.  
Constructions of masculinity that are intertwined with militarism and military experience in 
the form of war-making are central to sustaining the links of diaspora nationalism with the 
host community and dominant nationalism.  Although Circassians have joined other wars 
before and after the War of Independence, one of the contemporary research areas in 
Circassian diaspora in Turkey is the role of Circassians in the War of Independence which 
is historically considered to be the constitutive war of the Turkish Republic.156  While 
differences are displayed and sustained through the constructions of femininity, claims to 
equality and citizenship rights are formulated through a particular masculine experience of 
war-making that is shared with the host community.  The links with the Republic of Turkey 
are discursively formed through shared experiences of militarism which are exclusively 
masculine. 
These nationalist constructions link the diasporic community to the host community 
or simultaneously differentiate it from the host. This analysis proposes that a particular 
gender discourse has been fundamental for Circassian diaspora nationalism in Turkey to 
define and to locate itself vis-à-vis the host community and other ethnic groups in Turkey. 
 
 
 
6.3.3. Connecting with and Differentiating from the Homeland 
 
 
 While differences from the host community are displayed through constructions, 
duties and missions that supposedly pertain to women, such nationalist constructions and 
expectations also link the diasporic community to an essence, to “home”.  Diasporic 
communities may as well relate to the homeland through the gender constructions.   
                                                  
156See for instance, U. Tavkul, “Milli Mücadele Dönemine Ait Önemli Bir Belge: Çerkes Milletinin Düvel-i 
Muazzama ve Alem-i Đnsaniyet ve Medeniyete Umumi Beyannamesi,” accessed August 2005, accessible at 
http://www.bkd.org.tr/tarih/umumi_beyanname.asp; M. Ünal, Kurtuluş Savaşında Çerkeslerin Rolü (Đstanbul: 
Cem Yayınevi, 1996). 
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 Yet such gendered connections with the homeland are prone to change and 
transformation.  In the case of Circassians, encounters with the homeland after the collapse 
of Soviet Union have produced silences in the diaspora as far as written documents at hand 
are concerned.  Homeland which has become accessible after 1990s was different than it 
was imagined by the diaspora nationalists.  It was regarded as different from the diaspora in 
terms of traditions, morals, and values.  Köksal narrates on such an encounter with the 
Circassians of the homeland which had been disappointing for him in 1990s:  
 
   “It was the years 1992 or 1993.  When the doors was opened, when there was 
so much moral degeneration, when there was the Natasha mentality, a hotel in 
Fındıkzade was making advertisements stating that Circassian girls were being 
marketed there.  This was the discourse, it underlined Circassianhood as a 
quality and stated that Circassian girls were beautiful and there were Circassian 
girls in that hotel.  We heard about the advertisement, we sent a group of 10 
young people to the hotel and they, including the owner of the hotel, were 
beaten the hell out of them.  But in our investigation there, it turned out that 
there were 1 or 2 workers with Circassian origins.  There were really 2 of them.  
We made them return to the Caucasus…   Then I thought and realized that what 
we made was ignorant, it was wrong.  Each society has its vices, thieves etc.  
Same things can come out of the Caucasian society.”157   
 
 Yet, the claimed differences between the homeland and diaspora in terms of values 
and 'the protection of the heritage' have been crucial in the reinforcement of gender 
constructions in the diaspora.  Diaspora nationalists have started to consider diaspora the 
“real” site of the community that has protected traditional values and culture much better 
than the homeland.  Köksal and Cahit narrate on the difference of the status of women in 
diaspora and homeland: 
 
   “I can tell that the status of woman in the Caucasus is lower than it is here 
because the misery and the hardship of 80 years of communism have brought 
people to that point.”158   
 
   “For instance, here we have developed a culture within which our woman 
does not work.  In the Caucasus, it is the exact opposite, socialist culture 
imposed that woman should work.  And the men used this as an advantage.”159   
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 Köksal, interview by author, 28 August 2007, Đstanbul. 
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159
 Cahit, interview by author, 23 May 2007, Đstanbul. 
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 Such a discursive move has implied additional and increased emphasis on the 
significance of women’s role in terms of preventing assimilation and protecting the 
boundaries of the ethnic and cultural group.  Since 1990s, in the discourse of diaspora 
nationalism, constructions of femininity differentiate Circassian diaspora in Turkey not 
only from the people of Turkey but also from the homeland.  Hicran, who went to the 
Caucasus for some time “on her own”, for instance, tells about the hardships of being a 
woman from diaspora in the homeland:   
 
   “Afterwards when I told that I would be living alone, people invited me to 
live at their houses and stated that it was unnecessary for me to rent a house.  
They were afraid that something might have happened and this would have 
been a very bad example.  For instance, some people might break into your 
house, does not that happen in Turkey too?  …Well, they told me that 
Abkhazian girls did not stay alone like that, I told them that I had been living 
alone in Turkey for the last 20 years and I could do the same thing there.  I told 
them that it would not be as dangerous as it was in Istanbul.  Single and 
Abkhazian girl.”160  
 
 While increasing relationships with the homeland have forfeited the gendered roles 
of women, 1990s also had been a time when the idea of return could be put into practice.  
Yet, most of the returnists were unsuccessful in terms of returning to the homeland not only 
because of economic reasons but also because their wives and families mostly did not 
follow them or refused to “stay there” after return.  For the Circassian diaspora nationalists, 
the idea of return which prioritizes the idea of homeland has been a masculine project 
starting from mid 1960s as Şener highlights the gendered dynamics of the notion of return 
and repatriation: 
 
   “But women are always more sensitive, picky, they care more about details.  
For them, the school of the children, their futures, the moral values of the 
society within which one settles are very important.  Return, until today, has 
been a system thought dominated by men.  What mattered in terms of return 
have been the ambitions of men, the discourses of men, the passions of men.  
Women’s sensitivities have never been on the agenda.”161   
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 Hicran, interview by author, September 2007, Đstanbul. 
 
161
 Şener, interview by author, 18 June 2008, Đstanbul. 
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Most stories of return included instances of unfitting wives who rejected the idea or the 
practice of return.  Hence, since 1990s, the masculine dynamics of the idea of return has 
become obvious.  This is why most of the male diaspora nationalists now envisage return 
on the individual basis, not on the familial basis.   
 Furthermore, starting from 1990s, Circassian masculinity has been redefined 
through participation into the wars of the homeland162 either as voluntary soldiers or as aid 
donators.  From a nationalist framework, such militaristic enterprises have been considered 
the fulfillment of diasporic duty to the homeland and hence, the affirmation of the survival 
of the diasporic identity.  While the claims to equality and equal rights in the host country 
are based on the shared military experience with the people of the Turkish Republic, 
modern diasporic discourse and diaspora nationalism are connected to the homeland 
through participation into the wars of the homeland.  Circassian diaspora nationalism in 
Turkey since 1990s has been linked to the once-imagined homeland through the shared 
experiences of militarism which are once again exclusively masculine affairs.  Since 1990s 
militarized nationalist constructions of masculinity connect the Circassian diaspora in 
Turkey not only to the Turkish Republic and Turkish historiography but also to the 
homeland. 
 
 
  
6.3.4. Gendered Projects of Diaspora Nationalism  
  
 
 For the Circassian diaspora nationalists, gender is also important for the projects of 
diaspora nationalism.  In terms of the survival of diaspora and its relationship with the 
homeland, gender becomes an item on the agenda.  For instance Gürsoy mentions the 
importance of reproduction for the Circassians and explains his very loose project on 
population:  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
162Since 1989 the Caucasus has witnessed five wars: Nagorno-Karabagh (Armenia - Azerbaijan) (1989-1995), 
South Ossetian - Georgian (1991-1992); Abkhazian - Georgian (1992-1993); North Ossetian - Ingush (1992); 
Chechen - Russian (1994 - 1996).   
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   “The problem of population.  …We had a project like that, to support 
marriages and births there.  …You have not been able to bring 1000 people 
from here to there.  If you make 1000 families have one additional child for 10 
or 15 years, if you give each of them 100 dollars per month and per child, if 
each of them has one child, then here are 1000 people.  Then if these people 
have 2 children…”163 
 
However, reproduction for the survival of the community is regarded as significant not only 
for the homeland but also for diaspora.  For most of the diaspora nationalists interviewed 
for this study, marriage is a national matter.  Hakan explains highlighting the importance 
marriage as a mission as far as Circassian intellectuals are concerned.  He regards marriage 
as a standing vis-à-vis the policies of the Turkish nation-state: 
 
   “As a result of these, s/he should be Circassian.  It is not only about me; a 
social campaign on that should be started.  Well, this is not based on protecting 
the race for sure.  Because I encountered that a lot at my Turkish friends’ talks.  
Those who have a Circassian friend in university or elsewhere regarded their 
friends’ desire to marry a Circassian as fanaticism or extreme nationalism.  Of 
course, this perception is normal given the general patterns of thought in 
Turkey.  …I insist on not regarding this as nationalism.  Indeed it can be 
considered a standing against nationalism.  …Because what is desired in 
Turkey is the mixing of ethnic groups into Turkish society.  This is why there 
were so many projects in the party programs of RPP in 1950s.  This is already 
something that is encouraged.  Well, it already goes that way unless the 
intellectuals or the society itself intervene which should be the case.”164   
 
In line with this statement, throughout 1960s and 1970s, the issue of marriage and spousal 
preference had always been on the agenda of diaspora nationalists.  Hasan remembers their 
reactions to marriages with non-Circassian people in 1970s: “In those times, there was a 
very strong idea in the neighborhood and in the association that s/he should be Circassian.  
This is why we used to not to go to his/her marriage when someone married a non-
Circassian.  We sulked with a very close friend of ours since he married like that.”165   
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 Gürsoy, interview by author, 23 July 2007, Đstanbul. 
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 Hakan, interview by author, 3 July 2007, Đstanbul. 
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 Parallel to these reactions, throughout 1960s and 70s, diaspora nationalists arranged 
their marriages accordingly.  The marriage proposal of Neval further highlights how 
marriage, family life and reproduction are regarded as part of a nationalist project: 
 
   “I would like to tell you what he told me before marriage.  It is not a very 
private thing indeed.  He told me “I am a person who carries the responsibility 
of my people.  I will work for the survival of my people in diaspora and 
homeland, I will work for them not to get vanished during all my life.  If you 
are able to be in a work like that and if you are able to bear such a life, if you 
are able to climb a hill with me, I can marry.  I see such a potential in you.” My 
answer was that I was as Circassian as he was and that I, too, could see the 
disappearance of the Circassian people under the circumstances that they were 
living.  I told him that I would be in the struggle with him to prevent the 
perishing of our people.  …After we married, we dedicated our lives to the 
survival of our people under these hard circumstances.  But meanwhile we tried 
to lead our family lives.  …We told that the more Circassian children there 
were, the better it would be.  We told that if we could give birth to Circassian 
people to substitute those people who were vanishing, if we could raise them as 
Circassians, if we could give that to them, if we could make them speak 
Circassian, that would be fine.  Indeed, that was a social responsibility for 
us.”166   
 
 As most of the diaspora nationalists underlined the significance of marriage as a 
national strategy to overcome and slow down assimilation, there are also alternative 
perspectives that also regard marriage as a national strategy. Köksal, based on real 
examples in Turkey and in Europe, sees marriage as creating hinterlands for Circassians: 
 
   “I would think that marrying a random stranger would produce degeneration 
in our culture, in our people who are already in small numbers.  But I would 
also encourage the marriage of a Circassian with a foreigner when that is 
necessary.  Because these marriages give people a lot.  Is it bad that George 
Hewitt’s wife in England is Abkhazian?167  It gives us something in England, it 
                                                  
166
 Neval, interview by author, 6 February 2008, Ankara. 
 
167
 George Hewitt is a professor of Caucasian languages at the School of Oriental and African Studies in 
London.  In addition to his work in Georgian, for his works on Abkhazia and Abkhazian culture, see for 
instance B. Hewitt, Abkhazian Folklore (with Grammatical Introduction, Translation, Notes, and Vocabulary) 
(Lincom, 2005); G. Hewitt, Abkhazian Folktales (with Grammatical Introduction, Translation, Notes, and 
Vocabulary) (München: Lincom, 2005); B. Hewitt, and Z. Khiba, “A Selection of the Abkhaz Corpus – 10 
Stories Translated from the Nart Epic,” in John Colarusso's Nart Sagas from the Caucasus, ed. J. Colarusso 
(USA: Princeton University Press, 2002), 321-379;  G. Hewitt, “North West Caucasian,” Lingua 115(1-2) 
(2005): 91-145; B. Hewitt, The Languages of the Caucasus: Scope for Study and Survival (SOAS, 1998). 
Furthermore, with the scholarly and political support he has given to Abkhazia, he is considered a part of the 
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gives us an opening, it gives a hinterland.  Is it bad that Bülent Arınç’s wife is 
Circassian?  Is it bad that Cemil Çiçek’s wife is Circassian?168  It enables us to 
move in every sphere.”169   
 
 Marriage –whether within the ethnic group or outside the group- is regarded as a 
national strategy for the diaspora.  To the extent that assimilation and protection of the 
ethnic identity is important for a nation, connecting with the host community and other 
communities is crucial for diaspora.  Marriage is on the agenda of Circassian nationalists as 
a diasporic strategy which can work in both ways and which can still advantage diaspora.   
 
 
 
6.3.5. Diasporic Patriarchy  
 
 
 Finally, I will deal with the implications of these constructions as far as Circassian 
diaspora nationalism is concerned.  The basic question is whether diaspora means 
emancipation and deconstruction of the so-called traditional roles and patriarchy or whether 
diasporic communities, especially when coupled with nationalism produce new 
patriarchies.   
 In December 1975, in Yamçı, Karden D. wrote that Circassian society had had its 
own century-old traditions in terms of its respect to women and women’s perspective had 
been significant in discussing and solving social problems.170  In year 2004, in a panel 
organized for the March 8th, Women’s Day in Caucasian Association in Ankara, the 
panelist Fahri Huvaj highlighted the respectable status of women in Circassian society and 
                                                                                                                                                        
Abkhazian struggle vis-à-vis Georgia.  He is one of the most respected scholars as far as Circassians are 
concerned.  He is married to an Abkhazian woman that he met in Tiflis, he has two children named Amra and 
Gunda, Abkhazian names.   Hence, it is no coincidence that an interview made with him and published on the 
website of a Circassian organization is titled as the “Abkhazian Traces in Yorkshire.” See F. Taştekin and Z. 
A. Besleney, “Yorkshire’daki Abhaz Đzi: George Hewitt’in Hikayesi ve Abhazya’nın Güncel Sorunları,” 
Ajans Kafkas, 9 May 2002, http://www.kafkas.org.tr/ajans/2002/temmuz/George_Hewitt1.htm (April 2009).   
 
168
 Bülent Arınç and Cemil Çiçek are the contemporary politicians who have worked as ministers at the 
governments of the Justice and Development Party. 
 
169
 Köksal, interview by author, 28 August 2007, Đstanbul. 
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 D. Karden, “Kadınlar Yılında,” Yamçı 
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stated that Circassian culture was based on a perspective that regarded women as sensitive, 
honorable, and active.171  In the preface of a law book titled “The Development of Woman 
Rights and Problems Since Creation,” the author, Hayri Domaniç, a law professor wrote 
that in Circassian community within which he was raised, he remembered that since 1925s 
there was a particular respect towards married or single women and that women were also 
very respectful towards men, especially elder men.172  According to his account, in 
Circassian society polygamy was infrequent and there was no separation based on gender 
[kaç göç].173  In May 2009, in a television program on Abkhazian culture, the head of 
KAFFED repeated the argument that within Circassian society, the respect towards women 
is very high and based on that, Circassian society could be considered almost a matriarchal 
society.174   
 Similar arguments on the special character of Circassian society in terms of 
women’s status have also been made by Circassian diaspora nationalists who are 
interviewed for this study.  For Đzzet, what differentiates Circassians is the unlimited 
freedom that they give to their women:   
 
   “Circassian society, in the villages, used to give their girls an unlimited 
freedom more than any society in the world.  It was like that when we were 
young; I believe that it is still so though there are less people who have stayed 
there.  And none of the girls misused that freedom given to them, they never 
acted irresponsibly thinking that her parents set her free.”175   
 
Gürtuğ further elaborates on the notion of freedom that is “given” to the women and its 
conditions:   
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 For the notice of the panel on the bulletin of Caucasian Association in Ankara, see “Dünya Kadınlar Günü 
Paneli,” Ğuaze 2 (April 2004), 15. 
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 E. H. Domaniç, Yaradılıştan Bu Yana Kadın Haklarının Gelişimi ve Sorunları; Kadın Haklarını Savunan 
ve Koruyan Anayasalar, Yasalar ve Milletlerarası Sözleşmelerden Örnekler ile; Kadın Hakları ve Sorunları 
Konusundan Basından Örnekler (Istanbul: Arıkan Basım Yayım, 2007), VI.   
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   “Circassian woman obliges people to respect her.  You meet such a creature 
that she does not provoke men, she does not insult, she does not raise her voice.  
She does not do this and that.  Wherever she goes, she comes out in the purest 
[tertemiz] way.  She does not need control, she is the foundation of the family, 
she builds the family, she is everything.”176   
 
Hence, the idea of female freedom is conditional on the constant protection of purity and 
chastity by the women themselves.  The Circassian woman who is celebrated by the 
diaspora nationalists as the free woman liberated by the community itself is indeed heavily 
responsible for earning that freedom.  Meral further explores the high status attributed to 
women among Circassians: “For instance there are not many people who beat their wives 
among us.  It is wrong to say there are none but it is really a few because that woman is not 
a woman on her own; she is the daughter of a family, this is why she is important.  Well, 
there is something between that family and the other family.”177  What Meral highlights is 
that women is secondary in such an account, it is the communitarian and familial ties that 
protect women.  Therefore the high status of women that is mentioned by the diaspora 
nationalists is valid for the women acting in accordance with these ties.   
 However, apart from the arguments on the high status of women in Circassian 
society, there are other accounts that may help us to understand the gendered sites of 
Circassian diaspora in Turkey.  For instance, Hasan remembers how he, as a child, did not 
know his mother’s name:  
 
   “For example, when I went to the primary school, on the first day of school 
the teacher was asking the name of our fathers and mothers.  That was the time 
when I realized that I did not know my mother’s name.  I was 6 years old; I 
realized that my mother should have a name, a Turkish name.  Of course, at 
home we never address her with her name.  My father did not address her with 
her name.  All our relatives used to call her as “Kup” if I remember correctly.  
Among Circassians, there are names like that.  It seems that we did not have 
much communication with the non-Circassians; we did not hear from there, too.  
…I remember that I came home that day and asked my mother’s name.  It is 
good that the teacher did not ask me that day, if s/he did, I would just be 
stunned.”178  
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 Gürtuğ, interview by author, 3 February 2008, Ankara.   
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As Hasan’s account has some reference to Circassian traditions, it is remarkable that he 
knew his father’s name.  Who was left invisible and anonymous ‘in accordance with the 
traditions’ was the mother/bride figure.  Hence, despite the claims of “high status” of 
women, this high status does not correspond to a visibility in social sphere as far as women 
are concerned.   
 Gürsoy explores and criticizes the claims of equality in terms of division of labor in 
the urban context: 
 
   “Well, in Circassian society women are oppressed with responsibilities.  
Well, equality etc….  I think that that equality works for the benefit of men.  
Now my wife works too.  …she goes home, she goes into the kitchen.  I have 
no such concern; I would rather sleep hungry rather than do that.  …Which 
Circassian man is doing the opposite of that, are there any?  I do not think so.  
…Is there anything like that in this culture?  No.  …This is exactly the 
prototype of Circassian in the society; it is someone who is under the command, 
who looks at her husband’s eye to serve.”179   
 
Furthermore, in the accounts of diaspora nationalists, silence is portrayed as an asset of 
Circassian woman.  Circassian woman is expected to be silent and respectful.  In a 
magazine published in 1978 by the Circassians, a research on Circassian wedding 
ceremonies was translated from a magazine published in the Caucasus in 1960s.  In the 
text, it is mentioned that in the traditional wedding ceremony a prayer was being done by a 
folk artist.  The words of the prayer [huaho] is:  
 
   “The bride of this family  
Shall be silent like the sheep 
Soft-spoken like the lamb 
Reproductive like the chicken 
As loyal as the purebred dog 
Famous like the purebred horse 
Pleasant voiced like a bird 
She shall twitter. 
She shall use the broom 
She shall not overrun the family decisions.   
She shall have lots of dresses,  
Courageous children.  
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 Gürsoy, interview by author, 23 July 2007, Đstanbul. 
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She shall not lose the ones that she gave birth to.   
What she sewed shall not become unstitched.”180 
 
As the prayer was translated from a magazine published in the Caucasus in 1968, the 
expectations from the Circassian women highlighted in the prayer were reproduced by the 
diaspora nationalists in Turkey through translation and publication.  These expectations on 
female silence are also observed in the narratives of the diaspora activists in Turkey.  
Nurhan for instance narrates on female silence and how it is being sustained socially: 
 
   “But when compared to a Turkish family, woman is valued, she is respected 
but in a way, she is oppressed through traditions.  Avshar women are much 
freer.  Circassian woman is terrified that it is going to be a shame.  If the 
husband of the Avshar woman swears, then she swears too.  This is not so for 
Circassians.  It is not only woman who does that but man also does that.  
…There was no such thing like beating woman among Circassians, I do not 
know how it is now but it almost did not exist.  But why should she be beaten if 
the poor woman is telling nothing?”181   
 
 I do not consider silence as an automatic expression of female oppression but rather 
as a contradiction with the Circassian discourse on the freedom of Circassian woman.  I 
                                                  
180
 T. Şıkh, “Adige Evlenme Töreni,” Yamçı 7-16 (May 1977- February 1978): 376-387, 384.  The Turkish 
translation of the prayer, as published in the magazine with the original text in cyrillic alphabet, is  
 
   “Bu ailenin gelini 
Koyun gibi sessiz 
Kuzu gibi tatlı sözlü 
Tavul gibi bol yavrulu 
Cins köpek kadar sadık 
Cins at gibi ünlü 
Kuş gibi tatlı sesli olsun 
Cıvıl cıvıl cıvıldasın 
Süpürgeyi sürüsün 
Ailenin kararlarını aşmasın. 
Elbisesi bol 
Çocukları yiğit olsun 
Doğurdukları yitmesin. 
Diktiği sökülmesin 
Fidan boylu, şık görünümlü 
Đpek dudaklı 
Gür, çatal saçlı 
Kuğu gibi ak boyunlu 
Otururken kumru 
Uzandığında aslan olsun…” 
 
181
 Nurhan, interview by author, 23 March 2007, Đstanbul. 
 
313 
  
argue that this discourse on freedom and voluntary female silence coupled with female 
invisibility in the public sphere itself works as the formations of diaspora nationalism of 
Circassians in Turkey.  Esat further explores the notion of female silence and also narrates 
on patriarchal means of emancipation, patriarchal bargains as Kandiyoti refers:182  
 
   “There is really a patriarchal model.  I witnessed that woman is less 
significant than she is even in the average Turkish families since it is [kaşer] 
shameful that woman speaks too much or intervenes.  Well, in this sense, a 
Kurdish woman may yell at something, she can get angry, she can tell a man 
something nearby her husband.  Though we don’t like to say it, this is a space 
of freedom when you think about it.  …For example, I had much age difference 
with my father.  …He used to tell me very old stories.  For example, the people 
he celebrated the most were women who quote en quote did not betray their 
families and did not marry and who drove back from everything and stood by 
their families.  This was the sublime woman for him.  Those days, maybe, he 
did not explain that with these words but that was what he told and celebrated.  
It was like the ideal and best woman.  That was seen as the best in that clan 
system.  This was so because women could gain their status only by rejecting 
their sexual identities but they could not have done that as a bride.”183   
 
 As forms of patriarchal bargains are available for women, most of the women 
diaspora activists interviewed for this study shared their experiences of being a Circassian 
woman in Turkey.  To the extent that they employed the concepts of respect, high status, 
freedom; they shared their gendered experiences of Circassian diasporic identity.  Yasemin 
for instance mentioned the limitations imposed on her as a Circassian woman: 
 
   “For instance, we have some limitations as a Circassian woman.  For example 
I never raised my hands and danced like that.  [meaning oriental dance]…Of 
course I wanted to do that when everybody was dancing.  …But this was how I 
happened to be.  I would like to do debaucheries, I would like to hold 
somebody’s hand or I would like to kiss someone.  We married without kissing 
once in our lives, think about it.  We did nothing, I feel pity for ourselves.  If 
you have not done it, you shall do it.  Do not leave it in the name of 
Circassianhood.”184   
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For Nurhan, gender responsibilities, roles and expectations are getting heavier in diaspora 
with the impact and pressure of “others”:  
 
   “This pressure is the social pressure, it is the pressure of a more backward 
society.  Today in villages, they begin to not dance wuig.185  Circassians used to 
have not many marriages.  This place has been a heaven for men.  Polygamy, 
oppression of women, headscarf…  Neglecting women, music, art…”186   
 
Hicran similarly explores the experience of being a Circassian woman: 
 
   “Though we say that women are very valued etc., I think that women are very 
much oppressed in Circassian society.  Well, I have not been personally 
oppressed but you are being oppressed with your identity as a woman.  For 
example, in our region, women do not have the right to inheritance.  Okey, it is 
not a very rich region, it becomes a problem when land is divided etc. but when 
you claim inheritance, you become awful, you become like a thief, shameless.  
…When you look at other groups that are living around, our women are more 
social, they can enter into each kind of society, they are not close but there are 
so many responsibilities; when you do not obey them, you can immediately be 
ignored.  …I am individually very independent but as a Circassian woman I do 
not consider myself independent, because I am not.”187   
 
Hicran further explores her experience of being a Circassian woman in Turkey: 
 
   “…But they did not gossip about me.  It is also about personality.  That 
mission…  You look like a Circassian girl, you cannot be very comfortable.  
You cannot hold your boy friend’s hand and bring him to the neighborhood 
because you have an image and you cannot spoil it.  This was how I was raised 
so you lose in some sense but this is how it is.”188   
 
Neval, with her own experience highlights how the discourse on “the value of woman” may 
turn into limitations of her movement: 
 
   “I have never seen a Circassian woman working in the fields.  …Well, when 
their women worked very hard, our women used to be protected carefully, they 
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would not be worked in heavy tasks, and they worked in particular places.  …I 
won a university in Istanbul.  When I was sent to Istanbul, they asked “how can 
you send your daughter, Furthermore, a Circassian girl to a big city?”  
Presumably, Circassian girls needed to be protected more.”189  
 
 I argue that the frequently employed arguments of Circassian diaspora nationalists 
in Turkey on the freedom of Circassian woman is part of a myth which is formed vis-à-vis 
other ethnic communities in Turkey.  I further argue that it is through this freedom myth 
that Circassian society differentiates itself from the host community and other ethnic 
groups in Turkey.     
 In terms of findings, my research on gendered dimensions of Circassian diaspora 
nationalism is, in some respects, parallel to the three works that aim to analyze the notion 
of gender in Circassian society.  Ayşe Güneş-Ayata, in her research done in the shanty 
towns of Ankara states that for the Circassian women, their ethnic identity works as an 
asset and based on this women act as the willing reproducers and protectors of the status-
quo and the traditional patriarchy.190  Seteney Shami in her analysis of feminine identity 
and ethnic identity among the Circassians in Jordan states that gender is the contested 
domain through which ethnic majority and minority differentiation is maintained.191  Shami 
further argues that patriarchy is maintained through a constant reference to “the other”, the 
Arabs in the Jordanian context, which “serves to control female behavior without directly 
confronting elements central to Circassian culture including the relative freedom of 
mobility for married women and the lack of sexual segregation.192  Gönül Ertem, in her 
analysis of the relationship between Circassian women and feminism in Turkey that is 
based on her research done in Eskişehir, states that gender relations which are claimed to be 
“already modern”, “non-segregated” with the elevated position and freedom of Circassian 
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women by the Circassians provides a firm discursive ground for the Circassians “to subvert 
relations of power embedded in ethnically diverse but ideologically homogenous national 
contexts such as Turkey.”193 
 I argue that patriarchy in the Circassian society which coexists with the myths of the 
high status and freedom of women is constantly being reproduced in the diasporic context 
and I further argue that diaspora nationalism has a significant role in the reproduction of 
patriarchy and the formation of modern patriarchal dynamics.   
 This study proposes that when analyzed from a gender perspective, though they are 
quite similar, diaspora nationalism is different than nationalism in general.  Diasporic 
groups are subjected to two sets of gender relations, those of the dominant society and 
those internal to the group.194  Furthermore, there is also the homeland dimension which is 
not necessarily in harmony with the diasporic communities in terms of gender relations.  
Hence, the sources, the rivals, the loyalties and the 'threats' that diaspora nationalisms 
interact with are multiple.  This study proposes that diaspora nationalism is far more 
complicated than state nationalisms in terms of their relationships with gender.  Women in 
the diasporic communities are “subject-ed by a double articulation of discourses of cultural 
difference and patriarchy”195 which takes place among the relationships of the diaspora 
with the homeland, host community and transnational network.  Though literature on 
diaspora and gender emphasize the possibilities of limited emancipation and though 
diaspora nationalism has no state power, I argue that diaspora nationalism, however 
fragmented or chaotic it is, locates itself in a constant 'state of emergency' and hence, has 
the ability to constantly renew and recreate patriarchy in its modern forms.  Furthermore, 
diasporic patriarchy is one of the crucial formations of diaspora nationalism through which 
diasporic identity, history and boundaries are maintained and recreated.  Constructions of 
femininity and masculinity that are supported by diasporic patriarchy work for the 
formation and maintenance of diaspora nationalism.   
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6.4. Conclusion 
 
 
 
The constructions of femininity that are embraced by Circassian nationalists have 
been a significant part of the fragile stance that the Circassian community in Turkey has 
pursued vis-à-vis and through “the Others” which may be European Orientalists, “the 
Turks”, other ethnic groups or even the homeland.  Moreover, these constructions – which 
are subject to change and reconstruction – have worked to cope with the international 
developments regarding the post-Soviet conjuncture, which has implied new 
understandings of the notions of homeland, identity and diasporic experience for the 
Circassian community in Turkey. To that extent, the image of the Circassian woman 
symbolizes the limits and the boundaries of the Circassian community; and hence, the 
ethnic identity.  Therefore, particular gender constructions have worked as formations of 
diaspora nationalism which locates itself not only vis-à-vis / through host community but 
also within the politics of the so-called homeland.  Within diaspora nationalism, the 
discourse on the 'inbetweenness' of diasporas, connections with the homeland and host 
community, and diasporic condition are formed, recreated and reinvented through gender 
constructions.  Diasporas which are celebrated as the emblems and global carriers of 
hybridity and transnationalism may also create and recreate less visible forms of patriarchy 
through nationalism.  Exploring such gendered dimensions of diaspora nationalism allows 
us to rethink not only diasporas but also nationalism, ethnicity and globalization, within 
which diasporas are embedded.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
 This dissertation aims to explore and understand formations of diaspora nationalism 
through the case study of Circassians in Turkey; a relatively underresearched ethnic group 
who came to Ottoman lands as a result of immigration which Circassian activists in Turkey 
today calls “Great Exodus” that took place after Crimean War (1853-1856) at the peak of 
Russian expansionist policy.   
 Based on semi-structured in-depth interviews conducted with Circassian diaspora 
activists and intellectuals who were selected from the decision-making groups (from 
associations, foundations, platforms and youth committees) in Ankara and Istanbul, this 
dissertation explores the processes and structures of diaspora nationalism.  Regarding 
interview as a site of the production and construction of knowledge, the interviewees as co-
producers of knowledge and the interview responses as actively constructed ‘narratives’ 
rather than direct access to ‘experience’; the interviews conducted for this research aim to 
understand how diasporic subjectivities in terms of  experiences, life histories, conflicts, 
and discontents; and the relationships with the state apparatus, homeland and current 
debates in Turkey are constructed by the Circassian activists and intellectuals.  During the 
fieldwork for this dissertation which aims to explore these questions, my position as an 
insider who was studying her own community had some advantages and disadvantages.  
Despite some complications in terms of negotiations during the interviews, such an insider 
position, I believe, created an additional space for this research and provided me with 
almost unlimited access, trust and details in the field. 
 Employing the notion of diaspora first, as a choice which is manifested as a voice at 
the political level; second, as composed of multiple actors who participate in several 
networks of relationships with the homeland, host community, international community; 
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and third, as the crossroads where nationalism, ethnicity and globalization meet and cross 
each other; this dissertation takes diaspora as a heuristic device through which the dynamic 
terrains of nationalism, ethnicity and globalization can be explored.  In that exploration, 
diaspora nationalism is regarded as a channel through which diasporic communities 
enhance claims of identity, politics; and relate to homelands and host communities and 
nation-states.   
 To explore the formations of Circassian diaspora nationalism, there are four 
interrelated axes upon which this dissertation is based.  Each of these axes is significant in 
the formation and as the formations of Circassian diaspora nationalism in Turkey.   
 The first axis takes diaspora nationalism as a historical phenomenon with its ebbs 
and flows, and diasporic subjects as actors that are capable of negotiating, acting, reacting, 
resisting and narrating within the constantly changing limits set by the politics of 
homeland, host community and international relations.  On that level, Circassian 
nationalists are regarded as actors who interact with and articulate multiple discourses on 
nation, nationalism, diaspora and Turkish nationalism.  Within this multiplicity of 
discourses and interactions, Circassian diaspora nationalism is not a homogenous block but 
composed of multiple lines of thought and different historical forms.   
 Furthermore, the various ways diaspora nationalisms deal with nationalisms are 
complicated.  Concerning the hegemonic nationalism, encounters between hegemonic 
nationalism and diaspora shape the way diaspora narrates about itself, locates and 
transforms its identity.  Through state policies in education, armed service, justice etc. and 
a rising Turkish nationalism which is based on multiple and simultaneous tides of 
assimilation and exclusion, Circassian diasporic identity is constantly constructed and 
positioned vis-à-vis and through Turkish nationalism.  Most of the Circassians interviewed 
for this study have highlighted the multiplicity of the discourses of Turkish nationalism on 
Circassians while they also regard the inclusion of Circassians into Turkish nationalist 
groups as conditional.  Hence, despite the existence of a group of Circassians among the 
Turkish nationalist movement, the positions between friend and foe, support and opposition 
are easy to travel for Circassians in the discourse of Turkish nationalism.  In such instances 
of travel, Turkish nationalism regards Circassians as a potential threat which should be 
observed and kept under constant surveillance as a result of which some Circassian activists 
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criticize Turkish nationalism on the basis that it is oppressive, assimilating and unrespectful 
to differences. Moreover, the relationships with Turkish nationalism are not just based on 
rejection or criticism but also acknowledgement of the successful implementation of the 
Turkish nationalist project.  Through these discourses, diaspora nationalism simultaneously 
rejects, imitates, flirts, cooperates and challenges hegemonic nationalism.  Thus, the 
relationship between diaspora nationalism and hegemonic nationalism is far from being an 
exact opposition but rather includes strategies and maneuvers that are open to rapid change 
and transformation.   
 Maneuvering and strategizing within multiple nationalisms, Circassian activists 
demand and claim the public sphere; reverse official historiography by their attempts to 
overcome the stigmatizing identification of Çerkes Ethem and appropriate new roles for 
themselves within the official historiography through the claims of extensive participation 
into the wars of the Republic and Ottoman Empire; claim historical roots in Anatolia to 
locate themselves beyond the narratives of rootlessness, inbetweenness, inability to belong, 
diasporic loneliness; employ the discourse of military nation which defines Circassian 
history with reference to wars; and highlight the necessity to create a national discourse and 
employ the nationalist symbols and rituals.  This dissertation argues that diaspora 
nationalisms, within these maneuvers, are embedded in a basic dilemma which owes its 
existence to the uneasy alliance of diaspora and nationalism: that is the dilemma of 
simultaneously challenging and criticizing the national order of things on one level and 
reclaiming diasporic and still national identities on the other.    
 Studying Circassian diaspora nationalism not as a phenomenon that takes place in 
isolation but through profound and continuous interactions on multiple levels, this 
dissertation’s second axis regards the relationships of the diaspora with the host 
community, host state and the hegemonic nationalism of the host community.  On this 
level, this dissertation studies an ethnic group in Turkey whose relations with the Turkish 
state and society are more complicated than the oversimplified dualities such as oppressor 
versus oppressed, assimilator versus assimilator etc.  This dissertation highlights that the 
common the idea that Circassians is an advantaged group in Turkey in terms of their 
relations with the Turkish state is quite misleading as far as Circassian activists are 
concerned.  The other common idea that Circassians are pro-state or embedded in Turkish 
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state is also oversimplified.  Circassian relationships with the Turkish state are far from 
being homogenous, and they range between neglect, inclusion, exclusion, trust, gratitude 
and harmony.  The myth of MĐT and the critiques of Circassian activists on education are 
instances of these dynamic and multifaceted relationships with the Turkish state. 
 While Circassian activists defined Circassian diaspora in Turkey as politically and 
organizationally incompetent, restless, inbetween, fearful, grateful, trustworthy and loyal;  I 
argue that these characteristics that they have attributed to Circassian diaspora in Turkey 
are also reflections of their experiences in Turkey as a non-Turkish Muslim ethnic group.  
They feel incompetence in terms of politics and organizations, solitude and inbetweenness, 
fear and loyalty, simultaneously.  In terms of their image in Turkey and “others’” 
perceptions, the trilogy of Circassian Ethem, Circassian Girls/Beauty and Circassian 
chicken is a usual reference point in the narratives of Circassian activists.   
 I argue that such a wide range of relationships with the Turkish state and society on 
the side of Circassians in Turkey and in their narratives is a diasporic feature within which 
Circassian activists in Turkey employ an undecidable position.  Such a position constantly 
shifts between the migrant, the citizen, the founders and constitutive elements of the nation-
state, lonely and rootless strangers, and historical guests who may be called as undesired 
elements at any moment while their narratives on the relationships with the state vary 
between neglect, assimilation, hostility, harmony, tension, and alliance.  I argue that this 
undecidability in terms of defining the community and relating with the host state and host 
community is one of the basic formations of Circassian diaspora in Turkey.   
 Furthermore, this dissertation argues that this undecidability has its origins in the 
undecidability of Turkish nationalism in its various forms and currents since the end of 19th 
century.  The inclusion of non-Turkish Muslim groups in the nation building project has 
been highly conditional and ambiguous.  As an almost total rejection of non-Muslims can 
be observed, non-Turkish groups have not been exempt from the means of othering and 
exclusion but very close to be called as “the Others”.  Indeed, what differentiates “the 
others” from “us” has not been religion per se but rather loyalty attributed to the particular 
group as Yeğen underlines.1  Hence, inclusion of the Circassians into nation-building 
project and Turkish nationalism had been ambiguous, conditional and fragile. Yet, the 
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 M. Yeğen, “Citizenship and Ethnicity in Turkey,” Middle Eastern Studies 40(6)(2004): 51-66, 66. 
322 
  
conditions of inclusion have become more blurred with the formation of a nation-state and 
the emergence of multiple strands of Turkish nationalism.   
 The third axis that this dissertation studies as formations of diaspora nationalism 
considers homeland, the Caucasus in the Circassians’ case and it defines “homeland” as a 
dynamic construction that attains meaning not only through the political developments but 
also through memories, discourses and narratives of individuals on “home”, and 
“homeland.”  Exploring these narratives on “home” and “homeland” and situating them in 
national and international politics, I argue that Circassian diaspora nationalists constantly 
reconstruct the idea of homeland.  Especially the 1990s, the end of Soviet Union and Cold 
War, globalization processes, liberalization in Turkey, Turkey’s relationships with  
European Union and the rise of various nationalisms in Turkey have all contributed to the 
transformation of Circassian activists and Circassians in Turkey.  This transformation of 
Circassian diaspora in the 1990s meant new encounters and relations with the homeland 
while it also changed the relations with the host community, state and other ethnic groups 
in Turkey.  For the Circassian diaspora in Turkey, these encounters with the people, politics 
and problems of the homeland had been multidimensional.  Experiencing commonality and 
difference; enthusiasm and disappointment simultaneously; Circassians, in the 1990s 
became part of a real diasporic homeland with which real and systematic relations should 
be established.   The concerns, politics and geography of the “homeland” had also become 
accessible for the Circassian diaspora while these encounters with the homeland coupled 
with the political events in the Caucasus and Turkey led to the formation of new fault lines 
for the Circassian diaspora in Turkey.   
 Furthermore Circassian activists, since the 1990s, have been redefining their 
relationships with the Turkish state.  I argue that since the 1990s, Circassians in Turkey 
have been trying to develop new relationships with the Turkish state based on multicultural 
citizenship policies and search for new relations with the Turkish state through the 
redefinition of the notion of citizenship.  In line with these developments, Circassian 
community’s boundaries of knowledge, constructions of its past and future have also been 
continuously transformed.  For the Circassian diaspora in Turkey, the post-1990s also has 
meant the formation of new “others” as a result of new dynamics of Turkish politics.  As 
Turkey has been in a position to deal with the rise of Kurdish nationalism and the 
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problematization of the Armenian deportation in 1915; Circassian diaspora, as an ethnic 
group in Turkey, also has been in a position to situate itself vis-à-vis these questions and 
claims.   
 In terms of their visions of future, while the Caucasus is part of the future that 
Circassian diaspora nationalists imagine, politics of Turkey and particularly 
democratization in Turkey are also regarded as very significant.  As a diasporic community, 
they regard themselves as located in two geographies and two countries more when 
compared to the 1970s and before.  Hence -literally- all of the activists demand dual 
citizenship to fully situate themselves as a diasporic community.  Their ideas on future are 
focused on dual citizenship, dual identities, multiple concerns and multiple locations.   
 However, the processes of diasporization of the 1990s have also brought new 
problems and tensions.  When compared to the steady, timid, limited and predictable years 
of Cold War; Circassian diaspora activists have been dealing with a new diasporic chaos in 
terms of their group dynamics and their relationships with the homeland, host state, and 
other groups for the last two decades.   
 The fourth axis that this dissertation studies concerns the gendered dimensions of 
diaspora in general and diaspora nationalism in particular.  This dissertation argues that 
web of relations with the host community, homeland and other nationalisms, especially the 
hegemonic nationalism in the host society which constantly shapes diaspora nationalisms 
are made available to diaspora nationalisms not only by political and technological 
developments but also by a particular gender regime.   
 On this level, this dissertation studies the well-known construct of Circassian 
Beauty, a historical image of idealized feminine aesthetics that has been attributed to the 
women of the Caucasus for centuries as a heuristic tool to explore the gendered 
relationships between the Circassian diaspora in Turkey, host community and other 
geographies.  It explores the concept of Circassian Beauty on three interrelated levels: first 
as an Orientalist theme and figure in European literature, art and knowledge production; 
second as a historical figure that also finds its place in Turkish popular culture and third as 
an item on the agenda of Circassian diaspora nationalists.  As Orientalism, scientific 
racism, commodification, and the interest in geography as an imperial knowledge 
production mechanism all contributed to the idea of Circassian Beauty in European 
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imagination; in the Turkish context, it is a construct through which Circassians situate 
themselves in the host community.  I argue that the image of Circassian Beauty is a 
contested image through which Circassians in Turkey, as an ethnic group in Turkey, relate 
to the peoples of Anatolia and other geographies and vice versa.  It is a historical category 
which is crucial for diaspora to locate itself vis-à-vis and through the homeland, host 
community and other geographies such as Europe.   
 Furthermore the gendered dimensions of diaspora and diaspora nationalism go 
beyond the single image of Circassian Beauty.  Discourse of diaspora nationalism is 
gendered to the extent that it has provided men and women of the diaspora with different 
constructions, missions and roles.  Particular constructions of masculinity and femininity 
have worked as formations of diaspora nationalism which locates itself not only vis-à-vis / 
through host community but also within the politics of the so-called homeland.  In addition, 
these constructions – which are subject to constant change and reconstruction – have 
worked to cope with the international developments regarding the post-Soviet conjuncture, 
which has implied new understandings of the notions of homeland, identity and diasporic 
experience for the Circassian community in Turkey.  Furthermore for the Circassian 
diaspora nationalists, gender proves to be significant for the projects of diaspora 
nationalism.  In terms of the survival of diaspora and its relationship with the homeland, 
gender becomes an item on the agenda.   
 Within diaspora nationalism, the discourse on the 'inbetweenness' of diasporas, 
connections with the homeland and host community, and diasporic condition are formed, 
recreated and reinvented through gender constructions.  As a result of a gendered reading of 
Circassian diaspora and diaspora nationalism in Turkey, I argue that diasporas which are 
celebrated as the emblems and global carriers of hybridity and transnationalism may also 
create and recreate less visible forms of patriarchy through nationalism which this 
dissertation calls diasporic patriarchy.  Exploring such gendered dimensions of diaspora 
nationalism allows us to rethink not only diasporas but also nationalism, ethnicity and 
globalization, within which diasporas are embedded.  
 By exploring these four axes of diaspora nationalism through the case of 
Circassians in Turkey, this dissertation contributes to diaspora literature.  Most of the 
diaspora studies explain their focus on diaspora in terms of the tensions between the nation-
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states and the diasporic communities.  Yet, diasporas are living communities and political 
groups.  From such a perspective, diasporas should be analyzed not just as a particular kind 
of politics that locates itself vis-à-vis the nation-states but also as political bodies that are 
formed through the interplays of several discourses, such as nationalism, ethnicity, gender, 
citizenship and militarism.  Thus, understanding and exploring the particular discourses and 
strategies that make such a politics possible and ‘meaningful’ is crucial.  Studying diaspora 
as an actor with its own voice, politics and visions, this dissertation contributes to diaspora 
theory by transforming diaspora from a “vis-à-vis the nation state” position to the 
crossroads where multiple discourses on gender, nationalism, ethnicity and globalization 
form the diasporic sites. 
 Moreover, it locates diaspora not only in global and hybrid settings which are 
defined through mobility and displacement beyond national boundaries but also in 
nationalisms of multiple groups including nationalism of the group, hegemonic nationalism 
and other nationalisms.  From such a perspective, diasporas are not only globally mobile 
actors who, by their very existence and politics, deconstruct nation-states’ claimed 
monopolies over the construction of national identities but they are also nationalist actors 
dealing with nationalism on several grounds and levels.  Hence, this study contributes to 
diaspora literature by situating diaspora in nationalisms of various kinds.  I argue that 
diasporic consciousness, identities, histories and politics can only be understood in such a 
dynamism, multiplicity and complexity.   
 To that extent, this dissertation also contributes to our understanding of 
nationalisms without nation-states by exploring the question of how the nation is imagined 
in the absence of a nation-state but in the presence of a claimed and imagined homeland.  
Analyses of the ways in which diasporas are imagined through nationalist frameworks is 
crucial for social science to understand the notion of diaspora and diaspora politics in 
particular and nationalism in general.   
 This dissertation also contributes to literature on ethnic groups in Turkey.  
Circassian community is one of the least studied ethnic groups in Turkey despite the 
existence of common beliefs on Circassians which pertain to their roles in Turkish and 
Ottoman history, their relationships with the state and their characteristics.  Social science 
in Turkey mostly studies other ethnic groups whose nationalisms are more visible; whose 
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problems, claims and relations with the state are shaped by explicit opposition.  However, 
to understand the sites and meanings of ethnicity in Turkey and the relationships between 
ethnic groups and nation-state, one should think about not only Kurds or Lausanne 
minorities but also Circassians in Turkey.  I argue that a better understanding of ethnicity 
and nationalism in Turkey should include analyses of the other ethnic groups whose 
histories and experiences may not be shaped by explicit oppression, assimilation or conflict 
but by a more subtle set of relationships, tensions, flirts with official historiography and 
Turkish nationalism.  This dissertation studies these sites of ethnicity in Turkey within their 
historical and political complexities, and to that extent, it expands the scope of the studies 
on ethnic groups in Turkey.   
 Furthermore, this dissertation contributes to Turkish politics on other grounds.  To 
the extent that it explores the narratives on identity, memory and politics of Circassians in 
Turkey, it simultaneously discusses their interactions with Turkish identity, Turkish 
nationalism and nation-state’s policies.  Therefore it aims to contribute to the literature on 
Turkish nationalism, state and its relationships with minorities, not only legal minorities 
who are recognized by the Treaty of Lausanne but especially cultural minorities, Muslim 
non-Turkish groups.  From such a point of view, mechanisms and discourses of inclusion 
and exclusion which functioned simultaneously as far as non-Turkish groups are concerned 
are significant to understand not only Turkish identity as constructed and imagined by 
Turkish nationalism but also the ways multiple ethnic identities in Turkey are constructed.  
Exploring the mechanisms, strategies and discourses of Turkish nationalism on non-
Turkish Muslims will further our understanding of Turkish nationalism by understanding it 
as a multilayered ideology rather than an ideological homogenous block.  On that level, this 
dissertation sheds light into the formations of not only Circassian diasporic identity but also 
Turkish identity both of which are constructed in close and complicated relations with each 
other.  In addition, an analysis of Circassian diaspora nationalism in Turkey will contribute 
to our understanding of how ethnic groups in Turkey locate themselves vis-à-vis and 
through Turkish nationalism and historiography as a political discourse that creates ethnic 
hegemony through legitimizing a particular historical approach.   
 Finally, this dissertation is a contribution to gender studies.  As most studies of 
diasporic communities ignore gender as a category of analysis, this dissertation rereads 
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diaspora and interrogates diasporic identity, politics and history through gender lenses.   In 
terms of gender studies in Turkey, it aims to go beyond women's studies in Turkey which, 
since 1990s, have re-read nationalism, Kemalism and modernism from a gender perspective 
and questioned the Kemalist project of modernity and nation-building as a profoundly 
gendered project that has created a new form of patriarchy.  However, I argue that there are 
other nationalisms which construct the discourses and experiences of manhood and 
womanhood in Turkey.  This dissertation studies one of those ‘other' nationalisms that 
coexist with, that are related to but different from Turkish nationalism.  Such a perspective 
does not only deconstruct and re-read the ‘other’ nationalisms from gender lenses but it will 
also give gender studies in Turkey a more complicated historical diversity.   
 With these contributions, this dissertation on the formations of Circassian diaspora 
nationalism in Turkey aims to be a part of the “discovery of multiple selves”2 as far as 
studies on gender, diaspora, nationalism and Turkish nationalism are concerned.    
 
                                                  
 
2
 S. M. Okin and J. Mansbridge, ‘Introduction,’ in Feminism (Vol.1), eds. S. M. Okin and J. Mansbridge 
(Cambridge: University Press, 1994), ix-xvii, xii. 
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APPENDIX I 
 
Interview and Interviewee Details 
 
 
Name 
Date of 
Interview 
Place of 
Interview 
Duration 
of 
Interview 
(Hours) 
Date 
of 
Birth 
Profession 
Tribal 
Association 
Place 
of 
Birth 
Zekeriya 
28 
February,  
2007 
Office, 
Istanbul 
1:10:55 1921 Lawyer Kabardian Kayseri 
Nurhan 
23 March, 
2007 
Home, 
Đstanbul 
App. 2:30 1935 Lawyer Kabardian Kayseri 
Nesibe 
18 May,  
2007 
Association, 
Istanbul 
2:33:52 1950 
Manager in a  
Circassian 
organization 
Abzakh Đstanbul 
Cahit 
23 May, 
2007 
Cafe 4:06:32 1959 Engineer Abkhaz Akçakoca 
Meral 
7 June, 
2007 
Office, 
Istanbul 
2:23:47 1957 Businesswoman Kabardian Đstanbul 
Kaya 
7 June,  
2007 
Office, 
Istanbul 
3:02:02 1959 Businessman Abkhaz Adapazarı 
Mert 
12 June,  
2007 
Office, 
Istanbul 
3:05:05 1960 Architect Kabardian Kayseri 
Hakan 
3 July,  
2007 
Cafe, 
Istanbul 
3:03:19 1962 
Language 
Instructor 
Kabardian Eskişehir 
Gürsoy 
23 July,  
2007 
Office, 
Istanbul 
2:36:06 1961 Lawyer Chechen Çanakkale 
Esat 
10 August,  
2007 
Office, 
Istanbul 
2:38:04 1970 Lawyer Abkhaz Bilecik 
Taner 
15 August,  
2007 
Restaurant, 
Istanbul 
1:44:57 1956 Journalist Shapsug Samsun 
Yasemin 16 August,  Office, 3:07:55 1949 Retired state Abkhaz Bilecik 
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2007 Istanbul official 
Nezih 
17-18 
August,  
2007 
Office, 
Istanbul 
5:35:01 1941 Lawyer Kabardian Maraş 
Kenan 
20 August,  
2007 
Cafe, 
Istanbul 
3:25 1959 Engineer Chemguy Düzce 
Timuçin 
25 August,  
2007 
Home, 
Çanakkale 3:05 1946 Engineer Kabardian Kayseri 
Köksal 
28 August,  
2007 
Association, 
Istanbul 
3:55 1954 Teacher Shapsug Đzmit 
Hicran 
September,  
2007 
Home, 
Istanbul 
2:35 1965 Finance expert Abkhaz Sivas 
Hasan 
October, 
2007 
During the 
flight 
2:27 1960 Academician Shapsug Ankara 
Özer 
January, 
2008 
Cafe, Istnbul 1:34 1975 Businessman Beslenei Đstanbul 
Gürtuğ 
3 February,  
2008 
Association, 
Ankara 
4:13 1946 
Engineer, 
craftsman 
Beslenei Düzce 
Turgay 
4 February,  
2008 
Office, 
Ankara 
2:15 1948 Engineer Shapsug Amasya 
Metin 
5 February,  
2008 
Office, 
Ankara 
2:10 1946 Lawyer Abzakh Antalya 
Neval 
6 February, 
2008 
Office, 
Ankara 
2:01 1950 
Retired state 
official 
Kabardian Sivas, 
Cezmi 
7 February, 
2008 
Association, 
Ankara 
4:13 1943 Lawyer Abkhaz Kayseri 
Rüstem 
8 February,  
2008 
Association, 
Ankara 
4:04 1943 Retired lawyer Ubykh Samsun 
Okan 
9 February, 
2008 
Association, 
Ankara 
2:24 1944 
Retired state 
official 
Kabardian Adana 
Đzzet 
10 
February,  
2008 
Home, 
Ankara 
2:27 1946 
Retired state 
official 
Abkhaz Kayseri, 
Şener 
18 June, 
2008 
Association, 
Istanbul 
3:04 1963 Businessman Kabardian Istanbul 
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APPENDIX II 
 
Magazines Published by Circassian Activists in Turkey1 
 
 
 
 
NAME DATE ASSOCIATI
ON 
THEMES & AIMS OWNERS & AUTHORS2 
Kafkasya 
Dergisi 
January 
1953- 
December 
1953 
Caucasian 
Cultural 
Association 
of Istanbul 
Geography of Caucasia, 
immigration of 
Caucasians, Caucasian 
surnames, trade history 
of Caucasia 
Şeref Terim, Dr. Vasfi Güsar, 
Ahmet Canbek, Habjoka, Seyın 
Time, Mehmet Ketey, A. 
Meker, Đsmail Ziya Bersis, Đnal 
Şahaplı 
Kafkas 
Mecmuası 
April 
1954-May 
1956 
Caucasian 
Cultural 
Association 
of Istanbul 
Russian Imperialism,  
liberation of the 
homeland, Caucasian 
history and culture 
Şeref Terim, Turhan Yavuz 
Marşan, Mehmet Ketey, 
Alaattin Kutlu, Đnal Şahaplı 
Yeni 
Kafkasya 
Dergisi 
1957-
1962 
 History and social 
structure  of Caucasia, 
integration to the host 
state and society 
Vasfi Güsar, Mehmet Ketey, 
Seyin Time, Dr. Hilmi Tuğuş, 
Uğur Dipşov, M. Zahide Güsar, 
Ahmet Bedevi Atalay, Refık 
Hızel, Aytek Namitok 
Kafkasya 1964-
1977 
Published in 
Ankara 
Caucasian culture and 
folklore, history and 
geography of Caucasia, 
observations  from trips 
to Caucasia  
Vasfi Güsar, Đsmet Kalgay, 
Alhas Fiderok, Kadir Natho, B. 
Batırhan, Seteney, Mahmut 
Kusko, Yıldız Okay Tılfij, 
Ömer Beygua, Hapi C. Afeşij 
Emin, Dr. M. Ali Pçıhaluk 
                                                  
1
 This list of magazines published by the Circassian activists in Turkey is a selection.  It excludes those 
magazines published in the Ottoman Era, in multiple localities such as Samsun, Kayseri, Düzce etc.  
Therefore it is a selective list that aims to give a general idea on the characteristics of these magazines.   
 
2
 Some of the names of the authors and owners of these magazines are semi-pseudo names.  They are pseudo 
because they are not the legal names of those people.  However, they include the Circassian family names 
which were appropriated by the authors and owners in the magazines.   
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NAME DATE ASSOCIATI
ON 
THEMES & AIMS OWNERS & AUTHORS2 
Birleşik 
Kafkasya 
Dergisi 
1964-
1967 
 The need to publicize 
the Caucasian national 
will, Caucasian 
traditions, folklore and 
history  
Yılmaz Nevruz, Mustafa 
Beştoy, Barasbi Baytugan, 
Ahmet Janbek Habjoka, M. 
Zihni Hızal, Alhas Fidarok, 
Rezzan Dinçer Zübeyde Şhaplı, 
Kadircan Kaflı, Osman Çelik 
Kamçı 
Gazetesi 
1970s  Political solutions to the 
problems of  
Circassians,  self-
determination for 
Circassians, return 
Ali Ekrem, Yaşar Kemal 
Aksoy, Bahri Özen (owners) 
Yamçı 1975-
1978 
 The aim to be a society 
that determines its fate 
in its homeland, 
observations from trips 
to Caucasia, alphabets 
of Caucasian languages, 
sample texts in  
Caucasian  
Fahri Huvaj, Nart Savsur, 
Hatam N., Yısmeyl Ö., Kardan 
D., Dzıbe N., Nihat Bidanul, 
Cureyko A., Yenemıko M., 
Yabgeko A., Hatko Huşan, 
Kheseyko, Açmız Nihat, 
Aşamba Mümtaz 
Nartların 
Sesi 
1978-
1980 
North 
Caucasian 
People’s 
Culture 
Association 
of Ankara 
Caucasian history, 
developing relations 
with the homeland, the 
ideal of self-
determination in 
homeland  
Fahri Huvaj, Nihat Berzeg 
(owners) 
Kafdağı 1987 North 
Caucasian 
Culture 
Association 
Protecting and 
improving the 
Circassian culture 
Aslan Arı, Nahit Erus, Mansur 
Ulutaşlı, Süleyman Yançatoral, 
Özdemir Özbay, Fahri Huvaj 
Marje 1991 Lina 
Organization 
Presenting the 
Circassian culture in 
national and global 
spheres, news from the 
homeland and other 
Circassian 
communities, solution 
of the problems in 
democratic ways 
Sönmez Baykan, Mustafa Aziz 
Özbek, Cihan Đşbaşı (owners) 
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NAME DATE ASSOCIATI
ON 
THEMES & AIMS OWNERS & AUTHORS2 
Nart  1997-... Caucasian 
Association 
News about the 
Circassian 
organizations in 
Turkey, protection of 
cultural values in the 
process of assimilation 
Muhittin Ünal, Özdemir Özbay, 
Erol Taymaz, .... 
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APPENDIX III 
 
Selected e-Mail Discussion Groups of the Circassians in Turkey  
 
 
 
• MARJE, 2443 members, established on September 1999, 30314 messages.1 
 
Description: “The “MARJE” is an interactive communication platform 
which provides a free environment for those whose consciousness of 
being North Caucasian is developed, who are sensible for the events 
taking place in that part of the world and who do not have the 
opportunity to share their ideas because of geographical and physical 
distance.” 
 
(“MARJE, Kuzey Kafkasyalilik bilinci gelismis ve bu konuda cesitli 
duyarliliklari olan fakat cografya, ideoloji ve yas gibi sebeplerle ayni 
ortamda bulunma sansi olmayan insanlarimizin bilgilerini aktarip, fikir 
alisverisinde bulunduklari interaktif bir iletisim platformudur.”)  
  
• cerkes sohbeti, 428 members, established on April 2000, 3042 messages. 
 
Description: “The “cerkes sohbeti” aims at affording an efficient share 
of ideas, feelings and views about any subject among Circassians.”  
 
(“Guzel, faydali ve seviyeli paylasimlara vesile olmasi dilegiyle, tum 
cerkesler davetlidir...”) 
 
 
• cerkesplatformu, 146 members, established on August 2002, 3770 messages. 
 
Description: “The “Cerkesplatformu” is a discussion group that aims at 
establishing a communication platform among Circassian intellectuals 
who are residing in distant countries and willing to exchange ideas and 
discuss their projects.”   
 
(“Türkiye'de ve Dünyanın çeşitli ülkelerinde yaşayan Çerkes 
aydınlarının birbiriyle haberleşme görüş alışverişinde bulunma ve 
                                                  
1
 The numbers of mails and members, dates of establishment and group descriptions of these e-mail 
discussion groups are taken from groups’ web sites on May 10, 2009, in Yahoo Groups accessible at 
http://www.yahoogroups.com.  The groups are listed in terms of their dates of establishment.   
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projelerini paylaşmalarına aracı olmayı amaçlayan bir iletişim 
grubudur.”) 
 
 
• cerkesler, 701 members, established on January 2003, 1653 messages.  
 
Description: “The mailgroup “Cerkesler” is established in order to 
enhance communication among circassians, provide a discussion 
platform where problems of common interest are addressed with 
solidarity. Our mailgroup is expecting from each and every circassian 
to take all endeavors for protecting our identity and culture.”  
 
(“Çerkesler arası iletişimi güçlendirmek, bilgi alışverişinde bulunmak, 
sorunlarımızı tespit edip çözüm aramak, birlikteliği sağlayarak 
dayanışma içerisinde olmak için kurulan çerkesler mail grubu 
kültürümüzü ve benliğimizi korumak adına herkesin elden geldiğince 
çaba sarf etmesini beklemektedir.”) 
 
    
• Nart Kultur, 183 members, established on January 2004, 2481 messages.  
 
Description: “The “Nart Kultur” is a group that aims at developing 
concrete projects in order to promote and perpetuate Caucasian culture 
while enhancing communication among its members.”  
 
(“Nart Kultur mail grubu Kafkas Kulturunun yasatilmasi, tanitilmasi 
ve korunmasi anlaminda somut projeler gelistirmek ve uyeleri 
arasindaki iletisimi guclendirmek amaciyla kurulmus bir gruptur.”) 
 
 
• Adige, 136 members, established on February 2004, 492 messages. 
 
Description: “The “Adige” is a mail group that is open for all of the 
ideas, point of views and evaluations about North Caucasia.”  
 
(“Kuzey Kafkasya ile ilgili her türlü görüş, bilgi ve fikir alış verişinin 
sağlanabileceği bu gruba bütün soydaşlarımızı bekliyoruz.”) 
 
 
• Zekoşnığ (‘brotherhood’ in English), 93 members, established on June 2004, 695 
messages. 
 
Description: “The Zekoşnığ is a communication platform that aims at 
providing a free debate environment for the news about the autochthon 
nation of Caucasia, the Circasssians and on their political and social 
problems.”   
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(“Zekoşnığ; Kuzey Kafkasya otoktonu Çerkes Halklarının ulusal, 
toplumsal ve siyasal sorunlarıyla ilgili haber, bilgi ve düşünce 
alışverişi sağlamak amacıyla kurulmuş bir iletişim platformudur.”)  
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